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HISTORY 



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OF TH£ 



HARTFORD CONVENTION 



WITH A 



REVIEW OF THE POLICY 



OF THE 



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 



WHICH LED TO THE 



WAIL OF 1812. 



BY THEODORE DWIGHT, 

SECRETARY OF THE CONTENTION. 



V' -^''^'^5. 






Published by N. & J. White, 

NEW-YORK ; 

And Russell, Odiorne, & Co. 

BOSTON. 

D. Fanshaw, P "inter. 



1833. 

ID. 



£351 



-O'O 



Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year one thousand eight 
hundred and thirty-lhrefe, by Theodore Dwight, in the Clerk's Office of 
the Southern District of New- York. 



HISTORY 



OP THE 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 



No political subject that has ever occupied the atten- 
tion, or excited the feelings of the great body of the peo- 
ple of these United States, has ever been the theme of 
more gross misrepresentation, or more constant reproach, 
than the assembly of delegates from several of the New- 
England states, which met at Hartford, in the state of 
Connecticut, in December, 1ftl4, commonly called the 
" Hartford Convention." It has been reviled by multi- 
tudes of persons who were totally unacquainted with its 
objects, and its proceedings, and by not a few who proba- 
bly were ignorant even of the geographical position of the 
place where the convention was held. And it was suffi- 
cient for those who were somewhat better informed, but 
equally regardless of truth and justice, that it afforded an 
opportunity to kindle the resentments of party against 
men whose talents they feared, whose respectability they 
could not but acknowledge, whose integrity they dare not 
impeach, and the purity of whose principles they had not 
the courage even to question. A great proportion of those 
who, at the present time, think themselves well employed 
in railing at the Hartford Convention, were school-boys at 
the time of its session, and, of course, incapable of forming 
opinions entitled to the least respect in regard to the objects 
which it had in view, or of the manner in which its duties 



4 HISTORY OF THE 

were performed. In the meantime, men of more age, 
and greater opportunities for acquiring knowledge, have 
stood calmly by, and have coolly heard the general false- 
hoods and slanders that have been uttered against the 
convention, giving them at least their countenance, if not 
their direct and positive support. 

In these, and in various other ways, the Hartford Con- 
vention, from the time of its coming together to the present 
hour, has been the general topic of reproach and calumny, 
as well as of the most unfounded and unprincipled mis- 
representation and falsehood. 

In the meantime, very little has been done, or even 
attempted, by any person, to stem the general torrent of 
reproach by which that assembly have been assailed. Con- 
scious of their own integrity, and the purity of their mo- 
tives and objects, the members, with a single exception, 
have remained silent and tranquil, amidst the long series 
of efforts to provoke them to engage in a vindication of 
their characters and conduct. One able and influential 
member of the convention, a number of years since, pub- 
lished a clear and satisfactory account of its objects and 
its proceedings. But it was deemed sufficient for those 
who did not believe the accusations which had been so 
lavishly preferred against that body, and who, of course, 
had no intention of engaging seriously in a discussion of 
the general subject, to reply, that the author of the vindi- 
cation was one of the accused, and on trial upon the charge 
of sedition, at least, if not meditated treason, against the 
United States, and therefore not entitled to credit. 

This mode of replying to an unanswerable vindication 
of the convention, as might have been expected, satisfied 
the feelings of interested and devoted partizans ; of course, 
that publication had no tendency to check the utterance 
or the circulation of party virulence, or vulgar detraction. 
Revilings of the convention have been continued in com- 
mon conversation, in newspapers, in Fourth of July ora- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. $ 

tions, in festive toasts, and bacchanalian revelries and 
songs. And finally, when driven from every other topic 
on which to support false principles by unfounded argu- 
mentation, grave senators and representatives of the Uni- 
ted States, have introduced the threadbare subject of the 
Hartford Convention into debate, in the legislative halls 
of the nation, when engaged in discussing the weighty 
concerns of this extensive republic, and united with those 
of inferior standing and character, in villifying the Hart- 
ford Convention. 

Occurrences of this kind, with others of a more serious 
and portentous description, seemed to indicate, in a clear 
and convincing manner, that the time had arrived when 
the public at large should be better informed on the sub- 
ject of this convention. The objects for the accomplish- 
ment of which it had originally been convened, and the 
able and most satisfactory exhibition of their labors con- 
tained in their report, which was published by them to the 
world at the moment of their adjournment, have long 
been lost sight of, and forgotten. With this is connected 
the extraordinary circumstance, that besides the members 
themselves, no individual, except a single executive officer 
of the body, had any means of knowing what passed 
during their session. That officer was the only disinter- 
ested witness of what was transacted by the convention. 
He was present throughout every sitting, witnessed every 
debate, heard every speech, was acquainted with every 
motion and every proposition, and carefully noted the 
result of every vote on every question. He, therefore, of 
necessity was, ever has been, and still is, the only person, 
except the members, who had the opportunity to know, 
from personal observation, every thing that occurred. His 
testimony, therefore, must be admitted and received, unless 
he can be discredited, his testimony invalidated, or its force 
entirely destroyed. 

Previously to entering upon the immediate history of 



6 HISTORY OF THE 

the convention, it will be necessary to review the policy 
and measures of the national government, which eventu- 
ally led to the war between this country and Great Bri- 
tain ; as it was that war which induced the New-England 
states to call the convention. 

After the formation of the Constitution of the United 
States by the Convention of 1787, and before its adoption 
by the several states, the country became divided into two 
political parties — the friends and the enemies of that 
constitution. The former, being in favour of the establish- 
ment of a federal government, according to the plan de- 
lineated in the constitution, naturally took the name of 
Federalists. Those who were opposed to the constitution, 
and the form of government which it contained, as natu- 
rally took the name of Anti-federalists. Under these titles, 
when the constitution had been adopted, and was about to 
commence its operations, these parties took the field, and 
arrayed themselves, both in congress and in the country, 
under their several banners. THe Federalists, that is, the 
friends of the new constitution and government, were for 
the first eight years the majority, and of course were able 
to pursue the policy, and adopt the measures, which in 
their judgment were best calculated to promote the great 
interests of the Union. At their head, by the unanimous 
vote of the nation, was placed the illustrious Washing- 
ton, who had led their armies to victory in the war of 
independence, and who was now designated by the whole 
body of the people as their civil leader and guide, and the 
protector of their rights and liberties. No person who is 
not old enough to remember the feelings of ]789, can 
realize the deep emotions of that most interesting period, 
the hopes that were enkindled by the reappearance of this 
great man upon the stage of active usefulness, and of the 
confidence that was reposed in his talents, his wisdom, the 
purity of his character, and the disinterestedness of his 
patriotism. Congress assembled, and the government was 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 7 

organized. Among the members of the legislative houses, 
were to be found those who had attended the convention 
of 1787, and assisted in forming the constitution under 
which they were convened to deliberate on the highest 
interests of the Union. Among them were the names of 
Strong, King, Ellsworth, Johnson, Sherman, Madison, 
Langdon, Few, Paterson, Read, Baldwin, and Gilman — 
all members of the convention. These men could not 
fail of being thoroughly acquainted with the constitution, 
in all its parts and provisions, the views which were enter- 
tained of its character and principles by the convention, 
and which had been fully explained and discussed before 
the state conventions by which it had been approved and 
ratified. They were also associated, in the Senate and 
House of Representatives, with others from different parts 
of the Union, and of the highest reputation for public 
spirit and talents, many of whom had, either in the coun- 
cil or in the field, assisted in vindicating the rights and 
achieving the indepernlonoR of their country. Among the 
latter were R. Morris, Carroll, R. H. Lee, Izard, Schuy- 
ler, Benson, Boudinot, Fitzsimmons, Sedgwick, Sturges, 
Trumbull, Ames, and Wadsworth. On men of this de- 
scription, devolved the task of commencing operations 
under the new and untried system of government, which 
had been established by the great body of the people over 
this infant republic. No collection of statesmen or pa- 
triots were ever placed in a more sublime or responsible 
situation. On their wisdom, integrity, patriotism, and 
virtue, under the blessing of Heaven, depended not only the 
freedom, the prosperity, and the happiness of the unnum- 
bered millions who might hereafter inhabit this emanci- 
pated portion of the western continent, but the result of 
the great experiment which was about to be made, whe- 
ther there was virtue enough in men to support a system 
of free, elective, representative government. 

The attempt was made, and it was successful. During 



8 HISTORY OF THE 

the two successive periods of General Washington's ad- 
ministration, the cardinal principles of the government 
were ascertained and established, and a general system 
of national policy was marked out and pursued, which 
has regulated and controlled the important concerns of 
the national government to the present day. At the first 
session of the first congress, a judicial system was formed 
with such skill and wisdom, that forty year's experience 
approves and sanctions, in the fullest manner, the sound- 
ness of its principles and the practical wisdom and utility 
of its general character and provisions. A financial system, 
devised by the extraordinary mind, and matured by the 
intuitive discernment of Hamilton, was adopted, the great 
principles of which have been in operation through all the 
vicissitudes of party which the country has experienced, 
and are still in force. The funding system was also 
adopted by the first congress, which as strongly dis- 
played the wisdom, as it did the justice of the government. 
The national Bank, an institution indispensably necessary 
to the government as well as to the country at large, was 
another important measure of this administration. The 
organization of the militia, and the formation of a navy, 
were objects of its constant attention and solicitude. In 
short, it may be said, without danger of its being seriously 
controverted by men of intelligence and character, that 
the great principles of policy which have led the nation 
onward to reputation, respectability, prosperity, and power, 
were proposed and adopted under the administration of 
Washington, and were the fruits of the combined wisdom, 
profound forecast, and disinterested patriotism of himself 
and his associates in the councils of the nation. He was 
the great leader, and they were members, of that class 
of politicians who were called Federalists — a body of men 
who have been the objects of vulgar reproach and popular 
calumny from the time the government was formed, down 
to the present period. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 9 

The acknowledged head of the Anti-federal party was 
Thomas Jefferson. At the time when the convention 
which formed the constitution were in session, and until 
its adoption by nine of the states, Mr. Jefferson was absent 
from the country in France, where he had resided as the 
ambassador of the United States for a number of years. 
As his character and conduct will be found to be intimately 
connected with the subject of this work, it will be necessary 
to devote some time to an examination of his political 
career, from the time of his return from Europe, until the 
expiration of his administration of the national government. 

This gentleman came into public life at an early age; 
and after having been once initiated in political pursuits, 
he devoted to them a large portion of the residue of his 
days. His mind was of a visionary and speculative cast; — 
he was somewhat enthusiastic in his notions of government, 
ambitious in his disposition, and fanciful in his opinions of 
the nature and principles of government. By a long course 
of watchful discipline, he had obtained a strict command 
over his temper, which enabled him to wear a smooth and 
plausible exterior to persons of all descriptions with whom 
he was called to mingle or associate. Having been chair- 
man of the committee of the congress of 1776, by whom 
the Declaration of Independence was drawn up, that fact 
gave him a degree of celebrity, which the mere style of 
composition in that celebrated document would not, under 
other circumstances, have secured to its author. At the 
same time, he had the reputation of being a scholar as well 
as a statesman; and more deference was paid to him, in 
both respects, than the true state of the case called for, or 
in strictness would warrant. His knowledge of men, how- 
ever, was profound ; he understood the art of gaining and 
retaining popular favour beyond any other politician either 
of ancient or modern times. Whilst ho was apparently 
familiar with those who were about him, he was capable 
of deep dissimulation ; and though he had at his command 

2 



10 HISTORY OF THE 

a multitude of devoted agents, he was generally his owm 
adviser and counsellor. If, by any untoward circumstance, 
he found himself in the power of any individual to such an 
extent as to endanger his standing in the community, he 
took care to secure that individual to his interests, by an 
obligation so strong as to be relieved of all serious appre- 
hensions of a future exposure. In addition to all his other 
characteristics, during his long residence in France, he had 
become thoroughly imbued with the principles of the infidel 
philosophy which prevailed in that kingdom, and exten- 
sively over the continent of Europe, previously to and 
during the French revolution. This fact, in connection 
with the belief that his views of government were of a 
wild and visionary character, destroyed the confidence of 
a large portion of his most intelligent countrymen in him 
as a politician, as well as a moralist and a Christian. 

Mr. JeflTerson was in Paris when the constitution was 
published. He early declared himself not pleased with 
the system of government which it contained. On the 
13th of November, 1787, in a letter to John Adams, he 
said — " How do you like our new constitution ? I confess 
there are things in it which stagger all my dispositions to 
subscribe to what such an assembly has proposed. The 
house of federal representatives will not be adequate to^ 
the management of affairs either foreign or federal. Their 
president seems a bad edition of a Polish king. He may 
be elected from four years to four years, for life. Reason 
and experience prove to us, that a chief magistrate, so 
continuable, is an office for life. When one or two gene- 
rations shall have proved that this is an office for life, it 
becomes, on every succession, worthy of intrigue, of 
bribery, of force, and even of foreign interference. It 
will be of great consequence to France and England, to 
have America governed by a Galloman or an Angloman. 
Once in office, and possessing the military force of the 
Union, without the aid or check of a council, he would not 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 11 

be easily dethroned, even if the people could be induced to 
withdraw their votes from him. I wish that, at the end 
of the four years, they had made him forever ineligible a 
second time. Indeed, I think all the good of this new 
constitution might have been couched in three or four new 
articles to be added to the good, old, and venerable fabric, 
which should have been preserved even as a religious 
relique." 

In a letter of the same date to Colonel Smith, he 
says — " I do not know whether it is to yourself or Mr. 
Adams I am to give my thanks for the copy of the new 
constitution. I beg leave, through you, to place them 
where due. It will yet be three weeks before I shall 
receive them from America. There are very good arti- 
cles in it, and very bad. I do not know which preponde- 
rate. What we have lately read in the history of Holland 
in the chapter on the Stadtholder, would have sufficed to 
set me against a chief eligible for a long duration, if I had 
ever been disposed toward one ^ and what we have always 
read of the election of Polish kings, should have forever 
excluded the idea of one continuable for life. Wonderful 
is the effect of impudent and persevering lying. The 
British ministry have so long hired their gazetteers to 
repeat, and model into every form, lies about our being in 
anarchy, that the world has at length believed them, the 
English nation has believed them, the ministers them- 
selves have come to believe them, and what is more won- 
derful, we have believed them ourselves. Yet where does 
this anarchy exist, except in the single instance of Massa- 
chusetts ? And can history produce an instance of rebel- 
lion so honorably conducted ? I say nothing of its motives. 
They were founded in ignorance, not wickedness. God 
forbid we shoidd ever he twenty years without such a rebellion. 
The people cannot be all, and always well informed. The 
part which is wrong will be discontented in proportion to 
the facts they misconceive. If they remain in quiet under 



12 HISTORY or THE 

such misconceptions, it is a lethargy, the forerunner of death 
to public liberty. We have had thirteen states independent 
for eleven years. There has been one rebelHon. That 
comes to one rebelhon in a century and a half for each 
state. What country before ever existed a century and 
a half without a rebellion ? And what country can pre- 
serve its liberties, if its rulers are not learned from time to 
time that this people preserve the spirit of resistance^ Let 
them take arms. The remedy is to set them rio^ht as to 
facts, pardon, and pacify them. What signify a few lives 
lost in a century or two? The tree of liberty must be refreshed 
from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It 
is its natural manure. " 

In a letter to William Carmichael, dated December 
11th, 1787, he says — " Our new constitution is powerfully 
attacked in the American newspapers. The objections 
are, that its effect would be to form the thirteen states into 
one ; that proposing to melt all down into a general govern- 
ment, they have fenced the people by no declaration of 
rights ; they have not renounced the power of keeping a 
standing army ; they have not secured the liberty of the 
press ; they have reserved the power of abolishing trials 
by jury in civil cases ; they have proposed that the laws of 
the federal legislatures shall be paramount to the laws and 
constitutions of the states; they have abandoned rotation 
in office ; and particularly their president may be re- 
elected from four years to four years, for life, so as to ren- 
der him a king for life, like a king of Poland; and they 
have not given him either the check or aid of a council. 
To these they add calculations of expense, &c. <fec. to 
frighten the people. You will perceive that those objections 
are serious, and some of them not without foundation." 

The subject is alluded to subsequently in a variety of 
letters to different correspondents, in the course of which 
he confines his objections principally to the omission of a 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 18 

bill or declaration of rights, and the re-eligibility of the 
president. 

Enough has been quoted to show that Mr. Jefferson 
was not friendly to the constitution ; and some of his senti- 
ments were of a nature to shake the confidence of its friends 
in the soundness of his general political principles. Of this 
description were his remarks on the Massachusetts insur- 
rection. So far from considering rebellion against govern- 
ment an evil, he viewed it as a benefit — as a necessary 
ingredient in the republican character, and highly useful 
in its tendency to warn rulers, from time to time, that the 
people possessed the spirit of resistance. And particularly 
would the public feelings be shocked at the cold-blooded 
indifference with which he inquires, " What signify a few " 
lives lost in a century or two ?" and the additional reifiark, 
that " The tree of liherly must he refreshed from time to 
time v>ilh the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural 
manureJ'^ This language wuuld better become a Turkish 
Sultan, or the chief of a Tartar horde, than a distinguished 
republican, who had been born and educated in a Christian 
country, and enjoyed all the advantages to be derived from 
civilization, literature, and science. 

In September, 1789, Mr. Jeflferson left Paris, on his re- 
turn to the United States. On the 15th of December, of 
that year, he wrote the following letter to General Wash- 
ington : 

" Chesterfield, December 15, 1789. 

** To THE President. 

" Sir, — I have received at this place the honor of your 
letters of October the 13th, and November the 30th, and 
am truly flattered by your nomination of me to the very 
dignified office of Secretary of State, for which permit me 
here to return you my humble thanks. Could any circum- 
stance seduce me to overlook the disproportion between its 
duties and my talents, it would be the encouragement of 



14 HISTORY OP THE 

your choice. But when I contemplate the extent of that 
office, embracing as it does the principal mass of domestic 
administration, together with the foreign, I cannot be in- 
sensible of my inequality to it ; and I should enter on it 
with gloomy forebodings from the criticisms and censures 
of a public, just, indeed, in their intentions, but sometimes 
misinformed and misled, and always too respectable to be 
neglected. I cannot but foresee the possibility that this 
may end disagreeably for me, who having no motive to 
public service but the public satisfaction, would certainly 
retire the moment that satisfaction should appear to lan- 
guish. On the other hand, I feel a degree of familiarity 
with the duties of my present office, as far at least as I 
am capable of understanding its duties. The ground I 
have already passed over, enables me to see my way into 
that which is before me. The change of government too, 
taking place in the country where it is exercised, seems to 
open a possibility of piocuilug from the new rulers some 
new advantages in commerce, which may be agreeable to 
our countrymen. So that, as far as ray fears, my hopes, 
or my inclinations might enter into this question, I confess 
they would not lead me to prefer a change. 

" But it is not for an individual to choose his post. You 
are to marshal us as may best be for the public good ; and 
it is only in the case of its being indifferent to you, that I 
would avail myself of the option you have so kindly offered 
in your letter. If you think it better to transfer me to 
another post, my inclination must be no obstacle ; nor shall 
it be, if there is any desire to suppress the office I now 
hold, or to reduce its grade. In either of these cases, be 
so good as to signify to me by another line your ultimate 
wish, and I shall conform to it cordially. If it should be 
to remain at New- York, my chief comfort will be to work 
under your eye, my only shelter the authority of your 
name, and the wisdom of measures to be dictated by you 
and implicitly executed by me. Whatever you may be 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. IS 

pleased to decide, I do not see that the matters which have 
called me hither will permit me to shorten the stay I ori- 
ginally asked ; that is to say, to set out on ray journey 
northward till the month of March. As early as possible 
in that month, I shall have the honor of paying my re- 
spects to you in New- York. In the mean time, I have 
that of tendering to you the homage of those sentiments 
of respectful attachment with which I am. Sir, 

" Your most obedient, and most humble servant, 

" Th. Jefferson." 

This letter will show with what feelings of esteem and 
respect for General Washington Mr. Jefferson professedly 
accepted the appointment of Secretary of State. It may 
hereafter appear with what degree of sincerity these pro- 
fessions were made ; and it is important to the object of 
this work, that it should be borne in mind by the reader, 
because one end which the writer has in view in preparing 
it is, to enable the community to form a more just estimate 
of his principles and character. 

By adverting to that part of Mr. Jefferson's writings, 
published since his death, which bears the singular and 
awkward title of "^«a," it appears by his own declara- 
tions, that immediately upon entering upon the duties of 
his office, he became an opposer of some of the principal 
measures of the government. He says — 

" I returned from that mission (to France) in the first 
year of the new government, having landed in Virfinia in 
December, 1789, and proceeded to New- York in March, 
1790, to enter on the office of Secretary of State. Here, 
certainly, I found a state of things which, of all I had ever 
contemplated, I the least expected. I had left France in 
the first year of her revolution, in the fervor of natural 
rights, and zeal for reformation. My conscientious devo- 
tion to those rights could not be heightened, but it had 
been aroused and excited by daily exercise. The presi- 



^ 



16 HISTORY OF THE 

dent received me cordially, and my colleagues, and the cir- 
cle of principal citizens, apparently with welcome. The 
courtesies of dinner parties given me, as a stranger newly 
arrived among them, placed me at once in their familiar 
society. Eut I cannot describe the wonder and mortifica- 
tion with which the table conversations filled me. Poli- 
tics were the chief topic, and a preference of a kingly over a 
republican government, was evidently the favorite sentiment. 
An apostate I could not be, 7ior yet a hypocrite ; and I 
found myself, for the most part, the only advocate on the 
republican side of the question, unless among the guests 
there chanced to be some members of that party from the 
legislative houses. Hamilton's financial system had then 
passed. It had two objects : 1. As a puzzle, to exclude 
popular understandiug and inquiry ; 2. As a machine for 
the corruption of the legislature; for he avowed the opinion, 
that man could be governed by one of two motives only, 
force, or interest ; force, he observed, in this country, was 
out of the question ; and the interests, therefore, of the 
members, must be laid hold of to keep the legislature in 
unison with the executive. And with grief and shame it 
must be acknowledged that his machine was not without 
effect ; that even in this, the birth of our government, some 
members were found sordid enough to bend their duty to 
their interests, and to look after personal, rather than 
public good." 

Another measure of great Importance, which Mr. Jeffer- 
son strongly disapproved, was the assumption of the state 
debts. Nothing could be more just or more reasonable 
than this act of the "-eneral government. The exertions of 
different states had necessarily been unequal, and in the 
same proportion their expenses had been increased. But 
those expenses had all been incurred in the common cause ; 
and that cause having been successful, nothing could be 
more just than that the debts thus incurred should be borne 
by the nation. Mr. Jefferson, however, stigmatizes the 



HARTKORD CONVENTION. 17 

measure as corrupt. " The more debt," he says, " Ha- 
milton could rake up, the more plunder for his mercena- 
ries." And he closes a long series of opprobrious remarks 
upon the subject, and upon the manner in which, according 
to his opinion, it was carried, by saying — " This added to 
the number of votaries to the Treasury, and made its chief 
the master of every vote in the legislature, which might 
give to the government the direction suited to his politi- 
cal views." 

The bank was another measure which did not meet with 
Mr. Jefferson's support. 

After remarking on these various subjects, he says, 
" Nor was this an opposition to General Washington. He 
was true to the republican charge confided to him, and has 
solemnly and repeatedly protested to me, in our conversa- 
tions, that he would lose the last drop of his blood in sup- 
port of it ; and he did this the oftener, and with the more 
earnestness, because he knew my suspicions of Hamilton's 
designs against it, and wished to quiet them. For he was 
not aware of the drift, or of the eftect of Hamilton's 
schemes. Unversed in financial projects, and calculations, 
and budgets, his approbation of them was bottomed on 
his confidence in the man. 

*' But Hamilton was not only a monarchist, but for a 
monarchy bottomed on corruption." And he then gives 
an account of a conversation which he says took place at 
a meeting of the Vice-president and the heads of depart- 
ments, in the course of which the British constitution w^as 
alluded to ; and in regard to which he says — " Mr. 
Adams observed, 'Purge that constitution of its corrup- 
tion, and give to its popular branch equality of representa- 
tion, and it would be the most perfect constitution ever de- . 
vised by the wit of man.' Hamilton paused, and observed, 
* Purge it of its corruption, and give to its popular branch 
equality of representation, and it would become an iniprac- 
iicable government; as it stands at present, with all its 

3 



18 HISTORY OF THE 

supposed defects, it is the most perfect government which 
ever existed." 

The Funding System was one of the great measures 
that distinguished General Washington's administration. 
It was devised by Hamilton, and has ever been considered 
as reflecting the highest credit upon his talents and pa- 
triotism. No man labored with more zeal or ability to 
procure the adoption of the constitution than this great 
statesman. The Federalist, of which he was one of the 
principal writers, and contributed tlie largest share, has 
long been considered as a standard work on the constitu- 
tion, and is now resorted to as an authority of the highest 
respectability and character, respecting the true principles 
and consiruciiun of that hiatrument. The system of reve- 
nue adopted under General Washington, vi^as also the work 
of this distinguished financier ; and so nearly perfect was 
it found to be in practice, amidst all the changes and 
violence of party, and under the administration of those 
individuals who were originally opposed to its adoption, 
that they severally found it necessary, when placed at the 
head of the government, to pursue the system which he had 
devised. Even Mr. Jefferson himself, during the eight years 
that he held the office of chief magistrate, never ventured to 
adopt a new system of finance, but adhered, in all its essen- 
tial particulars, to that devised by Hamihon. And yet, 
from the moment he came into the executive department 
of the government, and was associated with Hamilton 
and others in establishing the principles of the constitution, 
it appears, by his own evidence, that he Avas endeavoring 
to destroy the reputation and influence of that great states- 
man, by secret slanders, and insidious suggestions against 
his political integrity and orthodoxy. The article from 
which the foregoing citations are taken, was not written at 
the moment — it was not the record of events as they occur- 
red from day to day : it bears date in 1818 — nearly thirty 
years after most of those events took place, and fourteen 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 19 

years after General Hamilton had been consigned to the 
tomb. A more extraordinary instance of vindictive, per- 
sonal, or political hostility, probably cannot be mentioned. 
This work, however, has not been undertaken with the 
view of vindicating the character of General Hamilton 
from the aspersions of Mr. Jefferson. That duty devolves 
on others ; and it is a gratification to know that the task is 
in a fair way to be performed by those, who, it is presumed, 
will see that it is done faithfully. Mr. Jefferson's " Writ- 
ings" have been referred to for the purpose of showing 
his original dislike of the constitution, his opposition to the 
most important measures of the government at its first 
organization, and his inveterate hostility to the most able, 
upright and disinterested expounders of the constitution. 
Among these was Alexander Hamilton. The mode of at- 
tack upon tliis Histingnislipd individual, and equally distin- 
guished public benefactor, was no less insidious than it 
was unjust and calumnious. It was to represent him not 
only as unfriendly to the constitution, in the formation and 
adoption of which he was one of the intelligent, active, and 
influential agents, but as a monarchist — an enemy to re- 
publicanism itself. In the quotations which have already 
been made from his " ^»a," he says General Hamilton 
" was not only a monarchist, but for a monarchy bottomed 
on corruption." And he professes to repeat declarations 
of a similar kind, made openly by General Hamilton at a 
dinner party, when Mr. Jefferson himself was present. 
Assertions of this kind, unsupported by any other evidence 
than his own declarations, are not worthy of credit. Gene- 
ral Hamilton was too well acquainted with Mr. Jefferson's 
feeling toward him, and of his disposition to undermine 
and destroy him, thus voluntarily and unnecessarily to 
place himself in his power. In some instances, in the 
course of his " Ana" other names are introduced as cor- 
roborating witnesses in support of some of the charges 
against General Hamilton. It is difficult to disprove post- 



20 HISTORY OF THE 

humous testimony by positive evidence, especially when the 
parties, as well as the witnesses, are in their graves ; but 
several of the individuals, named by Mr. Jefferson as the 
persons from whom he derived a knowledge of the conver- 
sations and declarations of General Hamilton, will add no 
strength to the evidence; they are not worthy of belief 
in a case of this kind. 

That General Hamilton was an enemy to the very na- 
ture of the government, in the formation of which he had 
assisted so zealously and so faithfully, in procuring the 
adoption of which he had laboured with as much talent, 
and with as much effect, as any other man in the United 
States, and in developing and establishing the great prin- 
ciples of which, his exertions were inferior to those of no 
other individual, will not at this late period be credited. 

That Mr. Jefferson wished, by eeciGt measures, and a 
train of artful and insidious means, to destroy his great 
rival, no person acquainted with his history, conduct, and 
character, can doubt. It comported with his policy to 
lay the charge of monarchical feelings and sentiments 
against him, because his object was to avail himself of 
the prejudices of the people against Great Britain, which 
the war of independence had excited, and which time had 
not allayed, to raise himself to popularity and power. 
When the French revolution had advanced far enough to 
enlist the feelings of a portion of our countrymen in their 
favour, on the ground that the nation was endeavouring to 
throw off a despotism, and establish a republican govern- 
ment, another portion of them considered the principles 
they avowed, and the course they pursued, as dangerous 
to the very existence of civilized society. Mr. Jefferson 
declares in his "-4wa," as above quoted, that he " had 
left France in the first year of her revolution, in the fervor 
of natural rights and zeal for reformation." His devotion 
to those rights, he says, " could not be heightened, but it 
had been aroused and excited by daily exercise." Accord- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 21 

ingly he became, at a very early period, the leader of the 
party in this country, who, in the utmost warmth of feel- 
ing, espoused the cause of revolutionary France. To 
render himself the more conspicuous, he found it expe- 
dient to stigmatize those who entertained different senti- 
ments from himself, as the enemies of republicanism, and 
of course, as the friends of monarchy. The meaning of 
this charge was, that they were the friends of Great Bri- 
tain and the British government. Hence proceeded the 
charges of a monarchical propensity in Mr. Adams and 
General Hamilton, specimens of which have been already 
adduced. But it was soon found necessary to go greater 
lengths than this. To pave the way for a gradual attempt 
to undermine the popularity of General Washington, and 
to shake the public confidence in his patriotism and in- 
tegrity, a similar effort was made to involve him in a 
similar accusation. The plan adopted to accomplish this 
object, was to represent him as having a bias toward 
Great Britain, and against France. If Mr. Jefferson, who 
had espoused the side of revolutionary France, could 
succeed in making the country believe that General 
Washington had taken sides with Great Britain against 
France, in the great controversy that was then convulsing 
Europe, it would follow almost as a necessary consequence, 
that he would be considered as the enemy of freedom, and 
the friend of monarchical government. In his corres- 
pondence, published since his death, there is the following 
letter : 

" To P. Mazzei. 

« Monticello, April 24, 1796. 

" My dear Friend — The aspect of our politics has 
wonderfully changed since you left us. In place of that 
noble love of liberty and republican government which 
carried us triumphantly through the war, an Anglican 
monarchical and aristocratical party has sprung up, whose 



22 HISTORY OF THE 

avowed object is to draw over us the substance, as they 
have ah-eady done the forms, of the British government. 
The main body of our citizens, however, remain true to 
their republican principles : the whole landed interest is 
republican, and so is a great mass of talents. Against us 
are the executive, the judiciary, two out of three branches 
of the legislature, all the officers of the government, all 
who want to be officers, all timid men who prefer the 
calm of despotism to the boisterous sea of liberty, British 
merchants, and Americans trading on British capitals, 
speculators and holders in the banks and public funds, a 
contrivance invented for the purposes of corruption, and 
for assimilating us in all things to the rotten as well as 
the sound parts of the British model. It would give you 
a fever were I to name to you the apostates who have 
gone over to these heresies, men who were- Samsons in 
the field and Solomons in the council, but who have had 
their heads shorn by the harlot England. In short, we 
are likely to preserve the lilierty wc have obtained only 
by unremitting labors and perils. But we shall preserve 
it ; and our mass of weight and wealth on the good side 
is so great, as to leave no danger that force will ever be 
attempted against us. We have only to awake, and snap 
the Lilliputian cords with which they have been entangling 
us during the first sleep which succeeded our labors." 

When this letter first appeared in the United States, it 
was in the following form : 

*' Our political situation is prodigiously changed since 
you left us. Instead of that noble love of liberty, and that 
republican government which carried us through the dan- 
gers of the war, an anglo-monarchic-aristocratic party 
has arisen. Their avowed object is, to impose on us the 
substance, as they have already given us the form, of the 
British government. Nevertheless, the principal body of 
our citizens remain faithful to republican principles, as 
also the men of talents. We have against us (republicans) 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 23 

the executive power, the judiciary, (two of the three 
branches of our government,) all the officers of govern- 
ment, all who are seeking for offices, all timid men, who 
prefer the calm of despotism to the tempestuous sea of 
liberty, the British merchants, and the Americans who 
trade on British capitals, the speculators, persons inte- 
rested in the bank, and public funds. [Establishments 
invented with views of corruption, and to assimilate us to 
the British model in its worst parts.] I should give you a 
fever, if I should name the apostates who have embraced 
these heresies, men who were Solomons in council, and 
Samsons in combat, but whose hair has been cut off" by 
the whore England. 

" They would wrest from us that liberty which we have 
obtained by so much labor and peril ; but we shall pre- 
serve it. Our mass of weight and riches are so powerful, 
that we have nothing to fear from any attempt against us 
by force. It is sufficient that we guard ourselves, and that 
we break the Lilliputian ties by which they have bound 
us, in the first slumbers which have succeeded our labors. 
It suffices that we arrest the progress of that system of 
ingratitude and injustice toward France, from which they 
would alienate us, to bring us under British influence." 

It may easily be imagined, that the appearance of this 
extraordinary article in the United States, was calculated 
to disturb the feelings of Mr. Jefferson. Such an attack 
as it contained on the character of General Washington, 
as well as upon his coadjutors, could not pass unnoticed ; 
and it obviously placed the writer of it in a perplexing 
and inextricable dilemma. Accordingly, in a letter ad- 
dressed to Mr. Madison, dated August 3d, 1797, he thus 
unbosomed himself: 

" The variety of other topics the day I was with you, 
kept out of sight the letter to Mazzei imputed to me in 
the papers, the general substance of which is mine, though 
the diction has been considerably altered and varied in 



24 HISTORY OF THE 

the course of its translations from French into Italian, 
from Italian into French, and from French into English. 
I first met with it at Bladensburg, and for a moment con- 
ceived I must take the field of the public papers. I could 
not disavow it wholly, because the greatest part was mine 
in substance, though not in form. I could not avow it as 
it stood, because the form was not mine, and, in one place, 
the substance was very materially falsified. This, then, 
would render explanations necessary; nay, it would ren- 
der proofs of the whole necessary, and draw me at length 
into a publication of all (even the secret) transactions of 
the administration, while I was of it ; and embroil me 
personally with every member of the executive and the 
judiciary, and with others still. I soon decided in my own 
mind to be entirely silent. I consulted with several friends 
at Philadelphia, who, every one of them, were clearly 
against my avowing or disavowing, and some of them 
conjured me most earnestly to let nothing provoke me to 
it. I corrected, in conversation with them, a substantial 
misrepresentation in the copy published. The original 
has a sentiment like this, (for I have it not before moj) 
*' They are endeavoring to submit us to the substance, as 
they already have to the forms of the British government; 
meaning by forms, the birthdays, levees, processions to 
parliament, inauguration pomposities, &c. But the copy 
published says, ' as they have already submitted us to the 
form of the British,' &c. ; making me express hostility to 
the form of our government, that is to say, to the consti- 
tution itself; for this is really the difference of the Word 
form, used in singular or plural, in that phrase, in the 
English language. Now it would be impossible for me to 
explain this publicly, without bringing on a personal dif- 
ference between General Washington and myself, which 
nothing before the publication of this letter has ever done. 
It would embroil me also with all those with whom his 
character is still popular, that is to say, with nine-tenths 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 25 

of the United States ; and what good would be obtained 
by avowing the letter with the necessary explanations ? 
Very little, indeed, in my opinion, to counterbalance a 
good deal of harm. From my silence in this instance, it 
cannot be inferred that I am afraid to own the general sen- 
timents of the letter. If I am subject to either imputa- 
tion, it is to avowing such sentiments too frankly both in 
private and public, often when there is no necessity for it, 
merely because / disdain every thing like dupliciiy. Still, 
however, I am open to conviction. Think for me on the 
occasion, and advise me what to do, and confer with Colo- 
nel Monroe on the subject." 

This letter, take which version of it we may, discloses 
the secret of Mr. Jefferson's policy. It was to represent 
the federal party as monarchists, and aristocrats,, enemies 
to republicanism, and thejefore devoted to the interests 
of Great Britain, and hostile to those of France. No man 
ever understood more perfectly the effect of names upon 
the minds of partizans, than this great champion of modern 
republicanism ; and hence he informs his friend Mazzei, 
that the Federalists were a body of Anglo-Monarchic- Aris- 
tocrats, and liimself and his friends were Repnhlicans. 

Nobody will be surprised to find, that the publication of 
his letter in the newspapers of the United States, gave 
Mr. Jefferson uneasiness. The man who had the hardi- 
hood to accuse General Washington with being an aristo- 
crat and a monarchist, and particularly, with being devoted 
to British influence and interests, must have possessed a 
degree of mental courage not often found in the human 
constitution. And it is perfectly apparent that this was 
the circumstance which so greatly embarrassed him, when 
determining the important question whether it would be 
most for his own advantage to come before the public, and 
endeavour to explain away the obvious meaning of his 
letter, or to observe a strict, and more j)rudent silence, 
and leave the world to form their own conclusions. He 

4 



26 HISTORY OF THE 

finally resolved on the latter, making his explanations only 
to his confidential friends, and leaving them in such a form, 
that they might pass, with his other posthumous works, 
to future generations. 

A little attention to the subject will show, that he 
adopted the most prudent course. Mr. Jeflferson's attempt 
to give a different meaning to his own language, is entirely 
unsatisfactory. In the letter, as first published in the 
newspapers, it is said — " Our jjoUtical sUiiation is prodi- 
giously changed since you left us." In the version of it 
in his posthumous works, it is — " The aspect o( our politics 
has wonderfully changed since you left us." Not having 
the original, either in Italian or French, it is not practi- 
cable at this time to say which is most correct. But there 
is a material difference between the expressions " Our 
political condition," and " the aspect of our politics." The 
first has an immediate and obvious reference to the situa- 
tion of the country at large, as connected with the general 
government, and the character of that government ; the 
other relates merely to the measures of the government. 
The first, if in any degree to be deplored, must be con- 
sidered as permanent ; the last, as referring to mere 
legislative acts, which in their nature were transitory. 
The next sentence shows, conclusively, that it was the 
character of the government, and not merely its measures, 
that were alluded to. " Instead of that noble love of 
liberty, and that republican government, which carried U3 
through the dangers of the war, an Anglo-Monarchic- 
Aristocratic party has arisen." The "republican govern- 
ment which carried us through the dangers of the war," 
was the " old confederation," as it is usually called. The 
change that had taken place was in the system of govern- 
ment — in the substitution of something else in the place of 
the confederation. By turning back to Mr. Jefferson's 
letter to Mr. Adams, dated November 13th, 1787, we shall 
find him using the following language — " How do you like 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 27 

our new constitution ? I confess there are things in it 
which stagger all my dispositions to subscribe to what such 
an assembly has proposed." He then enumerates several 
objections, and says — " I think all the good of this new 
constitution might have been couched in three or four new 
articles to he added to t]ie good, old, and venerable fabric, 
which should have been preserved even as a religious 
relique." It is obvious, therefore, that his affections were 
placed on the "good, old" confederation; and when he 
complains of the prodigious alteration that had taken place 
in our political condition since Mr. Mazzei had left us, he 
must have had reference to the new constitution. 

This is further manifest from the language which imme- 
diately follows. He declares in the letter as first published, 
that the "avowed object of the party to which he has alluded, 
is, to impose on us the substance, as they have already given 
us the form of the British government." In the letter as 
published in his works, he blends the two sentences toge- 
ther, and after mentioning the Anglo party, varies the pas- 
sage above quoted, by saying — "whose avowed object is 
to draw over us the substance, as they have already done the 
forms, of the British government." The British govern- 
ment consists of three estates — a hereditary monarchy, a 
hereditary House of Peers, and an elective House of Com- 
mons — or in other words, of King, Lords, and Commons. 
Our government consists of a President, Senate, and House 
of Representatives — all elective, though for different pe- 
riods. One objection urged, on various occasions, against 
the adoption of the constitution, was its resemblance, in 
the particulars just mentioned, to the British government. 
Among others, Mr. Jefferson was pointedly opposed to the 
re-eligibility of the executive. He compared it to the case 
of the king of Poland, and thought there ought to have 
been a provision prohibiting the re-election of any indivi- 
dual to that office. The people of the states, however, 
concluded that their Uberties would not be exposed to any 



28 HISTORY OF THE 

imminent hazard, under a system where all the officers, 
executive and legislative, were elective, and they took the 
constitution as it was. And great as Mr. Jefterson's fears 
of danger to freedom were from this quarter, he eventually 
overcame them so far as to suffer himself to be placed in 
the office of chief magistrate twice, without any apparent 
miso-iviuffs of mind or conscience. Now it is scarcely 
possible for any unbiassed mind to believe, that he had not 
immediate reference to this part of our constitutiqn, when 
he remarked, that the " Anglo-Monarchic- Aristocratic" 
party were endeavouring to impose upon the nation " ike 
substance, as they had already given it the form, of the 
British government." These three cardinal branches of the 
British government, viz. "Kings, Lords, and Commons," 
are all the form there is to that government. All the 
residue of what is called by themselves their constitution, 
consists of unwritten and prescriptive usages, sometimes 
called laws of parliament, which never were reduced to 
form, and certainly never were adopted in the form of a 
constitution. 

Mr. Jefferson, in his letter to Mr. Madison, attempts to 
give a totally different meaning to this part of his letter. 
He says, " The original has a sentiment like this, (for I have 
it not before me,) They are endeavouring to submit us to 
the substance, as they already have to the forms, of the 
British government ; meaning by forms, the birth-days, 
levees, processions to parliament, inauguration pomposi- 
ties, <fcc. For this is really the meaning of the word form, 
used in the singular or plural, in that phrase, in the Eng- 
lish language," We do not believe that any person, well 
acquainted with the English language, ever made use of 
such an awkward and senseless expression as that above 
cited — They are endeavouring to submit us to the substance. 
As Mr. Jefferson always was considered a scholar, the 
internal evidence derived from this singular phraseology 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 29 

is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that it was adopted 
here for the occasion. 

But the application of the expression form, or even 
forms, of the British government, to the practise of observ- 
ing birth-days, holding levees, of moving in procession to 
parliament, or the pomposities of inaugurations, is down- 
right absurdity. These ceremonious customs-are no part 
of the government, either in Great Britain, or in the 
United States. They may be childish, they may be 
pompous, they may be servile and adulatory, but they are 
not proceedings, either in form or substance, of the govern- 
ment. Nor has the word form or forms any such legitimate 
meaning. This explanation was doubtless contrived for 
future use, and not to be made public ; and it is not at all 
surprising that Mr. Jefferson found there were serious 
difficulties in the way of a public exposure of his meaning, 
if this was all the explanation he had to give. The course 
he adopted, which was to observe a strict silence, was far 
more discreet. A more weak and unsatisfactory attempt 
to evade a plain and obvious difficulty has rarely been made. 

The next sentence in the letter as first published is, " Ne- 
vertheless, the principal body of our citizens remain faith- 
ful to republican principles, as also the men of talents." 
In the letter in Mr. Jefferson's works, it stands thus — 
" The main body of our citizens, however, remain true to 
their republican principles ; the whole landed interest is re- 
publican, and so is a great mass of talents." Now it may be 
safely said, that no mistake in translation can possibly ac- 
count for the diversity that appears in these two sentences. 
Without noticing the difference between the first and last 
members of the two sentences, the expression — "the whole 
landed interest is republican" — is entirely wanting in the 
letter as first published. This must have been wilfully sup- 
pressed in the first letter, if it was in the original — a cir- 
cumstance that is not to be credited, because no possible 
motive can be assigned for such an act. The inference 



30 HISTORY OF THE 

then must be, that it was introduced into the copy left for 
posthumous publication, to help the general appearance of 
mistranslation, and to countenance and give plausibility to 
other alterations of more importance. 

The letter as first published, then proceeds — "We have 
against us (republicans) the Executive Poicer, the Judiciary, 
{two of the three branches of our government,) all the officers 
of government, all who are seeking for offices, all timid 
men, who prefer the calm of despotism to the tempestu- 
ous sea of liberty, the British merchants, and the Ameri- 
cans who trade on British capitals, the speculators, per- 
sons interested in the Bank and Public Funds, [establish- 
ments invented with views of corruption, and to assimilate 
us to the British model in its corrupt parts.] In the letter 
in Mr. Jefferson's works, it stands thus — " Against us are 
the executive, the judiciary, two out of three branches of the 
legislature, all the officers of government, all who want to 
be officers, all timid men who prefer the calm of despotism 
to the boisterous sea of liberty, British merchants, and 
Americans trading on British capitals, speculators and 
holders in the banks and public funds, a contrivance in- 
vented for the purposes of corruption, and for assimilating 
us in all things to the rotten as well as the sound parts of 
the British model. 

It is impossible to avoid the conclusion, that the article 
published in the form of a letter to Mazzei, in Mr. Jeffer- 
son's works, from which the last extract is taken, is not a 
correct transcript of the original, but was prepared to an- 
swer a specific purpose. No person will be persuaded 
that Mr. Jefferson ever called the executive and the judi- 
ciary " two out of three branches of the legislature.''^ The 
language of the letter first published is correct — " iico of 
the three branches of our government. ^^ Again he says, 
" speculators and holders in the banls.''^ There, was but 
one national bank, and reference must be made to national 
banks alone. The first letter has it correctly — the Bank. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 31 

The fact that banks are mentioned in the last, is decisive 
proof that the first is the most accurate translation. 

There is an expression here which is so strikingly cha- 
racteristic of the author, that it ought not to pass unno- 
ticed. Mr. Jefferson says, " We have against its republi- 
cans — all timid men who prefer the calm of despotism to 
the tempestuous sea of liberty." In the second letter it is 
" the boisterous sea of liberty." It will be borne in mind, 
the "timid men" here spoken of, were not inhabitants of 
France, or England, but of these United States, then under 
the mild, and peaceable, and prosperous influence of the 
government which they had so recently adopted, and the 
beneficial effects of which they were then realizing in a 
most gratifying degree. That a man of his temperament 
should call such a state of things, under such a govern- 
ment, the calm of despotism, is not a little extraordinary. 
But it will be recollected, that in a letter quoted in the 
former part of this work, when speaking of the insurrec- 
tion in Massachusetts, he said, "God forbid we should 
ever be twenty years without such a rebellion." "And 
what country can preserve its liberties, if its rulers are not 
warned from time to time, that this people preserve the 
spirit of resistance ? Let them take arms." — "What sig- 
nify a few lives lost in a century or tv/o ? The tree of liber- 
ty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of pa- 
triots and tyrants. It is its natural manure.^'' After read- 
ing these sentiments and expressions, no person can be 
surprised to find that Mr. Jefferson should prefer the tu- 
mults, the distresses, and the bloodshed of insurrections, to 
the peace, the tranquillity, and the social happiness, which 
are enjoyed under a mild, beneficent, well-regulated, and 
well-administered government. No man of sound mind, 
and virtuous principles, will envy him his choice. 

But the most extraordinary expression in this letter is 
the declaration, that the republicans, that is, Mr. Jefferson 
and his political partizans, were opposed by the executive 



32 HISTORY OF THE 

and the judiciary. When this allegation was made, and 
it is contained in both versions of the letter, the chief exe- 
cutive magistrate of the United States was George 
Washington. George Washington led the armies of the 
United States through the revolutionary war ; and during 
the whole of that arduous and distressing conflict, disco- 
vered military skill and talents of the highest order. Under 
all circumstances, and in all situations, he manifested the 
most pure and devoted patriotism ; and after having seen 
his country victorious, and its independence acknowledged, 
even by the adversary with whom he had so long and so 
successfully contended, in a manner that excited the sur- 
prise and the admiration not only of his own country, but 
of the civilized world, he surrendered the power with 
which he had been clothed, and which he had so lono- exer- 
cised, into the hands of those from whom he received it, and 
retired to private life amidst the applauses, and loaded with 
the gratitude and benedictions of his fellow citizens. When 
it was found that the government which had carried the 
nation through the war, was insufficient for the exigencies 
of peace, he again lent his whole talents audi nfluence to the 
formation and adoption of a new system, better calculated 
for the wants, and better suited to the promotion of the great 
interests of the union. As soon as that system was adopted 
by the nation, he was called by the spontaneous, and unani- 
mous voice of his countrymen, to the office of chief ma- 
gistrate ; which call was renewed, with the same unanimity, 
on a second occasion ; at the end of which, after havino- 
addressed his fellow citizens in a train of the warmest 
aff*ection, the purest patriotism, and the most elevated 
political morality and eloquence, he declined being again a 
candidate for office, and crowned with the highest honours 
which a free people could confer on their most respected 
and revered citizen, bade a final adieu to all further active 
engagement in the public affairs of the government and 
country. The life of this great man passed without a. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 33 

Stain. The annals of nations contain no account of a 
more unimpeachable character, either in military or civil 
life. And what adds much to the splendour of his reputa- 
tion, he was as highly distinguished as a statesman, as he 
had previously been as a soldier. In both he was illus- 
trious in the most exalted sense of the word ; while m 
private life, he was, in an exemplary degree, amiable and 
virtuous, beloved by his most intimate friends, and re- 
spected and venerated by an enlarged and highly respec- 
table circle of neighbours and acquaintance. 

Such was the man who was stigmatized in this letter 
to a foreigner, residing in a distant quarter of the globe, 
as a member of an " Anglo-monarchic-aristocratic party" 
in this country, whose " avou-ed object was to impose on 
us the substance, as they had already given us the form, 
of the British government." General Washington's re- 
publicanism is here expressly denied, notwithstanding he 
had risked more, suffered more, and made greater exer- 
tions, to support and establish the republican character, 
principles, and government of his country, than any other 
individual in it. 

After having thus attempted to fix upon General Wash- 
ington the reproach of being a monarchist, and of enmity 
to the Constitution of the United States, Mr. Jefferson 
proceeds to say of the monarchical party, of which he 
obviously considered General Washington as the head, 
*' They would wrest from us that liberty which u-c have 
obtained by so much labor and peril ; but we shall pre- 
serve it. Our mass of weight and riches are so powerful, 
that we have nothing to fear from any attempt against us 
by force." In the letter, as ^j?^&//^/<6\'/ in his works, this 
passage stands thus : "In short, we are likely to preserve 
the liberty we have obtained only by unremitting labors 
and perils. But we shall preserve it ; and our mass of 
weight and wealth on the good side is so great as, to 
leave no danger that force will ever be attempted against 

5 



34 HISTORY OF THE 

US." In the first place, it may be again remarked, that 
no man, even of ordinary understanding and capacity, 
will ever believe that the difference of phraseology between 
these two versions of this part of the letter, was caused 
by a mere mistake in the translation. The first implies -a 
full expectation that force might be used to destroy our 
liberties. It says, " They would urest from us that liberty," 
&.C. The second, that we are likely to preserve the liberty 
we have obtained," &c. without a suggestion of any at- 
tempt to wrest it from us. 

The letter, however, states the manner in which our 
liberties are to be preserved. It says — " It is sufficient 
that we guard ourselves, and that we break the Lilliputian 
ties by which they have bound us, in the first slumbers 
which have succeeded our labours." In the letter in the 
published works, this sentence is thus expressed — " We 
have only to awake and snap the Lilliputian cords with 
which they have been entangling us during the first step 
which succeeded our labors." This can be considered in 
no other light, than that of referring to the Constitution 
of the United States. It has already appeared, by the 
language used in a variety of instances in his letters that 
have been quoted, that Mr. Jefferson had strong objections 
to the constitution, and that in his judgment, " all that 
was good in it might have been included in three or four 
articles," added to the old confederation. As it was, the 
government was too strong for his taste. The first slum- 
bers which succeeded the labours of the country in achieving 
its independence, must mean the period between the peace 
of 1783, and the adoption of the constitution. This con- 
stitution was ^'■thc Lilliputian //e" by which the nation 
had been bound, while in a fit of drowsiness ; but which 
must be broken, to insure its safety from bondage. This 
passage will assist the community in forming a just esti- 
mate of Mr. Jefferson's regard for the constitution, and 
of the government which it provided, and over which he 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 35 

was destined at a future day to preside. This constitu- 
tion General Washington assisted in forming ; he recom- 
mended it strongly to the adoption of the country ; and 
he devoted his great talents and influence for eight years 
to the developement of its principles, and the establish- 
ment of its operations; and was laboriously engaged in 
these patriotic labours at the moment when Mr. Jefferson 
was thus secretly calumniating his character, and im- 
peaching his integrity ; and at the same time declaring, 
that our liberties could only be preserved by the destruc- 
tion of the constitution. 

But Mr. Jeffierson had still another machine to make 
use of in accomplishing our deliverance from the dangers 
with which our liberties were surrounded, and by which 
our freedom was threatened. " It suffices," says the let- 
ter first published, " that we arrest the progress of that 
system of ingratitude, and injustice towards France, from 
which they would alienate us, to bring us under British 
influence,''^ &c. 

Here is to be found the great governing principle of 
Mr. Jefl^erson's political conduct. — It u'as friendship for 
France and enmity to Great Britain. Those who 
did not adopt his sentiments, and pursue his system of 
policy, were monarchists and aristocrats; and those who 
agreed with him, and placed themselves under his direc- 
tion and influence, were republicans. 

It should be mentioned as one of the singular circum- 
stances which attend this letter, that the sentence last 
quoted from it is entirely omitted in that published in the 
posthumous works. It would seem very strange that the 
person who translated Mr. Mazzei's letter, should not only 
have added this sentence, and then finished with an &c. 
as if there had been something still further, if, as Mr. 
Jeff*erson would have it understood by leaving a copy of 
it to be published after his death, no such sentence was in 
the original. 



36 HISTORY OF THE 

That this attack upon the reputation of General Wash- 
ington, was the result of a political calculation, and intend- 
ed to answer the selfish and ambitious purposes of Mr. 
Jefferson, cannot for a moment be doubted. It has been 
seen, that General Washington, at the first organization of 
the government, appointed him Secretary of State. Mr. 
Jefferson's letters, on various occasions, are full of expres- 
sions of respect and regard for General Washington. He 
left that office at the close of the year 1793, and retired to 
his residence at Monticello, in Virginia. There he wrote, 
in 1818, the first article in that collection of "Ana," as it 
now stands in his book. This, it will be observed, was 
more than twenty years after the date of his letter to 
Mazzei. In that, when speaking of General Hamilton's 
influence, arising from the Bank, and other measures, and 
alluding to his monarchical principles, he says — " Here 
then was the real ground of the opposition which was 
made to the course of his administration. Its object was 
to preserve the legislature pure and independent of the 
executive, to restrain the administration to republican 
forms and principles, and not permit the constitution 
to be construed into a monarchy, and to be warped in 
practice, into all the principles and pollutions of their fa- 
vorite English model. Nor was this an opposition to Ge- 
neral Washington. He was true to the republican charge 
confided to him ; and has solemnly and repeatedly protest- 
ed to me, in our conversation, that he would lose the last 
drop of his blood in support of it." 

In the month of February, 1791, the House of Repre- 
sentatives of the United States passed a resolution calling 
on the Secretary of State [Mr. Jefferson] " to report to 
congress the nature and extent of the privileges and re- 
strictions of the commercial intercourse of the United 
States with foreign nations, and the measures which he 
should think proper to be adopted for the improvement of 
the commerce and navigation of the same." This report 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 37 

iv&s not delivered until December, 1793 ; and on the last 
day of that month Mr. Jefferson resigned his office. On 
the 4th of January following, the house resolved itself 
into a committee of the whole on the report above alluded 
to, " when Mr. Madison laid on the table a series of re- 
solutions for the consideration of the members." 

" These memorable resolutions," says Judge Marshall, 
in his Life of Washington, " almost completely embraced 
the idea of the report. They imposed an additional duty 
on the manufactures, and on the tonnage of vessels, of 
nations having no commercial treaty with the United 
States ; while they reduced the duties already imposed by 
law on the tonnage of vessels belonging to nations having 
such commercial treaty ; and they reciprocated the restric- 
tions which were imposed on American navigation." 

Mr. Pitkin, in his '' Political and Civil History of the 
United States," when alluding to this subject, says, " This 
report of Mr. Jefferson formed the basis of the celebrated 
commercial resolutions, as they were called, submitted to 
the house by Mr. Madison early in January, 1794. The 
substance of the first of these resolutions was, that the 
interest of the United States would be promoted by further 
restrictions and higher duties, in certain cases, on the 
manufactures and navigation of foreign nations. The ad- 
ditional duties were to be laid on certain articles manu- 
factured by those European nations which had no commer- 
cial treaties with the United States." " The last of the 
resolutions declared, that provision ought to be made for 
ascertaining the losses sustained by American citizens, 
from the operation of particular regulations of any country 
contravening the law of nations ; and that these losses be 
reimbursed, in the first instance, out of the additional du- 
ties on the manufactures and vessels of the nations estab- 
lishing such regulations." 

A long debate ensued on these resolutions, in the course 
of which, Mr. Fitzsimmons, a member from Pennsylvania, 



38 HISTORY OF THE 

moved that in their operations they should extend to all 
nations. This motion was met by one from Mr. Nicholas, 
of Virginia, the object of which was to exempt all nations 
from their operation except Great Britain. 

" In discussing these resolutions," says Mr. Pitkin, " a 
wide range was taken ; their political as well as commer- 
cial effects upon foreign nations, were brought into view. 
In the course of the debate it was soon apparent, that their 
political bearing was considered as the most important, 
particularly on that nation to which its operation was 
finally limited, by the motion of Mr. Nicholas." 

Judge Marshall gives a more extended sketch of the de- 
bate- The advocates of the resolutions said, they " con- 
ceived it impracticable to do justice to the interests of the 
United States without some allusion to politics ;" and after a 
long discussion of the character and effects of the resolu- 
tions, " It was denied that any real advantage was derived 
from the extensive credit given by the merchants of Great 
Britain. On the contrary the use made of British capital 
was pronounced a great political evil. It increased the 
unfavourable balance of trade, discouraged domestic man- 
ufactures, and promoted luxury. But its greatest mischief 
was, that it favored a system of British influence, which 
was dangerous to their political security." 

" It was said to be proper in deciding the question 
under debate, to take into view political, as well as com- 
mercial considerations. Ill will and jealousy had at all 
times been the predominant features of the conduct of 
England to the United States. That government had 
grossly violated the treaty of peace, had declined a com- 
mercial treaty, had instigated the Indians to raise the 
tomahawk and scalping knife against American citizens, 
had let loose the Algerines upon their unprotected com- 
merce, and had insulted their flag, and pillaged their trade 
in every quarter of the world. These facts being noto- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 39 

rious, it was astonishing to hear gentlemen ask how had 
Britain injured their commerce? 

" The conduct of France, on the contrary, had been 
warm and friendly. That nation had respected American 
rights, and had offered to enter into commercial arrange- 
ments on the liberal basis of perfect reciprocity. 

" In contrasting the ability of the two nations to support 
a commercial conflict, it was said Great Britain, tottering 
under the weight of a king, a court, a nobility, a priest- 
hood, armies, navies, debts, and all the complicated ma- 
chinery of oppression which serves to increase the number 
of unproductive, and lessen the number of productive 
hands ; at this moment engaged in a foreign war ; taxa- 
tion already carried to the ultimatum of financial device ; 
the ability of the people already displayed in the payment 
of taxes constituting a political phenomenon ; all prove 
the debility of the system and the decrepitude of old age. 
On the other hand, the United States, in the flower of 
youth ; increasing in hands ; increasing in wealth ; and 
although an imitative policy has unfortunately prevailed 
in the erection of a funded debt, in the establishment of 
an army, in the establishment of a navy, and all the paper 
machinery for increasing the number of unproductive, and 
lessening the number of productive hands ; yet the opera- 
tion of natural causes has, as yet, in some degree, coun- 
tervailed their influence, and still furnishes a great superi- 
ority in comparison with Great Britain." 

" The present time was declared to be peculiarly favour- 
able to the views of the United States. It was only while 
their enemy was embarrassed with a dangerous foreign 
war, that they could hope for the establishment of just and 
equal principles." 

The real object of this report by the Secretary of State, 
and of the resolutions introduced by Mr. Madison, was 
stated in the course of the debate upon the latter. *' The 
discussion of this subject, it was said, '' has assumed an 



40 HISTORY OF THE 

appearance which must be surprising to a stranger, and 
painful in the extreme to ourselves. The supreme legis- 
lature of the United States is seriously deliberating, not 
upon the welfare of our own citizens, but upon the rela- 
tive circumstances of two European nations; and this de- 
liberation has not for its object the relative benefits of their 
markets to us, but which form of government is best and 
most like our own, which people feel the greatest affection 
for us, and what measures we can adopt which will best 
humble one, and exalt the other. 

" The primary motive of these resolutions, as acknow- 
ledged by their defenders, is not the increase of our agri- 
culture, manufactures, or navigation, but to humble Great 
Britain, and build up France." 

And such was unquestionably their real character and 
object. But the intended operation of them, and of the 
language and sentiments uttered respectingthem in debate, 
was so clear and explicit, that they could not be mistaken, 
and therefore they could not fail of producing their designed 
effect upon the feelings of the British government and 
people. Nor could they be viewed in any other light, than 
as expressing great hostility to the interests of that nation, 
and strong partiality to those of France. And hence may 
be discerned the first traces of that system of policy towards 
Great Britain, which originated with Mr. Jefferson, and 
was steadily pursued by him through the remainder of his 
political life, and by his immediate successor in the admi- 
nistration of the national government, until it terminated 
in the war of 1812. 

To establish the truth of the position just advanced, it 
will be necessary to give a historical account of the mea- 
sures of the government, relating to the general subject, 
under the administrations of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madi- 
son. The facts which will be adduced, will be derived 
from the public records and state papers, or from other 
sources equally authentic and creditable. 



HARTFORD' CONVENTION. 41 

In April, 1794, Mr. Jay, then Chief Justice of the United 
States, was appointed minister extraordinary to the court 
of Great Britain. This mission was strongly disHked by 
the party of which Mr. Jefferson was the acknowledged 
leader. But notwithstanding their disapprobation it was 
pursued; and in November following, a treaty was con- 
cluded, in which the great causes of uneasiness and 
animosity between the two nations were adjusted, and a 
foundation laid for their future peace, harmony, and friend- 
ship. As soon as the news reached this country that such 
a treaty had been concluded and signed, and long before 
its contents were known, there was a great degree of 
excitement among what Mr. Jefferson called the republi- 
can party. Notwithstanding all the clamour, the treaty 
was submitted to the Senate, who advised its ratification, 
with the exception of one article. One member of that 
body, however, in violation of the injunction of secrecy 
under which they acted, and before the treaty was signed 
by the President, published it in a newspaper. Imme- 
diately upon its appearance, the country was thrown into 
a ferment, and every possible effort was made to induce 
the President to reject it. Meetings were held, violent 
resolutions were passed, and inflammatory addresses were 
made, and circulated, with the hope, if not the expectation, 
of overawing that dignified and inflexible magistrate and 
patriot, and of inducing him to withhold his final approba- 
tion from the treaty. The attempts all failed ; — the treatv 
was 1-a.tified ; and the nation derived from it numerous and 
substantial benefits. 

But it met the most decided disapprobation of Mr. 
Jefferson. In a letter to Mann Page, dated August 30th, 
1795, he says — " I do not believe with the Roche- 
foucaults and Montaignes, that fourteen out of fifteen men 
are rogues. I believe a great abatement from that propor- 
tion may be made in favour of general honesty. But I 
have always found that rogues would he uppermost, and I 

6 



42 HISTORY OF THE 

do not know that the proportion is too strong for the higher 
orders, and for those who, rising above the swinish multi- 
tude, always contrive to nestle themselves into the places 
of power and profit. These rogues set out with stealing 
the people's good opinion, and then steal from them the 
right of withdrawing it, by contriving laws and associations 
against the power of the people themselves. Our part of 
the country is in a considerable fermentation on what they 
suspect to be a recent roguery of this kind. They say that 
while all hands were below deck, mending sails, splicing 
ropes, and every one at his own business, and the captainr 
in his cabin attending to his log-book and chart, a rogue 
of a 'pilot has run them into an enemy's port. But meta- 
phor apart, there is much dissatisfaction witli Mr. Jay and 
his treaty.'''' In a letter to William B. Giles, dated Decem- 
ber 31, 1795, he says — " I am well pleased with the man- 
ner in which your house have testified their sense of the 
treaty : while their refusal to pass the original clause of 
the reported answer proved their condemnation, the con- 
trivance to let it disappear silently respected appearances 
in favour of the president, who errs as other men do, but 
errs with integrity." In a letter to Edward Rutledge^ 
dated November 30th, 1795, he says — " I join with you in 
thinking the treaty an execrable thing. But both nego- 
tiators must have understood, that as there were articles 
in it which could not be carried into execution without the 
aid of the legislatures on both sides, therefore it must be 
referred to them, and that these legislatures, being free 
agents, would not give it their support if they disapproved 
of it. I trust the popular branch of our legislature will 
disapprove of it, and thus rid us o? an infamous act, which 
is really nothing more than a treaty of alliance between 
England and the Anglomen of this country, against the 
legislature and people of the United States." 

This animosity against the treaty cannot be accounted 
for, on the ground that it was not a beneficial measure to 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 43 

the nation. After the excitement which its pubHcation 
and ratification produced had subsided, its advantages were 
reaUzed and acknowledged ; and it may be said with 
safety, that no subsequent arrangement between the two 
nations has ever been as beneficial to the United States 
as this. But it removed many sources of difficulty — the 
western posts, which the British had retained in violation 
of the treaty of 1783, were surrendered ; and the com- 
merce of the country was greatly benefited. And it was 
calculated to remove a variety of causes of uneasiness, of 
complaint, of interference, and of recrimination, between 
the nations, and therefore was thoroughly reprobated by 
Mr. JeflTerson. And it appears, by the last quotation from 
his letters, that rather than have it established, and go into 
operation, he would have rejoiced if the House of Repre- 
sentatives had encroached upon the constitutional prero- 
gative of the President and Senate, and withheld the 
necessary legislative aid to carry its provisions into effect. 
The constitution authorizes the President, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties ; and 
treaties, when constitutionally made, are declared to be 
the supreme law of the land. Of course, when thus made, 
if they require legislative acts to carry them into effect, the 
legislature are bound by their constitutional duty, to pass 
such laws ; otherwise the supreme law of the land may be 
rendered inoperative, and be defeated, by one branch of 
the government. This bold experiment, Mr. Jefferson 
would have been gratified to see made, rather than have 
peace and friendship established between this country and 
Great Britain. 

Nor is the coarse attack upon Mr. Jay's character, by 
Mr. Jefferson, in his letter above quoted, the least repre- 
hensible circumstance in his conduct in relation to this 
treaty. 3Ir. Jay was one of the most pure and virtuous 
patriots that this country ever produced. His talents were 
of a very high "order, his public services were of the most 



44 HISTORY OF THE 

meritorious and disinterested description, and his public 
and private reputation without reproach. Yet, with an air 
of levity, approaching jocularity, he is represented by Mr. 
Jefferson as one of those fortunate '■^ rogues,-^ who contrive 
to keep themselves uppermost in the world, — one who had 
been guilty of an "infamous act" in making the treaty. 
Happy would it have been for his calumniator, if his cha- 
racter had been equally pure, and his services equally dis- 
interested and patriotic. 

When 3Ir. Jefferson came into office as chief magistrate 
of the Union, in 1801, Rufus King was minister from the 
United States to Great Britain. In June, 1802, that gen- 
tleman was instructed to adjust the boundary line between 
the two nations ; and in May, 1803, in pursuance of his 
instructions, ho concluded a convention with that govern- 
ment. A dispute on this subject had existed between the 
two countries, from the ratification of the treaty of peace 
in 1783, to the date of the above mentioned convention. 
In forming this convention, it is known that Mr. King's 
views were fully acceded to by the British commissioner, 
Lord Hawkesbury, the latter having left the draft of the 
convention to Mr. King, and fully approved of that which 
he prepared. In a message of the President of the United 
States to Congress, dated October 17, 1803, is the follow- 
ing ]>assage — "A further knowledge of the ground, in the 
north-eastern and north-western angles of the United 
States, has evinced that the boundaries established by the 
treaty of Paris, between the British territories and ours 
in those parts, were too imperfectly described to be sus- 
ceptible of execution. It has therefore been thought 
worthy of attention for preserving and cherishing the har- 
mony and useful intercourse subsisting between the two 
nations, to remove by timely arrangements, what unfa- 
vourable incidents might otherwise render a ground of 
future misunderstanding. A convention has therefore 
been entered into, which provides for a practicable demar- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 45 

cation of those limits, to the satisfaction of both parties. 
The following is a copy of a letter from Mr. King, which 
accompanied the convention, when it was transmitted to 
the United States government 

" London, May 13, 1803. 

" Sir, — I have the honour to transmit herewith the con- 
vention which 1 yesterday signed in triplicate with Lord 
Hawkesbury relative to our boundaries. The convention 
does not vary in any thing material from the tenour of my 
instructions. The line through the bay of Passamaquoddy 
secures our interest in that quarter. The provision for 
running, instead of describing, the line between the north- 
west corner of Nova Scotia and the source of Connecticut 
river, has been inserted as well on account of the progress 
of the British settlements towards the source of the Con- 
necticut, as of the difficulty in agreeing upon any new de- 
scription of the manner of running this line without more 
exact information than is at present possessed of the geo- 
graphy of the country. 

" The source of the Mississippi nearest to the Lake of 
the Woods, according to Mackenzie's report, will be found 
about twenty-nine miles to the westward of any part of 
that lake, which is represented to be nearly circular. 
Hence a direct line between the northwesternmost part of 
the lake, and the nearest source of the Mississippi, which 
is preferred by this government, has appeared to me 
equally advantageous with the lines we had proposed. 

"RUFUSKlNG." 

On the 24th of October, one week after the delivery of 
the message to Congress, from which the passage above 
quoted is taken, Mr. Jefferson submitted this convention 
to the Senate, accompanied by the following message : — 

" I lay before you the convention signed on the 12th 
day of May last, between the United States and Great 



46 HISTORY OF THE 

Britain, for settling their boundaries in the north-eastern 
and north-western parts of the United States, which was 
mentioned in my general message of the 17th instant; to- 
gether with such papers relating thereto as may enable 
you to determine whether you will advise and consent to 
its ratification." 

A letter from Mr. Madison, Secretary of State, to Mr. 
Monroe, minister at Great Britain, dated February 14th, 
1801, contains the following passage: — 

" You will herewith receive the ratification, by the Pre- 
sident and Senate, of the convention with the British go- 
vernment, signed on the 12th of May, 1803, with an ex- 
ception of the 5th article. Should the British government 
accede to this change in the instrument, you will proceed 
to an exchange of ratifications, and transmit the one re- 
ceived without delay, in order that the proper steps may 
be taken for carrying the convention into efl^ect." 

" The objection to the fifth article appears to have 
arisen from the posteriority of the signature and ratifica- 
tion of this convention to those of the last convention with 
France, ceding Louisiana to the United States, and from 
a presumption that the line to be run in pursuance of the 
fifth article, might thence be found or alledged to abridge 
the northern extent of that acquisition." 

Then follow a series of reasons intended to show why the 
British government ought not to make objections to the 
alterations proposed by ours. 

" First. It would be unreasonable that any advantage 
against the United States should be constructively autho- 
rized by the posteriority of the dates in question, the in- 
structions given to enter into the convention, and the un- 
derstanding of the parties at the time of signing it, having 
no reference whatever to any territorial rights of the 
United States acquired by the previous convention with 
France, but referring merely to the territorial rights as 
understood at the date of the instructions for and signa- 



HARTFORD COiWENTION. 4Y 

ture of the British convention. The copy of a letter from 
Mr. King, hereto annexed, is precise and conchisive on 
this subject. 

" Secondly, If the fifth article be expunged, the north 
boundary of Louisiana will, as is reasonable, remain the 
same in the hands of the United States as it was in the 
hands of France, and may be adjusted and established ac- 
cording to the principles and authorities which would in 
that case have been applicable. 

" Fourthly. Laying aside, however, all the objections to 
the fifth article, the proper extension of a dividing line in 
that quarter will be equally open for friendly negociation 
after, as without, agreeing to the other parts of the con- 
vention, and considering the remoteness of the time at 
which such a line will become actually necessary, the post- 
ponement of it is of little consequence. The truth is that 
the British government seemed at one time to favour this 
delay, and the instructions given by the United States rea- 
dily acquiesced in it." 

It will be recollected, that in the message to Congress, 
on the 17th of October, J803, from which we have just 
quoted a passage, Mr. Jefl'erson speaks of this convention 
as one that would give satisfaction to all parties. It seems, 
however, not to have been ratified, although it was submit- 
ted to the Senate for their approbation only one week after 
the date of the abovementioned message to Congress. All 
that can be ascertained respecting the causes of its rejec- 
tion, are to be found in the above cited letter from the 
Secretary of State to Mr. Monroe, where the principal 
ground appears to be that it might in some way affect our 
concerns ivith France. By its rejection, however, the dis- 
pute about the boundary line was left unadjusted, and has 
remained so to this day. 

Mr. Jay's treaty expired in 1804. As the country had 
experienced its beneficial effects for ten years, it was rea- 
sonable to expect that it would have been renewed at the 



4d HISTORY OF THE 

earliest opportunity. On the 7th of August, 1804, Mr. 
Monroe, then ambassador from the United States to Great 
Britain, wrote a letter on that subject to Mr. Madison, 
then Secretary of State, from which the following are ex- 
tracts. 

" I received a note from Lord Harrowby on the 3d in- 
stant, requesting me to call on him at his office the next 
day, which I did. His lordship asked me, in what light 
was our treaty viewed by our government ? I replied that 
it had been ratified with the exception of the fifth article, 
as I had informed him on a former occasion. He observed 
that he meant the treaty of 1794, which by one of its 
stipulations was to expire two years after the signature of 
preliminary articles for concluding the then existing war 
between Great Britain and France. He wished to know 
whether we considered the treaty as actually expired. I 
said that I did presume there could be but one opinion on 
that point in respect to the commercial part of the treaty, 
which was, that it had expired : that the first ten articles 
were made permanent ; that other articles had been exe- 
cuted, but then, being limited to a definite period which 
had passed, must be considered as having expired with it." 

After a further detail of the conversation, the letter 
proceeds — 

" He asked, how far it would be agreeable to our go- 
vernment to stipulate, that the ireati/ of 1794: should remain 
in force until two years should expire after the conclusion of 
the present war 9 I told his lordship that I had no power 
to agree to such a proposal ; that the President, animated 
by a sincere desire to cherish and perpetuate the friendly 
relations subsisting between the two countries, had been 
disposed to postpone the regulation of their general commer- 
cial system till the period should arrive, when each party, 
enjoying the blessings of peace, might find itself at liberty to 
pay the subject the attention it merited ; that he wished those 
regulations to be founded in the permanent interests, justly 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 49 

and liberally viewed, of both countries ; that he sought for 
the present only to remove certain topics which produced 
irritation in the intercourse, such as the impressment of 
seamen, and in our commerce with other powers, parties 
to the present war, according to a project which I had the 
honor to present to his predecessor some months since, 
with which I presumed his lordship was acquainted. He 
seemed desirous to decline any conversation on this latter 
subject, though it was clearly to be inferred, from what he 
said, to be his opinion, that the policy which our govern- 
ment seemed disposed to pursue in respect to the general 
system, could not otherwise than be agreeable to his. He 
then added, that his government might probably, for the 
present, adopt the treaty of 1794, as the rule in its own con- 
cerns, or in respect to duties on importations from our country, 
and, as I understood him, all other subjects to which it 
extended ; in which case, he said, if the treaty had expired, 
the ministry would take the responsibility on itself, as there 
would be no law to sanction the measure : that in so doing, 
he presumed that the measure would be well received by 
our government, and a similar practice, in what concerned 
Great Britain, reciprocated. I observed, that on that par- 
ticular topic I had no authority to say any thing specially, 
the proposal being altogether new and unexpected ; that 
I should communicate it to you ; and that I doubted not 
that it would be considered by the President with the at- 
tention it merited. Not wishing, however, to authorize an 
mference, that that treaty should ever form a basis of a 
future one between the two countries, I repeated some re- 
marks which I had made to Lord Hawkesbury in the in- 
terview which we had just before he left the department 
of foreign affairs, by observing that informing a new treaty 
we must begin de novo ; that America was a young and 
thriving country ; that at the time that treaty was formed, 
she had little experience of her relations with foreign 
powers ; that ten years had since elapsed, a great portion 



50 HISTORY OF THE 

of the term within which she had held the rank of a sepa- 
rate and independent nation, and exercised the powers 
belonging to it ; that our interests were better understood 
on both sides at this time than they then were ; that the 
treaty was known to contain things that neither liked ; 
that I spoke with confidence on that point on our part ; 
that in making a new treaty we might ingraft from that 
into it what suited us, orait what we disliked, and add 
what the experience of our respective interests might sug- 
gest to be proper ; and being equally anxious to preclude 
the inference of any sanction to the maritime pretensions 
under that treaty, in respect to neutral commerce, I deem- 
ed it proper to advert again to the project, which I had 
presented some time since, for the regulation of those 
points, to notice its contents, and express an earnest wish 
that his lordship would find leisure, and be disposed to act 
on it. He excused himself again from entering into this 
subject, from the weight and urgency of other business, 
the difficulty of the subject, and other general remarks of 
the kind." 

By this correspondence it appears, that it was a part 
of Mr. Jefferson's policy, whenever Mr. Jay's treaty 
should expire, not to renew it. There were undoubtedly 
personal reasons for the adoption of this course. Mr. Jef- 
ferson, as has been seen, considered that treaty as an exe- 
crable measure, and regarded its ratification as opposed 
to the interests of revolutionary France, to which he was, 
in heart and soul, devoted. The advantages of the treaty 
had been so fully realized, that it was natural to expect 
that our government would have yielded at once to the 
offer of the British ministry to renew it. Their wil- 
lingness to form a new treaty, upon the principles of Mr. 
Jay's, was repeatedly expressed, first by Lord Hawkes- 
bury, in April, 1804, and afterwards by Lord Harrowby^ 
in August of the same year. Lord Hawkesbury, in a con- 
versation with Mr. Monroe, " went so far as to express a 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 51 

wish that the principles of the treaty of 1794 might be 
adopted in the convention, which it was then proposed to 
make; and Lord Harrowby informed him, " that his go- 
vernment might probably, for the present, adopt the treaty 
of 1794, as the rule in its own concerns, or in respect to 
importations from our country, and as he understood him, 
all other subjects to which it extended." He even went 
further, and said, if the treaty had expired (about which 
Lord Harrowby appeared to doubt) the ministry would 
take the responsibility on itself, as there would be no law 
to sanction the measure." But Mr. Monroe, acting under 
his instructions, was not willing to authorize even an in- 
ference, that the treaty of 1794 should ever form the basis 
of a future one, repeated to him the remarks he had pre- 
viously made to Lord Hawkesbury, and observed, that in 
forming a new one, we must begin de novo — that we were 
then but little experienced in our relations with foreign 
countries ; that our interests were better understood on 
both sides than when the treaty was made — and that in 
making a new one, we might introduce into it what suited 
us, omit what we disliked, and add what experience might 
suggest to be proper. 

The idea that the agents on the part of the United 
States, in this attempt at negotiation, understood the 
interests of their country more thoroughly than those con- 
nected with the negotiation of 1794, is but little short of 
ludicrous. The treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay, in its ope- 
ration and effects, proved to be a most beneficial one to 
the country ; and it is a little remarkable, that no subse- 
quent arrangement with Great Britain has been equally 
advantageous. Under Mr. Jefferson's directions, an effort 
was constantly made to procure some provision against 
impressment — an object, certainly of great importance to 
our country. But, when it was found impracticable to 
induce the British government to enter into stipulations on 
that subject, it might well be doubted whether it was good 



52 HISTORY OF THE 

policy, by insisting upon an impracticable measure, to 
sacrifice all the other advantages which must necessarily 
arise from a just and reasonable commercial treaty with 
that nation. To this day such a stipulation has not been 
obtained ; but the disadvantages experienced by the trade 
of the United States, for the want of a treaty -like that 
negotiated by Mr. Jay, have been numerous, and greatly 
detrimental. Those advantages were lost by not renewing 
that treaty; and the treaty was not renewed, it is believed 
the facts will warrant the declaration, because it com- 
ported with Mr. Jefferson's policy, at all times, to keep 
alive a controversy with Great Britain. 

In April, 1806, William Pinkney, of Maryland, was 
appointed joint commissioner with Mr. Monroe, for the 
purpose of settling all matters of difference between the 
United States and Great Britain, " relative to wrongs 
committed between the parties on the high seas, or other 
waters, and for establishing the principles of navigation 
and commerce between them." Their negotiations were 
held under the ministry of Mr. Fox, who was considered 
as a great friend to the United States. Owing to his 
sickness, the business on the part of the British govern- 
ment was placed in the hands of his nephew. Lord Hol- 
land, and Lord Auckland. On the 11th of September, 
1806, the American commissioners wrote to the secretary 
of state, giving him an account of their first interview with 
the noblemen abovementioned, in which, when noticing the 
matter of impressment, they say — "On the impressment 
subject it was soon apparent they (Lords Holland and 
Auckland) felt the strongest repugnance to a formal re- 
nunciation or abandonment of their claim to take from our 
vessels on the high seas such seamen as should appear to 
be their own subjects." And such was the answer, from 
first to last, to every attempt to come to a formal arrange- 
ment on this perplexing subject. Every ministry of Great 
Britain, however diflferently disposed on many other sub- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 53 

jects, on this thought and acted alike. With all the 
evidence that they possessed of the impracticability of 
negotiating successfully on this topic, Mr. Jefferson made 
it the turning point of all his efforts. In pursuance of this 
determination, on the 3d of February, 1807, Mr. Madison, 
secretary of state, wrote to Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, 
and after having alluded to the matter of impressments, 
said — 

" In the mean time, the President has, with all those 
friendly and conciliatory dispositions which produced your 
mission, and pervade your instructions, weighed the ar- 
rangement held out in your last letter, which contemplates 
a formal adjustment of the other topics under discussion, 
and an informal understanding only on that of impress- 
ment. The result of his deliberations which I am now to 
state to you, is, that it does not comport with his views of 
the national sentiment, or the legislative policy, that any 
treaty should be entered into with the British government 
which, whilst on every other point it is limited to, or short 
of strict right, would include no article providing for a case 
which both in principle and practice, is so feelingly con- 
nected with the honour and sovereignty of the nation, as 
well as with its fair interests ; and indeed with the peace 
of both nations."] 

"The President thinks it more eligible, under all cir- 
cumstances, that if no satisfactory or formal stipulation on 
the subject of impressmewt be attainable, the negotiation 
should be made to terminate without any formal compact 
whatever." 

On the 3d of January, 1807, Messrs. Monroe and Pink- 
ney wrote to the Secretary of State, saying — " We have the 
honour to transmit to you a treaty, which we concluded 
with the British commissioners on the 31st of December. 
Although we had entertained great confidence from the 
commencement of the negotiation, that such would be its 
result, it was not till the 27th, that we were able to make 



54 HISTORY OF THE 

any satisfactory arrangement of several of the most im- 
portant points that were involved in it. A large proportion 
of the provisions of this treaty, — no less than eleven of its 
articles — was taken from that o/1794." After giving an 
account of the various articles, those gentlemen say — 

" We are sorry to add that this treaty contains no 
provision against the impressment of our seamen. Our 
despatch of the 11th of November, comnmnicated to you 
the result of our labours on that subject, and our opinion 
that, although this government did not feel itself at liberty 
to relinquish, formally by treaty, its claim to search our 
merchant vessels for British seamen, its practice would, 
nevertheless, be essentially, if not completely abandoned. 
That opinion has been since confirmed by frequent confe- 
rences on the subject with the British commissioners, who 
have repeatedly assured us, that, in their judgment, we 
were made as secure against the exercise of their preten- 
sion by the policy which their government had adopted in 
regard to that very delicate and important question, as we 
could have been made by treaty." 

This treaty was received at Washington the beginning of 
March, 1807, but was never even submitted to the Senate 
for their advice and consent to its ratification. On the 
20th of May following, Mr. Madison wrote to Messrs. 
Monroe and Pinkney on the subject. The following is an 
extract from his letter : — 

" The President has seen in your exertions to accom- 
plish the great objects of your instructions, ample proofs of 
that zeal and patriotism. in which he confided ; and feels 
deep regret that your success has not corresponded with 
the reasonableness of your propositions, and the ability 
with which they were supported. He laments more espe- 
cially that the British government has not yielded to the 
just and cogent considerations which forbid the practice of 
its cruisers in visiting and impressing the crews of our ves- 
sels, covered by an independent flag, and guarded by the 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 55 

laws of the high seas, which ought to be sacred with all 
nations. 

" The President continues to regard this subject in the 
light in which it has been pressed on the justice and friend- 
ship of Great Britain. He cannot reconcile it with his 
duty to our sea-faring citizens, or with the sensibility or 
sovereignty of the nation to recognise even constructively, 
a principle that would expose on the high seas their liberty, 
their lives, every thing, in a word, that is dearest to the 
human heart, to the capricious or interested sentences 
which may be pronounced against their allegiance by offi- 
cers of a foreign government, whom neither the laws of 
nations, nor even the laws of that government, will allow 
to decide on the ownership or character of the minutest 
article of property found in a like situation." 

"It is considered, moreover, by the President, the more 
reasonable, that the necessary concession in this case 
should be made by Great Britain, rather than by the United 
States, on the double consideration, first, that a concession 
on our part would violate both a moral and political duty 
of the government to our citizens, which would not be the 
case on the other side ; secondly, that a greater number of 
American citizens, than of British subjects, are in fact im- 
pressed from our vessels ; and that, consequently more of 
wrong is done to the United States than of right to Great 
Britain, taking even her own claim for the criterion. 

'* On these grounds, the President is constrained to de- 
cline any arrangement, formal or informal, which does not 
comprise a provision against impressments from American 
vessels on the high seas, and which would, notwithstand- 
ing, be a bar to legislative measures, such as Congress 
have thought, or may think proper to adopt for controlling 
that species of aggression." 

" That you may the more fully understand his impres- 
sions and purposes, I will explain the alterations which are 



56 HISTORY OF THE 

to be regarded as essential, and proceed then to such ob- 
servations on the several articles as will show the other 
alterations which are to be attempted, and the degree of 
importance respectively attached to them. 

*' Without a provision against impressments, substantially 
such as is contemplated in your original instructions, no treaty 
is to he concluded^ 

After a long series of instructions, and remarks, relative 
to the manner of conducting the negociation, and of the 
concessions that may, if necessary, be made, it is said — 

" Should the concession, (relating to the ejuployment of 
seamen belonging to the respective countries,) contrary to 
all expectation, not succeed, even as to the essential ob- 
jects, the course prescribed by prudence will be to signify 
your purpose of transmitting ther esult to your government, 
avoiding carefully any language or appearance of hostile 
anticipations ; and receiving and transmitting, at the same 
time, any overtures which may be made on the other side, 
with a view to bring about an accommodation. As long 
as negociation can be honourably protracted, it is a re- 
source to be preferred under existing circumstances, to the 
peremptory alternative of improper concessions, or inevita- 
ble collisions." 

Thus, it is apparent, that this treaty was rejected pri- 
marily on the ground, that no arrangement was made in 
it to prevent the impressment of seamen. Of the impor- 
tance of such an arrangement, had it been practicable, 
there can be no difference of opinion among the inhabitants 
of the United States. But when it was perfectly ascer- 
tained, that no stipulations on that subject could be obtain- 
ed, that every successive cabinet in England had agreed 
on this point, and the question only remained for our ad- 
ministration to determine, whether all the relations of the 
two nations, and impressments with them, should be left 
in a loose, undefined, and irritating condition, or all except 
that should be satisfactorily adjusted, leaving that for fu- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 57 

lure consideration, no reasonable doubt can be entertained 
that the latter course should have been pursued. It will be 
recollected that the standing reason urged by Great Bri- 
tain, against yielding the principle that our flag should 
protect the crew was, that she was struggling against the 
power of revolutionary France for her existence, and de- 
pended on her navy for her safety ; and that under such 
circumstances she could not admit the force of mere ab- 
stract principles — self-preservation being with her the 
highest object of consideration. There certainly was much 
force in this objection on her part, to treating on that spe- 
cific point, at that critical period. That Mr. Jefferson 
should feel differently from the British statesmen, was 
perfectly natural. It has been shown that his governing 
principle in politics was, animosity against Great Britain, 
and attachment to France. It was well known, that from 
the strong national resemblance between Britons and 
Americans, and particularly from the identity of language, 
great difficulty would exist in distinguishing between Ame- 
rican citizens and British subjects ; and this was one argu- 
ment strongly urged against negotiation on this subject. 
But a clue to Mr. Jefferson's feelings towards that nation, 
may be discovered in his works published since his death, 
beyond the passages already quoted. The following is a 
letter to William B. Giles : — 

'' Monticello, April 27, 1795. 
" Dear Sir, — Your favour of the 16th came to hand by 
the last post. I sincerely congratulate you on the great 
prosperity of our two first allies, the French and the 
Dutch. If I could but see them now at peace with the 
rest of their continent, / should have hut little doubt of 
dining idth Pichegru in London next autumn; for I believe 
I should be tejnpted to leave my clover for awhile, to go and 
hail the dawn of liberty and republicanism in that island^ 

8 



68 HISTORY OF THE 

This is the language of Mr. Jefferson, when writing ta 
an intimate and confidential friend. What must have 
been the principles and the heart of the man, who, from 
mere political feelings and resentments, could talk with 
such an air of levity, on such a subject ? Wishing to dine 
with Pichegru in London, necessarily implied a wish that 
he might, as well as a belief that he would, be able to 
ifwade, overrun, and conquer Great Britain. That is, 
because the people of that nation preferred the govern- 
ment under which they lived, and which had been the 
means of elevating their country to a far greater height 
of freedom, prosperity, power, and renown, than any other 
European nation ever enjoyed, to Mr. Jefferson's notions 
of republicanism, he would have subjected them to all the 
miseries and horrors of an invading and victorious army, 
and to the tremendous consequences which must necessa- 
rily follow such a state of things, in such a country. For- 
tunately for Europe, and the interests of the civilized 
world, he was disappointed of the pleasure to be derived 
from such a festive entertainment. The French were not 
able to conquer Great Britain, and of course Pichegru had 
no opportunity of inviting his republican friends in other 
parts of the world to dine with him in London, and to 
heighten the hilarity of the entertainment, by witnessing 
the pillage and butcheries which must have attended a 
conquest over such a city. 

Mr. Monroe, after the conclusion of the treaty, returned 
to the United States. As might have been expected, he 
considered himself as having been harshly dealt with in 
relation to it. On the 10th of March, 1808, Mr. Jefferson 
wrote to him on that subject. Among other things he 
says — 

" You complain of the manner in which the treaty was 
received. But what was that manner ? I cannot suppose 
you to have given a moment's credit to the stuff which was 
crowded in all sorts" of forms into the public papers, or to 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 59 

the thousand speeches they put into my mouth, not a word 
of which I had ever uttered. I was not insensible at the 
time of the views to mischief, with which these lies were 
fabricated. But my confidence was firm, that neither 
yourself nor the British government, equally outraged by 
them, would believe me capable of making the editors of 
newspapers the confidants of my speeches or opinions. 
The fact was this. The treaty was communicated to us 
by Mr. Erskine on the day Congress was to rise. Two of 
the senators inquired of me in the evening, whether it 
was my purpose to detain them on account of the treaty. 
My answer was, ' that it was not ; that the treaty contain- 
ing no provision against the impressment of our seamen, 
and being accompanied by a kind of protestation of the 
British ministers, which would leave that government free 
to consider it as a treaty or no treaty, according to their 
own convenience, I should not give them the trouble of 
deliberating on it.' This was substantially, and almost 
verbally what I said whenever spoken to about it, and I 
never failed when the occasion would admit of it, to justify 
yourself and Mr. Pinkney, by expressing my conviction, 
that it was all that could he obtained from, the British go- 
vernment ; that you had told their commissioners that your 
government could not be pledged to ratify, because it was 
contrary to their instructions ; of course, that it should be 
considered but as a project ; and in this light 1 stated it 
publicly in my message to congress on the opening of the 
session." 

Some time after his return, Mr. Monroe addressed a 
letter to Mr. Madison, giving a detailed account of the 
difficulties which the commissioners met with in the nego- 
tiations, the light in which he viewed various provisions in 
the treaty, and the sentiments which he entertained of its 
general character. That letter was dated at Richmond, 
Virginia, February 23, 1808. The following are extracts 
from it — 



60 HISTORY OF THE 

" The impressment of seamen from our merchant ves- 
sels is a topic which claims a primary attention, from the 
order which it holds in your letter, but more especially 
from some important considerations that are connected 
with it. The idea entertained by the public is, that the 
rights of the United States were abandoned by the Ame- 
rican commissioners in the late negotiation, and that their 
seamen were left by tacit acquiescence, if not by formal 
renunciation, to depend, for their safety, on the mercy of 
the British cruisers. I have, on the contrary, alvyays be- 
lieved, and still do believe, that the ground on which that 
interest was placed by the paper of the British commis- 
sioners of November 8, 1806, and the explanations which 
accompanied it, was both honourable and advantageous to 
the United States ; that it contained a concession in their 
favour, on the part of Great Britain, on the great principle 
in contestation, never before made by a formal and obliga- 
tory act of the government, which was highly favourable 
to their interest; and that it also imposed on her the obli- 
gation to conform her practice under it, till a more com- 
plete arrangement should be concluded, to the just claims 
of the United States." " The British paper states that 
the king was not prepared to disclaim or derogate from a 
right on which the security of the British navy might 
essentially depend, especially in a conjuncture when he 
was engaged in wars which enforced the necessity of the 
most vigilant attention to the preservation and supply 
of his naval force ; that he had directed his commissioners 
to give to the commissioners of the United States the most 
positive assurances that instructions had been given, and 
should be repeated and enforced, to observe the great- 
est caution in the impressing of British seamen, to pre- 
serve the citizens of the United States from molestation 
or injury, and that immediate and prompt redress should 
be afforded on any representation of injury sustained by 
them. It then proposes to postpone the article relative to 



ARTFORD CONVENTION. 61 

impressment on account of the difficulties which were ex- 
perienced in arranging any article on that subject, and to 
proceed to conclude a treaty on the other points that were 
embraced by the negotiation. As a motive to such post- 
ponement, and the condition of it, it assures us that the 
British commissioners were instructed still to entertain the 
discussion of any plan which could be devised to secure 
the interests of both states without injury to the rights of 
either. 

" By this paper, it is evident that the rights of the 
United States were expressly to be reserved, and not 
abandoned, as has been most erroneously supposed ; that 
the negotiation on the subject of impressment was to be 
postponed for a limited time, and for a special object only, 
and to be revived as soon as that object was accomplished; 
and, in the interim, that the practice of impressment was 
to correspond essentially with the views and interests of 
the United States. It is, indeed, evident, from a correct 
view of the contents of that paper, that Great Britain re- 
fused to disclaim or derogate only from what she called her 
right, as it also is, that as her refusal was made applicable 
to a crisis of extraordinary peril, it authorized the reason- 
able expectation, if not the just claim, that even in that 
the accommodation desired would be hereafter yielded. 

" In our letter to you of November 11, which accom- 
panied the paper under consideration, and in that of 
January 3, which was forwarded with the treaty, these 
sentiments were fully confirmed. In that of November 
11, we communicated one important fact, which left no 
doubt of the sense in which it was intended by the British 
commissioners that that paper should be construed by us. 
In calling your attention to the passage which treats of 
impressment, in reference to the practice which should be 
observed in future, we remarked that the terms " high 
seas" were not mentioned in it, and added that we knew 
that the omission had been intentional. It was impossible 



62 HISTORY OF THE 

that those terms could have been omitted intentionally 
with our knowledge, for any purpose other than to admit a 
construction that it was intended that impressments should 
be confined to the land. I do not mean to imply that it 
was understood between the British commissioners and 
us, that Great Britain should abandon the practice of im- 
pressment on the high seas altogether. I mean, however, 
distinctly to state, that it was understood that the practice 
heretofore pursued by her should be abandoned, and that 
no impressment should be made on the high seas under the 
obligation of that paper, except in cases of an extraordi- 
nary nature, to which no general prohibition against it 
could be construed fairly to extend. The cases to which I 
allude were described in our letter of November 11. They 
suppose, a British ship of war and a merchant vessel of 
the United States, lying in the Tagus or some other port, 
the desertion of some of the sailors from the ship of war 
to the merchant vessel, and the sailing of the latter with 
such deserters on board, they being British subjects. It 
was admitted that no general prohibition against impress- 
ment could be construed to sanction such cases of injustice 
and fraud ; and to such cases it was understood that the 
practice should in future be confined. 

" It is a just claim on our part, that the explanations 
which. were given of that paper by the British commis- 
sioners when they presented it to us, and afterwards while 
the negotiation was depending, which we communicated 
to you in due order of time, should be taken into view, in 
a fair estimate of our conduct in that transaction. As the 
arrangement which they proposed was of an informal 
nature, resting on an understanding between the parties 
in a certain degree confidential, it could not otherwise than 
happen that such explanations would be given us in the 
course of the business, of the views of their government in 
regard to it. And if an arrangement by informal under- 
standing is admissible in any case between nations, it was 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 63 

out^duty to receive those explanations, to give them the 
weight to which they were justly entitled, and to communi- 
cate them to you, with our impression of the extent of the 
obligation which they imposed. It is in that mode only 
that what is called an informal understanding between na- 
tions can be entered into. It presumes a want of precision 
in the written documents connected with it, which is sup- 
plied by mutual explanations and confidence. Reduce the 
transaction to form, and it becomes a treaty. That an 
informal understanding was an admissible mode of arrang- 
ing this interest with Great Britain, is made sufficiently 
evident by your letter of February 3, 1807, in reply to ours 
of November 11, of the preceding year. 

" Without relying, however, on the explanations that 
were given by the British commissioners of the import of 
that paper, or of the course which their government in- 
tended to pursue under it, it is fair to remark on the paper 
itself, that as by it the rights of the parties were reserved, 
and the negotiation might be continued on this particular 
topic, after a treaty should be formed on the others, Great 
Britain was bound not to trespass on those rights while 
that negotiation was depending ; and in case she did tres- 
pass on them, in any the slightest degree, the United 
States would be justified in breaking off the negotiation, 
and appealing to force in vindication of their rights. The 
mere circumstance of entertaining an amicable negotiation 
by one party for the adjustment of a controversy, where no 
right had been acknowledged in it by the other, gives to 
the latter a just claim to such a forbearance on the part of 
the former. But the entertainment of a negotiation for 
the express purpose of securing interests sanctioned by 
acknowledged rights, makes such claim irresistible. We 
were, therefore, decidedly of opinion, that the paper of the 
British commissioners placed the interest of impressment 
on ground which it was both safe and honourable for the 
United States to admit : that in short it gave their govern- 



64 HISTORY OF THE 

ment the command of the subject for every necessary and 
useful purpose. Attached to the treaty, it was the basis or 
condition on which the treaty rested. Strong in its character 
in their favour on the great question of right, and admitting 
a favourable construction on others, it placed them on more 
elevated ground in those respects than they had held 
before; and by keeping the negotiation open to obtain a 
more complete adjustment, the administration was armed 
with the most effectual means of securing it. By this 
arrangement the government possessed a power to coerce 
without being compelled to assume the character belonging 
to coercion, and it was able to give effect to that power 
without violating the relations of amity between the coun- 
tries. The right to break off the negotiation and appeal 
to force, could never be lost sight of in any discussion on . 
the subject ; while there was no obligation to make that 
appeal till necessity compelled it. If Great Britain con- 
formed her practice to the rule prescribed by the paper of 
November 8, and the explanations which accompanied it, 
our government might rest on that ground with advantage ; 
but if she departed from that rule, and a favourable 
opportunity offered for the accomplishment of a more 
complete and satisfactory arrangement, by a decisive effort, 
it would be at liberty to seize such opportunity for the ad- 
vantage of the country." 

Large quotations have been made from this important 
document, not merely for the purpose of showing the 
grounds on which the United States commissioners acted 
in forming and concluding the treaty, but with the view of 
establishing the proposition, that Mr. Jefferson had no 
sincere disposition fully and finally to adjust the sources 
of uneasiness and irritation between this country and Great 
Britain. It will be recollected, that the great reason for 
rejecting this treaty, without even submitting it to the 
Senate, who were in session when it was received, was, 
that it contained no article providing against impressment. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 65 

The other important subjects of negotiation were adjusted 
in it ; and had the treaty been ratified, there is no reason 
to doubt that the war of 1812 might have been avoided. 
And there is too much reason to beUeve, that it was from 
an apprehension that the Senate might have advised to 
its ratification, that their opinion on the subject was not 
requested. It was, however, rejected, for the reason prin- 
cipally that there was no positive provision against im- 
pressment, under a full knowledge that no such provision 
«ould be obtained ; but, at the same time with an informal 
understanding, as appears by Mr. Monroe's letter, that the 
practice should be avoided. The right they would not dis- 
claim ; but they would essentially abstain from its exercise. 

Had the interests of the country alone been consulted, 
if there had not been something else in view, it is difficult 
to imagine any good reason for refusing to adjust all the 
subjects of dispute between this country and Great Britain, 
except one. If every thing had been concluded except 
impressment, the United States would have been placed in 
no worse situation as it regarded that. On the contrary, 
their condition would have been more favourable, both in 
relation to the practice, and to future negotiation. Be- 
sides, even that matter, by the informal understanding be- 
tween the British government and Messrs. Monroe and 
J^iuckney, was much more eligibly disposed of, than it could 
have been if left in the situation in which it had previously 
stood. That it would have been no worse for the United 
States, is most decisively proved by the fact, that from that 
day to this, no arrangement, formal nor informal, against 
impressment, has been made with Great Britain ; nor, on 
other points of difference, have there ever been more ad- 
vantageous terms obtained for the United States than 
were then offered and rejected. 

In June, 1807, the attack of the British frigate Leopard, 
npon the United States frigate Chesapeake, occurred. 

9 



QS HISTORY OF THE 

The first information whicb Mr. Monroe, our minister at 
London, received of this transaction, was through a note 
from Mr. Canning, dated July 25th, 1807. On the 29th 
of July Mr. Monroe addressed a note to Mr, Canning, 
calhng his attention to this aggression on the sovereignty 
of the United States ; and after having stated the case, he 
remarked — "I might state other examples of great indig- 
nity and outrage, many of which are of recent date, to 
which the United States have hecn exposed off their coast, 
and even within several of their harbours, from the British 
squadron ; but it is improper to mingle them with the pre- 
sent more serious cause of complaint ;" and he concluded 
his letter by saying — " I have called your attention to this 
subject, in full confidence that his majesty's government 
will see, in the act complained of, a flagrant abus« of its 
own authority, and that it will not hesitate to enable me 
to communicate to my government, without delay, a frank 
disavowal of the principle on which it was made, and its 
assurance that the officer who is responsible for it — shall 
sufiTer the punishment which so unexampled an aggressioii 
on the sovereignty of a neutral nation justly deserves." 

This letter was answered by Mr. Canning on the 3d of 
August. After noticing the general subject of Mr. Mon- 
roe's aote he remarks — " If, therefore, the statement in 
your note should prove to be correct, and to contain all the 
circumstances of the case, upon which complaint is intend- 
ed to be made, and if it shall appear that the act of his 
majesty's officers rested on no other grounds than the sim- 
ple and unqualified assertion of the pretension above refer- 
red to, his majesty has no difficulty in disowning that act, 
and will have no difficulty in manifesting his displeasure 
at the conduct of his officers. 

'* With respect to the other causes of complaint [whatever 
they may be] which are hinted at in your note, I perfectly 
agree with you, in the sentiment which you express, as Ko 
the propriety of not involving them in a question which is. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 67 

of itself of sufficient importance to claim a separate and 
most serious consideration." 

On the 2d of July, Mr. Jefferson, President of the 
United States, issued a proclamation requiring all armed 
vessels belonging to the King of Great Britain, then in the 
ports or harbours of the United States, immediately to de- 
part therefrom, and interdicting their entrance into those 
ports and harbours. Mr. Canning having received from 
the British minister an unofficial copy of this document, im- 
mediately, upon the 8th of August, wrote to Mr. Monroe, 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether it was genuine, or 
not, and received for answer, on the 9th, that Mr. Monroe 
had not heard from his government on the subject ; but 
expected, in a few days to be instructed to make a Com- 
munication to the British government in regard to it. On 
the 7th of September, Mr. Monroe made a long commu- 
nication to Mr. Canning respecting the attack on the Che- 
sapeake. On the 23d of September Mr. Canning replied, 
and in the commencement of his note made the following 
remarks — " Before I proceed to observe upon that part of 
it which relates more immediately to the question now at 
issue between our two governments, I am commanded, in 
the first instance, to express the surprise which is felt at 
the total omission of a subject upon which I had already 
been commanded to apply to you for information, the pro- 
clamation purported to have been issued by the President 
of the United States. Of this paper, when last I addressed 
you upon it, you professed not to have any knowledge be- 
yond what the ordinary channels of public information af- 
forded, nor any authority to declare it to be authentic. I 
feel it an indispensable duty to renew my inquiry on this 
subject. The answer which I may receive from you is by 
no means unimportant to the settlement of the discussion 
which has arisen from the encounter between the Leopard 
and the Chesapeake. 

" The whole of the question arising out of that transac- 



68 HISTORY OF THE 

tion, is in fact no other than a question as to the amount of 
reparation due by his majesty for the unauthorized act of his 
officer : and you will, therefore, readily perceive that, in 
so far as the government of the United States have thought 
proper to take that reparation into their own hands, and to- 
resort to measures of retaliation previously to any direct 
application to the British government, or to the British 
minister in America for redress, in so far the British go- 
vernment is entitled to take such measures into account^ 
and to consider them in the estimate of reparation which 
is acknowledged to have been originally due. 

*' The total exclusion of all ships of war belonging to one 
of the two belligerent parties, while the ships of war of the 
othei^were protected by the harbours of the neutral power, 
would furnish no light ground of complaint against that 
neutral, if considered in any other point of view than as a 
measure of retaliation for a previous injury : and so consi- 
dered, it cannot but be necessary to take it into account ia 
the adjustment of the original dispute. 

" I am, therefore, distinctly to repeat the inquiry, whe- 
ther you are now enabled to declare, sir, that the procla- 
mation is to be considered as the authentic act of your go- 
vernment ? and, if so, I am further to inquire whether you 
are authorized to notify the intention of your government to 
withdraw that proclamation, on the knowledge of his majes- 
ty's disavowal of the act which occasioned its publication ?" 
After a long series of remarks and reasoning on the 
subject of impressment, and the difficulties attending a 
modification of the practice, Mr. Canning says — " Whe- 
ther any arrangement can be devised, by which this prac- 
tice may admit of modification, without prejudice to the 
essential rights and interests of Great Britain, is a ques- 
tion, which, as I have already said, the British govern- 
ment may, at a proper season, be ready to entertain ; but, 
whether the consent of Great Britain to the entering into 
such a discussion, shall be extorted as the price of an ami- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 69 

cable adjustment, as the condition of being admitted to 
make honourable reparation for an injury, is a question 
of quite a different sort, and one which can be answered 
no otherwise than by an unqualified refusal. 

" I earnestly recommend to you, therefore, to consider, 
whether the instructions which you have received from 
your government may not leave you at liberty to come to 
an adjustment of the case of the Leopard and the Chesa- 
peake, independently of the other question, with which it 
appears to have been unnecessarily connected. 

" If your instructions leave you no discretion, I cannot 
press you to act in contradiction to them. In that case 
there can be no advantage in pursuing a discussion which 
you are not authorized to conclude ; and I shall have only 
to regret, that the disposition of his majesty to terminate 
that difference amicably and satisfactorily, is for the pre- 
sent rendered unavailing. 

" In that case, his majesty, in pursuance of the disposi- 
tion of which he has given such signal proofs, will lose no 
time in sending a minister to America, furnished with the 
necessary instructions and powers for bringing this unfor- 
tunate dispute to a conclusion, consistent with the harmony 
subsisting between Great Britain and the United States. 
But, in order to avoid the inconvenience which has arisen, 
from the mixt nature of your instructions, that minister will 
not be empowered to entertain, as connected with this 
subject, any proposition respecting the search of merchant 
vessels." 

On the 29th of September Mr. Monroe wrote a long 
answer to Mr. Canning's letter, in which, among other 
things, he says — " You inform me, that his majesty has 
determined, in case my instructions do not permit me to 
separate the late aggression from the general practice of 
impressment, to transfer the business to the United States, 
by committing it to a minister who shall be sent there 
with full powers to conclude it. To that measure I am far 



70 HISTORY OF THE 

from being disposed to raise any obstacle, and shall imme- 
diately apprise my government of the decision to adopt it." 
In a short time after the date of the letter from which 
the quotation immediately preceding was taken, the fol- 
lowing note was addressed to Mr. Canning by Mr. Monroe. 

" Portland Place, October 9, 1807. 

" To Mr. Canning, 

" Mr. Monroe presents his compliments to Mr. Canning, 
and requests that he will be so good as to inform him, 
whether it is intended, that the minister, whom his majesty 
proposes to send to the government of the United States, 
shall be employed in a special mission without having any 
connection immediate or eventual with the ordinary lega- 
tion. Mr. Monroe has inferred from Mr. Canning's note, 
that the mission will be of the special nature above de- 
scribed, but he will be much obliged to Mr. Canning to 
inform him whether he has taken a correct view of the 
measure. Mr. Monroe would also be happy to know of 
Mr. Canning at what time it is expected the minister will 
sail for the United States. Mr. Canning will be sensible 
that Mr. Monroe's motive in requesting this information 
is, that he may be enabled to communicate it without delay 
to his government, the propriety of which, he is persuaded, 
Mr. Canning will readily admit." 

" Foreign Office, October 10, 1807. 

'* From Mr. Canning, 

" Mr. Canning presents his compliments to Mr. Monroe, 
and in acknowledging the honour of his note of yesterday, 
has great pleasure in assuring him that he is at all times 
ready to answer any inquiries to which Mr. Monroe at- 
taches any importance, and which it is in Mr. Canning's 
power to answer with precision, without public inconve- 
nience. But it is not in Mr. Canning's power to state with 
confidence what may be the eventual determination of his 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 71 

majesty in respect to the permanent mission in America. 
The mission of the minister whom his majesty is now 
about to send will certainly be limited in the first instance 
to the discussion of the question of the Chesapeake." 

After Mr. Rose's arrival at Washington, he addressed 
a letter to Mr. Madison, then Secretary of State, dated 
January 26, 1808, from which the following passages are 
copied : 

" Having had the honour to state to you, that I am ex- 
pressly precluded by my instructions from entering upon 
any negotiation for the adjustment of the differences arising 
from the encounter of his majesty's ship Leopard and the 
frigate of the United States, the Chesapeake, as long as 
the proclamation of the President of the United States, of 
the 2d of July, 1807, shall be in force, I beg leave to offer 
you such farther explanation of the nature of that condi- 
tion, as appears to me calculated to place the motives, 
under which it has been enjoined to me thus to bring it 
forward, in their true light." 

After a series of remarks, he says — " I may add, that 
if his majesty has not commanded me to enter into the dis- 
cussion of the other causes of complaint, stated to arise 
from the conduct of his naval commanders in these seas, 
prior to the encounter of the Leopard and Chesapeake, it 
was because it has been deemed improper to mingle them, 
whatever may be their merits, with the present matter, so 
much more interesting and important in its nature ; an opi- 
nion originally and distinctly expressed by Mr. Monroe, and 
assented to by Mr. Secretary Canning. But if, upon this more 
recent and more weighty matter of discussion, upon which 
the proclamation mainly and materially rests, his majesty's 
amicable intentions are unequivocally evinced, it is suffi- 
ciently clear, that no hostile disposition can be supposed 
to exist on his part, nor can any views be attributed to liis 
government, such as, requiring to be counteracted by mea- 



72 HISTORY OP THE 

sures of precaution, could be deduced from transactions 
which preceded that encounter." 

To this Mr. Madison replied in a long letter, dated 
March 5, in which he goes into a review of all the causes 
of complaint on the part of the United States, against the 
British Government, arising from the conduct of the naval 
officers of that kingdom ; coming down in regular course 
to the attack upon the Chesapeake by the Leopard; and 
saying — that "it is sufficient to remark, that the conclu- 
sive evidence which this event added to that which had 
preceded, of the uncontrolled excesses of the British naval 
commanders, in insulting our sovereignty, and abusing our 
hospitality, determined the President to extend to all 
British armed ships the precaution heretofore applied to a 
few by name, of interdicting to them the use and privileges 
of our harbours and waters." 

"The President, having interposed this precautionary 
interdict, lost no time in instructing the minister plenipo- 
tentiary of the United States to represent to the British 
government the signal aggression which had been com- 
mitted on their sovereignty and their flag, and to require 
the satisfaction due for it ; indulging the expectation, that 
his Britannic majesty would at once perceive it to be the 
truest magnanimity, as well as the strictest justice, to 
offer that prompt and full expiation of an acknowledged 
wrong, which would re-establish and improve, both in fact 
and in feeling, the state of things which it had violated." 
The Secretary of State finally comes to the point between 
him and Mr. Rose, the revocation of the proclamation — 
" The proclamation [he says] is considered as a hostile 
measure, and a discontinuance of it, as due to the dis- 
continuance of the aggression which led to it. 

It has been sufficiently shown that the proclamation, as 
appears on the face of it, was produced by a train of 
occurrences terminating in the attack on the American 
frigate, and not by this last alone. To a demand, there- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 73 

fore, that the proclamation be revoked, it would be per- 
fectly fair to oppose a demand, that redress be first given 
for the numerous irregularities which preceded the aggres- 
sion on the American frigate, as well as for this particular 
aggression, and that effectual controul be interposed against 
repetitions of them. And as no such redress has been 
given for the past, notwithstanding the lapse of time which 
has taken place, nor any such security for the future, 
notwithstanding the undiminished reasonableness of it, it 
follows that a continuance of the proclamation would be 
consistent with an entire discontinuance of one only of the 
occurrences from which it proceeded. But it is not ne- 
cessary to avail the argument of this view of the case, 
although of itself entirely conclusive. Had the proclama- 
tion been founded on the single aggression committed on 
the Chesapeake, and were it admitted, that the discontinu- 
ance of that aggression merely gave a claim to the discon- 
tinuance of the proclamation, the claim would be defeated 
by the incontestible fact, that that aggression has*not been 
discontinued. It has never ceased to exist ; and is in ex- 
istence at this moment. Need I remind you, Sir, that the 
seizure and asportation of the seamen belonging to the crew 
of the Chesapeake entered into the very essence of that 
aggression, that, with an exception of the victim to a trial, 
forbidden by the most solemn considerations, and greatly 
aggravating the guilt of its author, the seamen in question 
are still retained, and consequently that the aggression, if in 
no other respect, is by that act alone continued and in force. 
*' If the views which have been taken of the subject have 
the justness which they claim, they will have shown that 
on no ground whatever can an annulment of the procla- 
mation of July 2d be reasonably required, as a preliminary 
to the negotiation with which you are charged. On the 
contrary, it clearly results, from a recurrence to the causes 
and objects of the proclamation, that, as was at first 
intimated, the strongest sanctions of Great Britain herself 

10 



74 HISTORY OF THE 

would support the demand, that, previous to a discussion 
of the proclamation, due satisfaction should be made to the 
United States; that this satisfaction ought to extend to all 
the wrongs which preceded and produced that act ; and 
that even limiting the merits of the question to the single 
relation of the proclamation to the wrong committed in the 
attack on the American frigate, and deciding the question 
on the principle that a discontinuance of the latter required 
of right a discontinuance of the former, nothing appears 
that does not lea\Te such a preliminary destitute of every 
foundation which could be assumed for it. 

" With a right to draw this conclusion, the President 
might have instructed me to close this communication with 
the reply stated in the beginning of it; and perhaps in 
taking this course, he would only have consulted a sensi- 
bility, to which most governments would, in such a case, 
have yielded. But adhering to the moderation by which 
he has been invariably guided, and anxious to rescue the 
two natidns from the circumstances under which an abor- 
tive issue to your mission necessarily places them, he has 
authorized me, in the event of your disclosing the terms 
of reparation which you believe will be satisfactory, and 
on its appearing that they are so, to consider this evidence 
of the justice of his Britannic majesty as a pledge for 
an effectual interposition with respect to all the abuses 
against a recurrence of which the proclamation was meant 
to provide, and to proceed to concert with you a revocation 
of that act, bearing the same date with the act of repara- 
tion, to which the United States are entitled. 

" / am not unaitmre, sir, that according to the view which 
you appear to have taken of your instructions, such a course 
of proceeding has not been contemplated hy them. It is pos- 
sible, nevertheless, that a re-examination, in a spirit, in 
which I am well pursuaded it will be made, may discover 
them to be not inflexible to a proposition in so high a de- 
gree liberal and conciliatory. In every event, the Presi- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 75 

dent will have manifested his willingness to meet your 
government on a ground of accommodation, which spares 
to its feelings, however misapplied he may deem them, 
every concession, not essentially due to those which must 
be equally respected, and consequently will have demon- 
strated that the very ineligible posture given to so impor- 
tant a subject in the relations of the two countries, by the 
unsuccessful termination of your mission, can be referred 
to no other source than the rigorous restrictions under 
which it was to be executed." 

On the 17th of March, Mr. Rose replied to the foregoing 
communication, informing Mr. Madison that he was " under 
the necessity of declining to enter into the terms of nego- 
tiation, which, by direction of the President of the United 
States," Mr. Madison had offered ; and saying, " I do not 
feel myself competent, in the present instance, to depart 
from the instructions, which I stated in my letter of the 
26th of January last, and which preclude me from acceding 
to the condition thus proposed." He then proceeds further 
and says — 

" I should add, that I am absolutely prohibited from 
entering upon matters unconnected with the specifick 
object I am authorized to discuss, much less can I thus 
give any pledge concerning them. The condition suggested, 
moreover, leads to the direct inference, that the proclama- 
tion of the President of the United States of the 2d of July, 
1807, is maintained either as an equivalent for reparation 
for the time being, or as a compulsion to make it. 

" It is with the more profound regret that I feel myself 
under the necessity of declaring, that I am unable to act 
upon the terms thus proposed, as it becomes my duty to 
inform you, in conformity to my instructions, that on the 
rejection of the demand stated in my former letter, on the 
part of his majesty, my mission is terminated." 

Thus another opportunity to adjust at least one, and 
perhaps several important subjects of dispute and com- 



76 HISTORY OF THE 

plaint between the United States and Great Britain, was 
lost, in consequence of Mr. Jefferson's refusing to yield a 
mere point of etiquette, respecting the recal of the procla- 
mation which he had issued, to say the least, precipitately, 
and which he was forewarned by the British government, 
would prevent an adjustment of the affair of the frigate 
Chesapeake, if continued in force. It is not to be believed, 
if he had been sincerely desirous of establishing a solid and 
permanent friendship (political friendship is here meant) 
between the two nations, that he would have failed of 
accomplishing that object on such slender a pretext as that 
which put an end to Mr. Rose's mission. 

That he did not entertain such a wish is evident, not 
only from the manner in which the negotiation with Mr. 
Rose was conducted, and the grounds on which it was 
concluded ; but from the circumstance, that a direct at- 
tempt was made by the Secretary of State, in his corres- 
pondence with him, to induce Mr. Rose to depart from his 
instructions, and enter upon the discussion of subjects 
which he was expressly ordered by his government not to 
meddle with. Mr. Madison, in his letter of the 5th of 
March, from which several extracts have been made, after 
using every effort in his power to induce Mr. Rose to 
violate his instructions, says in a passage already recited — 
*' I am not unaware, sir, that according to the view which 
you appear to have taken of your instructions, such a 
course of proceeding has not been contemplated by them. 
It is possible, nevertheless, that a re-examination, in a spirit, 
in which T am well persuaded it will be made, may dis- 
cover them to be not inflexible to a proposition in so high 
a degree liberal and conciliatory." This cannot be con- 
sidered as any thing more or less than a direct proposition 
to the British minister to violate his instructions ; and this 
must have been with a perfect knowledge on the part of 
Mr. Madison, that any treaty or arrangement made under 
such circumstances would be rejected by the British 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 77 

government, because made in violation of his instructions. 

The conduct of Mr. Canning, when corresponding with 
Mr. Monroe, was marked by a different disposition. After 
a long discussion of the difficulties between the countries, 
Mr. Canning said — "I earnestly recommend to you there- 
fore, to consider, whether the instructions which you have 
received from your government may not leave you at 
liberty to come to an adjustment of the case of the Leopard 
and the Chesapeake, independently of the other question 
with which it appears to have been unnecessarily con- 
nected. If your instructions leave you no discretion, I 
cannot press you to act in contradiction to them." 

On the 13th of November, 1811, more than four years 
after the affair between the British frigate Leopard and 
the American frigate Chesapeake, the following message 
and correspondence relating to that subject were transmit- 
ted to congress by the President of the United States. 

" I communicate to congress copies of a correspondence 
between the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipoten- 
tiary of Great Britain and the Secretary pf State, relating 
to the aggression committed by a British ship of war on 
the United States frigate Chesapeake, by which it will be 
seen that that subject of difference between the two coun- 
tries is terminated by an offer of reparation which has been 
acceded to." 

" Washington, October ZO,lSU. 

" Mr. Foster to Mr. Monroe. 

Sir, — I had already the honour to mention to you, that 
[ came to this country furnished with instructions from his 
royal highness the prince regent, in the name and on the 
behalf of his majesty, for the purpose of proceeding to a final 
adjustment of the differences which have arisen between 
Great Britain and the United States of America, in the 
affair of the Chesapeake frigate, and I had also that of 
acquainting you with the necessity, under which I found 



78 HISTORY OP THE 

myself, of suspending the execution of those instructions 
in consequence of my not having perceived that any steps 
whatever were taken by the American government to clear 
up the circumstances of an event which threatened so 
materially to interrupt the harmony subsisting between 
our two countries, as that which occurred in the month of 
last May, between the United States' ship President and 
his majesty's ship Little Belt, when every evidence before 
his majesty's government seemed to show that a most evi- 
dent and wanton outrage had been committed on a British 
sloop of war by an American commodore. 

" A court of inquiry, however, as you informed me in 
your letter of the 11th instant, has since been held by order 
of the President of the United States, on the conduct of 
Commodore Rodgers, and this preliminary to further dis- 
cussion on the subject being all that I asked in the first 
instance, as due to the friendship subsisting between the 
tw^o states, I have now the honour to acquaint you that I 
am ready to proceed in the truest spirit of conciliation to 
lay before you the terms of reparation which his royal 
highness has commanded me to propose to the United 
States' government, and only wait to know when it will 
suit your convenience to enter upon the discussion." 

Mr. Monroe replied to this letter on the following day. 

" Department of State, October 31, 1811. 
♦• Mr. Monroe to Mr. Foster. 

n SiR^ — I have just had the honour to receive your let- 
ter of the 30th of this month. 

" I am glad to find that the communication which I had 
the honour to make to you on the 11th instant relative to 
the court of inquiry, which was the subject of it, is viewed 
by you in the favourable light which you have stated. 

•' Although I regret that the proposition which you now 
make in consequence of that communication has been de- 
layed to the present moment, I am ready to receive the 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 79 

terms of it whenever you may think proper to communi- 
cate them. Permit me to add, that the pleasure of finding 
them satisfactory will be duly augmented, if they should 
be introductory to a removal of all the differences depend- 
ing between our two countries, the hope of which is so 
little encouraged by your past correspondence. A pros- 
pect of such a result will be embraced, on my part, with 
a spirit of conciliation equal to that which has been ex- 
pressed by you." 

" Washington^ November 1, 1811. 

" Mr. Foster to Mr. Monroe. 

" Sir, — In pursuance of the orders which I have re- 
ceived from his royal highness the prince regent, in the 
name and on the behalf of his majesty, for the purpose of 
proceeding to a final adjustment of the differences which 
have arisen between Great Britain and the United States, 
in the affair of the Chesapeake frigate, I have the honour 
to acquaint you — 

*' First, that I am instructed to repeat to the American 
government the prompt disavowal made by his majesty 
(and recited in Mr. Erskine's note of April 17th, 1809, to 
Mr. Smith,) on being apprized of the unauthorized act of 
the officer in command of his naval forces on the coast of 
America, whose recall from a highly important and honour- 
able command immediately ensued as a mark of his ma- 
jesty's disapprobation. 

" Secondly, that I am authorized to offer, in addition to 
that disavowal, on the part of his royal highness, the im- 
mediate restoration, as far as circumstances will admit, of 
the men who, in consequence of Admiral Berkeley's orders, 
were forcibly taken out of the Chesapeake, to the vessel 
from which they were taken : or, if that ship should be 
no longer in commission, to such seaport of the United 
States as the American government may name for the 
purpose. 

\ 



80 HISTORY OF THE 

" Thirdly, that I am also authorized to offer to the 
American government a suitable pecuniary provision for 
the sufferers in consequence of the attack on the Chesa- 
peake, including the families of those seamen who unfor- 
tunately fell in the action, and of the vrounded survivors. 

" These honourable propositions, I can assure you, sir, 
are made w^ith the sincere desire that they may prove 
satisfactory to the government of the United States, and 
I trust they will meet with that amicable reception which 
their conciliatory nature entitles them to. I need scarcely 
add how cordially I join with you in the wish, that they 
might prove introductory to a removal of all the differences 
depending between our two countries." 

*' Nove7nber \2th, 1811. 

" Mr. Monroe to Mr. Foster. 

" Sir, — I have had the honour to receive your letter of 
1st November, and to lay it before the President. It is 
much to be regretted that the reparation due for such an 
aggression as that committed on the United States frigate 
Chesapeake should have been so long delayed ; nor could 
the translation of the offending officer from one command 
to another, be regarded as constituting a part of a repa- 
ration otherwise satisfactory ; considering however the 
existing circumstances of the case, and the early and ami- 
cable attention paid to it by his royal highness the prince 
regent, the president accedes to the proposition contained 
in your letter, and in so doing your government will, I am 
persuaded, see a proof of the conciliatory disposition by 
which the President has been actuated." 

It is a little remarkable, that this final adjustment of a 
question about which so much had been said and done, 
should have been accompanied by such uncourteous and 
undignified language as that at the close of the foregoing 
letters. It seems as if it was studiously designed to irritate 
the British government, even when nothing could be gain- 
ed by it. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 81 

On the 16th of May, 1806, Mr. Fox,, then prime minis- 
ter of Great Britain, addressed the following note to Mr. 
Monroe, the United States envoy at London : — 

" Doicning-sireet, May 16, 1806. 

** The undersigned, his majesty's principal secretary of 
state for foreign affairs, has received his majesty's com- 
mands to acquaint Mr. Monroe, that the king, taking into 
<;onsideration the new and extraordinary means resorted 
to by the enemy for the purpose of distressing the com- 
merce of his subjects, has thought fit to direct, that the ne- 
cessary measures should be taken for the blockade of the 
coast, rivers, and ports, from the river Elbe to the port of 
Brest, both inclusive, and the said coast, rivers, and ports, 
are and must be considered as blockaded ; but that his majes- 
ty is pleased to declare, that such blockade shall not extend 
to prevent neutral ships and vessels, laden with goods not 
being the property of his majesty's enemies, and not being 
contraband of war, from approaching the said coast, and 
entering into and sailing from the said rivers and ports, 
(save and except the coast, rivers and ports, from Ostend 
to the river Seine, already in a state of strict and rigorous 
blockade, and which are to be considered as so continued,) 
provided the said ships and vessels so approaching and en- 
tering (except as aforesaid) shall not have been laden at 
any port belonging to or in the possession of any of his 
majesty's enemies, and that the said ships and vessels, so 
sailing from the said rivers and ports (except as aforesaid) 
shall not be destined to any port belonging to or in the pos- 
session of any of his majesty's enemies, nor have previ- 
ously broken the blockade. 

** Mr. Monroe is therefore requested to apprise the 
American consuls and merchants residing in England, 
that the coast, rivers, and ports above mentioned, must be 
considered as being in a state of blockade, and that from 
this time all the measures, authorized by the law of na- 
il 



82 HISTORY OF THE 

tions and the respective treaties between his majesty and 
the different neutral powers, will be adopted and executed 
with respect to vessels attempting to violate the said 
blockade after this notice." 

On the 17th of May, Mr. Monroe wrote to the Secreta- 
ry of State, and communicated this note from Mr. Fox ; 
and in the course of his letter made the following re- 
marks : — 

" Early this morning I received from Mr. Fox a note, a 
copy of which is enclosed, which you will perceive em- 
braces explicitly a principal subject depending between 
our governments, though in rather a singular mode. A 
similar communication is, I presume, made to the other 
ministers, tliough of that I have no information. The 
note is couched in terms of restraint, and professes to ex- 
tend the blockade further than was heretofore done ; never- 
theless it takes it from many ports already blockaded, in- 
deed from all east of Ostend and west of the Seine, except 
in articles contraband of war and enemies' property, which 
are seizable without a blockade. And in like form of ex- 
ception, considering every enemy as one power, it admits 
the trade of neutrals, within the same litnit, to be free, in 
the productions of enemies colonies, in every but the direct 
route between the colony and the parent country. I have, 
however, been too short a time in the possession of this 
paper to trace it in all its consequences in regard to this 
question. It cannot be doubted that the note was drawn 
by the government in reference to the question, and if in- 
tended by the cabinet as a foundation on which Mr. Fox 
is authorized to form a treaty, and obtained by him for 
the purpose, it must he viewed in a very favourable light. 
It seems clearly to put an end to further seizures, on the 
principle which has been heretofore in contestation^'^ 

On the 20th of May Mr. Monroe wrote again to the 
Secretary of State. The following is an extract from his 
letter. " From what I could collect, I have been strength- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 83 

ened in the opinion which I communicated to you in my 
last, that 3Ir. Fox's note of the 16th was drawn with a 
riew to a principal question with the United States, I 
mean that of the trade with enemies' colonies. It em- 
braces, it is true, other objects, particularly the commerce 
with Prussia, and the north generally, whose ports it opens 
to neutral powers, under whose flag British manufactures 
will find a market there. In this particular, especially, 
the measure promises to be highly satisfactory to the com- 
mercial interest, and it may have been the primary object of 
the government.'''' 

On the 21st of November, 1806, Bonaparte issued his 
decree, commonly called the Berlin decree, from the fact 
that it bears date from the Prussian capital. 

" Imperial Decree of the 2\st of November, 1806. 
" Art. 1. The British islands are declared in a state of 
blockade. 

2. All commerce and correspondence with the British 
islands are prohibited. In consequence, letters or packets, 
addressed either to England, to an Englishman, or in the 
English language, shall not pass through the post office, 
and shall be seized. 

3. Every subject of England, of whatever rank and con- 
dition soever, who shall be found in the countries occupied 
by our troops, or by those of our allies, shall be made a 
prisoner of war. 

4. All magazines, merchandise, or property whatso- 
ever, belonging to a subject of England, shall be declared 
lawful prize. 

5. The trade in English merchandise is forbidden; all 
merchandise belonging to England, or coming from its 
manufactories and colonies, is declared lawful prize. 

6. One half of the proceeds of the confiscation of the 
merchandise and property, declared good prize by the pre- 
ceding articles, shall be applied to indemnify the mer- 



84 HISTORY OF THE 

chants for the losses which they have suffered by the cap- 
ture of merchant vessels by English cruisers. 

7. No vessel coming directly from England, or from the 
English colonies, or having been there since the publica- 
tion of the present decree, shall be received into any port. 

8. Every vessel contravening the above clause, by 
means of a false declaration, shall be seized, and the ves- 
sel and cargo confiscated as if they were English pro- 
perty. 

9. Our tribunal of prizes at Paris is charged with the 
definitive adjudication of all the controversies which may 
arise within our empire, or in the countries occupied by 
the French army relative to the execution of the present 
decree. Our tribunal of prizes at Milan shall be charged 
with the definitive adjudication of the said controversies, 
which may arise within the extent of our kingdom of 
Italy. 

10. The present decree shall be communicated by our 
minister of exterior relations, to the kings of Spain, of 
Naples, of Holland, and of Etruria, and to our allies, whose 
subjects, like ours, are the victims of the injustice and the 
barbarism of the English maritime laws. Our ministers 
of exterior relations, of war, of marine, of finances, of 
police, and our post masters general, are charged each, in 
what concerns him, with the execution of the present 
decree." 

On the 11th of November, 1807, a new order in council 
was issued by the British government, in which it is de- 
clared, " that all the ports and places of France and her 
allies, or of any other country at war with his majesty, and 
other ports and places in Europe, from which, although 
not at war with his majesty, the British flag is excluded, 
and all ports or places in the colonies belonging to his 
majesty's enemies, shall from henceforth be subject to the 
same restrictions, in point of trade and navigation, with 
the exceptions hereinafter mentioned, as if the same were 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 8S 

actually blockaded by his majesty's naval forces in the 
most strict and rigorous manner : and it is hereby further 
ordered and declared, that all trade in articles, which are 
of the produce or manufacture of the said countries or 
colonies, together with all goods and merchandise on 
board, and all articles of the produce or manufacture of 
the said countries or colonies, shall be captured and con- 
demned as prize to the captors." 

The order contained various other provisions, not ne- 
cessary to the object of this work, all professedly founded 
upon the idea of retaliation for the French decree alluded 
to, and to the extravagant assumptions of power, and gross 
violation of principle, and the rights of neutrals. 

To meet this measure of the British government, the 
Emperor of France, on the 11th of December, 1807, 
issued a new decree from his imperial palace at Milan, 
which from that circumstance has been called the Milan 
Decree. After a preamble, it declares — 

" Art. 1. Every ship, to whatever nation it may belong, 
that shall have submitted to be searched by an English 
ship, or on a voyage to England, or shall have paid any 
tax whatsoever to the English government, is thereby and 
for that alone, declared to be denationalized, to have for- 
feited the protection of its king, and to have become 
English property, 

2. Whether the ships thus denationalized by the arbi- 
trary measures of the English government, enter into our 
ports, or those of our allies, or whether they fall into the 
hands of our ships of war, or of our privateers, they are 
declared to be good and lawful prizes. 

3. The British islands arc declared to be in a state of 
blockade, both by land and sea. Every ship of whatever 
nation, or whatsoever the nature of its cargo may be, that 
sails from the ports of England, or those of the English 
colonies, and of the countries occupied by English troops, 
and proceeding to England, or to the English colonies, or 



86 HISTORY OF THE 

to countries occupied by English troops, is good and lawful 
prize, as contrary to the present decree, and may be cap- 
tured by our ships of war, or our privateers, and adjudged 
to the captor. 

4. These measures, which are resorted to only in just 
retaliation of the barbarous system adopted by England, 
which assimilates its legislation to that of Algiers, shall 
cease to have any effect with respect to all nations who 
shall have the firmness to compel the English govern- 
ment to respect their flag. They shall continue to be 
rigorously in force, as long as that government does not 
return to the principle of the law of nations, which regu- 
lates the relations of civilized states in a state of war. The 
provisions of the present decree shall be abrogated and 
null, in fact, as soon as the English abide again by the 
principles of the law of nations, which are also the princi- 
ples of justice and of honour." 

These British orders in council, and French decrees, 
were all in force at the time the negotiation with Mr. 
Erskine commenced, and were just subjects of uneasiness, 
complaint and remonstrance, on the part of the United 
States. Property to a large amount, belonging to American 
citizens, and not liable to condemnation or capture under 
the well established principles of the laws of nations, was 
taken and confiscated by both parties ; and it almost 
seemed as if the warfare which was raging between the 
two most refined and civilized nations in Europe, would 
degenerate into downright piracy and barbarism. 

On the 18th of December, 1807, Mr. Jefferson commu- 
nicated to both houses of Congress the following message — 

" The communications now made, showing the great 
and increasing dangers with which our vessels, our sea- 
men, and merchandise, are threatened on the high seas 
and elsewhere, from the belligerent powers of Europe, and 
it being of the greatest importance to keep in safety these 
essential resources, I deem it my duty to recommend the 



HARTFORD CONVENTION- 8? 

subject to the consideration of Congress, who will doubt- 
less perceive all the advantages which may be expected 
from an inhibition of the departure of our vessels from the 
ports of the United States. 

" Their wisdom will also see the necessity of making 
every preparation for whatever events may grow out of the 
present crisis." 

The only documents published in the state papers as 
having accompanied this message, were, 

1. An "Extract of a letter from the (French) Grand 
Judge, Minister of Justice, to the Imperial Attorney Ge- ■ 
neral for the Council of Prizes ;" — of which the following 
is a translation — 

" Paris, Sept. 18, 1807. 

" Sir, — I have submitted to his majesty the emperor 
and king the doubts raised by his excellency the minister 
of marine and colonies, on the extent of certain disposi- 
tions of the imperial decree of the 21st of November, 1806, 
which has declared the British isles in a state of blockade. 
The following are his majesty's intentions on the points in 
question : 

1st. May vessels of war, by virtue of the imperial decree 
of the 21st November last, seize on board neutral vessels 
either English property, or even all merchandise proceed- 
ing from the English manufactories or territory ? 

Answer. His majesty has intimated, that as he did not 
think proper to express any exception in his decree, there 
is no ground for making any in its execution, in relation 
to any whomsoever (a I'egard de qui que ce peut etre.; 

2dly. His majesty has postponed a decision on the ques- 
tion whether armed French vessels ought to capture 
neutral vessels bound to or from England, even when they 
have no English merchandise on board. 

Regnier." 



88 HISTORY OF THE 

And 2. A document cut from an English newspaper, the 
London Gazette of October 17, purporting to be a procla- 
mation by the king of Great Britain, "for recalling and 
prohibiting British seamen from serving foreign princes 
and states," and dated October 16, 1807. This document 
concluded in the following manner — 

" And we do hereby notify, that all such our subjects as 
aforesaid, who have voluntarily entered, or shall enter, or 
voluntarily continue to serve on board of any ships of war 
belonging to any foreign state at enmity with us, are and 
will be guilty of high treason : and we do by this our royal 
proclamation declare, that they shall be punished with the 
utmost severity of the law." 

In a speech of Mr. Pickering, a member of the Senate 
of the United States from Massachusetts, on a resolution 
to repeal all the embargo laws, on the 30th of November, 
1808, in allusion to the act of Congress of December, 
1807, laying the embargo, the following remarks are to be 
found — 

" Of the French papers supposed to be brought by the 
Revenge, none were communicated to Congress, save a 
letter dated September 24M, 1807, from General Armstrong 
to M, Champagny, and his answer of the 1th of October, 
relative to the Berlin decree, and a letter from Regnier, 
minister of justice, to Champagny, giving the emperor's 
interpretation of that decree. These three papers, with a 
newspaper copy of a proclamation of the king of Great 
Britain, issued in the same October, were all the papers 
communicated by the President to Congress, as the 
grounds on which he recommended the embargo. These 
papers, he said, " showed the great and increasing dangers 
with which our vessels, our seamen and merchandise were 
threatened on the high seas and elsewhere, from the belli- 
gerent powers of Europe." 

These remarks of Mr. Pickering were made in debate 
in the Senate, within less than a year from the date of the 



HARTFORD CONVENTIOJN. 89 

message recommending an embargo, and of course, as 
they were not denied or questioned, they must be taken to 
be correct. It is certainly a singular circumstance, if they 
were correct, that none of the documents alluded to are 
published with the message recommending the embargo, 
except Regnier's letter, and the British proclamation 
recalling their seamen. In the same volume of " state 
papers," published by Wait &. Sons, four hundred pages 
farther advanced in the volume, are to be found Regnier's 
letter of the 18th of September, 1807, General Armstrong's 
letter of September 24th to the minister of foreign rela- 
tions, and Champagny's answer of October 7th. Why 
they were not published with the message with which they 
were communicated to Congress, and more especially how 
they came to be placed where they are, are matters that 
we cannot explain. General Armstrong's letter is as 
follows^ 

«' Paris, Sept. 24, 1807. 

" Sir, — I have this moment learned that a new arid 
extended construction, highly injurious to the commerce 
of the United States, was about to be given to the imperial 
decree of the 21st of November last. It is therefore in- 
cumbent upon me to ask from your excellency an expla- 
nation of his majesty's views in relation to this subject, and 
particularly .whether it be his majesty's intention, in any 
degree, to infract the obligations of the treaty now subsist- 
ing between the United States and the French empire .'' 

" John Armstrong. 

-' His Excellency the Minister of 
Foreign Relations." 

The following is M. Champagny's answer — 

" Fontainhleau, Oct. 7, 1807. 

" Sir, — You did me the honour, on the 24th of Septem- 
ber, to request me to send you some explanations as to the 

12 



90 HISTORY OF THE 

execution of the decree of blockade of the British islands, 
as to vessels of the United States. 

"The provisions of all the regulations and treaties rela- 
tive to a state of blockade have appeared applicable to the 
existing circumstance, and it results from the explanations 
which have been addressed to me by the imperial pro- 
cureur general of the council of prizes, that his majesty has 
considered every neutral vessel, going from English ports, 
with cargoes of English merchandise, or of English origin, 
as lawfully seizable by French armed vessels. 

" The decree of blockade has been now issued eleven 
months. The principal powers of Europe, far from pro- 
testing against its provisions, have adopted them. They 
have perceived that its execution must be complete, to 
render it more effectual, and it has seemed easy to recon- 
cile the measure with the observance of treaties, especially 
at a time when the infractions, by England, of the rights 
cf all -maritime powers, render their interests conimoUj 
and tend to unite them in support of the same cause. 

"Champagny." 

" His Excellency General Armstrong, 
Minister Plen. of the U. States." 

It is perfectly apparent, from the examination of these 
several documents, that no new facts appeared respecting 
the policy or measures of Great Britain, which justified or 
called for an embargo. The proclamation, allowing it to 
have been a genuine state paper, showed no new or ad- 
ditional marks of animosity against the United States, or 
their commerce. It appears to have been a mere mea- 
sure of precaution for the security of their seamen. The 
aggravated spirit of hostility towards this country, and its 
commercial interests, was to be found only in the French 
documents. But as the French had at that time very little 
external commerce, and but few vessels of any descrip- 
tion afloat, and Great Britain had the command of the 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 91 

ocean ; under such circumstances, it was doubtless thought 
necessary, if for nothing else, to appease the feelings of 
his imperial majesty of France, to adopt a measure which 
should involve Great Britain as well as France, in its ope- 
rations. And hence the British proclamation was intro- 
duced, as furnishing evidence of " the great and increasing 
dangers with which our vessels, our seamen, and merchan- 
dise were threatened on the high seas and elsewhere from 
the belligerent powers of Europe." 

The remark in the President's message, as far as it re- 
lated to this document, was not true. There is nothing in 
the British proclamation which showed the slightest in- 
crease of danger to our vessels, seamen, or merchandise. 

That our commerce had suffered great injustice from 
the British orders of council, there can be no doubt ; and 
there never was, it is presumed, any disposition among 
the opposers of the embargo, to excuse or vindicate that 
injustice. But great as it was, it in a variety of respects 
fell far short of the atrocious conduct of France towards us. 
After the naval power of France had been destroyed by the 
British, and the nation was in effect driven from the ocean, 
it became an object of the highest importance to Bona- 
parte to prevent all commercial intercourse between Great 
Britain and the continent. To accomplish this, he un- 
dertook to establish his famous Continental System — which 
was nothing less than an attempt, by the most arbitrary 
and oppressive measures, to shut out all British trade, mer- 
chandise, produce, and manufactures, from the nations on 
the continent. His decrees, issued at Berlin, Milan, and 
Rambouillet, were parts of the machinery by which he in- 
tended to carry his project into effect. It is perfectly clear 
from the nature of the case, that in prosecuting this pro- 
ject, it must have been his intention from the beginning to 
disregard every principle of law, justice, and humanity, 
that might stand in his way. As a large part of the neu- 
tral trade of the world was carried on through American 



92 HISTORY OF THE 

vessels, it was necessary for his purposes either to drive 
us from our neutrality,^ or render the trade so hazardous 
as to induce us to withdraw from it. And there is much 
evidence in the proceedings of our government, to show, 
that as far as his measures could be carried into ejffect 
against Great Britain, without too great a sacrifice on our 
part, Mr. Jefferson and his partisans were willing he 
should succeed. Many proofs of his animosity against 
Great Britain, and of his partiality for France, will be 
found in this history. And whoever will take the pains 
to examine the public state papers of the Congress of the 
United States, or the Memoirs and Correspondence of 
Mr. Jefferson, published since his death, will find abun- 
dant evidence of that animosity towards the one, and that 
partiality towards the other. In addition to the evidence 
derived from these sources, of his abject subserviency to 
France, further proof may be adduced, from a pamphlet 
published about the same period, of these transactions, 
entitled, " Further Suppressed Documents ;" from 
which is copied the following article : — 

" Extract of a letter from Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Madison. 

" February 22, 1808. 
" Mr. Patterson offering so good a conveyance that I 
cannot but employ it. Nothing has occurred here since the 
date of my public dispatches (the 17th) to give to our bu- 
siness an aspect more favourable than it then had ; but on 
the other hand, I have come to the knowledge of two facts 
which I think sufficiently show the decided character of 
the Emperor's policy with regard to us. These are first, 
that in a Council of Administration held a few days past, 
when it was proposed to modify the Decrees of November, 
1806, and December, 1807, (though the proposition was 
supported by the whole weight of the Council,) he became 
highly indignant, and declared that these decrees should 
suffer no change — and that the Americans should be com- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. - 93 

pelled to talie the positive character of either allies or enemies : 
2d, that on the 27th of January last, twelve days after 
Mr. Champagny's written assurances that these Decrees 
should work no change in the property sequestered until our 
discussions with England were brought to a close, and seven 
days before he reported to me verbally these very assurances, 
the Empei'or had by a special decision confiscated tivo of 
our ships and their cargoes, (the Julius Henry and the Ju- 
niata,) for want merely of a document not required by any 
law or usage of the commerce in which they had been en- 
gaged. This act was taken, as I am informed on a general 
report of sequestered cases, amounting to one hundred and 
sixty, and which, at present prices, will yield upwards of 
one hundred millions of francs, a sum whose magnitude 
alone renders hopeless all attempts at saving it — Danes, 
Portuguese, and Americans, will be the principal sufferers. 
If I am right in supposing that the emperor has definitively 
taken his ground, I cannot be wrong in concluding that you 
will immediately take yours J" 

Here is decisive evidence of Bonaparte's object in issu- 
ing and enforcing his decrees. It was to compel the United 
States to become either his allies, or his enemies ; and hence, 
when urged to modify those decrees by his Council of 
Administration, he became indignant, and declared they 
should suffer no change. 

In this same publication of " Suppressed Documents," 
is the following letter — 

" London, January 2()th, 1808. 

" From Mr. Pinkney to Mr. Madison. 

" Sir, — I had the honour to receive this morning your 
letter of the 23d of last month, inclosing a copy of a mes- 
sage from the President to Congress, and of their act in 
pursuance of it, laying an embargo on our vessels and 
exports. It appeared to be my duty to lose no time in 



94 HISTORY OF THE 

giving such explanations to the British government, of this 
wise and salutary measure, as your letter suggests. And 
accordingly I went to Downing-street immediately, and 
had a short conference with Mr. Canning, who received 
my explanations with great apparent saiisfaction, and took 
occasion to express the most friendly disposition towards our 
country. I availed myself of this opportunity, to mention 
a subject of some importance, connected with the late 
orders in council. 

*' I had been told, that American vessels coming into 
British ports under warning, could not obtain any docu- 
ment to enable them to return to the United States, in the 
event of its being found imprudent, either to deposit their 
cargoes, or to resume their original voyages, although they 
are not prohibited from returning, yet as the warning is 
endorsed on their papers, the return may be hazardous, 
without some British documents to prove compliance with 
it and give security to the voyage. Mr. C. took a note of 
what I said, and assured me that whatever was necessary 
to give the facility in question, icould be done without delay ; 
and he added, that it was their sincere tvish to show, in every 
thing connected ivith the orders in council, ivhich only necessity 
had compelled them to adopt, their anxiety to accommodate 
them, as far as was consistent with their object, to the feelings 
and interest of the American government and people. ^^ 

It is difficult to imagine why these documents were kept 
hidden from the public eye, unless it was the fear that the 
country at large, from the difference of style and sentiment 
between the two, would form opinions unfavourable to the 
policy which our gove^rnment were pursuing in- relation to 
the two countries. The tone of the French emperor, as 
conveyed in the letter of General Armstrong, was impe- 
rious, and insolent. He would force the United States to 
take the positive character of either allies, or enemies — 
he became highly indignant, and would suffer no change in 
his decrees — showing conclusively, that his object was to 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 95 

make them answer his own purposes, regardless of their 
effects upon the United States. 

By Mr. Pinkney's letter to Mr. Madison, it appears, that 
when the former communicated to Mr. Canning, the British 
minister, the information that Congress had established 
the embargo, the latter "received his explanations with 
great apparent satisfaction, and took occasion to express 
the most friendly disposition towards our country." 

It is not necessary to show in what manner these " sup- 
pressed documents" were obtained for publication. It is 
enough for the public to know that they were obtained, 
and that they are genuine. Of the latter fact they may 
rest assured ; the author having been furnished with the 
most satisfactory evidence of the fact — so much so, that it 
will not be questioned by those by whose order they were 
kept back from the public. 

In a report of the committee on foreign relations in the 
House of Representatives, bearing date November 22d, 
1808, is the following passage — 

" It was on the 18th of September, 1807, that a new con- 
struction of the decree took place ; an instruction having 
on that day been transmitted to the council of prizes by the 
minister of justice, by which that court was informed, that 
French armed vessels were authorized, under that decree, 
to seize without exception, in neutral vessels, either Eng- 
lish property, or merchandise of English growth or manu- 
facture. An immediate explanation having been asked 
from the French minister of foreign relations, he con- 
firmed, in his answer of the 7th of October, 1807, the de- 
termination of his government to adopt that construction. 
Its first application took place on the 10th of the same 
month, in the case of the Horizon, of which the minister 
of the United States was not informed until the month of 
November ; and on the twelfth of that month he presented 
a spirited remonstrance against that infraction of the 
neutral rights of the United States. He had, in the mean 



96 HISTORY OF THE 

while, transmitted to America the instruction to the coun- 
cil of prizes of the 18th of September. This was received 
on the of December ; and a copy of the decision in the 
case of the Horizon having at the same time reached 
government, the President, aware of the consequences 
which would follow that new state of things, communicated 
immediately to Congress the alteration of the French de- 
cree, and recommended the embargo, which was accord- 
ingly laid on the 22d of December, 1807 ; at ivhich time it 
was well understood, in this country, the British orders of 
council of November preceding had issued, although they 
were not officially communicated to cur governmenty 

In the " Suppressed Documents," to which reference 
has been made, there is a letter from General Armstrong, 
in which some remarks are made which may probably 
explain the reason why those papers were not suffered to 
see the light. The following is an extract from it — 

" 30^/t August, 1808. 

" We have somewhat overrated our means of coercion 
of the two great belligerents to a course of justice. The 
embargo is a measure calculated above any other, to keep 
us whole, and keep us in peace, but beyond this you must 
not count upon it. Here it is net felt, and in England (in 
the midst of the more interesting events of the day) it is 

forgot/en.^' 

However lightly it was esteemed as a measure of coer- 
cion in France, and however speedily it passed out of mind 
in England, it is very certain that its full force was felt at 
home, and it bore too hardly upon the public prosperity, 
as well as upon private enterprise, to be either slighted or 
disregarded. Upon finding a strong spirit of opposition 
to its principles, as well as to its provisions, in January, 
1809, Congress passed an act to enforce and make it more 
effectual, which excited a great deal of feeling, and no in- 
considerable degree of alarm through a large part of the 



HARTFORD CONVENTION- 97 

country ; and probably this measure had considerable 
efficacy in accomplishing the repeal of the embargo law, 
and of introducing the non-intercourse act in its place. 

But in this, as in almost all other cases of importance 
under Mr. Jefferson's administration, it is necessary to ex- 
amine closely into the subject, in order to ascertain whe- 
ther the reasons given to the public for the recommenda- 
tion of his measures are the genuine ones, and whether 
there is not something kept out of sight, which, if disco- 
vered, might give a different aspect to the matter in hand. 
It has been seen by the letter from General Armstrong to 
Mr. Madison, copied from the suppressed documents, dated 
February 22d, 1808, that Bonaparte had declared that the 
United States should be compelled to take the positive 
character of either allies or enemies. In Mr. Jefferson's 
Works, published since his death, is a letter to Robert L. 
Livingston, dated Washington, October 15th, 1808, from 
which the following is a quotation : — 

** Your letter of September the 22d waited here for my 
return, and it is not till now that I have been able to ac- 
knowledge it. The explanation of his principles, given 
you by the French Emperor, in conversation, is correct, as 
far as it goes. He does not wish us to go to war with 
England, knowing we have no ships to carry on that war. 
To submit to pay to England the tribute on our commerce 
which she demands by her orders of council, would be to 
aid her in the war against him, and would give him just 
ground to declare war with us. He concludes, therefore, as 
every rational man must, that the embargo, the only re- 
maining alternative, was a wise measure. These are ac- 
knowledged principles, and should circumstances arise 
which may offer advantage to our country in making them 
public, we shall avail ourselves of them. But as it is not 
usual nor agreeable to governments to bring their conver- 
sations before the public, I think it would be well to consi- 
der this on your part as confidential, leaving to the govern- 

13 



06 HISTORY OF THE 

ment to retain or make it public, as the general good may 
require. Had the Emperor gone furtlier, and said that 
he condemned our vessels going voluntarily into his ports 
in breach of his municipal laws, we might have admitted 
it rigorously legal, though not friendly. But his condem- 
nation of vessels taken on the high seas by his privateers, 
and carried involuntarily into his ports, is justifiable by no 
law, is piracy, and this is the wrong we complain of 
against him." 

Who, after reading this language from Mr. Jefferson, 
can hesitate as to the real object which he intended to^ 
accomplish by establishing an en>bargo ? No other course 
would have answered the purpose he had in view, which 
obviously was, not the avoidance of dangers to our seamen, 
vessels, and merchandise, but to injure Great Britain, and 
benefit Bonaparte. It would not benefit hmi if we were 
to go to war with Great Britain, because such a war 
must be to a great extent a war upon the ocean, and we 
had no ships to meet her there. If we submitted to the 
terms which Great Britain demanded, it would be nothing 
less than paying tribute to her, which would aid her in car- 
rying on her war with France, and therefore would be 
injurious to his majesty the Emperor, and would give him 
just cause of complaint against us. " He (that is Bona- 
parte) concludes, as every rational man must, that the em- 
bargo, the only remaining alternative, icas a wise Tneasure.^^ 
In what respect wise ? Not for the protection of our sea- 
men, vessels, and merchandise, for neither of them are 
alluded to in these remarks, but wise for the purposes for 
which it was intended — to benefit France, and injure Great 
Britain. 

It is to be regretted that the letter from Mr. Livingston, 
to which the foregoing is an answer, was not published. It 
might have disclosed other facts and circumstances besides 
those mentioned and referred to in the answer. But the 
latter contains clear and unquestionable evidence, that ire 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 99 

fhe adoption of this measure it was the object of Mr. Jef- 
ferson to throw the weight of this country, as far as he then 
dared to venture, into the scale of France, and against 
that of Great Britain. It appears in Bonaparte's opinion, 
as well as his own, that the best, and indeed the only thing 
we could then do to aid the French, in their warfare 
against Great Britain, was to establish an embargo. Ac- 
cordingly Mr. Jefferson recommended such a measure. 
But in bringing it before Congress he not only concealed 
his'real motives in doing it, but he gave to Congress false 
reasons for introducing it to their consideration. Such 
conduct, when detected, and exposed, would destroy all 
confidence in any man, in the relations of private life. It 
is far more dangerous, and more to be condemned in the 
ruler of a great nation, whose influence must of necessity 
be great, and whose example cannot fail to produce a pow- 
erful effect upon the community at large. But the oppor- 
tunity to prosecute his favourite political system towards 
the two great hostile nations of Europe was too flattering 
to be lost, and he improved it in the manner that has been 
related. He did all he could, in a secret manner, to for- 
ward the views and promote the interests of France, and 
to injure and depress those of Great Britain. 

Mr. Jefferson's caution to Mr. Livingston on the pro- 
priety on his part of observing secrecy with respect to the 
remarks of Bonaparte, on the subject of the policy of our 
government towards Great Britain and France, was strik- 
ingly characteristic. The principles advanced by the em- 
peror are acknowledged to be sound ; and should circum- 
stances arise, which may offer advantages to our country 
in making them public, we shall avail ourselves of them. 
But as it is not usual, nor agreeable to governments to 
bring their conversations before the public, I think it will 
be well to consider this on your part as confidential, leav- 
ing to the government to retain or make it public, as the 
public good may require." That he should not be desir- 



100 HISTORY OF THE 

Oils of having this decisive evidence of Bonaparte's opinion 
in favour of the embargo, in preference to any other course 
which the case presented, and the irresistible presumption 
which the conversation furnishes that our administration 
were shaping their measures in such a manner as to pro- 
mote the interests of France, pubhshed to the country, 
and the world, is not strange. It would ill comport with 
the professions which our government were constantly 
making of impartiality between the two belligerent pow- 
ers, and certainly furnish Great Britain with unansweVa- 
ble reasons for treating us as a secret and insidious 
enemy. 

And as a decisive proof of the entire and absolute sub- 
serviency of Mr. Jefferson's feelings as well as conduct to 
Bonaparte's policy and interests, he says — " Had the em- 
peror gone further, and said that he condemned our vessels 
going voluntarily into his ports in breach of his municipal 
laws, we might have admitted it rigorously legal, though 
not friendly." This, it is presumed, was the principle on 
which Bonaparte acted, when under his Rambouillet de- 
cree, he sequestered and confiscated, for the benefit of his 
privy purse, the immense amount of American property 
which was in his ports at the time that decree was pro- 
mulgated, and for which he never made any remuneration, 
considering it undoubtedly as " rigorously legale " 

But what must be thought of the nature and strength of 
Mr. Jefferson's devoted attachment to France, when in his 
private intercourse and communications with his confi- 
dential friends, he makes use of such language as that in 
the closing part of this letter — " But his condemnation of 
our vessels taken on the high seas by his privateers, and 
carried involuntarily into his ports, is justifiable by no law, 
is piracy. ^^ In all the complaints against Great Britain, 
nothing has been alledged of a more aggravated character 
than this. And yet, the general spirit and tenor of the 
correspondence with France, on the subject of her decrees, 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 101 

and the depredations upon our commerce under them, 
was, during the administration of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. 
Madison, tame, abject, and suppHcatory, obviously dictated 
by strong apprehensions of giving offence, and expressed 
under the influence of servility and fear. 

Mr. Madison came into office in March, 1809. Mr. 
Jefferson had bequeathed to him a series of difficulties and 
embarrassments with Great Britain, from which it was a 
perplexing task to extricate the country, and which, if 
suffered to remain in the predicament they were in at the 
time he left the presidency, could scarcely fail to involve it 
in deeper calamities. It has been shown in what manner 
the negotiation with Mr. Rose was defeated by an attempt 
to induce him to transcend his instructions, and take up 
controversies to which they did not extend. Upon Mr. 
Madison's accession to the government, the British minister 
in this country was the honourable David M. Erskine, son 
of Lord Chancellor Erskine, a member of the Whig cabi- 
net under Mr. Fox's administration. This gentleman was 
inexperienced in diplomatic services, and was not distin- 
guished by any uncommon talents, natiual or acquired ; 
but that he was extremely desirous of adjusting the diffi- 
culties between the two countries, cannot be doubted. On 
the 17th of April, 1809, about six weeks after Mr. Madi- 
son's inauguration as President of the United States, he 
addressed a letter to Mr. Smith, Secretary of State of the 
United States, of which the following is a copy — 

" Washington, April llth, 1809. 

•< SiRj — I have the honour to inform you that I have 
received his majesty's commands, to represent to the 
government of the United States, that his majesty is ani- 
mated by the most sincere desire for an adjustment of the 
differences which have unhappily so long prevailed between 
the two countries, the recapitulation of which might have 



102 HISTORY OF THE 

a tendency to impede, if not prevent an amicable under- 
standing. 

" It having been represented to his majesty's govern- 
ment, that the Congress of the United States, in their pro- 
ceedings at the opening of the last session, had evinced an 
intention of passing certain laws, which would place the 
relations of Great Britain with the United States upon an 
equal footing, in all respects, with the other belligerent 
powers ; I have accordingly received his majesty's com- 
mands, in the event of such laws taking place, to offer on 
the part of his majesty, an honourable reparation for the 
aggression committed by a British naval officer in the 
attack on the United States frigate Chesapeake. 

" Considering the act passed by the Congress of the 
United States on the 1st of March, (usually termed the 
non-intercourse act) as having produced a state of equa- 
lity in the relations of the two belligerent powers with 
respect to the United States, I have to submit, conforma- 
bly to instructions, for the consideration of the American 
government, such terms of satisfaction and reparation, as 
his majesty is induced to believe will be accepted in the 
same spirit of conciliation with which they are proposed. 

" In addition to the prompt disavowal made by his ma- 
jesty, on being apprized of the unauthorized act committed 
by his naval officer, whose recall, as a mark of the king's 
displeasure, from an highly important and honourable 
command immediately ensued ; his majesty is willing to 
restore the men forcibly taken out of the Chesapeake, and 
if acceptable to the American government, to make a 
suitable provision for the unfortunate sufferers on that 
occasion." 

This letter was answered by the Secretary of State on 
the same day, and the propositions were accepted by the 
government. On the following day, viz. the 18th of April, 
Mr Erskine addressed a second letter to Mr. Smith, in 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 103 

which, after alluding to what had previously occurred, 
added the following — 

" On these grounds and expectations, I am instructed to 
communicate to the American government, his majesty's 
determination of sending to the United States an envoy 
extraordinary, invested with full powers to conclude a 
treaty on all the points of the relations between the two 
countries. 

" In the mean time, with a view to contribute to the 
attainment of so desirable an object, his majesty would be 
willing to withdraw his orders in council of January and 
November 1807, so far as respects the United States, in 
the persuasion that the President would issue a proclama- 
tion for the renewal of the intercourse with Great Britain, 
and that whatever difference of opinion should arise in the 
interpretation of the terms of such an agreement, will be 
removed in the proposed negotiation." 

On the same day Mr. Smith wrote the following letter 
to Mr. Erskine — 

" Department of State, April 18^^, 1809. 

" Sir, — The note which I had the honour of receiving 
from you this day, I lost no time in laying before the Pre- 
sident, who being sincerely desirous of a satisfactory 
adjustment of the differences unhappily existing between 
Great Britain and the United States, has authorized me to 
assure you, that he will meet with a disposition correspon- 
dent with that of his Britannick majesty, the determination 
of his majesty to send to the United States a special envoy, 
invested with full powers to conclude a treaty on all the 
points of the relations between the two countries. 

"I am further authorized to assure you, that in case his 
Britannick majesty should, in the mean time, withdraw 
his orders in council of January and November, 1807, so 
far as respects the United States, the President will not 
fail to issue a proclamation by virtue of the authority, and 



104 HISTORY OF THE 

for the purposes specified in the eleventh section of the 
statute, commonly called the non-intercourse act." 

To this, on the succeeding day, the following answer 
was returned by Mr. Erskine — 

" Washington, April Idth, 1809. 

*' Sir, — In consequence of the acceptance, by the Pre- 
sident, as stated in your letter dated the 18th inst. of the 
proposals made by me on the part of his majesty, in my 
letter of the same day, for the renewal of the intercourse 
between the respective countries, I am authorized to de- 
clare that his majesty's orders in council of January and 
November, 1807, will have been withdrawn, as respects the 
United States on the 10th day of June next." 

On the same day Mr. Smith replied in the following 
letter — 

" Department of State, April 19, 1809. 

" Sir, — Having laid before the President your note of 
this day, containing an assurance, that his Britannick 
majesty will, on the tenth day of June next, have with- 
drawn his orders in council of January and November, 
1807, so far as respects the United States, I have the 
honour of informing you that the President will accordingly, 
and in pursuance of the eleventh section of the statute, 
commonly called the non-intercourse act, issue a procla- 
mation, so that the trade of the United States with Great 
Britain may on the same day be renewed, in the manner 
provided in the said section." 

In pursuance of this arrangement with the British Envoy, 
the following document was issued on the same day — 

•' By the President of the United States of America. 

"A PROCLAMATION. 
*' Whereas it is provided by the 11th section of the act 



HARTFORD COiNVENTION. 105 

of Congress, entitled ' An act to interdict the commercial 
intercourse between the United States and Great Britain 
and France, and their dependencies, and for other pur- 
poses; that in case either France or Great Britain shall 
so revoke or modify her edicts, as that they shall cease to 
violate the neutral commerce of the United States ;' the 
President is authorized to declare the same by proclama- 
tion, after which the trade suspended by the said act, and by 
an act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in the 
ports and harbours of the United States, and the several 
acts supplementary thereto, may be renewed with the na- 
tion so doing. And whereas the Honourable David Mon- 
tague Erskine, his Britannick majesty's envoy extraordina- 
ry and minister plenipotentiary, has by the order and in the 
name of his sovereign declared to this government, that 
the British orders in council of January and November, 
1807, will have been withdrawn, as respects the United 
States, on the 10th day of June next. 

" Now therefore, I, James Madison, President of the 
United States, do hereby proclaim, that the orders in coun- 
cil aforesaid, will have been withdrawn on the said tenth 
day of June next; after which day the trade of the United 
States with Great Britain, as suspended by the act of Con- 
gress abovementioned, and an act laying an embargo on 
all ships and vessels in the ports and harbours of the United 
States, and the several acts supplementary thereto, may 
be renewed. 

" Given under my hand and the seal of the United States, 
at Washington, the 19th day of April, A. D. 1809, and of 
the independence of the United States the thirty-third. 

" James Madison. 

" By the President. R. Smith, Secretary of State." 

The news of this arrangement was received throughout 

the Union with the highest degree of gratification ; and 

the general exultation furnished decisive evidence of the 

14 



106 HISTORY^OF THE 

Strong desire of all descriptions of persons and a great 
proportion of the politicians, to be at peace with Great 
Britain. In order to adapt the laws to the new state of 
things, Congress were convened in May following, and in 
addressing his message to both Houses, the President in- 
formed them that it afforded him much satisfaction to be 
able to communicate the commencement of a favourable 
chano-e in our forei<?a relations ; the critical state of which 
had induced a session of Congress at that early period. 
After recapitulating what had occurred in regard to the 
arrangement with Mr. Erskine, the message says, 

'* The revision of our commercial laws, proper to adapt 
them to the arrangement ivhich has taken place iiilh Great 
Britain, will doubtless engage the early attention of Con- 
gress." 

In pursuance of this recommendation the laws neces- 
sary for the occasion were passed, and the country was 
gratified with the prospect of an unshackled and undis- 
turbed prosecution of their commercial pursuits. In a 
short time, however, intelligence was received, that the 
British government had disclaimed the arrangement, on 
the broad ground that their agent had violated his instruc- 
tions, and that the negociation was carried on, and the 
arrangement concluded, without authority ; and in conse- 
quence thereof the minister was recalled. Upon receiving 
this information, a second proclamation was issued, bear- 
ing date the 3rd of August, 1809, by the President of the 
United States, declaring that thQ orders in council had not 
been withdrawn, agreeably to the arrangement with Mr. 
Erskine, and therefore the acts of Congress which had 
been suspended, were to be considered as in force. 

It has just been remarked, that the arrangement, the 
history of which has been given, was rejected by the Brit- 
ish government, on the ground that Mr. Erskine trans- 
cended, or violated his instructions. It is understood to 
be the fact, not only with reference to Great Britain, but 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 107 

Other countries, for governments to withhold their sanc- 
tions from treaties and conventions concluded in this man- 
ner. The principle is recognized by our government. 
And it is perfectly evident that such must be the case, or 
there would be no security in the negotiations between 
governments. Like all other acts under delegated au- 
thority, it is binding on the principal when performed 
within the scope of the commission granted to the agent. 
An inquiry necessarily arises here, whether our govern- 
ment were acquainted with the extent of Mrt Erskine's 
instructions, before, or at the time of the negotiation. The 
dates of the correspondence between the Secretary of 
State and Mr. Erskine show, that the business was hurried 
in a very extraordinary manner. The letters on both sides 
were all written, the arrangement concluded, and the pro- 
clamation founded upon that arrangement, was issued in 
the course of three days. On the 31st of July, J 809, Mr. 
Erskine communicated to Mr. Smith, Secretary of State, 
the information that the British government had not con- 
firmed the arrangement ; at the same time, expressing the 
conviction which he entertained at the time of making it, 
that he had conformed to his majesty's wishes, and to the 
spirit at least of his instructions. On the 9th of August 
the Secretary of State addressed a letter to Mr. Erskine, 
requesting an explanation of some communications con- 
tained in a letter from him to his government, respecting 
conversations with Mr. Madison, Mr. Gallatin, and Mr. 
Smith, on the affairs of the United States and Great Bri- 
tain ; and after noticing several distinct subjects of inquiry 
relating to these conversations, he says — " I, however, 
would remark, that had you deemed it proper to have com- 
municated in extenso this letter, [from Mr. Canning to Mr. 
Erskine,] it would have been impossible for the President 
to have perceived in its conditions, or in its spirit, that con- 
ciliatory disposition which had been professed, and which, 
it was hopedj had really existed." Mr. Erskine replied to 



108 HISTORY OF THE 

this letter of Mr. Smith, on the 14th of August, and in 
the course of his answer, after having noticed the several 
subjects of inquiry, he said — " Under these circumstances, 
therefore, finding that I could not obtain the recognitions 
specified in Mr. Canning's desjiatch, of the 23d of January, 
(which formed but one part of his instructions to me,) in the 
formal manner required, I considered that it would be in 
vain to lay before the government of the United States the 
despatch in question, which I was at liberty to have done 
in extenso had I thought proper : but as I had such strong 
grounds for believing that the object of his majesty's go- 
vernment could be attained, though in a different manner, 
and the spirit, at least, of my several letters of instructions 
be fully complied with, I felt a thorough conviction upon 
my mind, that I should be acting in conformity with his 
majesty's wishes, and accordingly concluded the late pro- 
visional agreement on his majesty's behalf with the govern- 
ment of the United States." 

These remarks, on the one side and the other, are doubt- 
less intended to convey the idea, that at the time of the 
negotiation, and until after the conclusion of the arrange- 
ment, our government were not made acquainted with the 
nature and extent of Mr. Erskine's instructions, but that 
they depended on his understanding of both. Among the 
documents connected with this subject, is a letter, dated 
_^_May_^7^ 1,809, from Mr. Canning to Mr. Pinkney, the 
/v United States minister at London, in which is the following 
I passage — 

I " Having had the honour to read to you in extenso, the 
I instructions with which Mr. Erskine was furnished, it is 
I not necessary for me to enter into any explanation of those 
\ points in which Mr. Erskine has acted not only not in con- 
\ formity, but in direct contradiction to them." 

From this passage it is apparent, that our government 

l^were, or might have been made acquainted with the nature 

and extent of Mr. Erskine's instructions. It was so clearly 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 109 

their duty to have ascertained this most important point, 
before entering on the negotiation, that it is not easy to 
imagine they could have passed it by, unless there were 
specific reasons for their remaining in ignorance concern- 
ing them. It has been seen, that in the negotiation with 
Mr. Rose, notwithstanding his instructions were strictly 
confined to a single object, and this fact was distinctly made 
known to Mr. Monroe before Mr. Rose left England, and 
as distinctly communicated to our government after his 
arrival, and before the negotiation was opened, still, with 
a full knowledge of this fact, immediately upon entering 
upon a discussion of the subject of Mr. Rose's mission, the 
first attempt of the Secretary of State was to draw him 
into a consideration of other subjects of controversy, which 
were not only not included in his commission, but which 
he was expressly prohibited from discussing. And this 
was attempted with a perfect knowledge on the part of 
our government, that if a treaty, or an arrangement had 
been entered into by Mr. Rose, in violation of his instruc- 
tions, his government would disclaim it, even if it should 
not otherwise be objectionable. No explanation can be 
given for this course of conduct on the part of our govern- 
ment, except the plain, and as it is believed undeniable 
fact, that they did not wish to adjust the difficulties be- 
tween the two nations. In consequence of the determi- 
nation by our government not to negotiate, unless Mr. 
Rose would violate his instructions, and extend the nego- 
tiation to topics not included in his commission, it was dis- 
continued, and reparation in the matter of the Leopard 
and the Chesapeake left undecided. 

In the case of Mr. Erskine, the negotiation was one of 
great importance. Mr. Madison had just entered upon 
the office of President of the United States. Mr. Jeffer- 
son had left the government surrounded with difficulties 
and embarrassments. The foreign commerce of the coun- 
try, under the system of embargo and non-intercourse, 



110 HISTORY OF THE 

was destroyed, and all the various branches of domestic 
industry — agricultural, mercantile, and mechanical, were 
in a state of deep depression, or stagnation ; and the com- 
munity were becoming very uneasy under privations which 
were not only unnecessary, but extremely injurious and 
oppressive. Under such circumstances, it was a stroke of 
good policy in him, at his entrance upon the duties of chief 
magistrate, to excite popular feeling in favour of his ad- 
ministration ; and nothing would be more likely to produce 
such an effect, than the adoption of measures which would 
relieve the nation from the multiplied evils of the restric- 
tive policy. And it required no extraordinary degree of 
foresight to discern, that if such an arrangement as was 
contemplated with Mr. Erskine should be accomplished, 
that it would be cordially welcomed throughout the coun- 
try, and render the new chief magistrate universally popu- 
lar. At the same time, if the arrangement should be re- 
jected by the British government, whatever the cause for 
refusing to ratify it might be, it could hardly fail to rouse 
a spirit of resentment in the United States, of a propor- 
tionate extent with the gratification which the adjustment 
had excited. 

The chances of a favourable result towards the popula- 
rity of the administration were altogether in their favour. 
If Mr. Erskine's instructions should, upon being disclosed, 
warrant the arrangement, the measure would be hailed as 
highly beneficial to the country. If not, and the treaty 
should be rejected by Great Britain, the indignation of our 
country would be raised to a high pitch against that govern- 
ment, and would open an easy way to such further mea- 
sures as our government might think proper to adopt. If 
the extent of the instructions was known to our govern- 
ment, before entering upon the negotiation, the subsequent 
proceedings were a fraud upon the nation. If it was not 
known, it was a most culpable omission on the part of the 
administration to engage in the negotiation in a state of 



HARTFORD COiNVENTlON. 111. 

ignorance respecting this indispensable fact, because the 
consequences could not, in the event of a want of autho- 
rity, be otherwise than injurious to the nation. 

An attempt was made to induce Mr. Erskine to say that 
he had not disclosed his instructions. His answer is equi- 
vocal, and leaves the point undecided. Whether he did 
or did not, does not seem to be a matter of much impor- 
tance. They were shown to Mr. Pinkney in London, in 
extenso; and it is hardly to be supposed that he could 
have failed to communicate their contents to the govern- 
ment at Washington. If known to them, the course pur- 
sued by them was in the highest degree unworthy, and de- 
ceptive, because they must have known that any arrange- 
ment made in violation of instructions would be rejected 
for that reason only, if there had been no other. Nor can 
any good excuse be given for that ignorance, if it actually 
existed. The government ought to have known the ex- 
tent of the minister's powers before they entered upon the 
negotiation. 

The rejection of the arrangement by the British, though 
declared to be upon the ground of a departure from, or a 
violation of instructions, produced its natural effects in the 
country. Upon receiving intelligence of the fact, the Pre- 
sident issued his proclamation, declaring the non-inter- 
course laws again in force : the feelings of the community 
were greatly excited, and a strong spirit of resentment was 
enkindled towards Great Britain. 

Mr. Erskine having been recalled, Mr. Francis James 
Jackson was sent to the United States as his successor. 
The date of the first correspondence with him is prefixed 
to a letter from the Secretary of State, of the 9th of Octo- 
ber, 1809. In this letter, the Secretary adverts to certain 
conversations which had taken place between him and 
Mr. Jackson, and states what he understood to be the pur- 
port of them; and adds, that "To avoid the misconcep- 
tions incident to oral proceedings, I have also the honour 



112 HISTORY OF THE 

to intimate that it is thought expedient that our further dis- 
cussions on the present occasion be in the written form." 
Mr. Jackson protested against this determination, as un- 
precedented in the annals of diplomacy, but consented to 
go on with the business of his mission, rather than to have 
it suspended until he could send home for further direc- 
tions. In the course of his letter he remarks — ^' It was 
not known when I left England, whether Mr. Erskine had, 
according to the liberty allowed him, communicated to 
you in extenso his original instructions. It now appears 
that he did not. But in reverting to his official correspon- 
dence, and particularly to a despatch addressed on the 
20th of April to his majesty's Secretary of State for 
foreign affairs, I find that he there states, that he had 
submitted to your consideration the three conditions spe 
cified in those instructions, as the groundwork of an ar- 
rangement which, according to information received from 
this country, it was thought in England might be made 
WMth a prospect of great mutual advantage. Mr. Erskine 
then reports verbatim et seriatim your observations upon 
each of the three conditions, and the reasons which induced 
you to think that others might be substituted in lieu of 
them. It may have been concluded between you that these 
latter were an equivalent for the original conditions ; but 
the very act of substitution evidently shows that those origi- 
nal conditions were in fact very explicitly communicated 
to you, and by you of course laid before the President for 
his consideration. I need hardly add, that the difference 
between these conditions and those contained in the ar- 
rangement of the 18th and 19th of April, is sufficiently 
obvious to require no elucidation ; nor need I draw the 
conclusion, which I consider as admitted by all absence of 
complaint on the part of the American government, viz. 
that under such circumstances his majesty had an undoubt- 
ed and incontrovertible right to disavow the act of his 
minister. I must here allude to a supposition which you 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 113 

• 

have more than once mentioned to me, and by which, if it 
had any the shghtest foundation, this right might, perhaps, 
have been in some degree affected. You have informed 
me that you understood that Mr. Erskine had two sets of 
instructions, by which to regulate his conduct ; and that 
upon one of them, which had not been communicated 
either to you or to the pubUck, was to be rested the justi- 
fication of the terms finally agreed upon between you and 
him. It is my duty, Sir, solemnly to declare to you, and 
through you to the President, that the despatch from Mr. 
Canning to Mr. Erskine, which you have made the basis of 
an official correspondence with the latter minister, and 
which was read by the former to the American minister in 
London, is the only despatch by which the conditions were 
prescribed to Mr. Erskine for the conclusion of an arrange- 
ment with this country on the matter to which it relates." 
A very long letter from Mr. Smith, Secretary of State, 
in answer to Mr. Jackson, bears date October 19. It is a 
laboured attempt to obtain a diplomatic victory over the 
British ambassador, on the subjects of dispute between the 
two governments. But the latter appears to have been 
thoroughly versed in his business ; and no advantage was 
gained over him by Mr. Secretary Smith, in the argu- 
ment. Owing perhaps to the disappointment which was 
experienced from this quarter, or to the long continuance 
of the discussion, more warmth of feeling began to be 
manifest. The controversy, at length, seemed to turn 
upon the nature and extent of the instructions given by 
the British government — whether Mr. Erskine acted 
under a limited, or what v.as called a full power. It was 
contended by Mr. Smith that Mr. Erskine supposed he 
had authority to make the arrangement, and that the 
British government were in hf^nour bound to ratify it. Mr. 
Jackson, in a letter to Mr; Smith, of the 23d of October, 
says — " I have, therefore, no hesitation in informing you, 
that his majesty was pleased to disavow the agreement 

15 



114 HISTORY OF THE 

concluded between you and Mr. Erskine, because it was 
concluded in violation of that gentleman's instructions, and 
altogether without authority to subscribe to the terms of 
it. These instructions, I now understand by your letter, 
as well as from the obvious deduction which I took the 
liberty of making in mine of the 11th inst. were at the 
time, in substance, made known to you; no stronger illus- 
tration, therefore, can be given of the deviation from them 
which occurred, than by a reference to the terms of your 
agreement." 

On the 1st of November the Secretary of State replied 
to Mr. Jackson. The following is an extract from his letter 
" For the first time it is now disclosed that the subjects 
arranged with this government by your predecessor, are 
held to be not within the authority of a minister plenipo- 
tentiary, and that not having had a ' full power distinct from 
that authority, his- transactions on those subjects might of 
right be disavowed by his government.' This disclosure,^ 
so contrary to every antecedent supposition and just in- 
ference, gives a new aspect to this business. If the 
authority of your predecessor did not embrace the subjects 
in question, so as to bind his government, it necessarily 
follows, that the only credentials yet presented by you, 
being the same with those presented by him, give you no 
authority to bind it ; and that the exhibition of a * full 
power' for that purpose, such as you doubtless are fur- 
nished with, is become an indispensable preliminary to 
further negotiation ; or to speak more strictly, was re- 
quired in the first instance by the view of the matter now 
disclosed by you. Negotiation without this preliminary 
would not only be a departure from the principle of equa- 
lity which is the essential basis of it, but would moreover 
be a disregard of the precautions and of the self-respect 
enjoined on the attention of the United States by the cir- 
cumstances which have hitherto taken place. 

"I need scarcely add, that in the full power alluded to, 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 115 

as a preliminary to negotiation, is not intended to be in- 
cluded either the whole extent or any part of your instruc- 
tions for the exercise of it. These of course, as you have 
justly remarked, remain subject to your own discretion. 

'* I abstain from making any particular animadversions 
on several irrelevant and improper allusions in your letter, 
not at all comporting with the professed disposition to 
adjust in an amicable manner the differences unhappily 
subsisting between the two countries. But it would be 
improper to conclude the few observations to which I pur- 
posely limit myself, without adverting to your repetition of 
a language implying a knowledge on the part of this 
government that the instructions of your predecessor did 
not authorize the arrangement formed by him. After the 
explicit and peremptory asseveration that this government 
had no such knowledge, and that with such a knowledge 
no such arrangement would have been entered into, the 
view which you have again presented of the subject, makes 
it my duty to apprize you, that such insinuations are 
inadmissible in the intercourse of a foreign minister with a 
government that understands what it owes to itself." 

Mr. Jackson replied to this letter on the 4th of Novem-. 
ber; and in the course of his remarks, says — "In his 
despatch of the 23d of January, Mr. Secretary Canning 
distinctly says to Mr. Erskine, 'upon receiving through 
you, on the part of the American government, a distinct 
and official recognition of the three abovementioned con- 
ditionsj his majesty will lose no time in sending to Ame- 
rica a minister fully empowered to consign them to a for- 
mal and regular treaty.' 

" This minister would, of course, have been provided 
with a full power ; but Mr. Erskine was to be guided by 
his instructions, and had the agreement concluded here 
been conformable to them, it would without doubt have 
been ratified by his majesty. I must beg your very parti- 
cular attention to the circumstance that his majesty's 



116 HISTORY OF THE 

ratification has been withheld, not because the agreement 
was concluded without a full power, but because it was 
altogether irreconcileable to the instructions on which it 
was professedly founded. The question of the full power 
was introduced by yourself to give weight, by a quotation 
from a highly respected author, to your complaint of the 
disavowal ; in answer to which I observed that the quota- 
tion did not apply, as Mr. Erskine had no full power. Never 
did I imagine, or any where attempt to rest, the right of 
disavowal upon that circumstance : indubitably his agree- 
ment would nevertheless have been ratified, had not the 
instructions, which in this case took the place of a full 
power, been violated." 

"I am concerned to be obliged a second time to appeal 
to those principles of publick law, under the sanction and 
protection of which I was sent to this country. Where 
there is not freedom of communication in the form substi- 
tuted for the more usual one of verbal discussion, there 
can be little useful intercourse between ministers ; and one, 
at least, of the epithets, which you have thought proper to 
apply to my last letter, is such as necessarily abridges that 
freedom. That any thing therein contained may be irrele- 
vant to the subject, it is of course competent in you to en- 
deavour to show ; and as far as you succeed in so doing, in 
so far will my argument lose of its validity ; but as to the 
propriety of my allusions, you must allow me to acknow- 
ledge only the decision of my own sovereign, whose com- 
mands I obey, and to whom alone I can consider myself 
responsible." 

*' You will find that in my correspondence with you, I 
have carefully avoided drawing conclusions that did not 
necessarily follow from the premises advanced by me, and 
last of all should I think of uttering an insinuation, where 
I was unable to substantiate a fact. To facts, such as I 
have become acquainted with them, I have scrupulously 
adhered, and in so doing I must continue, whenever the 



' HARTFORD CONVENTION. 117 

good faith of his majesty's government is called in ques- 
tion, to vindicate its honour and dignity in the manner that 
appears to me best calculated for that purpose." 

To this letter the Secretary of State made the following 

answer — 

" Department of State, November 8, 1809. 

"Sir, — In my letter of the 19th ultimo, I stated to you 
that the declaration in your letter of the 11th, that the de- 
spatch from Mr. Canning to Mr. Erskine, of the 23d of 
January, was the only despatch by which the conditions 
were prescribed to Mr. Erskine for the conclusion of an 
arrangement on the matter to which it related, was then 
for the first time made to this government. And it was 
added that if that despatch had been communicated at the 
time of the arrangement, or if it had been known that the 
propositions contained in it, were the only ones on which 
he was authorized to make an arrangement, the arrange- 
ment would not have been made. 

"In my letter of the 1st instant, adverting to the repe- 
tition in your letter of the 23d ultimo, of a language im- 
plying a knowledge in this government that the instructions 
of your predecessor did not authorize the arrangement 
formed by him, an intimation was distinctly given to you 
that, after the explicit and peremptory asseveration that 
this government had not any such knowledge, and that 
with such a knowledge, such an arrangement would not 
have been made, no such insinuation could be admitted by 
this government. 

" Finding that in your reply of the 4th instant, you have 
used a language which cannot be understood but as reitera- 
ting and even aggravating the same gross insinuation, it 
only remains in order to preclude opportunities which are 
thus abused, to inform you, that no further communications 
will be received from you, and that the necessity of this 
determination will, without delay, be made known to your 
government. In the mean time, a ready attention will be 



118 HISTORY OF THE 

given to any communications, affecting the interests of the 
two nations, through any other channel that may be sub- 
stituted. I have the honour to be, &.c. 

♦'R. Smith." 

Great pains were taken to excite the public feelings on 
this occasion. Mr. Jackson was accused of having insulted 
the government, and popular resentment was roused to so 
high a pitch, that it was considered hardly safe for him to 
travel through the country. On the 11th of November 
the following note was communicated to the Secretary of 
State — 

" Mr. Oakley, his majesty's secretary of legation, is de- 
sired by Mr. Jackson to state to the Secretary of State, 
that, as Mr. Jackson has been already once most grossly 
insulted by the inhabitants of the town of Hampton, in the 
unprovoked language of abuse held by them to several 
officers bearing the king's uniform, when those officers 
were themselves violently assaulted, and put in imminent 
danger ; he conceives it to be indispensible to the safety of 
himself, of the gentlemen attached to his mission, and of 
his family, during the remainder of their stay in the United 
States, to be provided with special passports or safe-guards 
from the American government. This is the more neces- 
sary, since some of the newspapers of the United States are 
daily using language whose only tendency can be to excite 
the people to commit violence upon Mr. Jackson's person." 

Congress met in November ; and on the 29th of that 
month the President's message was sent to both houses. 
After giving a history of the failure of the arrangement 
with Mr. Erskine, and mentioning his recall, the appoint- 
ment of a new minister, and referring to the state of things 
in the attempt to open a negotiation with him, the message 
says — The correspondence "will show also, that forgetting 
the respect due to all governments, he did not refrain from 
imputations on this, which required that no further commu- 
nications should be received from him." 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 119 

If there are any persons who have been well acquainted 
with the course of the administration under Mr. Madison, 
who believe that the arrangement with Mr. Erskine was 
made with sincerity and good faith on the part of our go- 
vernment, and with an expectation that it would be ratified, 
and carried into effect by the British government, they will 
of course give him credit for this professed attempt to ad- 
just the difficulties between the two nations. But persons 
of a different description, who view the whole proceeding 
as a political manoeuvre, intended to gain popularity to a 
new chief magistrate in the first place, and in the result 
of its being rejected by the British government, to excite 
the resentment of the country against that government, 
will come to a different conclusion, — one very far from 
being favourable to the frankness and political candour of 
the head of our government. 

At all events, it left the subject of controversy between 
the two nations, which gave rise to the negotiation, open 
and undecided. Its consequences will be more fully ascer- 
tained hereafter. 

In the maritime war of retaliation which Great Britain 
and France were carrying on against each other by decrees 
and orders in council, it was of course an object of each to 
charge its origin upon the other. In a letter from Count 
Champagny to General Armstrong, dated August 22d, 
1809, he says — " Let England revoke her declarations of 
blockade against France ; France will revoke her decree of 
blockade against England. Let England revoke her orders 
in council of the 1 1th of November, 1807, the decree of Milan 
will fall of itself. American commerce will then have re- 
gained all its liberty, and it will be sure of finding favour 
and protection in the ports of France. But it is for the 
United States to bring on these happy results. Can a nation 
that wishes to remain free and sovereign, even balance be- 
tween some temporary interests, and the great interests of 



120 HISTORY OF THE 

its independence, and the maintenance of its honour, of its 
sovereignty, and of its dignity ?" 

Having failed in the negotiation with Mr. Erskine, of 
obtaining a revocation of the British orders in council of 
January and November, 1807, the President's proclama- 
tion replaced the intercourse between the countries upon 
the same footing upon which it stood previously to the 
opening of that negotiation. It was then thought expe- 
dient by the American government to make an experi- 
ment with France, for the purpose of inducing the govern- 
ment of that nation to repeal the Berlin and Milan de- 
crees. On the 1st of December, 1809, the Secretary of 
State addressed a letter to General Armstrong, of which 
the following is an extract : — 

" Inclosed you have five copies of the President's mes- 
sage and of its accompanying documents. They will afford 
you a view of the existing state of things here, and parti- 
cularly of the ground taken in the correspondence of the 
British minister. You will perceive that the deliberations 
of congress at their present session cannot but be embar- 
rassed by the painful consideration, that the two principal 
belligerents have been, for some time, alike regardless of 
our neutral rights, and that they manifest no disposition to 
relinquish, in any degree, their unreasonable pretensions. 

" You will also herewith receive a copy of a letter to 
Mr. Pinkney, which will show the light in which M. 
Champagny's letter is viewed by the President, and at the 
same time the course of proceeding prescribed to our mi- 
nister in London. You will of course understand it to be 
wished that you should ascertain the meaning of the 
French government, as to the condition on which it has 
been proposed to revoke the Berlin decree. On the princi- 
ple which seems to be assumed by M. Champagny, nothing 
more ought to be required than a recall by Great Britain 
of her proclamation or illegal blockades, which are of a 
date prior to that of the Berlin decree, or a formal decla- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 121 

5ration that they are not now in force. Should this be done 
and be followed by an annulment of all the decrees and 
orders in chronological order, and Great Britain should 
afterwards put in force old, or proclaim new blockadeSj 
contrary to the law of nations, it would produce questions 
between her and the United States, which the French go- 
vernment is bound to leave to the United States, at least 
until- it shall find it necessary to bring forward complaints 
of an acquiescence on our part, not consistent with the 
neutrality professed by us." 

On the 25th of January, 1810, General Armstrong 
wrote the following letter to Mr. Pinkney : — 

" A letter from Mr. Secretary Smith of the 1st of De* 
ccmber last, made it my duty to inquire of his excellency 
the duke of Cadore, what were the conditions on which his 
majesty the emperor would annul his decree, commonly 
called the Berlin decree, and whether if Great Britain re- 
voked her blockades of a date anterior to that decree, his 
majesty would consent to revoke the said decree. To 
these questions 1 have this day received the following an- 
swer, which I hasten to convey to you by a special mes- 
senger. 

ANSWER. 

'* The only condition required for the revocation, by his 
majesty the emperor, of the decree of Berlin, will bera 
previous revocation by the British government of her 
blockades of France, or part of France, [such as that from 
the Elbe to Brest, ^c] of a date anterior to that of the 
aforesaid decree." 

On the 28th of January, 1810, General Armstrong 
wrote the following letter to the Secretary of State. 

" In conformity to the suggestions contained in your 
letter of the first of December, 1809, I demanded whether, 
if Great Britain revoked her blockades of a date anterior 
to the decree, commonly called the Bei'lin decree, his ma- 



122 HISTORY OF THE 

jesty the emperor would consent to revoke the said decree.'^ 
To which the minister answered, that *' the only condition 
required for the revocation, hy his majesty, of the decree of 
BerHn, will be a previous revocation by the British go- 
vernment of her blockade of France, or part of France, 
[such as that from the Elbe to Brest, &c.] of a date ante- 
rior to that of the aforesaid decree; and that if the British 
government would then recall the orders in council which 
had occasioned the decree of Milan, that decree should 
also be annulled." 

On the 11th of November, 1809, Mr. Smith, Secretary 
of State, wrote a letter to Mr. Pinkney, from which the 
following is an extract : — 

" From the enclosed copy of a letter from M. Cham- 
pagny to General Armstrong, it appears that the French 
government has taken a ground in relation to the British 
violation of our neutral rights, not the same with that here- 
tofore taken, and which it is proper you should be ac- 
quainted with. You will observe that the terms stating 
the condition on which the Berlin decree will be revoked, 
are not free from obscurity. They admit the construc- 
tion, however, that if Great Britain will annul her illegal 
blockades as distinct from her orders in council, such as the 
blockade from the Elbe to Brest, «fcc. prior to the Berlin 
decree, and perhaps of subsequent date, but still distinct 
from her orders in council, that France will put an end to 
her Berlin decree, or at least the illegal part of it. Whilst 
therefore it becomes important to take proper steps, as 
will be done, through General Armstrong, to ascertain the 
real and precise meaning of M. Champagny's letter, it is 
important also that your interposition should be used to 
ascertain the actual state of the British blockades, distinct 
from the orders in council, whether merely on paper or 
otherwise illegal, and whether prior or subsequent to the 
Berlin decree, and to feel the pulse of the British govern- 
ment on the propriety of putting them out of the way, iu 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 123 

order to give force to our call on France to prepare the 
way for a repeal of the orders in council, by her repeal of 
that decree. 

" In the execution of this task, I rely on the judgment 
and delicacy by which I am persuaded you will be guided, 
and on your keeping in mind the desire of this govern- 
ment to entangle itself as little as jjossible in the question of 
■priority in the violation of our neutral rights, and to com- 
mit itself as little as possible to either belligerent as to the 
course to be taken with the other. 

" If it should be found that no illegal blockades are now 
in force, and so declared by Great Britain, or that the 
British government is ready to revoke and withdraw all 
such as may not be consistent with the definition of block- 
ade in the Russian treaty of June, ISOI, it will be desirable 
that you lose no time in giving the information to General 
Armstrong, and whatever may be the result of your inqui- 
ries, that you hasten a communication of it to me." 

It is very apparent from the tenor of these letters, that 
the course which the government was pursuing, was not a 
little embarrassing to them. The British blockade of 
May, 1806, was prior in date to the French decree of 
Berlin. And it was an object of great importance, in the 
view of the French government, to have it understood, that 
the Berlin decree was issued in order to retaliate upon the 
British government for the blockading order abovemen- 
tioned. But that order had not been considered by the 
government of the United Stales as a violation of their 
neutral rights, at least so far as to make it the subject of 
any formal or serious complaint. It will be recollected, 
that in the correspondence between Mr. Monroe and Mr. 
Fox in regard to it, at the time when the measure was 
adopted, the former, as well as the latter of those states- 
men viewed it as rather advantageous to neutrals than 
otherwise. But after the failure of the arrangement with 
Mr. Erskine, it was a matter of deep concern with our 



i'24 HISTORY OF THE 

government to endeavour to adjust their difficulties at least jj 
with France ; or by attempting to play off one of the 
belligerents against the other, to bring one, if not both of 
them to terms. For this purpose. General Armstrong was 
directed to apply to the French government, to ascertain 
on what terms his imperial majesty would consent to 
revoke the Berlin decree. His instructions, however, 
made it necessary for him to do something more than ask 
the simple general question, on what terms his majesty the 
emperor would annul that decree ; he was directed to 
inquire " whether, if Great Britain revoked her blockades 
of a date anterior to tJiai decree, his majesty would consent 
;to revoke the said decree?" The only blockading order 
of a date prior to the Berlin decree, that appears to have 
formed the subject of complaint on the part of France, 
was that of May, 1806. Of course, as might have been, 
and doubtless was expected, the answer to the inquiry was, 
as has been already cited — " The only condition required 
for the revocation, by his majesty the emperor, of the de- 
cree of Berlin, will be the previous revocation by the 
British government of her blockades of France, or part of 
France, [such as that from the Elbe to Brest, &.C.] of a 
date anterior to the aforesaid decree." It is very easy tp 
see that the correspondence with the British government, 
under these circumstances, would be attended with no 
inconsiderable difficulty. 

In a letter from the Secretary of State to Mr. Pinkney, 
dated July 2d, 1810, he says — 

" As the British government had constantly alleged that 
the Berlin decree was the original aggression on our neu- 
tral commerce, that her orders in council were but a reta- 
liation on that decree, and had, moreover, on that ground, 
asserted an obligation on the United States to take 
effectual measures against the decree, as a preliminary to 
a repeal of the orders, nothing could be more reasonable 
than to expect, that the condition, in the shape last prp- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 125 

sented, would be readily accepted. The President is, 
therefore, equally disappointed and dissatisfied at the 
abortiveness of your correspondence with Lord Wellesley 
on this important subject. He entirely approves the de- 
termination you took to resume it, with a view to the 
special and immediate obligation lying on the British 
government to cancel the illegal blockades ; and you are 
instructed, in case the answer to your letter of the 30th of 
April should not be satisfactory, to represent to the British 
government, in terms temperate but explicit, that the United 
States consider themselves authorized by strict and unques- 
tionable right, as well as supported by the principles here- 
tofore applied by Great Britain to the case, in claiming and 
expecting a revocation of the illegal blockades of France, 
of a date prior to that of the Berlin decree, as preparatory 
to a further demand of the revocation of that decree. 

*' It ought not to be presumed that the British govern- 
ment, in reply to such a representation, will contend that 
a blockade, like that of May, 1806, from the Elbe to Brest, 
a coast of not less than one thousand miles, proclaimed 
four years since, without having been at any time attempted 
to be duly executed by the application of a naval force, is 
a blockade conformable to the law of nations and consistent 
with neutral rights." 

On the 19th of October, 1810, the Secretary of State 
wrote again to Mr. Pinkney, on the same subject. The 
following is an extract from his letter — 

" Your despatch of the 24th of August, enclosing a 
newspaper statement of a letter from the Duke of Cadore 
to General Armstrong, notifying a revocation of the Berlin 
and Milan decrees, has been received. It ought not to be 
doubted that this step of the French government will be 
followed by a repeal, on the part of the British govern- 
ment, of its orders in council. And if a termination of 
the crisis between Great Britain and the United States be 
really intended, the repeal ought to include the system of 



126 HISTORY OF THE 

paper blockades, which differ in name only from the 
retaliatory system comprised in the orders in council. 
From the complexion of the British prints, not to mention 
other considerations, the paper blockades may however 
not be abandoned. There is hence a prospect that the 
United States may be brought to issue with Great Britain 
on the legality of such blockades. In such case, as it 
cannot be expected that the United States, founded as they 
are in law and in right, can acquiesce in the validity of the 
British practice, it lies with the British government to 
remove the difficulty." 

Our government having demanded of Great Britain, the 
revocation of her blockading orders prior to the Berlin 
decree, and particularly that of May, 1806, as a condition 
of renewing commercial intercourse with that nation, but 
without success ; it became an object with Mr. Madison 
to adjust, if possible, his difficulties with France. The 
style and temper in which the correspondence in relation 
to France were essentially different from that which 
regarded Great Britain. With the latter it was peremp- 
tory, and dogmatical. With the former it was in the 
language of great moderation, not to say of humility and 
submission. It has been seen by one of the foregoing 
extracts, that having insisted, in the first place, upon the 
revocation of the blockading order of May, 1806, our 
government had advanced a step further, and claimed that 
the repeal ought to include the whole system of paper 
blockades. 

On the 26th of July, 1811, Mr. Monroe, Secretary of 
State, addressed a letter to Joel Barlow, who had been ap- 
pointed minister to France, from which the following ex- 
tracts are made — After referring to the events which had 
occurred respecting the revocation of the French decrees, 
and the issuing of the President's proclamation, suspend- 
ing the non-intercourse law as it regarded France, it is 
said — 



HAKTFORD CONVENTION. 127 

"This declaration of the emperor of France was con- 
sidered a sufficient ground for the President to act on. It 
was explicit, as to its object, and equally so as to its import. 
The decrees of Berlin and Milan, which had violated our 
neutral rights, were said to be repealed, to take effect at a 
subsequent day, at no distant period, the interval apparently 
intended to allow full time for the communication of the 
measure to this government. The declaration had, too, 
all the formality which such an act could admit of, being 
through the official organ on both sides, from the French 
minister of foreign affairs to the minister plenipotentiary 
of the United States, at Paris. 

"In consequence of this note from the French minister 
of foreign affairs, of the 5th of August, 1810, the Presi- 
dent proceeded on the 2d of November following, to issue 
the proclamation enjoined by the act of May 1, of the same 
year, to declare that all the restrictions imposed by it 
should cease and be discontinued, in relation to France and 
her. dependencies ; and in confirmation of the proclama- 
tion of the President, the Congress did, on the 2d of 
March, 1811, pass an act, whereby the non-importation 
system provided for by the 3d, &c. sections of the act en- 
titled &:.c. was declared to be in force against Great Bri- 
tain, her colonies and dependencies, ifcc." As Great Bri- 
tain did not revoke or modify her edicts, in the manner 
proposed, the fifth provision had no effect. 

" I will now inquire whether France has performed her 
part of this arrangement. 

"It is understood that the blockade of the British isles 
is revoked. The revocation having been officially declared, 
and no vessels trading to them having been condemned or 
taken on the high seas, it is fair to conclude that the mea- 
sure is relinquished. It appears too, that no American 
vessel has been condemned in France for having been 
visited at sea by an English ship, or for having been search- 
ed or carried into England, or subjected to impositions 



128 HISTORY OF THE 

there. On the sea, therefore, France i« understood to 
have changed her system. 

"Although such is the light in which the conduct of 
France is viewed in regard to the neutral commerce of 
the United States since the 1st of November last, it will 
nevertheless be proper for you to investigate fully the whole 
subject, and see that nothing has been or shall be omitted 
on her part, in future, which the United States have a 
right to claim. 

" Your early and particular attention will be drawn to the 
great subject of the commercial relation which is to subsist 
between the United States. The President expects that the 
commerce of the United States will be placed, in the ports 
of France, on such a footing as to afford to it a fair market, 
and to the industry and enterprise of their people a rea- 
sonable encouragement. An arrangement to this effect 
was looked for immediately after the revocation of the de- 
crees ; but it appears from the documents in this depart- 
ment, that that was not the case: on the contrary, that 
our commerce has been subjected to the greatest discourage- 
ment, or rather to the most oppressive restraints; that the 
vessels which carried coffee, sugar, &,c. <fec. though sailing 
directly from the United States to a French port, were held 
in a state of sequestration, on the principle that the trade 
was prohibited, and that the importation of those articles 
was not only unlawful, but criminal ; that even the vessels 
which carried the unquestionable productions of the United 
States were exposed to great and expensive delays, to te- 
dious investigations in unusual forms, and to exorbitant 
duties. In short, that the ordinary usages of commerce be- 
tween friendly nations were abandoned. 

" When it was announced that the decrees of Berlin 
and Milan were revoked, the revocation to take effect on 
the 1st of November last, it was natural for our merchants 
to rush into the ports of France to take advantage of a 
market to which they thought they were invited. All these 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 129 

restraints, therefore, have been unjust in regard to the 
parties who suffered by them ; nor can they be reconciled 
to the respect which was due to this government. If France 
had wished to exchide the American commerce from her 
ports, she ought to have declared it to this government in 
explicit terms, in which case due notice would have been 
given of it to the American merchants, who would either 
have avoided her ports, or gone there at their own hazard. 
But to suffer them to enter her ports, under such circum- 
stances, and to detain them there, under any pretext 
whatever, cannot be justified. It is not known to what 
extent the injuries resulting from those delays have been 
carried. It is evident, however, that for every injury thus 
sustained, the parties are entitled to reparation. 

"If the ports of France and her allies are not opened 
to the commerce of the United States on a liberal scale 
and on fair conditions, of what avail to them, it may be 
asked, will be the revocation of the British orders in coun- 
cil? In contending for the revocation of those orders, so 
far as it was an object of interest, the United States had 
in view a trade with the continent. It was a fair and le- 
gitimate object and worth contending for while France en- 
couraged it; but if she shuts her ports on our commerce, 
or burdens it with heavy duties, that motive is at an end." 

"You will see the injustice, and endeavour to prevent 
the necessity of bringing, in return for American cargoes 
Bold in France, an equal amount in the produce or manu- 
factures of that country. No such obligation is imposed 
on French merchants trading to the United States. They 
enjoy the liberty of selling their cargoes for cash, and ta- 
king back what they please from this country in return, 
and the right ought to be reciprocal. 

" It is indispensible that the trade be free ; and that all 
American citizens engaged in it be placed on the same 
footing ; and with this view, that the system of carrying 
it on by licenses granted by French agents, be immediately 

17 



130 HISTORY OF THE 

annulled. You must make it distinctly understood by the 
French government, that the United States cannot submit 
to that system, as it tends to sacrifice one part of the com- 
munity to another, and to give a corrupt influence to the 
agents of a foreign power in our towns, which is in every 
view incompatible with the principles of our government. 
It was presumed, that this system had been abandoned 
some time since, as a letter from the duke of Cadore, of 
to Mr .Riissel, gave assurance of it. Should it, how- 
ever, be still maintained, you will not fail to bring the sub- 
ject without delay before the French government, and to 
urge its immediate abandonment. The President having 
long since expressed his strong disapprobation of it, and 
requested that the consuls would discontinue it, it is proba- 
ble, if they still disregard his injunction, that he may find 
it necessary to revoke their exequaturs. I mention this 
that you may be able to explain the motive to such a mea- 
sure, should it take place, which, without such explanation, 
might probably be viewed in a mistaken light by the French 
government." 

'' You will be able to ascertain the various other claims 
which the United States have on France for injuries done 
to their citizens, under decrees of a subsequent date to 
those of Berlin and Milan, and you will likewise use your 
best exertions to obtain an indemnity for them. It is pre- 
sumed that the French government will be disposed to do 
justice for all these injuries. In looking to the future, 
the past ought to be fairly and honourably adjussted. If 
that is not done, much dissatisfaction will remain here, 
which cannot fail to produce a very unfavourable effect on 
the relations which are to subsist in future between the 
two countries. 

" The first of these latter decrees bears date at Ba- 
yonne, on the 17th of March, 1808, by which many Ame- 
rican vessels and their cargoes were seized and carried 
into France, and others which had entered her ports in 






HARTFORD CONVENTION. 131 

the fair course of trade, were seized and sequestered, or 
confiscated by her government. It was pretended in vin- 
dication of this measure, that as, under our embargo law, 
no American vessel could navigate the ocean, all those 
who were found on it were trading on British account, and 

lawful prize. The fact, however, was otherwise." 

" The Rambouillet decree was a still more unjustifiable 
aggression on the rights of the United States, and invasion 
of the property of their citizens. It bears date on the 
23d of March, 1810, and made a sweep of all American 
property within the reach of the French power. It was 
also retrospective, extending back to the 20th of May, 
1809. By this decree every American vessel and cargo, 
even those which had been delivered up to the owners by 
compromise with the captors, was seized and sold. The 
law of March ist, 1809, commonly called the non-inter- 
course law, was the pretext for this measure, which was 
intended as an act of reprisal. It requires no reasoning to 
show the injustice of this pretension. Our law regulated the 
trade of the United States with other powers, particularly 
with France and Great Britain, and was such a law as 
every nation had a right to adopt. It was duly promulgated 
and reasonable notice given of it to other powers. It was 
also impartial as it related to the belligerents. The con- 
demnation of such vessels of France or England as came 
into the ports of the United States in breach of this law, 
was strictly proper, and could aiford no cause of complaint 
to either power. The seizure of so vast a property as was 
laid hold of under that pretext by the French government, 
places the transaction in a very clear light. If an indem- 
nity had been' sought for an imputed injury, the measure 
of the injury should have been ascertained; and the indem- 
nity proportioned to it. But in this case no injury had 
been sustained on principle. A trifling loss only had been 
incurred, and for that loss all the American property which 
could be found was seized, involving in indiscriminate ruin 
innocent merchants who had entered the ports of Fiance 



132 HISTORY OF THE 

in a fair course of trade. It is proper that you should make 
it distinctly known to the French government that the claim 
to a just reparation for these spoliations cannot be relin- 
quished, and that a delay in making it will produce very 
high dissatisfaction with this government, and people of 
these states. 

" It has been intimated that the French government 
would be willing to make this reparation, provided the 
United States would make one in return for the vessels 
and property condemned under and in breach of our non- 
intercourse law. Although the proposition was objection- 
able in many views, yet this government consented to it, to 
save so great a mass of the property of our citizens. An 
instruction for this purpose was given to your predecessor, 
which you are authorized to carry into effect. 

" The influence of France has been exerted to the in- 
jury of the United States in all the countries to which her 
power has extended. In Spain, Holland, and Naples, it 
has been most sensibly felt. In each of those countries 
the vessels and cargoes of American merchants were 
seized and confiscated under various decrees founded in 
different pretexts, none of which had even the semblance 
of right to support them. As the United States never in- 
jured France, that plea must fail ; and that they had in- 
jured either of those powers was never pretended. You 
will be furnished with the documents which relate to these 
aggressions, and you will claim of the French government 
an indemnity for them. 

" The United States have also just cause of complaint 
against France for many injuries that were committed by 
persons acting under her authority. Of these the most 
distinguished, and least justifiable, are the examples which 
occurred of burning the vessels of our citizens at sea. 
Their atrocity forbids the imputation of them to the go- 
vernment. To it, however, the United States must look 
for reparation, which you will accordingly claim." 

The letter from which these passages are taken, was 



ti 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 133 

written in July, 1811 — about nine months after the pre- 
tended revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees. It 
contains a black catalogue of charges against the French 
government, the most outrageous of which, both as it re- 
gards the principle on which it was founded, and the 
amount of j)roperty piratically seized and confiscated, was 
that of the proceedings under the Rambouillet decree. 
That decree had been issued, and those confiscations had 
been adjudged more than seven months prior to the pre- 
tended revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees ; no re- 
muneration had been made, or even promised, before that 
revocation, and yet President Madison, upon receiving in- 
formation that his majesty the emperor of France had 
issued his decree respecting the revocation of the Berlin 
and Milan decrees, immediately suspended the non-inter- 
course law with regard to France, and thus opened the way, 
by encouraging the renewal of the trade with that country, 
for further depredations, and a renewed series of piracies 
upon our commerce. But because Bonaparte demanded 
the repeal of the British blockading order of May, 1806, 
as the only condition on which he would consent to revoke 
those decrees, our government condescended to demand 
that measure of the British, as the only terms on which 
the trade with that country could be renewed. And it was 
by insisting on this pre-requisite, that the war of 1812 was 
eventually produced. 

In addition to the passages quoted from the foregoing 
letter, the following is a letter addressed by the Secretary 
of State to Mr. Barlow, then minister at Paris, dated 
July 14, 1812— 

" The President has seen with great surprise and con- 
cern that the government of France had made no accom- 
modation to the United States on any of the important 
and just grounds of complaint to which you had called its 
attention, according to your instructions, given at the time 
of your departure, an^ repeated in several communica- 
tions since. It appears that the same oppressive restraints 



134 HISTORY OP THE 

on our commerce were still in force ; that the system of 
license was persevered in ; that indemnity had not been 
made for spoliations, nor any pledge given to inspire con- 
fidence that any would be made. More recent wrongs, 
on the contrary, and of a very outrageous character, have 
been added to those with which you were acquainted when 
you left the United States. By documents forwarded to 
you in my letter of the 21st of March, you were informed 
of the waste of our commerce, made by a squadron from 
Nantz, in January last, which burnt many of our vessels 
trading to the Peninsula. For these you were also in- 
structed to demand redress. 

" It is hoped that the government of France, regarding 
with a prudent foresight the probable course of events, 
will have some sensibility to its interest, if it has none to 
the claims of justice, on the part of this country." 

The task of reconcihng the expressions in this letter, 
with the declarations so often made and repeated by our 
government to that of Great Britain, when calling upon 
the latter to revoke their orders of council, on the grounds 
of an engagement to proceed pari passu with France in 
repealing her decrees which violated our neutral rights, 
must be left to those who are not easily staggered with 
inconsistencies, or disturbed with contradictions. It is a 
task which any man not immediately interested in the 
result, and who wishes to preserve a reputation for vera- 
city, will not undertake, or covet. 

On the 27th of July, 1811, Mr. Monroe communicated 
in a letter to Jonathan Russell, his appointment as charge 
d'affaires of the United States at London. Mr. Russell 
reached London in November of that year. On the 14th 
of February, 1812, he wrote to Mr. Monroe, that at that 
time there had been exhibited no evidence of a disposition 
on the part of the British government to repeal the orders 
in council. On the 9th of the same month, he also wrote 
as follows — "I have the honour to,transmit to you enclosed, 
a copy of a letter, dated 29th ult. from Mr. Barlow, and a 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 135 

copy of the note in wh'nih I yesterday communicated that 
letter to the Marquis Wellesley. 

"Although the proof of the revocation of the French de- 
crees, contained in the letter of Mr. Barlow, is, when taken 
by itself of no very conclusive character, yet it ought, when 
connected with that previously exhibited to this govern- 
ment, to be admitted as satisfactorily establishing that 
revocation; and in this view I have thought it to be my 
duty to present it here." 

On the 4th of March, 1812, Mr. Russell wrote a letter 
to Mr. Monroe, from which the following is copied — 

"Since my letters of the 19th and 22d ultimo, which I 
trust will have extinguished all expectation of any change 
here, the motion of Lord Landsdown on the 28th of Fe- 
bruary, and that of Mr. Brougham yesterday, have been 
severally debated in the respective houses of parliament. 
I atterrded the discussions on both, and if any thing was 
wanting to prove the inflexible determination of the pre- 
sent ministry to persevere in the orders in council without 
modification or relaxation, the declarations of the leading 
members of administration on these occasions must place 
it beyond the possibility of a doubt. In both houses these 
leaders expressed a disposition to forbear to canvass, in the 
present state of our relations, the conduct of the United 
States towards England, as it could not be done without 
reproaching her in a manner to increase the actual irrita- 
tion, and to do away what Lord Bathurst stated to be the 
feeble hopes of preventing war. 

" In the house of commons, Mr. Rose virtually confessed 
that the orders in council were maintained to promote the 
trade of England at the expense of neutrals, and as a mea- 
. sure of commercial rivalry with the United States. When 
Mr. Canning inveighed against this new (he must have 
meant newly acknowledged) ground of defending these 
orders, and contended that they could be justified only on 
the principle of retaliation, on which they were avowedly 



136 HISTORY OF THE 

instituted, and that they were intended to produce the 
effects of an actual blockade, and liable to all the inci- 
dents of such blockade — that is, that they were meant 
only to distress the enemy— and that Great Britain had 
no right to defeat this operation by an intercourse with 
that enemy which she denied to neutrals ; Blr. Percival 
replied, " that the orders were still supported on the 
principle of retaliation, but that this very principle involved 
the license trade ; for as France by her decrees had said 
that no nation should trade with her which traded with 
England, England retorted, that no country should trade 
with France but throuijh En<jrland. He asserted that 
neither the partial nor even the total repeal of the Berlin 
and Milan decrees, as they related to America, or to any 
other nation, or all other nations, would form any claim 
on the British government, while the continental system, so 
called, continued in operation. He denied that this system 
or any part of the Berlin and Milan decrees were merely 
municipal, 'i hey had not been adopted in time of peace 
with a view to internal regulation, but in a time of war, 
with a hostile purpose towards England. Every clause 
and particle of them were to be considered of a nature 
entirely belligerent, and as such, requiring resistance and 
authorising retaliation on the part of Great Britain. It 
was idle and absurd to suppose that Great Britain was 
bound, in acting on the principle of retaliation in these 
times, to return exactly and in form like fur like, and to 
choose the object and fashion the mode of executing it pre- 
cisely by the measures of the enemy. In adopting these mea- 
sures, France had broken through all the restraints imposed 
by the laws of nations, and trodden under foot the great 
conventional code received by the civilized world as pre- 
scribing rules for its conduct in war as well as in peace. 
In this state of things England was not bound any longer 
to shackle herself with this code, and by so doing become 
the unresisting victim of the violence of her enemy, but she 



9('i»- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 137 

was herself released from the laws of nations, and left at 
liberty to resort to any means within her power to injure 
and distress that enemy, and to bring it back to an observ- 
ance of the" jus gentium which it had so egregiously and 
wantonly violated. Nor was England to be restricted any 
more in the extent than in the form of retaliation; but she 
had a right, both as to the quantity and manner, to inflict 
upon the enemy all the evil in her power, until this enemy 
should retrace its steps, and renounce, not only verbally 
but practically, its decrees, its continental system, and 
every other of its belligerent measures incompatible with 
the old acknowledged laws of nations. Whatever neutrals 
might suffer from the retaliatory measures of England, was 
purely incidental, and as no injustice was intended to them, 
they had a right to complain of none ; and he rejoiced to 
observe that no charge of such injustice had that night 
been brought forward in the house. As England was 
contending for the defence of her maritime rights, and for 
the preservation of her national existence, which essen- 
tially depended on the maintenance of those rights, she 
could not be expected, in the prosecution of this great and 
primary interest, to arrest or vary her course, to listen to 
the pretensions of neutral nations, or to remove the evils, 
however they might be regretted, which the imperious 
policy of the times indirectly and unintentionally extended 
to them. 

" As the newspapers of this morning give but a very 
imperfect report of this speech of Mr. Percival, I have 
thought it to be my duty to present you with a more par- 
ticular account of the doctrines which were maintained in 
it, and which so vitally affect the rights and interests of 
the United States. 

" I no longer entertain a hope that we can honourably 
avoid war." 

On the 30th of May, 1812, Mr. Foster addressed a long 
letter to Mr. Monroe, in which he reviewed the whole 

18 



las HISTORY OF THE 

ground of controversy between the United States and 
Great Britain. This document is too long to be copied in 
full. It commences in the following manner — 

" Notwithstanding the discouraging nature of the con- 
versation which I had the honour to have with you a few 
days since at your office, and the circumstance of your 
continued silence in regard to two letters from me, furnish- 
ing additional proof of the existence of the French decrees, 
nevertheless there does now appear such clear and con- 
vincing evidence in the report of the duke of Bassano, 
dated the 10th of March, of the present year, of those 
decrees having not only never been rescinded, but of their 
being recently extended and aggravated in the republica- 
tion of them contained in that instrument, that I cannot 
but imagine it will seem most important to the President 
that it should be communicated to Congress, without 
delay, in the present interesting crisis of their delibera- 
tions ; and therefore hasten to fulfil the instructions of my 
government, in lading before the government of the United 
States the enclosed Moniteur of the IGth of last March, in 
which is contained that report, as it was made to the ruler 
of France, and communicated to the conservative senate. 

" This report confirms, if any thing were wanting to 
confirm, in the most unequivocal manner, the repeated as- 
sertions of Great Britain, that the Berlin and Milan de- 
crees have never been revoked, however some partial and 
insidious relaxations of them may have been made in a 
few instances, as an encouragement to America to adopt 
a system beneficial to France, and injurious to Great Bri- 
tain, while the conditions on which alone it has been de- 
clared that those decrees will ever be revoked, are here 
explained and amplified in a manner to leave us no hope 
of Bonaparte having any disposition to renounce the sys- 
tem of injustice which he has pursued, so as to make it 
possible for Great Britain to give up the defensive mea- 
sures she has been obliged to resort to. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 139 

" I need not remind you, sir, how often it has in vain 
been urged by Great Britain, that a copy of the instru- 
ment should be produced, by which the decrees of Bona- 
parte were said to be repealed, and how much it has been 
desired that America should explicitly state that she did 
not adopt the conditions on which the repeal was offered. 

"It is now manifest that there was never more than a 
conditional offer of repeal made by France, which we had 
a right to complain that America should have asked us 
to recognise as absolute, and which, if accepted in its ex- 
tent by America, would only have formed fresh matter of 
complaint, and a new ground for declining her demands." 

Mr. Foster then attempts to show, by a series of argu- 
mentation, that the Berlin and 3Iilan decrees had not in 
fact been revoked; and. he then proceeds as follows: — 

" I will not now trouble you, sir, with many observations 
relative to the blockade of May, 1806, as the legality of that 
blockade, assuming the blockading force to have been suf- 
ficient to enforce it, has latterly not been questioned by you. 

" I will merely remark that it was impossible Great Bri- 
tain should receive, otherwise than with the utmost jea- 
lousy, the unexpected demand made by America for the 
repeal of the blockade as well as of the orders in council, 
when it appeared to be made subsequent to, if not in con- 
sequence of, one of the conditions in Bonaparte's pretend- 
ed repeal of his decrees, which condition was our renoun- 
cing what he calls ' our new principles of blockade ;' that 
the demand on the part of America was additional and 
new, is sufficiently proved by a reference to the overture 
of Mr. Pinkney, as well as from the terms on which Mr. 
Erskine had arranged the dispute with America relative to 
the orders in council. In that arrangement ;iothing was 
brou;rht forward with regard to this blockade. America 
would have been contented at that time without any refe- 
rence to it. It certainly is not more a grievance, or an 
injustice, now, than it was then. Why thea is the renun- 



140 HTfSTORY OF THE 

ciation of that blockade insisted upon now, if it was not 
necessary to insist upon it then ? It is difficult to find any 
answer but by reference to subsequent communications 
between France and America, and a disposition in America 
to countenance France in requiring the disavowal of this 
blockade, and the principles upon which it rested, as the 
condition sine qua non of the repeal of the Berlin and Milan 
decrees. It seems to have become an object with Ame- 
rica, only because it was prescribed as a condition by 
France. 

" On this blockade, and the principles and rights upon 
which it was founded, Bonaparte appears to rest the justi- 
fication of all his measures for abolishing neutrality, and 
for the invasion of every state which is not ready, with 
him, to wage a war of extermination against the com- 
merce of Great Britain. 

" America, therefore, no doubt saw the necessity of de- 
manding its renunciation, but she will now see that it is in 
reality vain either for America or Great Britain to expect 
an actual repeal of the French decrees, until Great Bri- 
tain renoimces, first, the basis, viz. the blockade of 1806, 
on which Bonaparte has been pleased to found them ; 
next, the right of retaliation as subsequently acted upon 
in the orders in council ; further, until she is ready to re- 
ceive the treaty of Utrecht, interpreted and applied by the 
duke of Bassano's report as the universal law of nations ; 
and finally, till she abjures all the principles of maritime 
law which support her established rights, now more than 
ever essential to her existence as a nation." 

" I am commanded, sir, to express on the part of his 
royal highness the prince regent, that while his royal high- 
ness entertains the most sincere desire to conciliate Ame- 
rica, he yet can never concede that the blockade of May, 
1806, could justly be made the foimdation, as it avowedly 
has been, for the decrees of Bonaparte ; and further, that 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 141 

the British government must ever consider the principles on 
which that blockade rested, (accompanied as it vj^as by 
an adequate blockading force,) to have been strictly con- 
sonant to the established law of nations, and a legitimate 
instance of the practice which it recognises. 

*' Secondly, that Great Britain must continue to reject 
the other spurious doctrines promulgated by France in the 
duke of Bassano's report, as binding upon all nations. She 
cannot admit, as a true declaration of public law, that free 
ships make free goods, nor the converse of that proposi- 
tion, that enemy's ships destroy the character of neutral . 
property in the cargo : she cannot consent, by the adoption 
of such a principle, to deliver absolutely the commerce of 
France from the pressure of the naval power of Great Bri- 
tain, and by the abuse of the neutral flag, to allow her 
enemy to obtain, without the expense of sustaining a navy 
for the trade and property of French subjects, a degree of 
freedom and security, which even the commerce of her 
own subjects cannot find under the protection of the Bri- 
tish navy. 

" She cannot admit, as a principle of public law, that 
arms and military stores are alone contraband of war, and 
that ship timber and naval stores are excluded from that 
description. Neither can she admit without retaliation, 
that tlie mere fact of commercial intercourse with British 
ports and subjects should be made a crime in all nations, 
and that the armies and decrees of France should be 
directed to enforce a principle so new and unheard of 
in war. 

" Great Britain feels, that to relinquish her just mea- 
sures of self-defence and retaliation, would be to surrender 
the best means of her own preservation and rights, and 
with them the rights of other nations, so long as France 
maintains and acts upon such principles." 

Such was the state of things between the United States 
and Great Britain, at the beginning of June, 1812, that it 



142 HISTORY OF THE 

was apparent the former were resolved on a war with the 
latter. On the 1st of June, the President of the United 
States transmitted a message to Congress, in which he re- 
viewed the difficulties which had occurred, and those which 
then existed, and described in strong language the aggres- 
sions with which we had been visited by that nation. To- 
wards the conclusion he makes the following remarks — 

'* Such is the spectacle of injuries and indignities which 
have been heaped on our country ; and such the crisis 
which its unexampled forbearance and conciliatory efforts 
have not been able to avert. It might, at least, have been 
expected, that an enlightened nation, if less urged by mo- 
ral obligations, or invited by friendly dispositions on the 
part of the United States, would have found, in its true 
interest alone, a sufficient motive to respect their rights 
and their tranquility on the high seas ; that an enlarged 
policy could have favoured that free and general circula- 
tion of commerce, in which the British nation is at all times 
interested, and which, in times of war, is the best allevia- 
tion of its calamities to herself, as well as toother bellige- 
rents ; and more especially that the British cabinet would 
not, for the sake of a precarious and surreptitious inter- 
course with hostile markets, have persevered in a course 
of measures which necessarily put at hazard the invalu- 
able market of a great and growing country, disposed to 
cultivate the mutual advantages of an active commerce. 

"Other councils have prevailed. Our moderation and 
conciliation have had no other effect than to encourage per- 
severance, and to enlarge pretensions. We behold our 
seafaring citizens still the daily victims of lawless violence 
committed on the great common highway of nations, even 
within sight of the country which owes them protection. 
We behold our vessels, freighted with the products of our 
soil and industry, or returning with the honest proceeds of 
them, wrested from their lawful destinations, confiscated 
by prize courts, no longer the organs of public law, but 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 143 

the instruments of arbitrary edicts ; and their unfortunate 
crews dispersed and lost, or forced or inveigled, in British 
ports, into British fleets; whilst arguments are employed, 
in support of these aggressions, which have no foundation 
but in a principle equally supporting a claim to regulate 
our external commerce in all cases whatsoever. 

"We behold, in fine, on the side of Great Britain, a 
state of war against the United States; and on the side of 
the United States, a state of peace towards Great Britain. 

" Whether the United States shall continue passive un- 
der these progressive usurpations, and these accumulating 
wrongs ; or, opposing force to force in defence of their 
national rights, shall commit a just cause into the hands of 
the Almighty Disposer of events; avoiding all connections 
which might entangle it in the contests or views of other 
powers, and preserving a constant readiness to concur in 
an honourable re-establishment of peace and friendship, 
is a solemn question, which the constitution wisely confides 
to the legislative department of the government. In re- 
commending it to their early deliberations, I am happy in 
the assurance, that the decision will be worthy the enlight- 
ened and patriotic councils of a virtuous, a free, and a 
powerful nation." 

On the 3d of June, the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the House of Representatives made a long report on 
the foregoing message. After recapitulating various char- 
ges of aggression upon our neutral rights by the British 
nation, the committee in their manifesto say — 

" In May, 1806, the whole coast of the continent, from 
the Elbe to Brest, inclusive, was declared to be in a state 
of blockade. By this act, the well established principles 
of the law of nations, principles which have served for 
ages as guides, and fixed the boundary between the rights 
of belligerents and neutrals, were violated. By the law of 
nations, as recognised by Great Britain herself, no block- 
ade is lawful unless it be sustained by the application of 



144 HISTORY OF THE 

an adequate force ; and that an adequate force was applied 
to this blockade, in its full extent, ought not to be pretend- 
ed. Whether Great Britain was able to maintain legally, 
so extensive a blockade, considering the war in which she 
is engaged, requiring such extensive naval operations, is 
a question which it is not necessary at this time to exa- 
mine. It is sufficient to be known that such force was not 
applied, and this is evident from the terms of the blockade 
itself, by which, comparatively, an inconsiderable portion 
of the coast only was declared to be in a state of strict 
and rigorous blockade. The objection to the measure is 
not diminished by that circumstance. If the force was not 
applied, the blockade was unlawful, from whatever cause 
the failure might proceed. The belligerent who institutes 
the blockade cannot absolve itself from the objie^ation to 
apply the force, under any pretext whatever. For a bel- 
ligerent to relax a blockade which it could not maintain, 
with a view to absolve itself from the obligation to main- 
tain it, would be a refinement in injustice, not less insult- 
ing to the understanding than repugnant to the law of na- 
tions. To claim merit for the mitigation of an evil which 
the party either had not the power, or found it inconve- 
nient to inflict, would be a new mode of encroaching on 
neutral rights. Your committee think it just to remark, 
that this act of the British government does not appear to 
have been adopted in the sense in ivhich it has been since con- 
strued. On consideration of all the circumstances attend- 
ing the measure, and particularly the character of the dis- 
tinguished statesman who announced it, we are persuaded 
that it was conceived in a spirit of conciliation, and intended 
to lead to an accommodation of all differences between the 
United States and Great Britain. His death disappointed 
that hope, and the act has since become subservient to 
other purposes. It has been made by his successors a pre- 
text for that vast system of usurpation which has so long 
oppressed and harassed our commerce. 



HARTFORD CONVEiNTlON. 145 

" The next act of the British government which claims 
our attention, is the order of council of January 7, 1807, bv 
which neutral powers are prohibited trading from one port 
to another of France, or her allies, or any other country 
with which Great Britain might not freely trade. By this 
order, the pretension of England, heretofore disclaimed 
by every other power, to prohibit neutrals disposing of 
parts of their cargoes at different ports of the same enemy, 
is revived, and with vast accumulation of injury. Every 
enemy, however great the number, or distant from each 
other, is considered one, and the like trade even with 
powers at peace with England, who, from motives of 
policy, had excluded or restrained her commerce, was also 
prohibited. In this act, the British government evidently 
disclaimed all regard for neutral rights. Aware that the 
measures authorized by it could find no pretext in any 
belligerent right, none was urged. To prohibit the sale 
of our produce, consisting of innocent articles, at any port 
of a belligerent, not blockaded; to consider every bclli"-e- 
rent as one, and subject neutrals to the same restraints 
with all, as if there was but one, were bold encroachments. 
But to restrain, or in any manner interfere with our com- 
merce with neutral nations, with whom Great Britain was 
at peace, and against whom she had no justifiable cause of 
war, for the sole reason that they restrained or excluded 
from their ports her commerce, was utterly incompatible 
with the pacific relations subsisting between the two 
countries. 

" We proceed to bring into view the British order in 
council of November 11, 1807, which superseded every 
other order, and consummated that system of hostility on 
the commerce of the United States which has been since 
so steadily pursued. By this order, all France, and her 
allies, and every other country at war with Great Britain, 
or with which she was not at war, from which the British 
flag was excluded, and all the colonies of her enemies, were 

19 



146 HISTORY OF THE 

subjected to the same restrictions as if they were actually 
blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner ; and all 
trade in articles, the produce and manufacture of the said 
countries and colonies, and the vessels engaged in it, were 
subjected to capture and condemnation as lawful prize. 
To this order certain exceptions were made, which we 
forbear to notice, because they were not adopted from a 
regard to neutral riglits, but were dictated by policy to 
promote the commerce of England, and so far as they re- 
lated to neutral powers, were said to emanate from the 
clemency of the British government. 

" It would be superfluous in your committee to state, that 
by this order the British government declared direct and 
positive war against the United States. The dominion of 
the ocean was completely usurped by it, all commerce for- 
bidden, and every flag driven from it, or subjected to cap- 
ture and condemnation, which did not subserve the policy 
of the British government by paying it a tribute, and sail- 
ing under its sanction. From this period the United 
States have incurred the heaviest losses, and most mortify- 
ing humiliations. They have borne the calamities of war^ 
without retorting them on its authors. 

" So far your committee has presented to the view of 
the house, the aggressions which have been committed un- 
der the authority of the British government on the com- 
merce of the United States. We will now proceed to other 
wrongs which have been still more severely felt. Among 
these is the impressment of our seamen, a practice which 
has been unceasingly maintained by Great Britain in the 
wars to which she has been a party since our revolution. 
Your committee cannot convey in adequate terms the 
deep sense which they entertain of the injustice and oppres- 
sion of this proceeding. Under the pretext of impressing 
British seamen, our fellow citizens are seized in British 
ports, on the high seas, and in every other quarter to which 
the British power extends; are taken on board British 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 147 

men of war, and compelled to serve there as British sub- 
jects. In this mode our citizens are wantonly snatched 
from their country and their families ; deprived of their 
liberty, and doomed to an ignominious and slavish bond- 
age ; compelled to fight the battles of a foreign country, 
and often to perish in them. Our flag has given them no 
protection; it has been unceasingly violated, and our ves- 
sels exposed to danger by the loss of the men taken from 
them. "Your committee need not remark, that while 
this practice is continued, it is impossible for the United 
States to consider themselves an independent nation. 
Every new case is a new proof of their degradation. Its 
continuance is the more unjustifial)]e, because the United 
States have repeatedly proposed to the British government 
an arrangement which would secure to it the controul of 
its own people. An exemption of the citizens of the 
United States from this degrading oppression, and their 

flag from violation, is all that they have sought. 

" Your committee would be much gratified if they could 
close here the detail of British wrongs ; but it is their duty 
to recite another act of still greater malignity than any of 
those which have already been brought to your view. The 
attempt to dismember our Union, and overthrow our ex- 
cellent constitution by a secret mission, the object of which 
was to foment discontents and excite insurrection against 
the constituted authorities and laws of the nation, as lately 
disclosed by the agent employed in it, aflTords full proof that 
there is no bound to the hostility of the British gcvernment 
towards the United States: no act, however unjustifiable, 
which it luoidd not commit to accomplish their ruin. This 
attempt excites the greater horrour, from the considera- 
tion that it was made while the United States and Great 
Britain were at peace, and an amicable negotiation was 
depending between them for the accommodation of their 
differences, through public ministers regularly authorized 
for the purpose. 



148 HISTORY OF THE 

" The United States have beheld with unexampled for- 
bearance this continued serjes of hostile encroachments on 
their rights and interests, in the hope, that yielding to the 
force of friendly remonstrances, often repeated, the British 
government might adopt a more just policy towards them ; 
but that hope no longer exists. Tney have also weighed 
impartially the reasons which have been urged by the 
British government in vindication of tlioso encroachments, 
and found in them neither justification nor apology. 

" The British government has alleged, in vindication of 
the orders in council, that they were resorted to as a reta- 
liation on France, for similar aggressions committed by 
her on our neutral trade with the British dominions. But 
how has this plea been supported ? The dates of British 
and French aggressions are well known to the world. 
Their origin and progress have been marked with too 
vvide and destructive a waste of the property of our fellow 
citizens, to have been forgotten. The decree of Berlin, of 
November 21st, 1806, was the first aggression of France 
in the present war. Eighteen months had then elapsed 
after the attack made by Great Britain on our neutral 
trade with the colonies of France and her allies, and six 
months from the date of the proclamation of May, 1806. 
Even on the 7th of January, 1807, the date of the first 
British order in council, so short a term had elapsed after 
the Berlin decree, that it was hardly possible that the 
intelligence of it should have reached the United States. 
A retaliation which is to produce its eflect by operating on 
a neutral power, ought not to be resorted to till the neutral 
had justified it, by a culpable acquiescence in the unlawful 
act of the other belligerent. It ought to be delayed until 
after sufficient time had been allowed to the neutral to re- 
monstrate against the measures complained of, to receive 
an answer, and to act on it, which had not been done in 
the present instance. And when the order of November 
11th was issued, it is well known that a minister of France 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 149 

had declared to the minister plenipotentiary of the United 
States at Paris, that it was not intended that the decree 
of Berlin should apply to the United States. It is equally 
well known that no American vessel had then been con- 
demned under it, or seizure been made, with which the 
British government was acquainted. The facts prove in- 
contestably that the nieasures of France, however unjus- 
tifiable in themselves, were nothing more than a pretext 
for those of England. And of the insufficiency of that pre- 
text, ample proof has already Ueen affiarded by the British 
government itself, and in the most impressive form< Al- 
though it was declared that the orders in council were re- 
taliatory on France for her decrees, it was also declared, 
and in the orders themselves, that owing to the superiority 
of the British navy, by which the fleets of France and her 
allies were confined within their own ports, the French 
decrees were considered only as empty threats. 

"It is no justification of the wrongs of one power, that 
the like were committed by another ; nor ought the fact, 
if true, to have been urged by either, as it could aflTord no 
proof of its love of justice, of its magnanimity, or even of 
its courage. It is more worthy the government of a great 
nation, to relieve than to assail the injured. Nor can a re- 
petition of the; wrongs by another power repair the violated 
right or wounded honour of the injured party. An utter 
inability alone to resist, could justify a quiet surrender of 
our rights, and degrading submission to the will of others. 
To that condition the United States are not reduced, nor 
do they fear it. That they ever consented to discuss with 
either power the misconduct of the other is a proof of their 
love of peace, of their moderation, and of the hope which 
they still indulged, that friendly appeals to just and gene- 
rous sentiments would not be made to them in vain. But 
the motive was mistaken, if their forbearance was imputed 
either to the want of a just sensibility to their wrongs, or a 
determination, if suitable redress v*'as not obtained, to re- 



150 HISTORY OF THE 

sent them. The time has now arrived when this system 
of reasoning must cease. It would be insulting to repeat 
it. It would be degrading to hear it. The United States 
must act as an independent nation, and assert their rights, 
and avenge their wrongs, according to their own estimate 
of them, with the party who commits them, holding it re- 
sponsible for its own misdeeds, unmitigated by those of 
another. 

" For the difference made between Great Britain and 
France, by the application of the non-importation act against 
England only, the motive has been already too often explain- 
ed, and is too well known to require further illustration. In 
the commercial restrictions to which the United States re- 
sorted as an evidence of their sensibility, and a mild reta- 
liation of their wrongs, they invariably placed both powers 
on the same footing, holding out to each in respect to itself, 
the same accommodation, in case it accepted the condition 
offered, and in respect to the other the same restraint if it 
refused. Had the British government confirmed the ar- 
rangement which was entered into with the British minis- 
ter in 1809, and France maintained her decrees, with 
France would the United States have had to resist, with 
the firmness belonging to their character, the continued 
violation of their rights. The committee do not hesitate 
to declare, that France has greatly injured the U?iited 
States, and that satisfactory reparation has not yet been 
made for many of those injuries. But that is a concern 
which the United States ivill look to and settle for themselves. 
The high character of the American people is a sufficient 
pledge to the world that they will not fail to settle it, on 
conditions which they have a right to claim. 

" More recently the true policy of the British govern- 
ment towards the United States, has been completely un- 
folded. It has been publicly declared by those in power, 
that the orders in council should not be repealed until the 
French government had revoked all its internal restraints 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 151 

on the British commerce ; and that the trade of the United 
States with France and her alHes, should be prohibited 
until Great Britain was also allowed to trade with them. 
By this declaration it appears, that to satisfy the preten- 
sions of the British government, the United States must 
join Great Britain in the war with France, and prosecute 
the war until France should be subdued ; for without her 
subjugation, it were in vain to presume on such a conces- 
sion. The hostility of the British government to these 
states has been still further disclosed. It has been made 
manifest that the United States are considered by it as the 
commercial rival of Great Britain, and that their prospe- 
rity and growth are incompatible with her welfare. When 
all these circumstances are taken into consideration, it is 
impossible for your committee to doubt the motives which 
have governed the British ministry in all its measures to- 
wards the United States since the year 1805. Equally is 
it impossible to doubt, longer, the course which the United 
States ought to pursue towards Great Britain. 

" From this review of the multiplied wrongs of the Bri- 
tish government since the commencement of the present 
war, it must be evident to the impartial world, that the 
contest which is now forced on the United States, is radi- 
cally a contest for their sovereignty and independence. 
Your committee will not enlarge on any of the injuries, 
however great, which have had a transitory effect. They 
wish to call the attention of the House to those of a per- 
manent nature only, which intrench so deeply on our most 
important rights, and wound so extensively and vitally our 
best interests, as could not fail to deprive the United States 
of the principal advantages of their revolution, if submit- 
ted to. The controul of our commerce by Great Britain 
in regulating, at pleasure, and expelling it almost from the 
ocean ; the oppressive manner in which these regulations 
have been carried into effect, by seizing and confiscating 
such of our vessels, with their cargoes, as were said to 



152 HISTORY OF THE 

have violated her edicts, often without previous warning 
of their danger ; the impressment of our citizens from on 
board our own vessels on the high seas, and elsewhere, and 
holding them in bondage till it suited the convenience of 
their oppressors to deliver them up, are encroachments of 
that high and dangerous tendency, which could not fail to 
produce that pernicious effect : nor would these be the only 
consequences that would result from it. The British govern 
ment might, for a while, be satisfied with the ascendency 
thus gained over us, but its pretensions would soon increase. 
The proof which so complete and disgraceful a submission 
to its authority would afford of our degeneracy, could not 
fail to inspire confidence, that there was no limit to which' 
its usurpations, and our degradation, might not be carried. 

" Your committee, believing that the freeborn sons of 
America are worthy to enjoy the liberty which their fa- 
thers purchased at the price of so much blood and trea- 
sure, and seeing in the measures adopted by Great Britain, 
a course commenced and persisted in, which must lead to 
a loss of national character and independence, feel no he- 
sitation in advising resistance by force ; in which the Ame- 
ricans of the present day will prove to the enemy and to the 
world, that we have not only inherited that liberty which 
our fathers gave us, but also the will and the power to main- 
tain it. Relying on the patriotism of the nation, and confi- 
dently trusting that the Lord of Hosts will go with us to bat- 
tle in a righteous cause, and crown our efforts with success, 
your committee recommend an immediate appeal to arms." 

This manifesto was followed by an act of Congress, con- 
taining a formal declaration of war, in the following words : 

"^n act declaring War between the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, 
and the United States of America and their territories. 

" Be it enacted, &,c. that war be and the same is hereby 
declared to exist between the United Kingdom of Great 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 153 

Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, and the 
United States of America and their territories ; and that 
the President of the United States is hereby authorized to 
use the whole land and naval force of the United States to 
carry the same into effect, and to issue to private armed 
vessels of the United States commissions or letters of 
marque and general reprisal, in such form as he shall 
think proper, and under the seal of the United States, 
against the vessels, goods, and effects of the government 
of the said United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 
and the subjects thereof." — [Approved, June 18th, 1812.] 

On the next day, viz. June 19th, 1812, the following 
proclamation was issued : — 

" By the President of the United States of America — 
A Proclamation. 

'* Whereas the Congress of the United States, by virtue 
of the constituted authority vested in them, have declared 
by their act bearing date the iSth day of the present 
month, that war exists between the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, 
and the United States of America and their territories ; 
now, therefore I, James Madison, President of the United 
States of America, do hereby proclaim the same to all 
whom it may concern : and I do specially enjoin on all 
persons holding offices, civil or military, under the authori- 
ty of the United States, that they be vigilant and zealous in 
discharging the duties respectively incident thereto : and I 
do moreover exhort all the good people of the United States, 
as they love their country ; as they value the precious heri- 
tage derived from the virtue and valour of their fathers ; 
as they feel the wrongs which have forced on them the 
last reyort of injured nations ; and as they consult the best 
means, under the blessing of Divine Providence, of abridg- 
ing its calamities, that they exert themselves in preserving 
order, in promoting concord, in maintaining the authority 
and efficacy of the laws, and in supporting and invigorat- 

20 



154 HISTORY OF THE 

ing all the measures which may be adopted by the consti- 
tuted authorities, for obtaining a speedy, a just, and ao 
honourable peace. 

" Done at Washington, the 19th day of June, 1812, &-c. 

"James Madison. 
" By the President. James Monroe, Sec. of State." 

On the 18th of June, 1812, the day on which Congress 
declared war against Great Britain, Mr. Russell, United 
States charge d'affaires at London, wrote as follows to the 
Secretary of State — 

London, June IS, 1812. 

" I hand you herein the Times of yesterday, containing 
the debate in the House of Commons on the preceding 
evening, relative to the orders in council. From this de- 
bate it appears that these measures are to be abandoned, 
but as yet no official extinction of them has been announc- 
ed. The time already elapsed since the declaration of 
Lord Castlereagh, excites a suspicion that either the pro- 
mised revocation will not take place, or what is more pro- 
bable, some other measure, equally unjust, is now under 
consideration, to replace those which are to be revoked. 

"I hope, until the doings here are ascertained with cer- 
tainty and precision, there will be no relaxation on our 
part." 

On the 30th of June Mr. Russell wrote as follows — 

" I have at length had the satisfaction to announce to 
you, in my letters of the 26th instant, the revocation of 
the orders in council. 

" You will, without doubt, be somewhat surprised that 
this is founded on the French decree of the 28th of Aprils 
1811. 

" The real cause of the revocation is the measures of 
our government. These measures have produced a de- 
gree of distress among the manufacturers of this country 
that was becoming intolerable ; and an apprehension of 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 155 

still greater misery, from the calamities of war, drove 
them to speak a language which could not be misunder- 
stood or disregarded." 

The following correspondence and documents will ex- 
plain Mr. Russell's allusion to the French decree of the 
28th of April, 1811. 

Extract of a letter from Mr. Barlow, to the duke of 
Bassano, dated May 1, 1812. 

" It is much to be desired that the French government 
would now make and publish an authentic act, declaring 
the Berlin and Milan decrees, as relative to the United 
States, to have ceased in November, 1810, declaring that 
they have not been applied in any instance, since that time, 
and that they shall not be so applied in future." 

It has already been shown, that whatever our govern- 
ment thought of blockades in 1799, in 1806, and for 
some time afterwards, they were very little disturbed 
by that which the British government had established 
from the Elbe to Brest ; nor, as far as their public docu- 
ments show, was it ever considered worthy of serious 
remonstrance or complaint, until it became necessary to 
exercise their diplomatic skill between Great Britain 
and France. The importance of it, as bearing an earlier 
date than the Berlin decree, to the French government, 
has already been mentioned. It will be recollected, that 
in January, 1810, the French minister, in answer to a note 
from General Armstrong on the subject, had expressed the 
willingness of his majesty the emperor to repeal his de- 
crees, on condition that the British government would re- 
voke their blockades of France of a date prior to the Ber- 
lin decree. In the mean time, however, his imperial ma- 
jesty had issued a third decree more extravagant in its ob- 
ject, and more injurious to the neutral rights of the Uni- 
ted States than either the Berlin or Milan decree. It 
bears date at Rambouillet, March 23d, 1810, and is of the 
following tenour — 



156 HISTORY OF THE 

"Napoleon, &c. &c. &c. Considering that the govern- 
ment of the United States, by an act dated the 1st of 
March, 1809, which forbids the entrance of the ports, har- 
bours, and rivers of the said states, to all French vessels, 

orders — 

" 1st. That after the 20th of May following, vessels un- 
der the French flag, which shall arrive in the United 
States, shall be seized and confiscated as well as their car- 
goes : 2d. That after the same epoch, no merchandise or 
produce, the growth or manufacture of France or her colo- 
nies, can be imported into the said United States from any 
foreign port or place whatsoever, under penalty of seizure, 
confiscation, and a fine of three times the value of the 
merchandise : 3d. That American vessels cannot go to any 
port of France, of her colonies, or dependencies : We have 
decreed, and do decree as follows: 

"Art. 1. All vessels navigating under the flag of the 
United States, or possessed in whole or in part by any citi- 
zen or subject of that power, which, counting from the 
20th of May, 1809, have entered, or shall enter into the 
ports of our empire, of our colonies, or of the countries 
occupied by our arms, shall be seized, and the product of 
the sales shall be deposited in the surplus fund (caisse 
d'amortissement.) 

" There shall be excepted from this regulation, the ves- 
sels which shall be charged with despatches, or with com- 
missions of the government of the said States, and who 
shall not have either cargoes or merchandise on board." 

American property to a large amount was seized under 
this extraordinary decree, and declared forfeited. On the 
5th of July following Mr. Secretary Smith addressed a let- 
ter to General Armstrong, from which the following ex- 
tract is taken — 

" The arrival of the John Adams brought your letters 
of the 1st, Sec. and 16th of April. 

"From that of the 16th of April it appears that the 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 157 

seizures of the American property, lately made, had been 
followed lip by its actual sale, and that the proceeds had 
been deposited in the emperor's caisse prive. You have 
presented in such colours the enormity of this outrage, 
that I have only to signify to you, that the President en- 
tirely approves the step that has been taken by you, and 
that he does not doubt that it will be followed by you, or 
the person who may succeed you, with such farther inter- 
positions as may be deeaied advisable. He instructs you 
particularly to make the French government sensible of 
the deep impression made here hy so signal an aggression on 
the principles of Justice and of good fai/h, and to demand 
every reparation of which the case is susceptible. If it be 
not the purpose of the French government to remove every 
idea of friendly adjustment with the United States, it would 
seem impossible but that a reconsideration of this violent 
proceeding must lead to a redress of it as a preliminary 
to a general accommodation of the differences between the 
two countries. 

"At the date of the last communication from Mr. Pink- 
ney, he had not obtained from the British government an 
acceptance of the condition on which the French govern- 
ment was willing to concur, in putting an end to all the 
edicts of both against our neutral commerce. If he should 
afterwards have succeeded, you will of course, on receiving 
information of the fact, immediately claim from the French 
government the fulfillment of its promise, and by trans- 
mitting the result to 3Ir. Pinkney, you will co-operate with 
him in completing the removal of all the illegal obstruc- 
tions to our commerce. 

"Among the documents now sent is another copy of the 
act of Congress, repealing the non-intercourse law, but 
authorizing a renewal of it against Great Britain, in case 
France should repeal her edicts and Great Britain should 
refuse to follow her example, and vice versa. You have 
been already informed that the President is ready to ex- 



158 HISTORY OF THE 

ercise the power vested in him for such a purpose, as soon 
as the occasion shall arise. Should the other experiment, 
in the hands of Mr. Pinkney, have failed, you will make 
the act of Congress, and the disposition of the President, 
the subject of a formal communication to the French 
government, and it is not easy to conceive any ground, 
even specious, on which the overture specified in the act 
can be declined. 

" If the non-intercourse law, in any of its modifications, 
was objectionable to the emperor of the French, that law 
no longer exists. 

" If he be ready, as has been declared in the letter of 
the duke of Cadore of February 14, to do justice to the 
United States, in the case of a pledge on their part not to 
submit to the British edicts, the opportunity for making 
good the declaration is now afforded. Instead of submis- 
sion, the President is now ready, by renewing the non- 
intercourse act against Great Britain, to oppose to her 
orders in council a measure, which is of a character that 
ought to satisfy any reasonable expectation. If it should 
be necessary for you to meet the question whether the 
non-intercourse will be renewed against Great Britain, in 
case she should not comprehend, in the repeal of her edicts, 
her blockades, which are not consistent with the law of 
nations, you may, should it be found necessary, let it be 
anderstood, that a repeal of the illegal blockades of a date 
•prior to the Berlin decree, namely, that of May, 1806, mil 
he included in the condition required of Great Britain, that 
particular blockade having been avowed to be compre- 
hended in, and of course identified with the orders in 
council. With respect to blockades of a subsequent date 
or not, against France, you will press the reasonableness 
of leaving them, together with future blockades not war- 
ranted by public law, to be proceeded against by the 
United States in the manner they may choose to adopt. 
As has been heretofore stated to you, a satisfactory pro- 



HARTFORD CONVENTlOiN. 159 

vision for restoring the property lately surprised and 
seized by the order or at the instance of the French govern- 
ment, must be combined icith a repeal of the French edicts, 
with a view to a non-intercourse with Great Britain : such 
a provision being an indispensable evidence of the just 
purpose of France towards the United States. And you 
will, moreover, be careful, in arranging such a provision 
for that particular case of spoliations, not to weaken the 
ground on which a redress of others may be justly pursued." 
From the numerous quotations which have been made, 
and from a great number of passages which might be 
added, it is perfectly obvious, that our negotiations respect- 
ing the revocation of the British orders in council were 
greatly embarrassed by the form of the inquiry made of 
the French minister by General Armstrong, by order of 
the Secretary of State, in January, 1810. That inquiry 
was not limited to what were the conditions on which his 
majesty the emperor would annul the Berlin decree, but it 
was asked ichether he woidd do so if Great Britain revoked 
her blockades of a date anterior to that of the Berlin decree ? 
The subject was alluded to very often in the course of the 
correspondence ; and on the 26th of March, 1810, Lord 
Wellesley, in answer to an inquiry whether the blockade 
of May, 1806, had been withdrawn, said — " The blockade, 
notified by Great Britain in May, 1806, has never been 
formally withdrawn. It cannot therefore be accurately 
stated, that the restrictions which it established, rest 
altogether on the order of council of the 7th of January, 
1807 : they are comprehended under the more extensive 
restrictions of that order. No other blockade of the ports 
of France was instituted by Great Britain, between the 
I6th of May, 1806, and the 7th of January, 1807, except- 
ing the blockade of Venice, instituted on the 27th of July, 
1806, which is still in force." It seems from this declara- 
tion of the British minister, that every thing except a 
formal revocation had taken place, the decree, as Mr, 



160 HISTORY OF THE 

Pinkney justly considered it, had been absorbed in the 
orders of council of January, 1807. But as this last order 
of council was of a subsequent date to the Berlin decree, it 
would not have answered the object which the French 
government had in view, which, as has been already re- 
marked, was to obtain an admission, at least by implica- 
tion, that the British government first adopted the policy 
of interfering with the rights of neutrals. For no other 
purpose than that of enabling the French government to 
gain this advantage over the British, was this subject of con- 
troversy first started, and afterwards continued between the 
parties; thus adding one more proof, that our government 
deemed it expedient at all times to keep on hand some 
distinct subject of controversy with Great Britain. In con- 
firmation of the idea that the blockading order of May, 
1806, was not in force, Mr. Pinkney wrote to General 
Armstrong on the 6th of April, 1810, in the following 
manner — " I do not know whether the statement con- 
tained in my letter of the 27th of last month will enable 
you to obtain the recall of the Berlin decree. Certainly 
the inference from that statement is that the blockade of 
1806 is virtually at an end, being merged and compre- 
hertded in an order in council, issued after the date of the 
edict of Berlin. I am, however, about to try to obtain a 
formal revocation of that blockade (and that of Venice,) or 
at least a precise declaration that they are not in force. 
It is not a little remarkable, that our government should 
have shown such a degree of meekness and humility to- 
wards France, whilst they were manifesting such a lofty 
air, and such a peremptory tone, in their correspondence 
with Great Britain. The treatment they received from 
the French government was not only supercilious and 
haughty, but the language of their official communications, 
in relation to the very subject in discussion, contemptuous 
and insulting. On the 17th of February, 1810, General 
Armstrong addressed a letter to the Secretary of State, 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 161 

enclosing a note which he had received from M. Cham- 
pagny, from which the following passages are extracted : 

" His majesty could place no reliance on the proceed- 
ings of the United States, who having no ground of com- 
plaint against France, comprised her in their acts of ex- 
clusion, and since the month of May have forbidden the 
entrance of their ports to French vessels, under the penalty 
of confiscation. As soon as his majesty was informed of 
this measure, he considered himself bound to order repri- 
sals on American vessels not only in his territory, but 
likewise in the countries which are under his influence. 
In the ports of Holland, of Spain, of Italy, and of Naples, 
American vessels have been seized, because the Americans 
have seized French vessels. The Americans cannot hesi- 
tate as to the jjart uihich they are to take. They ought 
either to tear to pieces the act of their independence, and to 
become again as before the revolution, the subjects of England, 
or to take such measures as that their commerce and industry 
should not be tariffed (tarifes) by the English, which renders 
them more dependent than Jamaica, which at least has its as- 
sembly of representatives and its privileges. Men without just 
political views, (sans politique,) ivithout honour, without en- 
ergy, may alledge that payment of the tribute imposed by 
England may be submitted to because it is light ; but why 
will they not perceive that the English will no sooner have 
obtained the admission of the principle, than they will 
raise the tariff in such a way that the burden, at first light, 
becoming insupportable, it will then be necessary to fight 
for interest, after having refused to fight for honour.' 

" The undersigned avows with frankness, that France 
has every thing to gain from receiving well the Americans 
in her ports. Her commercial relations with neutrals are 
advantageous to her. She is in no way jealous of their 
prosperity ; great, powerful and rich, she is satisfied when, 
by her own commerce, or by that of neutrals, her expor- 

21 



162 HISTORY OF THE . 

tations give to her agriculture and her fabricks the proper 
developernent. 

" It is now thirty years since the United States of Ame- 
rica founded, in the bosom of the new world, an indepen- 
dent country, at the price of the blood of so many immor- 
tal men, who perished on the field of battle to throw off 
the leaden yoke of the English monarch. These gene- 
rous men were far from supposing, when they thus sacri- 
ficed their blood for the independence of America, that 
there would so soon be a question whether there should be 
imposed upon it a yoke more heavy than that which they 
had thrown off, by subjecting its indus^try to a tariff of 
British legislation, and to the orders in council of 1807. 

" If then the minister of America can enter into an 
engagement, that the American vessels will not submit to 
the orders in council of England of November, 1807, nor 
to any decree of blockade, unless this blockade should be 
real, the undersigned is authorized to conclude every spe- 
cies of convention tending to renew the treaty of com- 
merce with America, and in which all the measures pro- 
per to consolidate the commerce and the prosperity of the 
Americans shall be provided for." 

It is also remarkable, that the same Administration^^ 
whose dignity was so suddenly affronted, and whose re- 
sentment was so greatly roused, by a single expression in 
Mr. Jackson's letter, relating to the rejection of the ar- 
rangement with Mr» Erskine, as to refuse to hold any in- 
tercourse with that minister, should have borne, with such 
philosophical meekness and coolness, the foregoing lan- 
guage of M. Champagny. It is not easy to imagine phra- 
seology more insolent, or sentiments more degrading to 
our government and country. And yet General Armstrong 
was not recalled; nor, in examining the correspondence 
relating to this subject, has any order even to remonstrate 
against the indignity offered to both been discovered. 

In a little more than a month after the date of this let- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 163 

ler, the Rambouillet decree, which has already been cited, 
was issued. No one who reads it can hesitate about its 
true character ; which was Uttle better than a Hcense to 
commit piracy, in a manner the most base and infamous. 

On the 5th of August following, General Armstrong 
received a note from the duke of Cadore, (Champagny) 
containing a formal declaration that the Berlin and Milan 
decrees were both revoked, and that after the 1st of No- 
vember ensuing they would cease to have effect. This 
note is couched in language equally extraordinary with 
that from which we have copied the foregoing extracts. 
The following passages are quoted — 

"Sir — I have laid before his majesty, the emperor and 
king, the act of Congress of the 1st of May, taken from 
the gazette of the United States, which you have sent to 
me. 

" His majesty could have wished that this act, and all 
the other acts of the government of the United States, 
which interest France, had always been officially made 
known to him. In general, he has only had a knowledge of 
them indirectly, and after a long interval of time. There 
have resulted from this delay serious inconveniences, which 
would not have existed if these acts had been promptly 
and officially commnnicated. 

"The emperor had applauded the general embargo, laid 
by the United States on all their vessels, because that 
measure, if it has been prejudicial to France, had in it at 
least nothing offensive to her honour." 

" The act of the 1st of March has raised the embargo, 
and substituted for it a measure the most injurious to the 
interests of France. 

" This act, of which the emperor knew nothing until 
very lately, interdicted to American vessels the commerce 
of France, at the time it authorized that to Spain, 
Naples, and Holland, that is to say, to the countries under 
French influence, and denounced confiscation against all 



164 HISTORY OF THE 

French vessels which should enter the ports of America. 
Reprisal was a right, and commanded hy the dignity of 
France, a circumstance on which it was impossible to make 
a compromise (de transigir.) The sequester of all the 
American vessels in France has been the necessary conse- 
quence of the measure taken by Congress. 

" Now Congress retrace their steps, (revient sur ses pas ;) 
they revoke the act of the 1st of March; the ports of 
America are open to French commerce, and France is no 
longer interdicted to the Americans. In short, Congress 
engages to oppose itself to that one of the belligerent 
powers which should refuse to acknowledge the rights of 
neutrals. 

" In this new state of things, I am authorized to declare 
to you, sir, that the decrees of Berlin and Milan are re- 
voked, and that after the first of Nov'ember they will cease 
to have effect; it being understood that, in consequence of 
this declaration, the English shall revoke their orders in 
council, and renounce the new principles of blockade which 
they have wished to establish, or, that the United States, 
conformably to the act you have just communicated, shall 
cause their rights to be respected by the English. 

"It is with the most particular satisfaction, sir, that I 
make known to you this determination of the emperor. 
His majesty loves the Americans. Their prosperity and 
their commerce are within the scope of his policy. 

"The independence of America is one of the principal 
titles of glory to France. Since that epoch the emperor 
is pleased in aggrandizing the United States, and, under all 
circumstances, that rvhich can contribute to the independence, 
to the prosperity, and the liberty of the Americans, the empe- 
ror will consider as conformable with the interests of his 
empire.''^ 

On the 2d day of November, 1810, the President issued 
his proclamation, giving notice that the French decrees 
were revoked. After the usual recital, referring to the 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 165 

act of Congress, authorizing him to adopt that measure, 
the proclamation says — 

" And whereas it has been officially made known to this 
government, that the edicts of France violating the neu- 
tral commerce of the United States have been so revoked 
as to cease to have effect on the first of the present month : 
Now, therefore, I, James Madison, President of the United 
States, do hereby proclaim that the said edicts of France 
have been so revoked as that they ceased on the said first 
day of the present month to violate the neutral commerce 
of the United States ; and that, from the date of these 
presents, all the restrictions imposed by the aforesaid act 
shall cease and be discontinued in relation to France and 
her dependencies." 

Thus it appears, that after this long train of negotiation 
and eflfort, the French government had succeeded, in co- 
operation with ours, in bringing the United States to a 
species of issue with Great Britain. This was taking one 
more important step towards the open conflict which even- 
tually occurred between the countries. A little further at- 
tention will be necessary to the correspondence of General 
Armstrong, relating to this adjustment. 

It has been seen, that upon the issuing of the Rambou- 
illet decree, a large amount of American property within 
the reach of French authority was seized and confiscated, 
and the avails were placed in the imperial privy purse. On 
the 10th of September, 1810, General Armstrong address- 
ed a letter to the Secretary of State, in which he says, that 
by a letter from the duke of Cadore, a copy of which was 
enclosed, " it will be seen that the decree of Rambouillet 
is not in operation, and that American ships entering the 
ports of France before the 1st of November next, will be 
judged under the decrees of Berlin and of Milan. In a 
paragraph in the same letter, under the date of September 
12th, he says — " I have the honour to enclose copies of 
two other letters from the duke of Cadore, one of which 



166 HISTORY OF THE 

is an answer to my note of the 8th instant. To the ques- 
tion whether we had any thing to expect in reparation for 
past wrongs ? they reply, that their act being of reprisal, 
the law of reprisal must govern ; in other words, that 
if you confiscate French property under the law of non-inter- 
course, they will confiscate your property under their decree of 
Rambouillet.^^ The words underscored is the verbal ex- 
planation which accompanied the letter. 

/ 

" THE DUKE OF CADORE tO GENERAL ARMSTRONG. 

" Paris, September 7lh, 1810. 

a Sir, — You have done me the honour to ask of me, by 
your letter of the 20th of August, what will be the lot of 
the American vessels which may arrive in France before 
the 1st of November. 

" His majesty has always wished to favour the com- 
merce of the United States. It was not without reluc- 
tance that he used reprisal towards the Americans while 
he saw that Congress had ordered the confiscation of all 
French vessels which might arrive in the United States. 

" It appears that Congress might have spared to his 
majesty and his subjects this mortification (ce desagrement) 
if in place of that harsh and decisive measure, which left 
to France no choice, they had used some palliative, such 
as that of not receiving French vessels, or of sending them 
away, after a delay of so many days. 

" As soon as his majesty was informed of this hostile 
act, he felt that the honour of France, involved in this 
point, could not be cleansed (ne pouvait etre lave) but by 
a declaration of war (which) could not take place but by 
tedious explanations. 

" The emperor contented himself with making repri- 
sals; and in consequence, he applied to American vessels 
which came to France, or to countries occupied by the 



I 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 167 

French armies, word for word, the regulations of the act 
of Congress. 

" Since the last measures by which that hostile act is 
repealed, his majesty hastens to cause it to be made known 
to you that he anticipates that which may re-establish har- 
mony with the United States, and that he repeals his de- 
crees of Berlin and 3Iilan, under the conditions pointed out 
in my letter to you, of the 5th of August. 

" During tJiis interval, the American vessels which 
shall arrive in France will not be subjected to confisca- 
tion ; because the act of Congress, which had served as a 
motive to our reprisals, is repealed ; but these vessels will 
be subjected to all the effects of the Berlin and Milan de- 
crees ; that is to say, they will be treated amicably, if they 
can be considered as Americans, and hostilely, if they have 
lost their national character (s'ils se sont laisse denatio- 
nalise) by submitting to the orders in council of the British 
government." 

On the 7th of September, 1810, General Armstrong 
wrote a letter to the duke of Cadore, from which the fol- 
lowing passages are copied — 

"Your excellency will not think me importunate if I 
should employ the last moments of my stay in Paris, in 
seeking an explicit declaration on the following jioints : 

1. Has the decree of his majesty of the 23d of 3Iarch 
last, enjoining acts of reprisal against the commerce of the 
United States on account of their late law of non-inter- 
course, been recalled ? 

2. What will be the operation (on the vessels of the 
United States) of his majesty's decree of July last, forbid- 
ding the departure of neutral ships from the ports of 
France, unless provided with imperial licenses'? Are these 
licenses merely substitutes for clearances.^ or do they pre- 
scribe regulations to be observed by the holders of them 
within the jurisdiction of the United States ? 

" Do they confine the permitted intercourse to two ports 



168 HISTORY OF THE 

only of the said States, and do they enjoin that all ship- 
ments be made on French account exclusively ? 

" Is it his majesty's will, that the seizures made in the 
ports of Spain and other places, on the principle of repri- 
sal, shall become a subject of present or future negotiation 
between the two governments ? or, are the acts already 
taken by his majesty to be regarded as conclusive against 
remuneration ? 

" I need not suggest to your excellency the interest that | 

both governments have in the answers that may be given 
to these questions, and how nearly connected they are 
with the good understanding which ought to exist between 
them. After the great step lately taken by his majesty 
towards an accommodation of differences, we are not at 
liberty to suppose that any new consideration will arise, 
which shall either retard or prevent the adoption of mea- 
sures necessary to a full restoration of the commercial 
intercourse and friendly relation of the two powers." 

The following is the reply to the foregoing note — 

" THE DUKE OF CADORE tO GENERAL ARMSTRONG. 

''Paris, Sept. 12i/«, 1810. 

" I have received your letter of the 7th of September. 
That which I wrote to you the same day answered the 
first of the questions you put to me. I will add to what I 
have had the honour to write to you, that the decree of the 
23d of March, 1810, which ordered reprisals in conse- 
quence of the act of Congress of the 1st of March, 1809, 
was repealed as soon as we Avere informed of the repeal 
of the act of non-intercourse passed against France. 

" On your second question I hasten to declare to you, 
that American vessels loaded with merchandise the growth 
of the American provinces, will be received without diffi- 
culty in the ports of France, provided they have not suffered 
their flag to lose its national character, by submitting to the 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. lOS) 

acts of the British council; they may in like manner depart 
from the ports of France. The emperor has given licenses 
to American vessels. It is the only flag which has obtained 
them. In this his majesty has intended to give a proof of 
the respect he loves to show to the Americans. If he is 
somewhat dissatisfied (pen satisfaite) that they have not 
as yet been able to succeed in causing their flag to be re- 
spected, at least he sees with pleasure that they are far 
from acknowledging the tyrannical principles of English 
legislation. 

"The American vessels which may be loaded on ac- 
count of Frenchmen, or on account of Americans, will be 
admitted into the ports of France. As to the merchandise 
confiscated, it having been confiscated as a measure of repri- 
sal, the prijiciples of reprisal must be the latv in that affair.^'' 

The government of Great Britain considered the revo- 
cation of the Berlin and Milan decrees as not absolute, 
but conditional, and therefore declined repealing their 
orders in council. On the 23d of July, 1811, Mr. Monroe, 
Secretary of State, addressed a long letter to Mr. Foster, 
the British minister, on the general controversy. After al- 
luding to what occurred respecting the French decrees, he 
remarks, "Great Britain still declines* to revoke her 
edicts, on the pretension that France has not revoked 
hers. Under that impression she infers that the United 
States have done her injustice by carrying into effect the 
non-importation against her. 

" The United States maintain that France has revoked 
her edicts so far as they violated their neutral rights, and 
were contemplated by the law of May 1st, 1810, and have 
on that ground particularly claimed, and do expect of 
Great Britain a similar revocation. 

" The revocation announced oflicially by the French 
minister of foreign affairs, to the minister plenipotentiary 
of the United States at Paris, on the 5th of August, 1810, 
was in itself sufficient to justify the claim of the United 

22 



170 HISTORY OF THE 

States to a correspondent measure from Great Britain- 
She had declared that she would proceed pari passu iit 
the repeal with France, and the day being fixed when the 
repeal of the French decrees should take eflect, it was rea- 
sonable to conclude that Great Britain would fix the same 
day for the repeal of her orders. Had this been done, the 
proclamation of the President would have announced the 
revocation of the edicts of both powers at the same time ; 
and in consequence thereof, the non-importation would 
have gone into operation against neither. Such too is 
the natural course of proceeding in transactions between 
independent states ; and such the conduct which they ge- 
nerally observe towards each other. In all compacts be- 
tween nations, it is the duty of each to perform what it 
stipulates, and to presume on the good faith of the other 
for a like performance. The United States having made 
a proposal to both belligerents, were bound to accept a 
compliance from either, and it was no objection to the 
French compliance, that it was in a form to take eifect at 
a future day, that being a form not unusual in laws and 
other public acts. Even when nations are at war and 
make peace, this obligation of mutual confidence exists, 
and must be respected. In treaties of commerce, by 
which their future intercourse is to be governed, the obli- 
gation is the same. If distrust and jealousy are allowed to 
prevail, the moral tie which binds nations together, in all 
their relations, in war as well as in peace, is broken. 

" Great Britain has declined proceeding pari passu with 
France in the revocation of their respective edicts. She 
has held aloof, and claims of the United States proof not 
only that France has revoked her decrees, but that she con- 
tinues to act in conformity with the revocation. 

" You urge only as an evidence that the decrees are riot 
repealed, the speech of the emperor of France to the de- 
puties from the free cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lu- 
beck ; the imperial edict dated at Fontainbleau, on the 



HAT5TF0RD CONVEN'TION. 171 

19th of October, 1810; the report of the French minister 
of foreign affairs dated in December last, and a letter of 
the minister of justice to the president of the council of 
prizes of the 25th of that month. 

" There is nothing in the first of these papers incompa- 
tible with the revocation of the decrees, in respect to the 
United States. It is distinctly declared by the emperor in 
his speech to the deputies of the Hanse Towns, that the 
blockade of the British islands shall cease when the British 
blockades cease ; and that the French blockades shall cease 
in favour of those nations in whose favour Great Britain re- 
vokes hers, or who support their rights against her preten- 
sion, as France admits the United States will do by en- 
forcing the non-importation act. The same sentiment is 
expressed in the report of the minister of foreign affairs. 
The decree of Fontainbleau having no effect on the high 
seas, cannot be brought into this discussion. It evidently 
has no connection with neutral rights. 

"The letter from the minister of justice to the president 
of the council of prizes, is of a different character. It re- 
lates in direct terms to this subject, but not in the sense in 
which you understand it. After reciting the note from 
the duke of Cadore of the 5th of xlugust last, to the Ame- 
rican minister at Paris, which announced the repeal of the 
French decrees, and the proclamation of the President in 
consequence of it, it states that all causes arising under 
those decrees after the 1st of November, which were then 
before the court, or might afterwards be brought before it, 
should not be judged by the principles of the decrees, but 
be suspended until the '2d of February, when the United 
States having fulfilled their engagement, the captures should 
be declared void, and the vessels and their cargoes be 
delivered up to their owners. This paper appears to afford 
an unequivocal evidence of the revocation of the decrees, 
so far as relates to the United States, By instructing the 
French tribunal to make no decision until the 2d of Febru- 



172 HISTORY OF THE 

ary, and then to restore the property to the owners on r 
particular event which has happened ; all cause of doubt 
on that point seems to be removed. The United States 
may justly complain of delay in the restitution of that pro- 
perty, but that is an injury which affects them only. Great 
Britain has no right to complain of it. She was interested 
only in the revocation of the decrees by which neutral 
rights would be secured from future violation ; or if she 
had been interested in the delay, it would have afforded 
no pretext for more than a delay in repealing her orders 
till the 2d February. From that day, at farthest, the 
French decrees would cease. ; At the same day ought her 
orders to have ceased." 

On the 26th of July, Mr. Foster replied to Mr. Monroe. 
The following are extracts from his letter : — 

"You urge, sir, that the British government promised 
to proceed pari passu with France in the repeal of her 
edicts. It is to be wished you could point out to us 
any step France has taken in the repeal of hers. Great 
Britain has repeatedly declared that she would repeal 
when the French did so, and she means to keep to that 
declaration. 

"I have stated to you that we could not consider the 
letter of August 5th, declaring the repeal of the French 
edicts, provided we revoked our orders in council, or Ame- 
rica resented our not doing so, as a step of that nature; 
and the French government knew that we could not ; their 
object was, evidently, while their system was adhered to in 
all its rigour, to endeavour to persuade the American go- 
vernment that they had relaxed from it, and to induce her 
to proceed in enforcing the submission of Great Britain to 
the inordinate demands of France. It is to be lamented 
that they have but too well succeeded ; for the United 
States government appear to have considered the French 
declaration in the sense in which France wished it to be 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 173 

taken, as an absolute repeal of her decrees, without ad- 
verting to the conditional terms which accompanied it." 

" To the ambiguous declaration in M. Champagny's 
note, is opposed the unambiguous and personal declara- 
tion of Bonaparte himself. You urge that there is nothing 
incompatible with the revocation of the decrees, in respect 
to the United States, in his expressions to the deputies of 
the free cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck ; that it 
is distinctly stated in that speech that the blockade of the 
British islands shall cease when the British blockades cease, 
and that the French blockade shall cease in favour of those 
nations in whose favour Great Britain revokes hers, or who 
support their rights against her pretension. 

" It is to be inferred from this and the corresponding 
parts of the declaration alluded to, that unless Great 
Britain sacrifices her principles of blockade, which are 
those authorized by the established law of nations, France 
will still maintain her decrees of Berlin and Milan, which 
indeed the speech in question declares to be the funda- 
mental laws of the French empire. 

" I do not, I confess, conceive how these avowals of the 
ruler of France can be said to be compatible with the repeal 
of his decrees in respect to the United States. Tf the 
United States are prepared to insist on the sacrifice by 
Great Britain of the ancient and established rules of nifiri- 
time war practised by hei", then, indeed, they may avoid 
the operation of the French decrees ; but otherwise, ac- 
cording to this document, it is very clear that th(;y are still 
subjected to them. 

" The decree of Fontainbleau is confessedly founded on 
the decrees of Berlin and Milan, dated the J 9th of Octo- 
ber, 1810, and proves their continued existence. The 
report of the French minister of December 8, announcing 
the perseverance of France in her decrees, is still further 
in confirmation of them, and a repernsal of the letter of the 
minister of justice of the 25th last December, confirms me 



174 HISTORY OF THE 

in the inference I drew from it ; for, otherwise, why should 
that minister make the prospective restoration of Ameri- 
can vessels taken after the 1st November to be a conse- 
quence of the non-importation, and not of the French 
revocation? If the French government had been sincere, 
they would have ceased infringing on the neutral rights 
of America after the 1st November: that they violated 
them, however, after tliat period, is notorious. 

" Your government seem to let it be understood that an 
ambiguous declaration from Great Britain, similar to that 
of the French minister, would have been acceptable to 
them. But, sir, is it consistent with the dignity of a na- 
tion that respects itself to speak in ambiguous language ? 
The subjects and citizens of either country would, in the 
end, be the victims, as many are already, in all probability, 
who, from a misconstruction of the meaning of the French 
government, have been led into the most imprudent spe- 
culations. Such conduct would not be to proceed /Xi-n 
passu with France in revoking our edicts, but to descend 
to the use of the perfidious and juggling contrivances of 
her cabinet, by which she fills her coffers at the expense 
of independent nations. A similar construction of pro- 
ceeding pan passu might lead to such decrees as those of 
Rambouillet or of Bayonne, to the system of exclusion or 
of licenses ; all measures of France against the American 
commerce, in nothing short of absolute hostility." 

"I have now followed you, I believe, sir, through the 
whole range of your argument, and on reviewing the 
course qf it, I think I may securely say, that no satisfac- 
tory proof has as yet been brought forward of the repeal 
of the obnoxious decrees of France, but on the contrary, 
that it appears they continue in full force ; consequently 
that no grounds exist on which you can with justice de- 
mand of Great Britain a revocation of her orders in coun- 
cil ; that we have a right to complain of the conduct of the 
American government in enforcing the provisions of the 



HARTFOUD COJNVENTlOiN. 175 

act of May, 1810, to the exclusion of the British trade, and 
afterwards in obtaining- a special law for the same pur- 
pose, though it was notorious at the time that France still 
continued her aggressions upon American commerce, and 
had recently promulgated anew her decrees, sufFerirg no 
trade from this country but through licenses publickly sold 
by her agents, and that all the suppositions you have 
formed of innovations on the part of Great Britain, or of 
her pretensions to trade with her enemies, are wholly 
groundless. 1 have also stated to you the view his ma- 
jesty's government has taken of the question of the block- 
ade of May, 1806, and it now only remains that I urge 
afresh the injustice of the United States' government per- 
severing in their union with the Fre«ch system, for the 
purpose of crushing the commerce of Great Britain." 

A still more extended correspondence ensued relating 
to this subject, in which it was contended on the part of 
the American government, that the French decrees were 
actually repealed, and on that of the British government, 
that the professed act of repeal by the French emperor 
was a mere deception, and that the decrees were still in 
force ; and this was urged as the reason why tlie British 
orders in council were not formally revoked. The cause 
which lay at the bottom of the difficulty in adjusting the 
controversy respecting the edicts of Great Britain, which 
it was contended violated our neutral rights, was the de- 
mand on our part of the revocation of the blockading order 
of May, 1806; the circumstances attending which have 
already been adverted to. In a letter from the Marquis 
of Wellesley to Mr. Pinkney, dated December 29th, 1810, 
his lordship says — " By your explanation it appears, that 
the American government understands the letter of the 
French minister as announcing an ab-olute repeal, on the 
1st of November, 1810, of the French decrees of Berlin 
and Milan ; which repeal, however, is not to continue in 
force unless the British government, within a reasonable 



176 HISTOilY OF THE 

time after the 1st of November, 1810, shall fulfil the two 
conditions stated distinctly in the letter of the French 
minister. Under this explanation, if nothing more had 
been required from Great Britain for the purpose of secur- 
ing the continuance of the repeal of the French decrees, 
than the repeal of our orders in council, I should not have 
hesitated to declare the perfect readiness of this govern- 
rnent to fulfil that condition. On these terms the British 
government has always been sincerely disposed to repeal 
the orders in council. It appears, however, not only by 
the letter of the French minister, but by your explanation, 
that the repeal of the orders in council will not satisfy 
either the French or the American government. The 
British government is further required, by the letter of the 
French minister, to renounce those principles of blockade 
which the French government alleges to be new. A re- 
ference to the terms of the Berlin decree will serve to 
explain the extent of this requisition. The Berlin decree 
states, that Great Britain " extends the right of blockade 
to commercial unfortified towns, and to ports, harbours, 
and mouths of rivers, which according to the principles and 
practice of all civilized nations, is only nj)plicable to forti- 
fied places." On the part of the American government, 1 
understand you to require that Great Britain should revoke 
her order of blockade of May, 1806. Combining your re- 
quisition with that of the French minister, I must conclude 
that America demands the revocation of that order of 
blockade as a practical instance of our renunciation of those 
principles of blockade which are condemned by the French 
government. Those principles of blockade Great Britain 
has asserted to be ancient and established by the laws of 
maritime war, acknowledged by all civilized nations, and 
on which depend the most valuable rights and interests of 
this nation. If the Berlin and Milan decrees are to be 
considered as still in force, unless Great Britain shall re- 
nounce these established foundations of her maritime 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 177 

rights and interests, the period of time is not yet arrived, 
when the repeal of her orders in council can be claimed 
fi'om her, either with reference to the promise of this 
government, or to the safely and honour of the nation." 

Mr. Pinkney replied to Lord Wellesley on the 14th of 
July, 1811. In alluding to that part of his lordship's let- 
ter which has been above cited, he says — "If I compre- 
hend the other parts of your lordship's letter, they declare 
in effect, that the British government will repeal nothing 
but the orders in council, and that it cannot at present re- 
peal even them, because, in the first place, the French go- 
vernment has required, in the letter of the duke of Cadore 
to General Armstrong, of the 5th of August, not only that 
Great Britain shall revoke those orders, but that she shall 
renounce certain principles of blockade (supposed to be 
explained in the preamble to the Berlin decree) which 
France alleges to be new ; and in the second place, be- 
cause the American government has (as you conclude) de- 
manded the revocation of the British order of blockade 
of May, 1806, as a practical instance of that same renuncia- 
tion, or, in other words, has made itself a party, not openly 
indeed, but indirectly and covertly, to the entire requisition 
of France, as you understand that requisition. 

" It is certainly true that the American government 
has required, as indispensable in the view of its acts of 
intercourse and non-intercourse, the annulment of the 
British blockade of May, 1806 ; and further, that it has 
through me declared its confident expectation that other 
blockades of a similar character (including that of the 
island of Zealand) will be discontinued. But by what pro- 
cess of reasoning your lordship has arrived at the conclu- 
sion, that the government of the United States intended 
by this requisition to become the champion of the edict of 
Berlin, to fashion its principles by those of France while it 
aflfected to adhere to its own, and to act upon some part- 
nership in doctrines, which it would fain induce you to ac- 

23 



178 HISTORY OF THE 

knowledge, but could not prevail upon itself to avow, I am 
not able to conjecture. The frank and honourable charac- 
ter of the American government justifies me in saying that, 
if it had meant to demand of Great Britain an abjuration 
of all such principles as the French government may think 
fit to disapprove, it would not have put your lordship to the 
trouble of discovering that meaning by the aid of combi- 
nations and inferences discountenanced by the language of 
its minister, but would have told you so in explicit terms. 
What I have to request of your lordship, therefore, is that 
you will take our views and principles from our own mouths, 
and that neither the Berlin decree, nor any other act of 
any foreign state, may be made to speak for us what we 
have not spoken for ourselves." 

In a letter from Mr. Pinkney to Mr. Smith, Secretary 
of State, of the 17th of January, 1811, in alluding to the 
letter from which the above passages are cited, he says — 
"My answer to lord Wellesley's letter was written under 
the pressure of indisposition, and the influence of more 
indignation than could well be suppressed." As the agent 
of his government, it was doubtless the duty of Mr. Pink- 
ney to make the best of the case he had on hand. But it 
will be made apparent, before this examination is finished, 
that the British minister was not entirelv destitute of rea- 
son for his suggestion respecting that which was called "a 
partnership in doctrines." It is sufficient for the present 
to remark, that the circumstance of the American govern- 
ment having introduced, as a preliminary to their negotia- 
tions respecting the appeal of the British orders in council, 
the British blockading order of May, 1806, prevented the 
adjustment of that question, and was the means of keep- 
ing alive the spirit of hostility, until it terminated in the 
war of 1812. 

In a letter from the Marquis of Wellesley to Mr. Pink- 
ney, dated February 11th, 1811, he again adverts to this 
subject, and says — " Great Britain has always insisted uoon 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 179 

her right of self-defence against the system of commercial 
warfare pursued by France, and the British orders of coun- 
cil were founded upon a just principle of retaliation against 
the French decrees. The incidental operation of the or- 
ders of council upon the commerce of the United States, 
(although deeply to be lamented) must be ascribed exclu- 
sively to the violence and injustice of the enemy, which 
compelled this country to resort to adequate means of de- 
fence. It cannot now be admitted that the foundation of 
the original question should be changed, and that the mea- 
sure of retaliation adopted against France should now be 
relinquished, at the desire of the United States, without 
any reference to the actual conduct of the enemy. 

"The intention has been repeatedly declared of repeal- 
ing the orders of council, whenever France shall actually 
have revoked the decrees of Berlin and Milan, and shall 
have restored the trade of neutral nations to the condition 
in which it stood previously to the promulgation of those 
decrees. Even admitting that France has suspended the 
operation of those decrees, or has repealed them, with re- 
ference to the United States, it is evident that she has not 
relinquished the conditions expressly declared in the letter 
of the French minister under date of the 5th of August, 
1810. France therefore requires that Great Britain shall 
not only repeal the orders of council, but renounce those 
principles of blockade which are alleged in the same letter 
to be new ; an allegation which must be understood to re- 
fer to the introductory part of the Berlin decree. If Great 
Britain shall not submit to these terms, it is plainly inti- 
mated in the same letter that France requires America to 
enforce them. 

" To these conditions, his royal highness, on behalf of 
his majesty, cannot accede. No principles of blockade 
have been promulgated or acted upon by Great Britain 
previously to the Berlin decree, which are not strictly con- 
formable to the rights of civilized war, and to the approved 



180 HISTORY OF THE 

usages and law of nations. The blockades established by 
the orders of council rest on separate grounds, and are 
justified by the principles of necessary retaliation, in which 
they originated." 

That the French decrees were not in truth repealed on 
the 1st of November, 1810, was further inferred by the 
British government, from the fact that Bonaparte had es- 
tablished the practice of requiring the American vessels 
to take out licenses, before they could be admitted into 
French ports, and that they should take in for their return 
cargoes two-thirds of the quantity in French silks and 
wines. On the 16th of January, 1811, Mr. Russell, charge 
d'affaires of the United States at Paris, wrote to Mr. Smith, 
Secretary of State, as follows — 

•'Your letter of the 8th of November, relative to the 
powers given by this government to its consuls in the Uni- 
ted States, under its decree concerning licenses, was re- 
ceived by me on the 11th instant, and the next day 1 com- 
municated its contents to the duke of Cadore in a note, a 
copy of which you will find enclosed." 

The following is a copy of the note above alluded to — 

MR. RUSSELL tO THE DUKE OF CADORE. 

Paris, January 12, 1811. 

" Sir, — The public journals and letters from General 
Armstrong have announced to the American government 
an imperial decree, by which permission is to be granted 
to a stated number of American vessels, to import into 
France from certain ports in the United States, the arti- 
cles therein specified, and to export in return such pro- 
ductions of the French empire as are also enumerated in 
said decree. This trade, it would appear, is to be carried 
on under the authority of imperial licenses, and can only 
be perfected by the act of the French consul residing within 
the jurisdiction of the United States at the specified ports. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 181 

" The United States have no pretension of right to ob- 
ject to the operation of commercial regulations, strictly 
municipal, authorised by the French government to take 
effect within the limits of its own dominions ; but I am in- 
structed to state to you the inadmissibility, on the part of 
the United States, of such a consular superintendence as 
that which is contemplated by this decree respecting a 
trade to be carried on under licenses. 

" France cannot claim for her consuls, either by treaty 
or custom, such a superintendence. They can be per- 
mitted to enjoy such legitimate functions only as are sanc- 
tioned by public law, or by the usage of nations grow- 
ing out of the courtesy of independent states. 

" Besides, the decree in (juestion professes to invest cer- 
tain consuls with a power which cannot be regularly 
exercised in the United States without the tacit permis- 
sion of the American government ; a permission that can- 
not be presumed, not only because it is contrary to usage, 
but because consuls thus acting would be exercising func- 
tions in the United States in virtue of French authority 
only, which the American government itself is not compe- 
tent to authorise in any agents whatever. 

"If the construction given by the government of the 
United States to this decree be correct, the government of 
France should not for a moment mislead itself by a belief, 
that its commercial agents will be permitted to exercise the 
extraordinary power thus intended to be given to them." 

That the American government were much annoyed by 
this attempt of his imperial majesty of France to regulate 
and controul our trade with that country, in such a manner 
as to make it answer his own purposes, cannot be doubted. 
That they complain with great moderation and fear, is not 
a matter of surprise to any person who is acquainted with 
the occurrences of that period. 

The duke of Cadore, in reply to the foregoing letter 
from Mr. Russell, on the 18th of January, 1811, said — 



182 HISTORY OF THE 

" I have read with much attention your note of the 12th 
of January, relative to the Yicenses intended to favour ihe 
commerce of the Americans in France. This system had 
been conceived before the revocation of the decrees of 
Berlin and Milan had been resolved upon. Now circum- 
stances are changed by the resolution taken by the United 
States, to cause their flag and their independence to be re- 
spected, that which has been done before this last epoch, 
can no longer serve as a rule under actual circumstances." 

Ten months after this, however, viz. on the 21st of No- 
vember, 1811, in a letter from the Secretary of State to 
Mr. Barlow, then minister in France, the following lan- 
guage is used — 

" The trade by licenses must be abrogated. I cannot 
too strongly express the surprise of the President, after 
the repeated remonstrances of this government, and more 
especially after the letter of the duke of Cadore of the 

last, informing him that that system 

would fall with the Berlin and Milan decrees, that it still 
should be adhered to. The exequaturs of the consuls who 
have granted such licenses, would long since have been 
revoked, if orders to them to discontinue the practice had 
not daily been expected, or in case they were not received, 
the more eflfectual interposition of Congress to suppress it. 
It will certainly be prohibited by law, under severe penal- 
ties, in compliance with the recommendation of the Presi- 
dent, if your despatches by the Constitution do not prove 
that your demand on this subject has been duly attended to." 

The recommendation of the President here alluded to 
by the Secretary of State, it is presumed is in the following 
passage of the executive message at the opening of Con- 
gress, on the 5th of November ; — that is about a fortnight 
before the date of the foregoing letter — 

" The justice and fairness which have been evinced on 
the part of the United States towards France, both before 
and since the revocation of her decrees, authorised an ex- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 183 

pectation that her government would have followed up 
that measure, by all such others as were due to our rea- 
sonable claims, as well as dictated by its amicable profes- 
sions. No proof, however, is yet given, of an intention to 
repair the other wrongs done to the United States; and par- 
ticularly to restore the great amount of American property 
seized and condemned under edicts, which though not 
affecting our neutral relations, and therefore not entering 
into questions between the United States and other belli- 
gerents, were nevertheless founded in such unjust prin- 
ciples, that the reparation ought to have been prompt and 
ample. 

" In addition to this, and other demands of strict right 
on that nation, the United States have much reason to be 
dissatisfied with the rigorous and nncxjjecfed restrictions to 
which their trade with the French dominions has been sub- 
jected ; and ivhich, if not discontinued, will require at least 
corresponding restrictions on importations from France into 
the United States.''^ 

There is nothing in this message like a call upon Con- 
gress to interpose and suppress the license trade under 
severe penalties. That trade is doubtless alluded to, 
though not by name, in the paragraph last quoted ; but it 
speaks of " rigorous and unexpected restrictions, whichj if 
not discontinued, will require at least corresponding restric- 
tions''^ on our part. In other words, instead of revoking 
consular exequaturs, which was so boldly threatened 
nearly a year before, an attempt was made to frighten 
Bonaparte by the hint of establishing a license trade with 
France ! 

It has been the object of this work to show, by quota- 
tations from the public documents of the government, that 
whilst the administration were endeavoring by their lan- 
guage, as well as by their acts, to irritate the British go- 
vernment, they were manifesting towards France either a 
strong and unreasonable biass, or a servile and unmanly 



184 HISTORY OF THE 

fear. Some additional evidence in support of these posi- 
tions may be derived from another, but an undoubtedly 
correct and credible source. 

In the year 1811, Mr. Robert Smith, who had held the 
office of Secretary of State for a number of years under 
Mr. 3Iadison, in consequence of some disagreement or 
misunderstanding between these two personages, left that 
office, and retired to private life. Soon after the occur- 
rence of that event, Mr. Smith published an address to 
the people of the United States, containing the reasons 
for his resignation. Among other statements in his pub- 
lication are the following — 

"The non-intercourse law of the last session was also 
the device of Mr. Madison. It too was introduced by pre- 
sidential machinery. 

" Should this statute be viewed, as it ought to he, in con- 
nexion with and as emanating from the law of May, 1810, 
then will we have to look for the "/ac^" required by that 
law, namely, the actual revocation of the Berlin and Milan 
decrees. 

"If this revocation did in fact take place, as declared 
by the proclamation, then the act of May, communicated 
as it had been by the executive to the two belligerent 
powers, did become ipso facto a compact between the Uni- 
ted States and France, and in that case neither party had a 
right to disregard, or by law to change, its stipulated terms 
and conditions, as this government confessedly did by the 
non-intercourse act of the last session." 

"If, however, the emperor of the French did not in fact 
revoke, as declared by the proclamation, the Berlin and 
Milan decrees, the act of May did not become a compact 
between the United States and France, and in that case 
his imperial majesty had no claim against this government, 
founded upon that statute, to enforce the non-intercourse 
against the other belligerent. 

" What, then, was the evidence which had induced Con- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 185 

gress to consider these decrees repealed, and which had 
accordingly induced them to pass the non-intercourse law? 
To the President, in this as in every other case touching 
Gur foreign relations, the legislature must necessarily have 
looked for infurmation and recommendatiuiu From him 
they had in due form received what, they imagined, they 
were officially bound to consider as satisfactory evidence 
of the repeal of these decrees, namely, Ids proclamation^ 
and his messaa^e containing a recommendation to enforce 
the act of May, 1810. In respect then to this evidence, and 
in pursuance of this recommendation, did Congress pass the 
act called the non-intercourse law of the last session. 

" This non-intercourse law, let it be distinctly kept in 
mind, was passed after the arrival at Washington of the 
new French minister, viz. on the second day of March, 

1811." 

" Notwithstanding the precise protestation, solemnly 
communicated to the French government, and openly pro- 
mulgated to the whole world, in virtue of the letters from 
the State Department of June and July, 1810, that "a sa- 
tisfactory provision for restoring the property, lately sur- 
prised and seized by the order or at the instance of the 
French government, must be combined with a repeal of the 
French edicts, vnih a view to a non-intercourse wilh Great 
Britain, yet it is a fact, that before the passing of the non- 
intercourse law of the last session, viz. on the 20th of Fe- 
bruary, 1811, the French government did officially and for- 
mally, through their minister, Mr. Serrurier, communicate 
to this government their fixed determination not to restore 
the property that had been so seized. And moreover, 
from the information which had been received by Mr. 
Madison, prior to the date of the non-intercourse law, it 
was at the time of passing it, evident to my mind, that the 
Berlin and Milan decrees had not been revoked, as had been 

declared by the proclanmtiony 

" The following draught of a letter to General Arm- 

24 



186 HISTORY OF THE 

strong was accordingly prepared by me immediately after 
the letter of the duke of Cadore, to which it refers, had 
been received. It was in the usual form laid before the 
President for his approbation. He, however, objected to the 
sending of it. And as there is reason to believe that this 
very letter constituted part of the ground of the hostility of 
Mr. Madison to me, it is but proper to give it publicity. 

" Copy of the draught of the letter proposed to he sent to 

General Armstrong. 

^^ Department <.f State, June — , 1810. 

"Gen. Armstrong, — Your letters of the — with their 
respective enclosures were received on the 21st day of May. 

"In the note of the duke of Cadore nothing can be per- 
ceived to justify the seizure of the American property in 
the ports of France and in those of her allies. The facts as 
well as the arguments, which it has assumed, are confuted 
by events known to the world, and particularly by that mo- 
deration of temper which has invariably distinguished the 
conduct of this government towards the belligerent nations. 

"After a forbearance equalled only by our steady ob- 
servance of the laws of neutrality and of the immutable 
principles of justice, it is with no little surprise that the 
President discerns in the French government a disposition 
to represent the United States as the original aggressor. 
An act of violence which under existing circumstances is 
scarcely less than an act of war, necessarily required an 
explanation, which would satisfy not only the United States, 
but the world. But the note of the duke of Cadore, in- 
stead of a justification, has not furnished even a plausible 
palliation or a reasonable apology for the seizure of the 
American property. 

" There has never been a period of time when the 
United States have ceased to protest against the British 
orders in council. With regard to the resistance which 
the United States may have deemed it proper to oppose 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 



187 



lo such unlawful restrictions, it obviously belonged to the 
American government alone to prescribe the mode. If a 
system of exclusion of the vessels and merchandise of the 
belligerent powers from our ports has ))een preferred to 
war, if municipal prohibition has been resorted to instead 
of invasive retaliation, with what propriety can the empe- 
ror of the French pretend to see in that method of pro- 
ceeding any thing else than a lawful exercise of sovereign 
power ? To construe the exercise of this power into a 
cause of warlike reprisal is a species of dictation, which, 
could it be admitted, would have a tendency to subvert 
the sovereignty of the United States. 

" France has converted our law of exclusion into a pretext 
for the seizure of the property of the citizens of the United 
States. This statute was also in force against the vessels of 
Great Britain. If its operation had been considered by the 
French government as of sufficient efficacy to justify this 
pretended reprisal, that very operation, as it would have 
been more severely felt by Great Britain, ought also to 
have been considered as constituting a resistance to her 
orders, the non-existence of which resistance has been 
stated by the duke of Cadore as the pretext for the act of 
violence exercised on the American property. The United 
States having resisted the British orders, the real ground 
of complaint would seem to be, not so much that the Ame- 
rican government has not resisted a tax on their naviga- 
tion, as that it has likewise resisted the French decrees, 
which had assumed a prescriptive power over the policy 
of the United States, as reprehensible as the attempt of the 
British government to levy contributions on our trade was 
obnoxious. Placed in a situation where a tax was pro- 
claimed on the one hand, and a rule of action prescribed 
on the other, the United States owed it to their own honour 
to resist with corresponding measures the cupidity of the 
one and the presumption of the other. When the Ameri- 
can government sees in the provisions of the British orders 



188 HISTORY OF THE 

an assumption of maritime power in contravention of the 
law of nations, how can it fail also to perceive in the 
French decrees the adoption of a principle equally deroga- 
tory and injurious to the neutral character of the United 
States ? 

" The pretension of subjecting American navigation to i 
a tax, as advanced by the British order of November, 
1807, was in reality withdrawn by the order of the 26th of 
April, 1809. Yet ten months subsequent to the recall of 
that pretension, its alleged existence is made the basis of 
reproach against the American government by the empe- 
ror of the French. It would be fruitless to comment upon 
the disposition to insist upon the prevailing influence of a 
fact which no longer exists ; which, when it did exist, was 
uniformly combated ; and the final extinction of which 
was the manifest consequence of the measures of this 
government. 

" If the American government had seized French ves- 
sels, as erroneously asserted in the note of the duke of 
Cadore, the occurrence could only have been attributed to 
the temerity of their owners or commanders, who, after a 
previous notification, from the 1st of March to the 20th of 
May, of the act of exclusion, would have strangely presumed 
upon impunity in the violation of a prohibitory municipal law 
of the United States. Had France interdicted to our ves- 
sels all the ports within the sphere of her influence, and 
had she given a warning of equal duration with that given 
by our law, there would have been no cause of complaint 
on the part of the United States. The French government 
would not then have had the opportunity of exercising its 
power in a manner as contrary to the forms as to the sj)irit 
of justice, over the property of the citizens of the United 
States. 

*' It was at all times in the power of France to suspend, 
with regard to herself, our acts of exclusion, of which she 
complains, by simply annulling or modifying her decrees. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 189 

Propositions to this effect have been made to her govern- 
ment through you. They were not accepted. On the 
contrary, a policy was preferred which was calculated to 
produce any other result than that of a good understand- 
ing between the two countries. By the act of Congress 
of the last session an opportunity is again afforded to his 
imperial majesty to establish the most amicable relations 
between the United States and France. Let him with- 
draw or modify his decrees ; let him restore the property 
of our citizens so unjustly seized, and a law of the United 
States exists which authorizes the President to promote 
the best possible understanding with France, and to im- 
pose a system of exclusion against the ships and merchan- 
dise of Great Britain in the event of her failing to conform 
to the same just terms of conciliation. In fine, as the 
emperor will now be acquainted with the fact that no 
French vessels have been unlawfully seized in the ports of 
the United States, as the law of exclusion against the 
commerce of France is no more in operation, there can be 
no longer a solitary reasonable pretext for procrastinating 
the delivery of the American property, detained by the 
French government, into the possession of the respective 
owners. 

"These observations you will not fail to present to the 
view of the French government, in order that the emperor 
may learn that the United States insist upon nothing but 
' their acknowledged rights, and that they still entertain a 
desire to adjust all differences with the government of 
France upon a basis equally beneficial and honourable to 
both nations. 

" I have the honour to be, &.c. 
"R. Smith." 

It seems, from a passage above quoted, that Mr. S.Tiith, 
who as Secretary of State had full opportunity to become 
acquainted with all the correspondence, and every fact in 



190 HISTORY OF THE 

possession of the government, relative to our relations and 
intercourse, political and commercial, with France, had 
come to the conclusion that the allegation in the Presi- 
dent's proclamation, that the Berlin and Milan decrees had 
been revoked, was not true. He says, "From the infor- 
mation that had been received hy Mr. Madison, prior to the 
date of the non-intercourse law, it was, at the time of 
passing it, evident to my mind, that the Berlin and Milan 
decrees had not been revoked, as had been declared by the 
proclamation." It is not a little remarkable, that the 
President should have been convinced that those decrees 
had bee-n revoked, by evidence of so slight a character as 
to produce a directly opposite effect upon the Secretary's 
mind, viz. that such a revocation had not taken place. 

Mr. Smith goes on to say — 

" Previously to the meeting of Congress last autumn, I 
expressed to Mr. Madison my apprehension that the empe- 
ror of France would not bona ^</e fulfil the just expecta- 
tions of the United States; that our commerce would be 
exposed in his ports to vexatious embarrassments, and that 
tobacco and cotton would probably not be freely admitted into 
France. He entertained a different opinion, and, indeed, 
was confident that the Berlin and Milan decrees would bona 
fide cease on the first day of November, 18J0, and that 
from that day our commercial relations with France would 
be incumbered with no restrictions or embarrassments 
whatever. I nevertheless told him that my impressions 
were such that I would have a conversation with General 
Turreau upon the subject in my interview with him in re- 
lation to certificates of origin. In the course of the corres- 
pondence which thence ensued, I was greatly checked by 
the evident indications of utter indifl^erence on the part of 
Mr. Madison. Instead of encouraging, he absolutely dis- 
couraged the making of any animadversions upon General 
Turreau's letter of December 12th, ISIO." 

This letter was written by the Secretary of State, im- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 191 

mediately after the receipt by our government of the letter 
from the duke of Cadore, which has been quoted in this 
work, and in which such language as the following was 
made use of — " The Americans cannot hesitate as to the 
part which they are to take. They ought either to tear to 
pieces the act of their independence, and so become again as 
before the revolution the subjects of England.'" — '' Men with- 
out Just political views, tvithout honour, without energy, may 
allege that payment of the tribute imposed by England 
may be submitted to because it is light" — " it will then be 
necessary to fight for interest after having refused to fight 
for honour.''^ 

Mr. Smith's letter has been copied at length, that there 
may be no mistake, nor any charge of unfairness concern- 
ing its language, or its import. No dispassionate person 
who reads the correspondence to which it relates, and 
calls to mind the haughty, insolent, and rapacious conduct 
of the French government towards the United States, the 
violation of our neutral rights, and the plunder of our 
commerce, will be able to find any thing in it, which, in 
regard either to language or sentiment, under the circum- 
stances of the case, would be considered intemjierate, 
or even improper. And certainly, when compared with 
many parts of the correspondence with Great Britain, it 
must be viewed as tame and spiritless. Much less ought 
it to have been treated as if it contained a spirit of hostility 
in the executive department, and calling for resentment 
towards as high and responsible an officer as the Secretary 
of State. But what was the result ? 

" Instead of the animadversions," says Mr. Smith, " con- 
tained in the aforegoing letter, the President directed the 
insertion of simply the following section in my letter of the 
5th of June, 1810. 

" As the John Adams is daily expected, and as your 
further communications by her will better enable me to adapt 
to the actual state of our affairs with the French government ^ 



192 HISTORY OF THE 

the observations proper to be fnade in relation to their seizure 
of our j)roper1y, and to the letter of the duke of Cadore of 
the 14th of February, it is by the President deemed expe- 
dient not to make at this time any such animadversions. I 
cannot, however, forbear informing you, that a high indig- 
nation is felt by the President, as well as by the public, at 
this act of violence on our property, and at the outrage, 
both in the language and in the matter, of the letter of the 
duke of Cadore, so justly portrayed in your note to him 
of the 10th of March. 

" It is worthy of notice," adds Mr. Smith, " that the 
last sentence of the above section was merely a communi- 
cation to General Armstrong, personally, as to the impres- 
sion made here by that outrage of the French government, 
and that it was not an insiruciion to him to make the empe- 
ror of France acquainted witk the high indignation felt on 
the occasion by the President and the nation. It simply 
shows, that our executive had, at that time, but just reso- 
lution enough to impart to his own minister the sentiments 
of indignation that had been here excited by the enormous 
outrage of the Rambouillet decree, and by the insulting 
audacity of the duke of Cadore's letter." 

Mr. Smith, in his exposition, goes on to remark 

"It is within the recollection of the American people, 
that the members of Congress, during the last session, 
were much embarrassed as to the course most proper to 
be taken with respect to our foreign relations, and that 
their embarrassments proceeded principally from the defect 
in the communications to them as to the views of the emperor 
of the French. To supply this defect was the great desi- 
deratum. At a critical period of their perplexities the 
arrival at Norfolk of an Envoy Extraordinary from France 
was announced. Immediately thereon all their proceed- 
ings touching our foreign relations were suspended. Their 
measures, as avowed by themselves and as expected by 
the nation, were then to be shaped according to the infor- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 193 

mation that might be received from Mr. Serruricr, espe- 
cially as he necessarily must have left France long after 
the all-important first day of November. Upon his arri- 
val at Washington, and immediately after he had been 
accredited, knowing, as I did, the impatience of Congress 
and of my countrymen, I lost no time in having with him 
a conference." 

At this conference, Mr. Smith informed Mr. Serruier 
that he would address a note to him, propounding the seve- 
ral questions he had put to him in conversation, and lay 
his answer before the President. He accordingly prepared 
such a letter, and submitted it to the President for his ap- 
probation, when, he says, he was "to his astonishment told 
by him that it would not he expedient to send to Mr. Serru- 
rier any such node. His deportment throughout this inter- 
view evinced a high degree of disquietude, which occasion- 
ally betrayed him into fretful expressions;" — and he says 
he "entreated him, but in a manner the most delicate, not 
to withhold from Congress any information that might be 
useful to them at so momentous a juncture." He then 
gives the following as a copy of the letter which he had 
prepared — 

" Department of State, February 20, 1811. 

"Sir, — Desirous of laying before the President with 
the utmost precision the substance of our conference of 
this day, and knowing that verbal communications are not 
unfrequently misunderstood, I consider it proper to propose 
to you in a written form the questions which I have had 
the honour of submitting to you in conversation, namely : 

"1st. Were the Berlin and Milan decrees revoked in whole 
or in part on the fifth day of last November ? Or have 
they at any time posterior to that day been so revoked? 
Or have you instructions from your government to give to 
this government any assurance or explanation in relation 
to the revocation or modification of those decrees ? 

25 



194 HISTORY OF THE 

" 2d. Do the existing decrees of France admit into French 
ports, with or without licenses, American vessels laden 
with articles not the produce of the United States, and 
under what regulations and conditions ? 

"3d. Do they admit into French ports, with or without 
licenses, American vessels laden with articles not the pro- 
duce of the United States, and under what regulations and 
conditions ? 

"4th. Do they permit American vessels with or without 
licenses, to return from France to the United States, and 
upon what terms and conditions ? 

"5th. Is the importation into France of any articles, the 
produce of the United States, absolutely prohibited ? And 
if so, what are the articles so prohibited, and especially 
are tobacco and cotton ? , 

"6th. ')A2csQ yon instructions from your government to 
give to this government any assurance or explanation in 
relation to the American vessels and cargoes seized under 
the Rambouillet decree V 

It will be remarked that the inquiries in this letter were 
intended to draw from the French minister information re- 
specting the great points of complaint and controversy 
between the United States and France, viz. whether the 
Berlin and Milan decrees were actually repealed; whether 
the practice of granting licenses to the American trade 
was continued, and to .what extent; whether American 
produce was admitted into French ports, and on what 
terms; and whether he was instructed to give any expla- 
nation respecting the American property seized under the 
Rambouillet decree!* These were subjects of the highest 
interest to our citizens, and the government spent a great 
deal of time, in one form and another, in complaining of 
the treatment our country had received, that our country- 
men had been plundered of their property, and interrupted 
in their commerce; and particularly on the subject of the 
repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, they had not only 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 195 

insisted upon it that such a repeal had taken place, but the 
President had formally and officially proclaimed it to the 
nation ; and yet, when his confidential minister, the organ 
of communication and intercourse with foreign govern- 
ments, proposed to make specific inquiries of the French 
minister on these several subjects, in order to ascertain the 
precise facts concerning them, he was told by the President, 
*'that it would not be expedient to send to Mr. Serrurier 
any such note." Who can doubt respecting the kind and 
degree of influence which was exercised over Mr. Madison, 
when he refused to adopt the only course that existed, by 
which the information that was necessary could be obtain- 
ed ? Who can avoid the conclusion that it proceeded either 
from a servile fear of, or a most unwarrantable and repre- 
hensible attachment to France? 

Among the extraordinary occurrences of the period, one 
of the most remarkable was that which has been called 
the Henry plot. The history of that memorable afi'air may 
be collected from the following documents. 

On the 9th of March, 1812, President Madison trans- 
mitted the following message to both houses of Congress. 

" I lay before Congress copies of certain documents 
which remain in the department of state. They prove 
that, at a recent period, whilst the United States, notwith- 
standing the wrongs sustained by them, ceased not to ob- 
serve the laws of peace and neutrality towards Great 
Britain, and in the midst of amicable professions and nego- 
tiations on the part of the British government, through its 
public minister here, a secret agent of that government was 
employed in certain states, more especially at the seat of 
government in Massachusetts, in fomenting disaffection to 
the constituted authorities of the nation, and in intrio-iies 
with the disaffected, for the purpose of bringing about resist- 
ance to the laws, and, eventually, in concert with a Brilisk 
force, of destroying the Union and forming the eastern part 
thereof into a political connection with Great Britain, 



196 HISTORY OF THE 

'* In addition to the effect which the discovery of such a 
procedure ought to have on the public councils, it will not 
fail to render more dear to the hearts of all good citizens, 
"that happy union of these states, which, under divine Pro- 
vidence, is the guaranty of their liberties, their safety, their 
tranquillity, and their prosperity." 

This message was accompanied by a large number of 
documents, from which a few extracts only will be copied. 
The following is the first in the series 



" Philadelphia, Feb. 20, 1812. 

" Sir — Much observation and experience have convinced 
me, that the injuries and insults with which the United 
States have been so long and so frequently visited, and 
which cause their present embarrassment, have been owing 
to an opinion entertained by foreign states — ' That in any 
measure lending to wound their pride, or provoke their hosti- |jl 
lity, the government of this country could never induce a 
great majority of its citizens to concur.'' And, as many of 
the evils which flow from the influence of this opinion on 
the policy of foreign nations, may be removed by any act 
that can produce imanimity a/mong all parties in America, I 
voluntarily tender to you, sir, suth means as I possess 
towards promoting so desirable and important an object; 
which, if accomplished, cannot fail to extinguish, perhaps 
forever, those expectations abroad, which may protract 
indefinitely, an accommodation of existing differences, and 
check the progress of industry and prosperity in this rising 
empire. 

" I have the honour to transmit herewith the documents 
and correspondence relating to an important mission, in 
which I was employed by Sir James Craig, the late go- 
vernor-general of the British provinces in North America, 
in the winter of the year 1809. 

" The publication of these papers will demonstrate a 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 197 

fact not less valuable than the good already proposed ; it 
will prove that no reliance ought to be placed on the pro- 
fessions of good faith of an administration, which, by a 
series of disastrous events, h^s fallen into such hands as a 
Castlereagh, a Wellesley, or a Liverpool — I should rather 
say, into the hands of the stupid subalterns, to whom the 
pleasures and the indolence of those ministers have con- 
signed it. In contributing to the good of the United States 
by an exposition, which cannot (I think) fail to solve and melt 
all division and disunion among its citizens ; I flatter myself 
with the fond expectation, that when it is made public in Eng- 
land, it will add one great motive to the many that already 
exist, to induce that nation to withdraw its confidence from 
men, whose political career is a fruitful source of injury and 
embarrassment in America ; of injustice and misery in Ire- 
land ; of distress and apprehension in England ; and con- 
tempt every where. 

" In making this communication to you, sir, I deem it 
incumbent on me, distinctly and unequivocally to state, 
that I adopt no party views ; that I have not changed any 
of my political opinions ; that I neither seek nor desire the 
patronage nor countenance of any government, nor of any 
party; and that in addition to the motives already ex- 
pressed, / am influenced hy a just resentment of the perfidy 
and dishonour of those who first violated the conditions upon 
which I received their confidence; who have injured me, and 
disappointed the expectations of my friends ; and left me 
no choice, but between a degrading acquiescence in injus- 
tice, and a retaliation which is necessary to secure to me 
my own respect. 

" This wound will be felt where it is merited ; and if Sir 
James Craig still live, his share of the pain will excite no 
sympathy among those who are at all in the secret of our 
connection. 

" I have the honour to be, <kc. <fec. 

" J. Henry. 
" To James Monroe, Esq. Secretary of State." 



198 HISTORY OF THE 

"MR. RYLAND, SECRETARY TO SIR JAMES CRAIG, GOVER- 

NOUR GENERAL OF CANADA, TO MR. HENRY. 
"*' Most secret and confidential. 

" Quebec, January 26, 1809. 

" My Dear Sir — The extraordinary situation of things 
at this time in the neighbouring states, has suggested to the 
governor in chief, the idea of employing you on a secret 
and confidential mission to Boston, provided an arrange- 
ment can be made to meet the important end in view, 
without throwing an absolute obstacle in the way of your 
professional pursuits. The information and political ob- 
servations heretofore received from you, were transinitted 
by his excellency to the secretary of state, who has ex- 
pressed his particular approbation of them ; and there is 
no doubt that your able execution of such a mission as I 
have above suggested, would give you a claim not only on 
thegovernour-general,butonhis majesty's ministers, which 
might eventually contribute to your advantage. You will 
have the goodness therefore to acquaint me, for his excel- 
lency's information, whether you could make it convenient 
to engage in a mission of this nature, and what pecuniary 
assistance would be requisite to enable you to undertake it 
without injury to yourself. 

" At present it is only necessary for me to add, that the 
governour would furnish you with a cypher for carrying on 
your correspondence ; and that in case the leading party in 
any of the states wished to open a communication with this 
government, their views might be communicated through 
you. 

" I am, with great truth and regard, &c. 

" Herman W. Ryland," 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. i9& 



"SIR JAMES CRAIG to MR. HENRY. 
*' m[ost secret and confidential. 

" Quebec, February 6, 1809. 

" Sir — As you have so readily undertaken the service, 
which I have suggested to you, as being Hkely to be at- 
tended with much benefit to the pubHc interests, I am to 
request that with your earhest conveniency you will pro- 
ceed to Boston. 

" The principal object that I recommend to your atten- 
tion, is the endeavour to obtain the most accurate infor- 
mation of the true state of affairs in that part of the Union, 
which from its wealth, the number of its inhabitants, and 
the known intelligence and ability of several of its leading 
men, must naturally possess a very considerable influence 
over, and will indeed probably lead the other eastern states 
of America, in the part that they may take at this impor- 
tant crisis. 

" I shall not pretend to point out to you the mode by 
which you will be most likely to obtain this important in- 
formation ; your own judgment, and the connection which 
you may have in the town, must be your guide. I think it 
however necessary to put you on your guard against the 
sanguineness of an aspiring party ; the federalists, as I 
understand, have at all times discovered a leaning to this 
disposition, and their being under its particular influence at 
this moment, is the more to be expected from their having 
no ill founded ground for their hopes of being nearer the 
attain-ment of their object than they have been for some 
years past. 

" In the general terms which I have made use of in de- 
scribing the object which I recommend to your attention, 
it is scarcely necessary that I should observe, I include the 
state of the public opinions, both with regard to their inter- 
nal politicks, and to the probability of a war with England; 



200 HISTORY OF THE 

the comparative strength of the two great parties into 
which the country is divided, and the views and designs of 
that which may ultimately prevail. 

*' It has been supposed that if the federalists of the eas- 
tern states should be successful in obtaining that decided 
influence which may enable them to direct the publick 
opinion, it is not improbable that rather than submit to a 
continuance of the difficulties and distress to which they are 
now subject, they will exert that influence to bring about a 
separation of the general union. The earliest information 
on this subject may be of great consequence to our govern- 
ment, as it may also be, that it should be informed, how far 
in such an event they ivoiild look up to England for assist- 
ance, or be disposed to enter into a connection with us. 

"Although it would be highly inexpedient that you should 
in any manner appear as an avowed agent, yet if you could 
contrive to obtain an intimacy with any of the leading 
party, it may not be improper that you should insinuate, 
though with great caution, that if they should wish to enter 
into any communication with our government through me, you 
are authorized to receive any such, and will safely transmit 
it to me; and as it may not be impossible that they should 
require some document by which they may be assured that 
you are really in the situation in which you represent your- 
self ; I enclose a credential to be produced in that view; 
but I most particularly enjoin and direct that you do not 
make any use of this paper, unless a desire to that pur- 
pose should be expressed, and unless you see good ground 
for expecting that the doing so may lead to a more confiden- 
tial communication than you can otherwise look for. 

"In passing through the state of Vermont, you will of 
course exert your endeavours to procure all the informa- 
tion that the short stay you will probably make there will 
admit of. You will use your own discretion as to delaying 
your journey, with this view, more or less, in proportion to 
your prospects of obtaining any information of consequence. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 201 

" I request to hear from you as frequently as possible ; 
and as letters directed to me might excite suspicion, it 
may be as well, that you put them under cover to Mr. 

, and as even the addressing letters always to 

the same person might attract notice, I recommend your 
sometimes addressing your packet to the chief justice here, 
or occasionally, though seldom, to Mr. Ryland, but never 
with the addition of his official description. I am, &.c. 

" James H. Craig." 

" Copy of the • Credentials' given by Sir James Craig to 

Mr. Henry. 
[Seal.] 

"The bearer, Mr. John Henry, is employed by me, and 
full confidence may be placed in him for any communica- 
tion which any person may wish to make to me in the busi- 
ness committed to him. In faith of which, I have given 
him this under my hand and seal at Quebec, this 6th day 
of February, 1809. 

» J. H.Craig." 

Mr. Henry, according to the account contained in his 
correspondence, after having received his instructions, 
proceeded to Burlington, in Vermont, where he passed a 
few days, apparently listening to such conversations, and 
chit-chat, as occurred in his hearing. In a letter from 
that place, he says he found the embargo laws were con- 
sidered as unnecessary, oppressive, and unconstitutional ; 
and that, in his opinion, if Massachusetts should take any 
bold step towards resisting their execution, Vermont would 
join her ; and he adds — 

" I learn that the governor of this state is now visiting 
the towns in the northern section of it ; and makes no se- 
cret of his determination, as commander in chief of the 
militia, to refuse obedience to any command from the ge- 
neral government, which can tend to interrupt the good 

26 



202 HISTORY OF THE 

understanding that prevails between the citizens 6f Ver- 
mont and his majesty's subjects in Canada." 

On the 19th of February he dated a letter from Wind- 
sor, Vermont, where he says the federal party declared, 
that in the event of a war, the state of Vermont would 
treat separately with Great Britain ; and that the demo- 
crats would risk every thing in preference to a coalition 
with that nation. 

On the 5th of March, he writes from Boston, and says, 
'* It does not yet appear necessary that I should discover 
to any person the purpose of my visit to Boston ; nor is it 
probable that I should be compelled, for the sake of gain- 
ing more knowledge of the arrangements of the federal 
party in these states, to avow myself as a regular autho- 
rized agent of the British government, even to those indi- 
viduals who would feel equally bound with myself to pre- 
serve with the utmost inscrutability so important a secret 
from the public eye. I have sufficient means of informa- 
tion to enable me to judge of the proper period for offer- 
ing the co-operation of Great Britain, and opening a cor- 
respondence between the governor-general of British 
America and those individuals who, from the part they 
take in the opposition to the national government, or the 
influence they may possess in any new order of things that 
may grow out of the present differences, should be quali- 
fied to act on behalf of the northern states. An appre- 
hension of any such state of things as is presup|)osed by 
these remarks begins to subside, since it has appeared by 
the conduct of the general government that it is seriously 
alarmed at the menacing attitude of the northern states." 

On the 7th of March, he wrote again from Boston. 
The following is an extract from his letter. "I have 
already given a decided opinion that a declaration of war 
is not to be expected : but, contrary to all reasonable cal- 
culation, should the Congress possess spirit and indepen- 
dence enough to place their popularity in jeopardy by so 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 203 

Strong a measure, the legislature of 3Iassachusetts will 
give the tone to the neighboring states ; will declare itself 
permanent, until a new election of members ; invite a Con- 
gress to be composed of delegates from the federal states, 
and erect a separate government for their common defence 
and common interest. This congress would probably be- 
gin by abrogating the offensive laws and adopting a plan 
for the maintenance of the power and authority thus as- 
sumed. They would by such an act be in a condition to 
make or receive proposals from Great Britain; and I 
should seize the first moment to open a correspondence 
with your excellency. Scarce any other aid would be ne- 
cessary, and perhaps none required, than a few vessels of 
war, from the Halifax station, to protect the maritime 
towns from the little navy which is at the disposal of the 
national government. What permanent connection be- 
tween Great Britain and this section of the Republic would 
grow out of a civil commotion, such as might be expected, 
no person is prepared to describe ; but it seems that a strict 
alliance must result of necessity. At present, the oppo- 
sition party confine their calculations merely to resistance ; 
and I can assure you that at this moment, they do not 
freely entertain the project of withdrawing the eastern 
states from the Union, finding it a very unpopular topick; 
although a course of events, such as I have already men- 
tioned, would inevitably produce an incurable alienation 
of the New-England from the southern states. 

" The truth is, the common people have so long regard- 
ed the constitution of the United States with complacency, 
that they are now only disposed in this quarter to treat it 
like a truant mistress, whom they would for a time put 
away on a separate maintenance, but without further and 
greater provocation would not absolutely repudiate." 

The series of letters is continued until the 25th of May, 
when the 14th in number was written at Boston. By that 
time Mr. Henry appears to have been fully convinced that 



/ 



204 HISTORY OF THE 

his mission was not likely to terminate successfully. He 
says — if I beg leave to suggest, that in the present state of 
things in this country, my presence can contribute very 
little to the interests of Great Britain." And it seems 
that his employers were under a similar impression; for 
on the 4th of May, Mr. Secretary Ryland wrote to him in 
a formal manner that his speedy return was hoped for, as 
the object of his journey seemed to be at an end. And on 
the 12th of June, he addressed his letter. No. 15, to the 
governor-general from Montreal, informing him of his 
arrival at that city. 

These papers were referred, in the House of Repre- 
sentatives, to the committee on foreign relations; who 
made the following report — 

"The committee of foreign relations, to whom was re- 
ferred the President's message of the 9th instant, covering 
copies of certain documents communicated to him by a 
Mr. John Henry ; beg leave to report, in part — 

"That although they did not deem it necessary or pro- 
per to go into an investigation of the authenticity of docu- 
ments communicated to Congress on the responsibility of 
a co-ordinate branch of the government, it may, neverthe- 
less, be satisfactory to the house to be informed, that the 
original papers, with the evidences relating to them, in 
possession of the Executive, were submitted to their ex- 
amination, and were such as fully to satisfy the committee 
of their genuineness. 

"The circumstances under which the disclosures of 
Henry were made to the government, involving considera- 
tions of political expediency, have prevented the commit- 
tee from making those disclosures the basis of any pro- 
ceeding against him. And from the careful concealment, 
on his part, of every circumstance which could lead to the dis- 
covery and punishment of any individuals in the United 
States (should there be any such) who were criminally con- 
nected with him, no distinct object was presented to the com- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION'. 205 

mittee by his communication, for the exercise of the 
power with which they were invested of sending for per- 
sons and papers. 

"On being informed, however, that there was a fo- 
reigner in the city of Washington, who lately came to this 
country fiom Europe, with Henry, and was supposed to be 
in his confidence, the committee thought proper to send 
for him. His examination, taken under oath, and reduced 
to writing, they herewith submit to the house. 

"The transaction disclosed by the President's message, 
presents to the minds of the committee conclusive evidence 
that the British government, at a period of peace, and during 
the mod friendly professions, have heen deliberately and per- 
fidiously pursuing measures to divide these States, and to in- 
volve our citizens in all the guilt of treason, and the horrors 
of a civil war. It is not, however, the intention of the 
committee to dwell upon a proceeding, which, at all times, 
and among all nations, has been considered as one of the 
most aggravated character ; and which, from the nature 
of our government, depending on a virtuous union of sen- 
timent, ought to be regarded by us with the deepest ab- 
horrence." 

This report was accompanied by the testimony of the 
foreigner alluded to in it, and who signs the deposition as 
Count Edward de Crillon, taken and reduced to writing 
bv the committee. 

Upon the publication of the message and the papers 
connected with it, the following document was communi- 
cated to the President in the following message — 

•' I lay before Congress a letter from the envoy extra- 
ordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Groat Britain, to 
the Secretary of State. 

"James Madison." 

" Mr. Foster to Mr. Monroe. Washington, March 11th, 1812. 
" The undersigned, his Britanniek majesty's envoy extra- 



206 HISTORY OF THE 

ordinary, and minister plenipotentiary to the United States, 
has read in the pubHc papers of this city, with the deepest 
concern, the message sent by the President of the United 
States to Congress on the 9th instant, and the documents 
which accompanied it. 

"In the utter ignorance of the undersigned as to all the 
circumstances alluded to in those documents, he can only 
disclaim most solemnly, on his own part, the having had 
any knowledge whatever of the existence of such a mission, 
or of such transactions as the communication of Mr. Henry 
refers to, and express Wis conviction, that from what he 
knows of those branches of his majesty's government with 
which he is in the habit of having intercourse, no counte- 
nance whatever was given by them to any schemes hostile 
to the internal tranquility of the United States. 

"The undersigned, however, cannot but trust that the 
American government and the Congress of the United 
States will take into consideration the character of the in- 
dividual who has made the communication in question, and 
will suspend any further judgment on its merits until the 
circumstances shall have been made known to his majesty's 



government. 



(Signed) Aug. J. Foster." 



John Henry was born a subject of Great Britain. For a 
while, he had resided in this country, and held a commission 
in the army of the United States. Having left the service, 
by his own account he resided for some time in Vermont, 
and afterwards returned to his natural allegiance, and be- 
came a resident of Canada. There, in the beginning of 
the year 1809, if his own account is to be credited, he was 
employed by Sir James H. Craig, governor of Canada, to 
repair to Boston, for the purpose of ascertaining whether 
the federal politicians of the New England states, parti- 
cularly those of Massachusetts, were desirous of withdraw- 
ing from the Union, and forming a close connection with 



HARTFORD COiNVENTION. 207 

Great Britain. Accordingly in the month of February of 
that year, he commenced his journey, and after spendino- 
some time in Vermont, and passing through Ne\v Hamp- 
shire, he reached Boston early in the month of 3Iarch. 
Having taken his station in the New England capital, he 
opened his correspondence with his employers in Canada. 
His first letter is dated March 5th, 1809. In that he re- 
marked, that it had not thus far appeared necessary for 
him to discover to any person the object of his visit ; nor 
was it probable that he should find it necessary, for the 
purpose of gaining a knowledge of the arrangements of 
the federal party, to avow himself as a regular authorised 
agent of the British government, even to those who would 
keep the secret — that he had sufficient means of informa- 
tion to enable him-to judge of the proper time for offering 
the co-operation of Great Britain, and opening a corres- 
pondence between the governor-general of British Ame- 
rica, and disaffected individuals in Massachusetts. Accord- 
ingly, he remained unknown at Boston till the 25th of 
May following, when he wrote to his principals at Quebec, 
that it would be unnecessary for him in the existing state of 
things, and unavailing also, to attempt to carry into effect the 
original purposes of his mission. He was soon recalled from 
that mission, and returned to Canada; and in 1811 was 
in England, petitioning the British government for com- 
pensation for his services abovementioned. For some 
cause or other, the ministry declined paying him ; but re- 
ferred him to the governor of Canada, on the ground that 
they had not discovered any wish on the part of Sir James 
Craig that Henry''s claims for compensation should he re- 
ferred to the mother country, and because no allusion was 
made to any Iciml of arrangement or agreement that had 
been made by that officer with him. 

It is certainly a very extraordinary circumstance, that in 
the absence of all proof that the British government ever 



208 HISTORY OF THE 

had the least knowledge of Henry's mission until long 
after it was finished, that the President should have made 
use of the following language, when speaking of the docu- 
ments which accompanied his message to Congress — 

" They prove that, at a recent period, whilst the United 
States, notwithstanding the wrongs sustained by them, 
ceased not to observe the laws of peace and neutrality 
towards Great Britain, and in the midst of amicable pro- 
fessions and negotiations on the part of the British govern- 
ment, through its public minister here, a secret agent of that 
government was employed in certain states, more especially 
at the seat of government ii> Massachusetts, in fomenting 
disaffection to the constituted aidhorities of the nation, and in 
intrigues itith the disaffected, for the purpose of bringing 
about resistance to the laws, and, eventually, in concert with a 
British force, of destroying the Union and forming the eastern 
part thereof into a political connection with Great Britain.'' 

The committee on foreign relations, to whom the mes- 
sage and documents were referred, in their report, make 
the following remarks — " 'I'he transaction disclosed by the 
President's message, presents to the minds of the commit- 
tee, conclusive evidence, that the British government, at a 
period of peace, and during the most friendly professions, 
have been deliberately and perfidiously pursuiyig measures to 
divide these States, and to involve our citizens in all the guilt 
of treason, and the horrors of a civil icar" 

At the time of this occurrence, it is very apparent from 
a review of the general state of things, and from the cha- 
racter and course of their measures, that the government 
of this country had resolved on a war with Great Britain. 
Having formed that determination, it was natural for them 
to pursue such a course as would be likely to excite the 
public resentment towards thai nation. This affair of 
Henry, in any other light in which it might be considered, 
was calculated to disgrace the American government. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 209 

Hence it was doubtless viewed as indispensable to the ac- 
complishment of the main object, that Henry's plot should 
be charged over to the British government, as an attempt 
on their part to produce discord and division among the 
States. And both President Madison, and the committee 
on foreign relations, make the bold, unqualified, and cer- 
tainly unfounded assertion, that the documents connected 
with the transaction prove such a flagitious attempt on the 
part of the British government to destroy the Union, in- 
volve the citizens in the guilt of treason, and the horrors 
of a civil war, and to form a political connection in the 
eastern states with Great Britain. But so far from this 
beino- true, there is no satisfactory evidence that the British 
government ever knew of the employment of Henry by the 
governor-general of Canada, that he ever visited Boston 
for such a purpose, or that they even knew there was such 
a man in existence. And when called upon by Henry for 
compensation for his services, the minister at London re- 
ferred him back to the colonial government, by which he 
had l>een employed, with the remark, that it did not ap- 
pear that Sir James Craig had ever expressed a wish that 
Henry should apply for his pay to the government of the 
mother country, or that any arrangement for that pur- 
pose had been even alluded to. From whence then does 
the inference arise, that this was a measure for which 
the British government was chargeable ? Merely from 
the remark in Ryland's letter, which has been alluded 

to. 

Is there not, however, strong ground for the belief, that 
one important object of this absurd, ridiculous, and dis- 
graceful transaction, was to fix a degree of odium upon 
the New England states, and especially upon a certain 
class of New England politicians ? It was well known 
that a large majority of the people of those states were 
opposed to the approaching declaration of war. It was 
not believed by those who were the best informed on the 

27 



210 HISTORY OF THE 

subject, that the real object of hostilities was avowed by 
those who were the most earnestly bent on bringing the 
war upon the nation. They were perfectly aware of the 
kind of influence which was exercising to bring it to pass, 
and as they could not justify such a measure, under such 
circumstances, to their consciences, they were steadily and 
firmly opposed to it. To excite the feelings of the country 
against them, no more efficacious mode could be devised, 
than to accuse them of being false to their country — to re- 
present them as intrigueing with the power whicii was in so 
short a time intended to be the open and declared enemy 
of the United States, to destroy the Union, and to re-unite 
a part of its territory and inhabitants to the British nation. 
The miserable farce got up by Henry furnished the most 
plausible opportunity to accomplish the object ; and it was 
laid hold offer that purpose with the utmost avidity. To 
show how utterly unfounded this whole plot against New 
England was, it will be remarked, that durivig the whole 
period of Henry's residence in Boston, it does not appear 
that he ever conversed with a single individual respecting 
the object of his mission, that any overtures of the kind 
alluded to were ever made to him ; nor does he mention 
the name of even a solitary person, who ever uttered, even 
by accident, a sentence of disafl:ection to the Union of the 
States, or of a wish to form a connection with Great Bri- 
tain. And the committee on foreign relations, in their 
report on this subject, say — '' The circumstances under 
which the disclosures of Henry were made to the govern- 
ment, involving considerations of political expediency, have 
prevented the committee from making those disclosures 
the basis of any proceeding against him. And from the 
careful concealment, on his part, of every circumstance 
which could lead to the discovery and punishment of any 
individuals in the United States (should there be any such) 
who were criminally connected with him, no distinct object 
was presented to the committee by his communication for 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 211 

the exercise of the power with which they were invested, 
of sending for persons and papers." 

In this state of things, without the slightest evidence, or 
any possible clue, which would warrant even the suspicion 
of guilt in a single inhabitant of Massachusetts, or of New 
England at large, nothing remained but to leave them ex- 
posed to the conjectures of those who seemed to consider 
it a species of patriotism to upbraid and reproach the in- 
habitants of those states as the enemies of their country. 
Henry, in this transaction, was accompanied by a fo- 
reign adventurer, who called his name Crillon ; and who, 
to give dignity to the enterprise, added the title of count to 
his escutcheon. He went through a long examination, 
under oath, before the committee of foreign relations ; but 
for what particular purpose his testimony was published, 
unless it was to swell the amount of the documents, it is 
not easy to say. The President of the United States re- 
warded the profligate Henry with the sum of fifty thou- 
sand DOLLARS, for this contemptible disclosure of his own 
baseness, and for the purpose of enabling liimself to pro- 
duce an effect upon popular feeling and opinion in favour 
of his favourite measure of war. 

It is much to be regretted, that for the honour of the 
country, and the character of the government, this whole 
proceeding was ever suffered to sec the light. It ought to 
have occurred in secret session, and been buried in deep 
oblivion. Unfortunately it was found expedient to publish 
the documents to the world ; and they must of course for- 
ever remain as evidence of the unworthy spirit by which 
the government. was actuated on that memorable occasion. 
It must be acknowledcred, however, that it was well de- 
signed to increase the animosity of the country against the 
British government, and to have some influence in recon- 
1 ciling: the country to the idea of u war with that nation. 
But after such an insidious attempt to vilify and traduce 
the inhabitants of New England, it can scarcely lea mat- 



212 HISTORY OF THE 

ter of surprise, that when these same New England men 
were called upon to advance money, for the purpose of ena- 
bling the government to prosecute the war which they had 
thus unnecessarily and rashly undertaken, they should 
withhold their aid. If any thing further was necessary to 
induce them to pursue such a course, beyond a conscien- 
tious conviction that the war was unjustifiable, the treat-|j 
ment they had received from the government in this foul 
attempt, founded on the testimony of an unprincipled and 
daring foreign swindler, to blast their reputations, and ren 
der them odious to their country and the world, this trans 
action was su^cient to confirm them in that course. 

Such was the origin of the war of 1812. In order that 
its character may be fully understood, and duly appre 
ciated, a review of the policy and measures of the govern 
ment, which finally terminated in that measure, has beenj 
exhibited. 

The first conclusion to be drawn from that review is, 
that the real object in view in engaging in hostilities wit 
Great Britain, at the precise time when those hostilitie 
commenced, was not specified in the manifesto publishe 
by the American government. The grounds for declarin 
war, as stated in that document, were twofold — the edict 
of Great Britain which violated our neutral rights — and im 
pressment. The orders in council, which were the subject 
of such loud complaints on the part of the United States,! 
were dated in January and November, 1807. The wa 
was declared in June, 1812 — four years and a half afte 
the date of the latest of those edicts. The order of Janu 
ary was avowedly adopted by the British government, as 
measure of retaliation for the French decree of the pre 
ceding November, called the Berlin decree ; and the order 
of November was issued professedly in retaliation for the 
French decree of Milan. In May, 1806, the British order 
for blockading the coast from the river Elbe to Brest was 
adopted. The French government declared that the 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 213 

Berlin decree was issued as a measure of retaliation for 
the abovetnentioned blockading order. The order of 
May, 1806, was issued during the administration of Mr. 
Fox, the whig minister, and the great friend of this coun- 
try. He declared to Mr. Monroe, at that time our minis- 
ter at the court of London, that the order was intended to 
operate beneficially, and not injuriously to neutrals. And 
this view of the measure was communicated to our go- 
vernment by Mr. Monroe ; and no complaint of its injus- 
tice was made at Washington for some years afterwards. 
The non-intercourse law contained a provision which au- 
thorised the President, in case either France or Great Bri- 
tain should so revoke or modify her edicts, as that they should 
cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, to 
declare the same by proclamation ; after which the trade 
suspended by said act, and by an act laying an embargo on 
all ships and vessels in the ports and harbours of the Uni- 
ted States, and the several acts supplementary thereto, 
might be renewed with the nation so doing. Here is the 
ground, and the only ground on which the President was 
empowered by that act to adjust the existifig difficulties 
with those nations, and renew friendly and commercial in- 
tercourse with them. 

When the arrangement was made with Mr. Erskine, in 
April, 1809, it was stipulated by him, on the part of the 
British government, that in consequence of the accept- 
ance by the President of the proposals made by him on 
the part of the King, for the renewal of the intercourse 
between the respective countries, he was authorised to de- 
clare that the orders in council of January and November, 
1807, would be withdrawn, as respected the United States, 
on the 10th day of June then next — that is 1809. In con- 
sequence of this assurance by the British minister, the 
President, on the 19th of April, 1807 — the day after the 
arrangement was completed — issued his proclamation, de- 
claring that those orders in council would, on the 10th of 



214 HISTORY OF THE . 

June following, have been withdrawn, and that the trade 
of the United States, which had been suspended by the 
non-intercourse act, might after that day be renewed. 

In the correspondence relative to this arrangement, not 
a word was said en the part of the United Slates about 
the blockading order of May, 380G, nor was the slightest 
allusion made to the subject of imj)ressment. The nego- 
tiation throughout was confined entirely to the abovemen- 
tioned orders in council, they were considered as the only 
grounds on which the intercourse had been suspended ; 
and upon their removal, the way was clear for its re-esta- 
blishment. Such was the construction put upon the law 
by the President, when he approved the principles of the 
arrangement, and issued his proclamation in pursuance of 
the provisions of the non-intercourse act. 

On the 23d of May, 1809, immediately after this ar- 
rangement had been concluded, Congress were, in conse- 
quence of it, convened, and the result of the negotiation 
was communicated to both houses by the President, in a 
message bearing that date. The following is an extract 
from that dooument. 

" On this first occasion of meeting you, it affords me 
much satisfaction to be able to communicate the com- 
mencement of a favourable change in our foreign relations ; 
the critical state of which induced a session of Congress at 
this early period. 

"In consequence of the provisions of the act interdict- 
ing commercial intercourse with Great Britain and France, 
our ministers at London and Paris were, without delay, 
instructed to let it be understood by the French and Bri- 
tish governments, that the authority vested in the Execu- 
tive, to renew commercial intercourse with their respective 
nations, would be exercised in the case specified by that act. 

*' Soon after these instructions were despatched, it was 
found that the British government, anticipating, from 
early proceedings of Congress, at their last session, the 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 215 

State of our laws, which has had the effect of placing the 
two belligerent powers on a footing of equal restrictions, 
and relying on the conciliatory disposition of the United 
States, had transmitted to their legation here, provisional 
instructions, not only to offer satisfaction for the attack on the 
frigate Chesapeake, and to make known the determination 
of his Britannick majesty to send an envoy extraordinary 
with powers to conclude a treaty on all the points between 
the two countries, but, moreover, to signify his willingness, 
in the meantime, to withdraw his orders in council, in the 
persuasion that the intercourse with Great Britain would 
be renewed on the jjart of the United States. 

"These steps of the British government led to the cor- 
respondence and the proclamation now laid before you ; 
by virtue of which, the commerce between the two coun- 
tries will be ^enewable after the tenth day of June next." 

" The revision of our commercial laws, proper to adapt 
them, to the arrangement which has taken place with Great 
Britain, will doubtless engage the early attention of Con- 
gress." 

In pursuance of the above suggestion, Congress imme- 
diately passed the following act — 

" Be it enacted, &,c. That from and after the passing 
this act, all ships or vessels owned by citizens or subjects 
of any foreign nation with which commercial intercourse 
is })ermitted by the act entitled 'An act to interdict the 
commercial intercourse between the United States and 
Great Britain and France, and their dependencies, and 
for other purposes,' be permitted to take on board car- 
goes of domestic or foreign produce, and to depart with 
the same for any port or place with which such intercourse 
is, or shall, at the time of their departure, respectively, be 
thus permitted, in the same manner, and on the same con- 
ditions, as is provided by the act aforesaid, for vessels 
owned by citizens of the United States; any thing in said 
act, or in the act laying an embargo on all ships and ves- 



216 HISTORY OF THE 

sels in the ports and harbours of the United States, or in 
any of the several acts supplementary thereto, to the con- 
trary notwithstanding." This act was approved May 30th, 
1809. 

An act was also passed at the same session, continuing 
in force certain sections of the non-intercourse law until 
the end of the then next session of Congress, with a pro- 
viso, that nothing therein contained should be construed to 
prohibit any trade or commercial intercourse which had 
been, or might be permitted in conformity with the pro- 
visions of the eleventh section of the non-intercourse act. 
The eleventh section was that which authorised the Presi- 
dent to suspend the operation of the edicts of the bellige- 
rent nations, upon their revoking or modifying their edicts 
so that they should cease to violate our neutral rights. 

Here then is a solemn declaration, in the first place, by 
the President, and in the second, by Congress, that the 
British blockading order of May, 1806, ivas not an edict 
that violated our neutral rights in April and May, 1809, 
and the inference is equally strong, that at the same time 
impressment was not then considered a justifiable cause ofivar, 
because it was not alluded to either in the arrangement 
with Mr. Erskine, in the President's proclamation suspend- 
ino- the non-intercourse law, or in that law, or in the pro- 
ceedings of Congress, when engaged in adapting the com- 
mercial laws of the United States to that arrangement. 

Having seen that the British blockading order of May, 
1806, was not considered by our government, in the ar- 
rano-ement with Mr. Erskine, as one of the edicts of that 
nation which violated our neutral rights, but was after- 
wards introduced into the manifesto of the government, 
■which laid the foundation of the President's proclamation 
of war, it becomes an object of importance to inquire 
when that decree began to be considered as a justifiable 
ground of hostilities. It will be recollected, that in De- 
cember, 1809, General Armstrong was instructed by the 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 2l7 

President, to inquire of the duke of Cadore, on what con- 
ditions his majesty the emperov of France would consent 
to annul the Berlin decree; and whether, if Great Britain 
revoked her blockades, of a date anterior to that decree, 
his majesty would consent to revoke the said decree. In 
a letter from Mr. Smith, Secretary of State, to Mr. Pink- 
iiey, then our minister to the British court, dated July 5th, 
1810, it is said — "In explaining the extent of the repeal, 
which, on the British side, is required, you will be ffuided 
by the same principle. You will accordingly let it be dis- 
tinctly understood, that it must necessarily include an an- 
nulment of the blockade of May, 1806, which has been 
avowed to be comprehended in, and identified with the or- 
ders in council ; and which is palpably at variance with 
the law of nations. This is the explanation which will be 
given to the French government on this point by our mi- 
nister at Paris, in case it should there be required." 

The letter then proceeds to state reasons why "the Brit- 
ish government ought to revoke every other blockade rest- 
ing on proclamations or diplomatic notifications, and not on 
the application of a naval force adequate to a real blockade." 
The second of these reasons was the following — "With- 
out this enlightened precaution, it is probable, and may in- 
deed be inferred from the letter of the duke of Cadore to 
General Armstrong, that the French government will draw 
Great Britain and the United States to issue on the legality 
of such blockades, hy acceding to the act of Congress, with a 
CONDITION, that a repeal of the blockades shall accompany a 
repeal of the orders in council, alleging that the orders and 
blockades differing little, if at all, otherwise than in name, 
a repeal of the former, leaving in operation the latter, would 
be a mere illusion." To ascertain the point of time, then, 
when the blockading order of 3Iay, 1806, began to assume 
the importance which it afterwards acquired, resort must 
be had to the negotiation between General Armstrong, in 
January, 1810, on the subject of revoking the Berlin and 

28 



218 HISTORY OF THE 

Milan decrees, in which the French government were, in 
terms Uttle short of expUcit, invited to include the order of 
May, 1806, in their demand for the repeal of the British 
orders in council. And to satisfy every unprejudiced mind, 
that there was a full and thorough understanding between 
our government and that of France on this subject, the 
passage from the letter of Secretary Smith to Mr. Pink- 
ney, of the 5th of July, 1810, distinctly proves. " The 
French government," says the letter, " will draw Great 
Britain and the United States to issue on the legality of such 
blockades, by acceding to the act of Congress, with a condi- 
tion, that a repeal of the blockading orders shall accom- 
pany a repeal of the orders in council." Here, it is fore- 
told, not only that the French government will draw Great 
Britain and the United States to issue on the legality of the 
blockades, but the very terms on which that issue would be 
made are predicted — they will accede to the act of Con- 
gress, with a condition, that the repeal of the blockading 
orders shall accompany the repeal of the orders in council. 
This was precisely the course pursued by the French go- 
vernment — they did attach a condition to their nominal 
revocation of the Berlin and 3Iilan decrees, that the block- 
ading orders, meaning emphatically that of May, 1806, 
should be withdrawn also. 

From that time forward, this order made a prominent 
figure in the various correspondence and negotiations be- 
tween the United States and the British governments. 
The British government refused to consider the French 
conditional revocation of their orders, as bringing them- 
selves within the terms of a declaration that the British 
government had made, that they would proceed pari passu 
with the French government in removing their edicts 
which interfered with the rights of neutrals ; and insisted 
that the blockading order of May, 1806, did not violate 
those rights. The demand for the repeal of that or^r 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 219 

was, however, persisted in by the United States, until it was 
terminated by the uar. 

When the committee of foreign relations were engaged 
in drawing the manifesto, proceeding as the government 
did upon false principles, they felt themselves under the 
necessity of making as large a display of British aggres- 
sions as they could, introducing into the catalogue of grie- 
vances, a variety of subjects which had nothing to do with 
the causes of war. Those causes were then reduced to 
two — the orders in council, and impressment. In discus- 
sing the former, it was impossible for the committee to 
pass by the blockading order of May, 1806, as that had 
been one of the prime causes of the crisis which the affairs 
of the country had reached. To assert in the face of the 
facts which were publicly known to exist, and to which 
allusion has already been made, viz. that the order was 
declared by Mr. Fox, the British minister, to be intended 
to benefit neutrals, an opinion assented to by Mr. Monroe, 
— that it was not considered as violating our neutral rights 
in the negotiation with Mr. Erskine — and had not been 
complained of as such by our government, until the rejec- 
tion of that arrangement by the British government. It 
certainly required some dexterity to work this ground of 
complaint into the form of such a charge against the Bri- 
tish as to make it appear to the country, and the civilized 
world, as a justifiable cause of war. The passage from 
the manifesto of the committee has been already cited. But 
it is expedient to advert to it and to the subject again. 

The committee say, " In May, 1806, the whole coast 
of the continent, from the Elbe to Brest, inclusive, was de- 
clared to be in a state of blockade." This they considered 
as a violation of the law of nations, as no blockade is re- 
cognized by that law, unless it is supported by an adequate 
force. Such a force, they contend, was not applied. But 
to make such a blockade a good cause of war on the part 
of the United States, it must, in its operations, have vio- 



220 HISTORY OF THE 

lated specifically the neutral rights of our country. The 
government of the United States could never be justified 
in going to war for the purpose of vindicating mere ab- 
stract principles ; nor would the country ever have sup- 
ported such a war. The non-intercourse law was founded 
entirely upon the principle that the edicts of Great Britain 
and France violated our neutral rights. Pressed with this 
view of the subject, and conscious that the evidence of the 
facts to which allusion has been made were in the posses- 
sion of the public, the committee were constrained to say 
they thought it just " to remark that this act of the British 
government does not appear to have been adopted in the sense 
in which it has since been construed. On consideration of all 
the circumstances attending the measure, and particularly 
the character of the distinguished statesman who an- 
nounced it, we are persuaded that it ivas conceived in a spi- 
rit of conciliation, and intended to lead to an accommodation 
of all differences between the TJnited States and Great Bri- 
tain. His death disappointed that hope, and the act has 
since become subservient to other purposes. It has been 
made by his successors a pretext for that vast system of 
usurpation, which has so long oppressed and harassed our 
commerce." 

It is very much doubted, whether the history of modern 
wars can produce, in all the variety of manifestoes which 
they have given rise to, such an extraordinary cause of 
war as that abovemcntioned. Here it is acknowledged by 
the committee of foreign relations, that the blockading 
order of May, 1806, was conceived in a spirit of concilia- 
tion, and intended to lead to an accommodation of all dif- 
ferences between the United States and Great Britain ; 
but by the construction put upon it by those who succeeded 
Mr. Fox in the British ministry, it has been made the pre- 
text for the system of usurpation which has so long op- 
pressed and harassed American commerce. For nearly 
four years after the adoption of this measure, it was not, 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 221 

as far as appears, made the subject of any complaint by 
the government of the United States. The manner and 
the occasion of its being made a ground of remonstrance, 
has been stated. It was after the rejection of the Erskine 
arrangement, and upon the commencement of negotiations 
with the French government, respecting the revocation of 
the BerHn and Milan decrees. In no instance that is re- 
collected, was it complained of as having been the cause 
of positive mischief to American commerce ; but the rea- 
soning was directed aUogether to the nature of the block- 
ade, and intended to show that it was not legitimate, be- 
cause not supported by an adequate force. On this point 
the governments were at issue, and both appear to have 
depended very much upon assertion — one affirming, and 
the other denying the application of such a force. No 
evidence has been discovered, in the examination of all 
the correspondence upon the subject, that the successors of 
Mr. Fox ever put a different construction upon the mea- 
sure from that which he confessedly intended it should 
bear. The declaration, therefore, of the committee of 
foreign relations, appears to have been gratuitous, and 
without any foundation in fact. That so important and 
responsible an act as that of a declaration of war by one 
civilized and Christian power against another, should be 
placed upon such a false and unfounded basis as this, can 
only excite surprise in the mind of every lover of truth 
and justice. 

It will be recollected, that the orders in council, which 
formed one of the avowed causes of the war, were actually 
repealed by the British government within five days after 
the declaration of war. A very little delay on the part of 
the American government would have removed this 
ground of controversy, and left nothing for this country to 
contend for but freedom from impressment. The French 
emperor Iiad authorized his minister to declare to the 
American government, that the Berlin and Milan decrees 



222 HISTORY OF THE 

were revoked on the 1st of November, 1810. Upon this 
annunciation, application was made by our government to 
that of Great Britain, to follow the example set by France, 
and repeal their orders in council. This was refused on 
the part of Great Britain, on the ground that the revoca- 
tion of the French decrees was not absolute, but was con- 
ditional. This question gave rise to repeated and labour- 
ed discussions between the two governments, the Ameri- 
can negotiators maintaining with great zeal that the repeal 
was absolute, and those of Great Britain contending with 
equal pertinacity that it was conditional. It has been 
shown by extracts fronlkhe official correspondence, that 
after Mr. Barlow had AVm^d at Paris, as envoy from the 
United States, viz. in May, '1812, he pressed the French 
minister with great earnestness for an absolute revocation 
of the Berlin and Milan decrees. Such a revocation, it 
was known, would remove the only obstacle to a repeal of 
the British orders in council. On the 1st of May, 1812, 
Mr. Barlow addressed a letter to the duke of Bassano, in 
which, after adverting to the fact that the British govern- 
ment refused to repeal the orders in council, on the ground 
that the French decrees were not revoked ; he says — " It 
is much to be desired that the French government would 
now make and publish an authentic act, declaring the Ber- 
lin and Milan decrees, as relative to the United States, to 
have ceased in November, 1810." In a letter to Mr. 
Monroe, Secretary of State, dated May 12th, 1812, he 
says — " I found from a pretty sharp conversation with the 
duke of Bassano, that there tvas a singular reluctance to 
answering my note of the 1st of May. Some traces of that 
reluctance you will perceive in the answer which finally 
came, of which a copy is here enclosed." 

It is stated, that in the course of the conversation al- 
luded to, the duke produced a decree of the emperor, da- 
ted April 28th, 1811, more than a year previously, declar- 
ing the Berlin and Milan decrees definitively revoked, and to 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 223 

date from the Jst of November, 1810. This, as might have 
been expected, surprised the American minister, though he 
made no comment on the fact of its concealment. Upon 
being inquired of by Mr. Barlow, whether the decree had 
ever been published, he was informed by the duke that 
it had not ; but was assured it had been co7nmunicated to 
Mr. BarlouJ's predecessor at that court, and had been trans- 
mitted to the French minister in this country, with orders to 
have it communicated to our government. Mr. Barlow 
informed the duke, that it was not among the archives of 
the legation; and requested that he might be furnished 
with a copy ; which request was complied with. 

Upon receiving the information of this singular transac- 
tion, the French minister in this country was applied to, 
but he had no knowledge of such a decree, until he re- 
ceived the information from home, of what had occurred 
between Mr. Barlow and the duke of Bassano. Under 
these circumstances, a call for information was made in 
the House of Representatives upon the President for in- 
formation, who referred the subject to the Secretary of 
State, and whose report has already been alluded to, as 
far as it related to this subject. It fidly confirmed the 
statement made by Mr. Barlow, that nothing was known 
to the American government respecting the existence of 
such a decree, before they received the information of what 
had passed between the duke of Bassano and Mr. Barlow 
When the course which our government had pursued to- 
wards both the French and the British, is taken into con- 
sideration, it is easy to imagine that the receipt of these 
communications must have proved the source of severe 
mortification to them. The declaration of the French 
minister, that the decree of April 28th, 1811, had actually 
been passed at the time of its date, no uninterested per- 
son will for a moment believe. That it had been commu- 
nicated to Mr. Barlow's predecessor at the court of France, 
cannot be true ; and the assertion that it had been trans- 



224 HISTORY OP THE 

mitted to the French minister, is not to be credited. There 
is no room to doubt, that it was a mere pretence, got up 
for the occasion, and intended to answer a particular pur- 
pose, which will be alluded to hereafter. 

The Secretary of State, in his report on the subject, 
shows strong marks of chagrin, arising either from the 
fact that the matter had become public, or at the unfound- 
ed declaration of the French minister, that the decree had 
been passed and communicated at a period so long ante- 
cedent to its actual promulgation, in the manner as is above 
related. But instead of manifesting the proper degree of 
dignity and spirit, which such an attempt at imposition ob- 
viously demanded, the Secretary of State enters upon a 
long and laboured series of reasoning, to prove that the 
repeal of their orders in council by the British govern- 
ment, was not the result of the final revocation of the 
French decrees, but of other causes, althcugh "it was 
made the ground of their repeal" by that government. 
It is difficult to reason conclusively against facts. The 
British government had uniformly declared that the French 
decree of revocation of August, 1810, to take effect on the 
1st of November, 1810, was conditional only, and there- 
fore they refused to repeal their orders in council. That 
it would be conditional, was declared a good while before 
it took place by our government, when they predicted that 
France would draw the United States and Great Britain 
to issue on this subject, by revoking her decrees "with a 
condition, that a repeal of the blockades should accompany 
a repeal of the orders in council." That it was conditional, 
was proved by the terms of the decree. But the Ameri- 
can government insisted that it was a condition subsequent, 
and therefore formed no apology for their refusal to pro- 
ceed pari passu with the French in removing their edicts. 
But the language of the French decree of the date of 
April 28th, 1811, whenever it was passed, by necessary 
implication admits that the decree of August, 1810, was 



HARTl'ORD CONVENTION. 225 

• 

not such a revocation as the British demanded. It is there 
called a defijiUive revocation. A definite act of this kind, 
leaves room for a strong inference, that what had pre- 
viously occurred was conditional, or at least not absolute. 

The British government had resisted the demand of the 
American government, for the repeal of the orders in coun- 
cil, from August, 1810, to May, 1812, on the specific ground 
that the, French decree of revocation of the former date 
was conditional. But upon receiving official intelligence 
that France had definitively revoked her decrees, the British 
orders in council were repealed. To suppose that this act 
was produced by the apprehension that the American go- 
vernme^lt were approaching a more serious and threaten- 
ing crisis towards them, appears like a mere attempt to 
escape from an awkward and uncomfortable dilemma, into 
which our administration had plunged themselves. A 
more just and liberal spirit than that which adopted this 
construction, would have ascribed the measure to some 
more manly motive than that of fear. Great Britain had 
braved too many dangers inconceivably greater than that 
of a war with the United States, to have been alarmed by 
the threat of a war with them. 

Impressment was the second, and the only additional 
cause of war, set forth in the report of the committee on 
foreign relations. The practice of impressing American 
seamen, by the British, had been a ground of just com- 
plaint, almost from the commencement of the French 
revolutionary wars. The strong resemblance in the cha- 
racter and language of British and American seamen, 
rendered it somewhat difficult to discriminate between 
natives of the two countries. And it is not probable 
that naval officers, in a time of war, and when hostili- 
ties were sharpened by the most active and powerful 
passions that ever influence the human mind or conduct, 
would be very scrupulous in deciding the question of origin, 
where the evidence must have been in its nature doubtful, 

29 



226 HISTORY OF THE 

and in its application very difficult. Nor in such wars as 
those which raged so long, and with such virulence, be- 
tween Great Britain and France, during that memorable 
period, is it strange that less regard should be had to the 
personal or political rights of neutrals, than the latter 
would have an unquestionable right to demand. Both 
these nations considered themselves as struggling for ex- 
istence ; and of course, both acted, in a variety of exigen- 
cies, on the principle of self-preservation. Under such 
circumstances, they considered the law of nations as an 
object of secondary importance. A multitude of instances 
might be adduced in the conduct of both nations, in which 
a total disregard of the law of nations, and the rights of 
neutrals, was manifested. As soon as the evils of impress- 
ment were seriously felt by American seamen, complaints 
and remonstrances from time to time were forwarded to 
both governments, and efforts to open negotiations were 
made, for the purpose of adjusting the difficulty by treaty ; 
but all without effect. 

It will be recollected, that the treaty agreed upon with 
Great Britain, in 1806, by Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, 
was rejected by Mr. Jefferson, without ever consulting the 
Senate, professedly on the ground that it contained ncr 
stipulation against impressment. In the letter which 
accompanied the treaty, those commissioners, when giving 
the reasons why they concluded to form a treaty without 
such a provision, remark — "On the 9th instant, we re- 
ceived from the British commissioners the note which they 
had promised us in the last interview, which we have 
found to correspond in all respects with what we had been 
taught to expect." — " When we take into view all that has 
passed on this subject, we are far from considering the note 
of the British commissioners as a mere circumstance of 
form. We persuade ourselves that by accepting the invi- 
tation which it gives, and proceeding in the negotiation^ 
we shall place the business almost, if not altogether, on as 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 227 

good a footing as we should have done by treaty, had the 
project which we offered them been adopted." 

Mr. Monroe, in his letter of February, 1808, written 
after his return to this country, says — " I have always be- 
lieved, and still do believe, that the ground on which that 
interest was placed by the paper of the British commis- 
sioners of November 8, 1806, and the explanations which 
accompanied it, was both honourable and advantageous to 
the United States ; that it contained a concession in their 
favour, on the part of Great Britain, on the great principle 
in contestation, never before made by a formal and obliga- 
tory act of the government, which was highly favourable 
to their interest; and that it also imposed on her the obli- 
gation to conform her practice under it, till a more com- 
plete arrangement should be concluded, to the just claims 
of the United States." 

" By this paper it is evident that the rights of the United 
States were expressly to be reserved ; and not abandoned, 
as has been most erroneously supposed ; that the nego- 
tiation on the subject of impressment was to be postponed 
for a limited time, and for a special object only, and to be 
revived as soon as that object was accomplished ; and in 
the interim, that the practice of impressment was to cor- 
respond essentially with the views and interests of the 
United States." 

By the rejection of this treaty, this difficult and irri- 
tating subject was left open to all the abuses to which it 
was unfortunately liable. The consequence was, that com- 
plaints of impressment continued, until the subject became 
the ground of open war with Great Britain. Indeed, within 
a few days after the declaration of war, it became, by the 
repeal of the orders in council, the only existing cause of 
war. That war, in the course of two years and a half, 
cost the United States from thirty to fifty thousand lives, 
and more than a hundred millions of dollars ; and when 
peace was determined upon, a treaty was made, and rati- 



228 * HISTORY OF THE 

fied, not only without any provision against impressment^ 
but without its containino^ the slio^htest allusion to that 
subject. The treaty of Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney was 
accompanied by the note, or paper, above referred to, in 
which the British commissioners made the declarations 
already cited, and agreed to postpone the subject of im- 
pressment for a limited time, after which it was to be 
revived. It is remarkable, that in the last letter of in- 
structions but one to the American commissioners who 
negotiated the treaty of peace in 1814, they were expressly 
instructed, if the British commissioners would not agree to 
a provision against it in the treaty, to stipulate that it 
should be postponed to a future opportunity ; thus bringing 
our government back, after all its correspondence, and its 
multiplied attempts at negotiation, its complaints, remon- 
strances, and threats, and its immense expense of blood 
and treasure, to the precise position in which they stood 
when Mr. Jefferson rejected Messrs. Monroe and Pink- 
ney's treaty in 1808. But that position was far more 
humiliating to the United States, than the ground they 
held at the period just mentioned. War had been waged 
to obtain security against impressment, and they had been 
reduced to the necessity, after a controversy of two years 
and a half duration for that sole object, to make a peace 
without obtaining the smallest degree of that security. 

This review of the policy and measures of the United 
States government, during the administrations of Mr. Jef- 
ferson and Mr. Madison, has been undertaken for the pur- 
pose of establishing the principal proposition advanced in 
the early part of this work, viz. That an ardent and over- 
weening attachment to revolutionary/ France, and an impla- 
cable enmity to Great Britain, were the governing jmnci- 
ples of those two distinguished i^idividuals. That their con- 
duct at the head of the government was influenced and 
controlled by feelings of this description, will be admitted 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 229 

by all who consider the evidence adduced as sufficient to 
prove the truth of the pro|)osition. 

In the case of Mr. Jefferson, his own declarations con- 
tained in his posthumous works, have been cited in sup- 
port of the proposition. The evidence itself cannot be 
contradicted or impeached. Whether it proves the point 
or n-ot, the reader will determine for himself, upon care- 
fully examining its weight and import. • But much addi- 
ional proof is to be found in the public state papers of his 
administration. His report to Congress, just before he 
resigned the office of Secretary of State, in 1793, laid the 
foundation of the commercial resolutions, introduced to 
the House of Representatives of the United States, by Mr. 
Madison, then a member of that body, and afterwards his 
successor to the chief magistracy of the Union. Those 
resolutions were avowedly designed to detach the United 
States from their commercial relations with Great Britain, 
and transfer their foreign trade to France. 

An attempt has been made to show, by an appeal to 
historical evidence, that it was a part of Mr. Jefferson's 
policy, for the purpose of influencing public feeling, and 
directing public opinion, to retain at all times some matter 
of dispute or controversy with Great Britain on hand, 
which might keep the feelings of the government and peo- 
ple of both countries in a state of fretfulness and irritation. 
When the treaty of 1794 was negotiated by Mr. Jay, Mr. 
Jefferson, though out of office, was decidedly opposed to 
its ratification. And when he found it had received the 
approbation of the Senate, and the final sanction of the 
Executive, he wished its execution might be defeated in 
the House of Representatives, though such a result would 
most obviously have involved the exercise of an unconsti- 
tutional power- 
That treaty expired soon after he came into the ad mi 
nistration of the government ; but though the British go- 
vernment repeatedly offered to renew it, he instructed his 



230 HISTORY OF TPIE 

S 

minister at that court to decline the offer ; thus choosing 
to leave the important subject of the trade to the British 
colonies open, and exposed to all the bickering and con- 
troversy which must naturally grow out of such an unset- 
tled state of things. 

The Convention for establishing the boundary line be- 
tween the United States and the British territories adjoin- 
ing them, which was negotiated and concluded by Mr. 
King, in the year 1803, was not ratified, leaving unsettled 
a dispute which has never been adjusted to this day. 

In 1S07, Mr. Rose was sent by the British government 
to this country, to make reparation for the injury we had 
received by the attack on the frigate Chesapeake ; his in- 
structions confined his negotiations to that subject alone, 
and this was well known to our government ; but when, after 
a fruitless attempt to induce him to transcend his powers, 
by discussing other subjects of dispute, the negotiation 
was broken off, and the controversy left unadjusted. 

When Mr. Jackson came as envoy from Great Britain, 
our cabinet very soon satisfied themselves that he was too 
experienced and adroit a diplomatist to be overreached or 
circumvented, and they accused him of insulting our go- 
vernment, and he was dismissed, though authorized to 
adjust the affair of the frigate Chesapeake. 

In 1811, four years after that affair had happened, the 
offer to renew the negotiations on that subject was made ; 
and finally, though with a very ill grace, and in a very un- 
dignified manner, our government accepted the same terms 
of reparation which they might have received from Mr. 
Rose if they had not broken off the negotiation with him. 
It is believed that this is the only controversy of any mo- 
ment that was ever settled with Great Britain during the 
administrations of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison. 

In December, 1807, Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney con- 
cluded a treaty with Great Britain, on all the points in 
dispute between the countries, except that of impressment, 



HARTFORD CONVENTION- 231 

and an informal understanding was agreed to on that sub- 
ject. This treaty was rejected, without even submitting it 
to the consideration of the Senate ; thereby throwing open 
for controversy all the questions between the governments, 
professedly because one was left unadjusted ; — and that 
one remains unadjusted to this day. 

The arrangement with Mr. Erskine was made under 
circumstances which furnish room for very strong suspi- 
cions, at least, that its ratification by Great Britain was 
not expected by our government. If our government were 
not acquainted with the nature and extent of Mr. Erskine's 
instructions, they were chargeable with gross negligence 
of duty in not previously obtaining the necessary informa- 
tion. If they were acquainted with them, they are justly 
liable to a charge of a much more heinous character. 

The "restrictive system," as it was called — that is, the 
system of embargo and non-intercourse — was obviously 
adopted in pursuance of the general policy of Bonaparte, 
and for the purpose of furthering his views of hostility 
agains4; Great Britain. It was necessarily calculated to 
injure the trade of Great Britain, without materially af- 
fecting that of France, as the latter was scarcely able to 
keep even a merchant vessel afloat on the ocean. The 
evidence in support of this general allegation against our 
government, is derived from many sources, but most spe- 
cifically from Mr. Jefferson's letter to Mr. Livingston, 
which has been quoted. 

It will be necessary to extend this recapitulation some- 
what further — 

Upon the failure of Erskine's arrangement, our govern- 
ment, as has been seen, immediately turned their attention 
towards the adjustment of their difficulties with France. 
By a series of servile and humiliating conduct towards 
the haughty and imperious ruler of that nation, they be- 
came involved in his unprincipled policy, and were sub- 
jected to his influence and controul. This is abundantly 



232 HISTORY OF THE 

proved by the public documents which have been cited. 
In the year 1811, when it was well known that Bonaparte 
was making preparations upon the most extensive scale to 
invade the Russian dominions, for the purpose of forcing 
the emperor Alexander to submit to such terms as the for- 
mer should prescribe, or to hurl him from his throne, the 
measures of our government began to assume a warlike 
appearance ; and advancing step by step, with the lapse of 
time and the progress of events, nearly at the same mo- 
ment when the French army commenced its march for the 
north, the United States declared war against Great Bri- 
tain. That the course pursued by our government was 
intended to operate as a diversion in favour of France, by 
dividing the British forces, and in some measure distract- 
ing the attention of their government from the great thea- 
tre of war in Europe, is too apparent to be questioned by 
any person possessed of a frank and independent mind. 
It might have been considered as a good political manoeu- 
vre, had it been certain that Bonaparte would succeed in 
his enterprise. But he failed ; and the consequences were 
soon seen in the change of tone assumed by our govern 
ment. It is true, they endeavoured to hold out to the 
country the appearance of courage and confidence concern- 
ing the result of the war; but the secret history of the 
times shows that they were greatly alarmed at their situ- 
ation, surrounded as it was with difficulties and dangers, 
and their conduct was obviously influenced less by courage 
than it was by despair; and hence alone can it be account- 
ed for, that they so suddenly and so essentially changed 
their tone in the instructions given to their commissioners, 
who were endeavouring to negotiate for peace, and in- 
structed them to give up all that the war was professedly 
made for, and to take up with a simple peace, if that could 
be obtained. 

Coupled with these remarks, by way of recapitulation, 
the attempt to excite the angry passions and resentments 



HARTFORD COWVENTION. 233 

of the country, by the disclosure of the aff'air of John 
Henry, should not be lost sight of. It was, indeed, a mere 
episode in the principal work, having no connection with 
the grievances of which our government complained, and 
was not even named in the government manifesto as one 
of the causes of war. It was, however, eagerly seized 
hold of by the administration as a part of the machinery 
which was used for the purpose of producing an effect up- 
on the public mind — for that purpose it was set in motion, 
and after suffering themselves to be grossly duped and 
swindled by a couple of sharpers out of fifty thousand dol- 
lars, the whole plot, and its actors, were suffered to die 
away, and be forgotten ; or remembered only to excite 
feelings of contempt and disgust for the policy and objects 
of those by whom the farce was prepared for public exhi- 
bition. 

Such is a brief history of the origin and causes of the war 
of 1812. The evidence on which it rests is derived from 
\ the public documents of the government — from state pa- 
pers published by their authority, and from other sources 
equally creditable. Its authenticity, therefore, cannot be 
doubted ; and the only question that can be raised is, whe- 
ther it is sufficient to establish the point for which it is ad- 
duced. On this subject, if the author is not greatly de- 
ceived, there will be little room for dispute. The chain of 
evidence is, in his opinion, entire, its credit unimpeachable, 
and its force irresistible. 

The next object to which the attention of the reader 
will be turned is the manner in which the operations of the 
war were conducted. 

On the 10th of April, 1812, a little more than two 
months before the formal declaration of war, but after it 
was perfectly obvious that such a measure was determined 
upon. Congress passed an act, of which the following are 
extracts — 

" I. Be it enacted, &fc. That the President of the 

30 



234E HISTORY OF THE 

United States be, and he is hereby authorised to require of 
the executives of the several states and territories, to take 
effectual measures to organize, arm, and equip, according 
to law, and hold in readiness to march at a moment's 
warning, their respective proportions of one hundred thou- 
sand militia, officers included, to be apportioned by the 
President of the United States, from the latest militia re- 
turns in the department of war ; and, in cases where such 
returns have not been made, by such other data as he shall 
judge equitable. 

" II. That the department of militia aforesaid shall be 
officered out of the present militia officers, or others, at the 
option and discretion of the constitutional authority in the 
respective states and territories ; the President of the 
United States apportioning the general officers among the 
respective states and territories, as he may deem proper. 

'• IV. That the President of the United States be, and 
he hereby is, authorized to call into actual service any part, 
or the whole, of said detachment, in all the exigencies 
provided by the constitution." 

On the 15th of April, 1812, the Secretary of War wrote 
to the Governor of Connecticut, and it is to be presumed 
to the governors of the other states, as follows — 

" War Department, 15th April, 1812. 

"HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF 

CONNECTICUT. 

" Sir — I am instructed by the President of the United 
States, to call upon the executives of the several states to 
take effectual measures to organize, arm and equip ac- 
cording to law, and hold in readiness to march at a mo- 
ment's warning, their respective proportions of one hun- 
dred thousand militia, officers included, by virtue of an act 
of Congress, passed the 10th inst. entitled, * an act to 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 235 

authorize a detachment from the militia of the United 
States.' " 

" This therefore is to require your excellency to take 
effectual measures for having three thousand of the mili- 
tia of Connecticut (being her quota) detached and duly 
organized in companies, battalions, regiments, brigades 
and divisions, within the shortest period that circumstances 
will permit, and as nearly as possible in the following pro- 
portions of artillery, cavalry and infantry, viz. one twen- 
tieth part of artillery ; one twentieth part of cavalry; and 
the residue infantry. There will, however, be no objectioir 
on the part of the President of the United States, to the ad- 
mission of a proportion of riflemen, duly organized in a dis- 
tinct corps, and not exceeding one tenth part of the whole 
quota of the states respectively. Each corps shall be pro- 
perly armed and equipped for actual service. 

" When the detachment and organization shall have 
been effected, the respective corps will be exercised under 
the officers set over them ; but will not remain embodied, 
or be considered as in actual service, until by subsequent 
orders they shall be directed to take the field. 

" Your excellency will please to direct that correct 
muster rolls and inspection returns be made of the several 
€orps, and that copies thereof be transmitted to this depart- 
ment as early as possible. 

" I have the honor to be, 

" Sir, very respectfully, 

" Your obedient servant, 

'* William Eustis." 

Immediately after the declaration of war was passed, 
the members of the House of Representatives of the 
United States, who were in the minority on that question, 
published an address on that subject to their constituents. 
In that document, which is drawn up with much force of 
reasoning and talent, the following is given as the principal 



236 HISTORY OF TTfF 

reason for adopting that mode of communicating their sen- 
timents to those to whom they were addressed — 

" The momentous question of war with Great Britain is 
decided. On this topic, so vital to your interests, the right 
of public debate, in the face of the world, and especially of 
their constituents, has been denied to your representatives. 
They have been called into secret session on this most in- 
teresting of all your public relations, although the circum- 
stances of the time and of the nation afforded no one 
reason for secrecy, unless it be found in the apprehension 
of the effect of public debate on public opinion ; or of 
public opinion on the result of the vote. 

" Except the message of the President of the United 
States, which is now before the public, nothing confiden- 
tial was communicated. That message contained no fact 
not previously known. No one reason for war was inti- 
mated, but such as was of a nature public and notorious. 
The intention to wage war and invade Canada, had been 
long since openly avowed. The object of hostile menace 
had been ostentatiously announced. The inadequacy of 
both our army and navy for successful invasion, and the 
insufficiency of the fortifications for the security of our sea- 
board, were every where known. Yet the doors of Con- 
gress were shut upon tH% people. They have been care- 
fully kept in ignorance of the progress of measures, until 
the purposes of the administration were consummated, and 
the fate of the country sealed. In a situation so extraor- 
dinary, the undersigned have deemed it their duty by no 
act of their.'i to sanction a proceeding so novel and arbi- 
trary. On the contrary, tliey made every attempt, in 
their power, to attain publicity for their proceedings. All 
such attempts were vain. When this momentous subject 
was stated, as for debate, they demanded that the doors 
should be opened. 

'* This being refused, they declined discussion ; being 
perfectly convinced, from indications too plain to be mis- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 237 

understood, that in the house, all argument with closed 
doors was hopeless ; and that any act giving implied vali- 
dity to so flagrant an abuse of power, would be little less 
than treachery to the essential rights of a free people." 

The allusion to the unprepared condition of the country 
and government for a war, and especially with Great Bri- 
tain, in the abovementioned address, was perfectly well 
founded. Great Britain, at that time, had absolute domi- 
nion over the ocean. No other power in Europe was in a 
situation to annoy our commerce or invade our country. 
We had a sea-coast of about two thousand miles extent 
exposed to hostile visits, and of course to depredations, 
from a maritime enemy; our principal sea-ports and har- 
bours were in a great measure unprotected ; vve had a 
small standing army, scattered in many directions, and 
over a vast extent of country, and of course incapable of 
being brought to act with efficiency upon any specific point 
and a small navy ; we were to a great degree unprovided 
with the ordinary materials of offensive war, and particu- 
larly with the indispensable ingredient of money. No part 
of the country was more open and exposed to the visits and 
depredations of an enemy, than the territory bordering 
upon the New England coast. The fortifications were 
hardly entitled to the name; and the garrisons employed 
in them were merely nominal, and so few in numbers, as 
to be incapable of resisting any serious attack from a well 
disciplined and well provided enemy. In such a state of 
things, letters of the following import were addressed by 
the Secretary of War to the governors of Massachusetts 
and Connecticut 

" War Department, June 12, 1812. 

" Sir — I am directed by the President to request your 
excellency to order into the service of the United States, 
on the requisition of Major General Dearborn, such part 



238 HISTORY OF THE 

of the quota of militia from the state of Massachusetts, 
detached conformably to the act of April 10, 1812, as he 
may deem necessary for the defence of the sea-coast. 
"With great respect, I have the honor to be 
"Your excellency's obedient servant, 

" W. EUSTIS." 

To the foregoing letter. Governor Griswold of Con- 
necticut returned the following answer — 

" Lyme, 11 th June, 1812. 

"THE HONOURABLE THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 

" Sir— I had the honour, this afternoon, to receive your 
letter of the 12th instant, communicating to me the re- 
quest of the President, that I would order into the service 
of the United States, on the requisition of Major General 
Dearborn, such part of the quota of militia from the state 
of Connecticut, detached conformably to the act of Con- 
gress of April 10th, 1812, as he may deem necessary for 
the defence of the sea-coast. 

"In obedience to which request, I shall, on the requisi- 
tion of General Dearborn, execute without delay the 
request of the President. 

" With great respect, I have the honour to be 
" Your obedient servant, 

"Roger Griswold." 

On the 22d of June, General Dearborn addressed the 
following letter to Governor Strong of Massachusetts — 

" Head Quarters, Boston, June 22d, 1812. 

"TO HIS EXCELLENCY CALEB STRONG. 

" Sir — I have received instructions from the President 
of the United States, to call on your Excellency for such 



UARTFORD COMVENTlOiN. 239 

part of the quota of the militia of Massachusetts, which 
was detached conformably to the act of Congress of April 
10, 1812, as I may deem necessary for the defence of the 
sea-coast : and I have now the honour of requesting your 
Excellency to order fourteen companies of artillery, and 
twenty-seven companies of infantry into the service of the 
United States, for the defence of the ports and harbours of 
this state, and the harbour of Newport in the state of Rhode- 
Island. The companies are intended for the following 
ports and harbours in the following proportions. For Pas- 
samaquoddy one company of artillery and two companies 
of infantry, to be commanded by a major. For Machias 
one company of artillery. For Castine one company of 
artillery and two companies of infantry, to be commanded 
by a major. For Damariscotta and Wiscasset two com- 
panies of artillery. For Kennebunk one company of ar- 
tillery. For Portland two companies of artillery and two 
companies of infantry, to be commanded by a major. For 
Marblehead, Salem, Cape Ann, and Newburyport, two 
companies of artillery and two companies of infantry. 
For Boston, four companies of artillery and eight compa- 
nies of infantry, with a lieutenant-colonel and one major. 
For the defence of Rhode-Island eight companies of infan- 
try, with a lieutenant-colonel and one major. 

" Having received official information that war has been 
declared by Congress against Great Britain, your Excel- 
lency will perceive the expediency of giving facility to 
such measures of defence as the crisis demands ; and as the 
defence of the sea-coast of New-England is by the general 
government confided to my direction, I shall with confi- 
dence rely on all the aid and support that the respective 
governors of the New-England states can afford ; and in a 
special manner on that of the Commander-in-Chief of the 
important state of Massachusetts. And I shall at all times 
receive with the greatest pleasure and readiness any ad- 



240 HISTORY OF THE 

Vice or information that your Excellency may be pleased to 
communicate. 

** With respectful consideration, I am, <fcc. 

" H. Dearborn." 

The following letter of the same date, was addressed to 
Governor Griswold of Connecticut — 

" Head Quarters, Boston, June 22, 1812. 

•' TO HIS EXCELLENCY ROGER GRISWOLD. 



" Sir — Having received instructions from the President 
of the United States, to call on your excellency for such 
part of the quota of the militia, which was detached from the 
state of Connecticut, conformably to the act of Congress, 
of April the 10th, 1812, as I may deem necessary for the 
defence of the sea-coast ; I have now the honor of request- 
ing your Excellency to order into the service of the United 
States, two companies of artillery, and two companies of 
infantry, to he placed under the command of the commanding 
officer at Fort Trnmhidl, near Neir-London ; and one com- 
pany of artillery, to be stationed at the battery, at the en- 
trance of the harbour of New-Haven. Having received 
official information thatwar has been declared by Congress 
against Great Britain, I shall rely with confidence on the 
aid and support of your Excellency, in giving effect to 
measures of defence on the sea-coast, which has been con- 
fided to my direction by the general government; and I 
shall, at any time, receive with the greatest pleasure and 
readiness, any advice or information you may please to 
communicate. 

" With great respect I have the honour to be, 
" Your Excellency's most obedient servant, 

" H. Dearborn, Major- General.*' 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 241 

By the letter to the governor of Massachusetts, a requi- 
sition was made for forty-one companies — fourteen of ar- 
tillery, and twenty-seven of infantry. They were ordered 
to different places, in that state, and in Rhode-Island. 
Two lieutenant-colonels were called for from the militia ; 
but no officer of a higher grade. The order to the gover- 
nor of Connecticut was for five companies — two of artille- 
ry and three of infantry, but no officers of any description 
were included in the call. On the contrarv, four of the 
companies were expressly directed " to be placed under 
the command of the commanding officer at Fort Trumbull, 
near New-London," who was an officer of the United 
States army, of the rank of captain, and the other at the 
battery at the entrance of New-Haven harbour, where 
there was a United States officer stationed. 

The governor of Massachusetts did not consider the 
call made by the President of the United States, through 
General Dearborn, as warranted by the constitution, and 
therefore did not detach the men agreeably to his requisi- 
tion. The general reasons by which he was influenced, 
are contained in the following extract from the speech de- 
livered by him to the legislature of the state, who were 
convened in October, 1812, for the purpose of deliberating 
on the events which had recently occurred — 

"The Constitution of the United States declares, that 
* Congress may provide for calling forth the militia to exe- 
cute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and 
repel invasions,' and the act of Congress of April 10th, 
1812, authorising a detachment of 100,000 of the militia, 
empowers the President to ' call into actual service any 
part, or the whole of said detachment, in all the exigen- 
cies provided by the constitution.' From these clauses in 
the constitution and the law of April 10th, the President 
derives his authority to call the militia of the states into 
actual service ; and except in the exigencies abovemen- 
tioned, he can have no authority by the constitution to do 

31 



242 HISTORY OF THE 

ii. But there was no suggestion, either in the letter tVoir* 
the War Department, above referred to, or in those from 
General Dearborn, that this state or Rhode-Island was in- 
vaded, or in imminent danger of invasion ; or that either 
of the exigencies recognised by the constitutional laws of 
the United States existed. If such declaration could have 
been made with truth, it would undoubtedly have been 
made. 

" General Dearborn plainly supposed, that in conse- 
quence of the act declaring war, he was authorized by 
virtue of the power given him by the President, to require 
any part or the whole of our detached militia to be called 
out and marched to such places in this and the other states 
as he might think proper. If this construction of the con- 
stitution is correct, the President and Congress will be 
able at any time, by declaring war, to call the whole mili- 
tia of the United States into actual service, to march them 
to such places as they may think fit, and retain them in 
service as long as the war shall continue. It is declared 
indeed by the aforesaid act of April 10th, that*he said de- 
tachment shall not be compelled to serve a ' longer time 
than six months after they aiiive at the place of rendez- 
vous.' But if the mere act of declaring war gives a right 
to the national government to call the militia into service, 
and detain them six months, it must give a right to detain 
them six years, if the war continues so long ; and the na- 
tional government has the same authority to call out the 
whole, as a part of the militia." 

"Although many of the most important attributes of 
sovereignty are given by the constitution to the government 
of the United States, yet there are some which still belong 
to the state governments ; of these, one of the most essen- 
tial is the entire control of the militia, except in the exi- 
gencies above mentioned ; this has not been delegated to 
the United States — it is therefore reserved to the states 
respectively ; and whenever it shall be taken from them. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 243 

and a consolidation of the military force of the states shall 
be effected, the security of the state governments will be 
lost, and they will wholly depend for their existence upon 
the moderation and forbearance of the national govern- 
ment. 

"I have been fully di?posed to comply with the require- 
ments of the conslitutitn of the United States and the 
laws made in pursuance of it, and sincerely regretted that 
any request should be made by an officer of the national 
government to which I could not constitutionally conform. 
But it appeared to me that the requisition aforesaid was 
of that character; and I was under the same obligation to 
maintain the rights of the state, as to support the constitu- 
tion of the United States. If the demand was not war- 
ranted by the constitution, I should have violated my duty 
in a most important point, if I had attempted to enforce 
it, and had thereby assisted in withdrawing the militia 
from the rightful authority of the state. Besides, if the 
measure was not required by the constitution, it would 
have been oppressive, as the militia must have been called 
from their occupations to places remote from their homes, 
and detained in the service during the busy season of the 
year." 

The governor of Connecticut, upon receiving General 
Dearborn's letter of June 22d, in pursuance of the prac- 
tice upon extraordinary occasions in that state, immedi- 
ately convened the Council, and submitted the correspon- 
dence, and the whole subject, to their consideration, for 
their opinion and advice, in the following message — 

"Gentlemen of the council, — The agitation which 
has been produced by the late measures of Congress, un- 
doubtedly requires great caution in every step which may 
be taken by the government of this state. And it would 
afford me particular satisfaction, if the Council would at 
this meeting, direct their attention to this novel situation 



244 HISTORY OF THE 

of our affairs, and communicate to me their advice re- 
specting the general course which it is proper for the Ex- 
ecutive to pursue, under those emergencies which may 
probably arise. But the particular object for which I have 
thought it my duty to convene you at this time, is to request 
your advice respecting the course which it is proper to take 
with a requisition of the national government, communi- 
cated through the medium of General Dearborn, for de- 
taching five companies of the drafted militia, for the de- 
fence of New-London and New-Haven. 

" The order for detaching three thousand men, being 
the quota of this state under the act of Congress of the 
10th of April, was received and immediately executed. 
Since which I received a letter from the Secretary of War. 
communicating a request from the President, that as many 
of the detached troops as General Dearborn should re- 
quire for the defence of the sea-coast might be ordered 
into the service of the United States. General Dearborn 
has now made his requisition, and requested four compa- 
nies to march for New-London, and one for New-Haven, 
and to be placed under the command of the officers com- 
manding at those posts. 

" My answer to the second letter from the Secretary of 
War was necessarily expressed in general terms that the 
request of the President should be executed, as I had no 
right to presume that any thing would be required which 
was not warranted by the Constitution and the law. The 
demand however, now made, presents several important 
considerations. It becomes a question whether the militia 
can be constitutionally and legally demanded until one of 
the contingencies enumerated in the Constitution shall have 
arisen. And whether a requisition, to place any portion 
of the militia under the command of a continental officer, 
can be executed. Other questions, especially important, 
may arise from the same subject. 

" Relying, gentlemen, on your advice in this emergency 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 245 

I have to request your serious and deliberate attention to 
every point connected with it. 

"Roger Griswold. 

" Harlfonh June 29, 1 8 1 2." 

The body of men who composed the Council of Con- 
necticut, formed one of the houses of the legislature of that 
state, and consisted of the lieutenant-governor, and twelve 
assistants. They took the matter into their consideration, 
and after due deliberation, came to the following result — 

" At a meeting of the governor and council of the state of Connecti- 
cut, at Hartford, on the 29th of June, A. D. 1812. 

'< His excellency the governor has requested of this 
board advice respecting the course which it is proper 
to take on a requisition of the national government, com- 
ymunicated through the medium of General Dearborn, for 
detaching five companies of the militia, drafted under the 
act of Congress of the 10th of April last, for the defence 
of New-London and New-Haven. The order for this draft 
of three thousand men was received, and immediately 
executed. On the 12th of instant June, the Secretary of 
War requested of the Governor that as many of the militia 
thus drafted as General Dearborn should require for the 
defence of the sea-coast, should be ordered into the service 
of the United States. Presuming that nothing would be 
required which was not warranted by the constitution and 
the law, assurance was given of a compliance with this 
request. The council entirely approve of the promptitude 
with which the Governor has thus manifested his readiness 
to comply with all legal and constitutional requisitions, a 
promptitude always shown by the Government of Con- 
necticut. 

" General Dearborn now requests that four companies 
of the militia drafted as stated, be detached for the fort at 
New-London, and one company for the fort at New- 
Haven, to be put under the command of the officers of the army 



246 HISTORY OF THE 

of the United States, stationed at those posts. His excel- 
lency the Governor has requested the ' serious and deli- 
berate attention ' of this board to the following questions, 
arising out of the requisition of General Dearborn, — 'Can 
the militia be legally and constitutionally demanded until 
one of the contingencies enumerated in the constitution 
shall have arisen ? And can a requisition, to place any 
portion of the militia under the command of a continental 
officer, be executed ? The council, impressed with the 
great importance of these questions, have seriously and 
deliberately examined them, and in compliance with the 
request of the Governor, now present to him the result of 
their deliberations. 

"The constitution of the United States has wisely or- 
dained that Congress may provide for calling forth the 
militia to execute the laivs of the Union, siqipress insurrec- 
tions, and repel invasions. The acts of Congress of Fe- 
bruary, 1795, and of April, 1812, in strict pursuance of the 
constitution, provide for calling forth the militia into the 
actual service, in the exigencies above named. 

" This board is not informed that the requisition of Ge- 
neral Dearborn, said to be in pursuance of that of the 
Secretary of War of the 12th of instant June, is grounded 
on a declaration made by the President of the United 
States, or notice by him given, that the militia are required 
to execute the laivs of the Union, suppress insurrections, or 
repel invasions, or that the United States are in imminent 
danger of invasion. As none of the exigencies recognized 
by the constitution and laws of the United States are 
shown to exist, this board deem his excellency the Go- 
vernor to be, of right, the commander in chief of the 
militia of this state, and that they cannot thus be with- 
drawn from his authority. 

" The council to the second inquiry observe, that the 
constitution of the United States provides that the ap- 
pointment of the officers of the militia shall be reserved 



HARTFORD C0NVENT10^. 247 

to the states respectively. In the event of their being 
called forth into the actual service of the United States, in 
any of the exigencies specified, the laws of the United 
States provide, that they are to be called forth as a 
militia, furnished with officers by the state. The militia 
organized under.the act of the 10th of April, from which 
the detachment in question is required, have been regu- 
larly, and in conformity to law, formed into a division, 
consisfnig of brigades, regiments, battalions, and com- 
panies. The requisition of General Dearborn is, that 
five companies, which constitute a battalion, be detached, 
four of which are required for the fort at New-Lon- 
don, and one for the fort at New-Haven, to he put under 
the command of the officers there stationed. The council 
do not perceive in the constitution or laws of the United 
States, any warrant for thus taking from the officers 
duly appointed by the state, the men under their con- 
troul, and thus impairing, and as the case may be, even- 
tually destroying the military force of the state. Nor do 
they perceive any law authorizing the officers of the army 
of the United States to detach from a body of drafted 
militia, now organized with constitutional officers, a por- 
tion of its men, and thus weaken and, as the case may 
be, annihilate the detachment. They do perceive, how- 
ever, that a compliance with such a requisition might 
transfer the militia of the respective states into the army 
of the United States, and that thus the officers of the mili- 
tia might be left without any command, except in name, 
and that the respective states might thus be deprived of 
the militia which the constitution has granted to them. In 
this view of this interesting subject, the council advise his 
excellency the governor not to comply with the requisition 
of General Dearborn. 

"In view of this result, made from a conviction that it 
is just and conformable to the constitution, the Council 
feel entirely disposed to give ample assurance that this 



248 HISTORY OF THE 

state will ever support the national government in all con- 
stitutional measures, and presume that in case of invasion, 
or imminent danger of invasion, the governor ^viil deem 
it expedient to make such provision for the protection of 
the sea-coast by the militia of the state, in co-operation 
with the military force of the United Stajes, as the public 
exigency may require, and as is warranted by law. 

"In regard to other matters in the governor's commu- 
nication, the Council forbear to remark particularly, rely- 
ing with perfect confidence on the wisdom of his Excel- 
lency, to pursue such a course, in any emergencies which 
may arise, as becomes the chief magistrate of a free and 
enlightened people, and imploring the blessings of the God 
of our fathers for protection in the midst of the calami- 
ties of war. 

" Passed in the Council^ 
June 29th, 1812. 

"Thomas Day, Secretary.'" 

The call upon the governor of Massachusetts, it has 
been seen, was for forty-one companies. These compa- 
nies, upon the most moderate estimate of their numbers, 
must have contained between three and four thousand 
men, including officers, non-commissioned officers, musi- 
cians, &.C. ; and of course they would have formed a divi- 
sion, and would have had a legal right to be commanded 
by a major-general. Instead of which, the highest officer 
named in the order was a lieutenant-colonel. The order 
to the governor of Connecticut was more explicit. It re- 
quired five companies, which would form a battalion, and 
be entitled to a major's command. Instead of which, no 
officer of any rank or description is named or called for, 
but four of the companies were directed to be placed im- 
mediately under the command of the United States officer 
commanding at Fort Trumbull, near New-London, and 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 249 

the fifth under the United States officer of the garrison at 
New-Haven. 

In both cases, the orders were not warranted by the con- 
stitution of the United States. The reasoning on the na- 
ture and objects of the requisition, in the foregoing result 
of the dehberations of the Council of Connecticut, is con- 
clusive. And the principle for which they contended, is 
one of the most interesting description to the safety of the 
militia, and the rights and security of the individual states. 
By the constitution of the United States, Congress have 
power to call forth the militia of the states only in three 
emergencies, viz. "To execute the laws of the union, sup- 
press insurrections, and repel invasions." But to guard 
against any possible mischief that might arise, either to 
the several states, when thus temporarily deprived of their 
natural protectors, or to that portion of the inhabitants 
who compose the militia, it was provided in the constitution, 
that Congress should have power "To provide for orga- 
nizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for govern- 
ing such parts of them as may be employed in the service 
of the United States, reserving to the states respectively the 
appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the 
militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." 
This provision is not o»ly plain and explicit, but in the 
highest degree important to the militia, and to the states 
to which they belong. If when called into the service of 
the United States, they were to be taken from the super- 
intendence of their own officers, and placed under the 
command of United States officers, they would, to all in- 
tents and purposes, become incorporated into the standing 
army of the nation, be shut up in garrisons, be commanded 
by officers of the standing army, and be subject to the 
same government with the standing army — or in other 
words, to that 'severe and sanguinary code, the " Rules 
and Articles of War." By those rules and articles it is pro- 
vided, — that " All officers serving by commission from the 

32 



250 HISTORY OF THE 

authority of any particular state, shall on all detachments, 
courts-martial, or other duty, wherein they may be em- 
ployed in conjunction with the regular forces of the United 
States, take rank next after all officers of the like grade 
in said regular forces, notwithstanding the commissions of 
such militia or state officers may be older than the com- 
missions of the officers of the regular forces of the United 
States." From this provision, it is apparent, that it was 
intended, by the order of General Dearborn, to put the 
militia of Connecticut into the United States forts at New- 
London and New-Haven, under the immediate command 
of United States officers, to perform garrison duty, in the 
same manner as if they had been regularly enlisted into 
the standing army of the United States. No proposition 
can be more plain than this, — that if this project had suc- 
ceeded, an unquestionable and most important provision 
of the constitution would have been violated, and the rights 
of the militia, in an equal degree, not have been merely 
infringed, but sacrificed. 

The consequences of such an attempt on the part of the 
national government, had it been carried into effect, may 
perhaps be considered at the present time with a greater 
degree of coolness and deliberation, than could have been 
expected when the country was under the agitation and 
excitement which a state of war naturally produces, and 
which party feelings and passions are well calculated great- 
ly to increase and extend. If the New-England states 
had given up their militia, at the requisition of the Presi- 
dent of the United States, and in a total disregard of the 
federal constitution, a precedent would have been establish- 
ed that might, and, one day or other, in all probability 
would, have proved fatal to the liberties of the country. 
By the act of Congress of April 10th above alluded to, the 
President was authorized, at his own discretion, to call 
into the public service one hundred thousand militia. lie 
was constituted the sole judge of the time when they should 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 251 

be ordered into the field, and of the numbers that should 
be called for on any given occasion. By depriving them 
of their constitutional right to be commanded by their own 
officers, and placing them under that of officers of the re- 
gular army, they might be pent up in garrisons, or sent to 
any distant point of military operations which the Presi- 
dent himself, or Major-Gencral Dearborn should think 
proper to designate. In this way, the several states would 
have been stripped of their natural and constitutional de- 
fenders, and left exposed to all the variety of evils which 
such a condition necessarily presupposes, while the mihtia 
themselves would have been subjected to all the hardships 
and degradation which are always experienced in standing 
armies. 

Nor was this all. By the rules and articles of war it is 
provided, that — " The officers and soldiers of any troops, 
whether militia or others, being mustered and in pay of 
the United States, shall, at all times, and in all places, 
when joined, or acting in conjunction with the regular 
forces of the United States, be governed by these rules and 
articles of war, and shall be subject to be tried by courts 
martial, in like manner with the officers and soldiers in 
the regular forces, save only ihat such courts martial shall 
he composed entirely of militia officers.''^ By omitting in the 
order issued by General Dearborn to the Governor of Con- 
necticut, to include officers, and placing the men under the 
exclusive command of United States officers, the impor- 
tant provision above recited from the rules and articles of 
war, securing to the militia the privilege of being tried in 
courts martial by militia officers, would have been entirely 
evaded, because no such officers would have been in the 
service, of whom such courts could have been formed. And 
in the case of Massachusetts, by ordering out ordy officers 
of a lower grade than the laws required, and a much 
smaller number than the number of troops demanded, the 
benefit intended to be secured to the militia by the forego- 



252 HISTORY OF THE 

ing- provision, would have been in a great measure lost to 
them, because there might not have been, in various sup- 
posable cases, militia officers in the service, of whom the 
courts martial could have been formed. 

On the 15th of July, 1812, General Dearborn wrote let- 
ters of the follqwing tenor to the governors of Massachu- 
setts and Connecticut — 

" Head Qiiarters, Boston, July 15, 1812. 

" Having received orders to leave the sea-coast, where I 
was ordered for the purpose of taking the necessary mea- 
sures for placing the towns and garrisons in a state of 
defence against the invasion or attack of the enemy, and 
to repair to Albany — it becomes my duty again to request 
your excellency to order out such part of your states' quota 
of detached militia as the present state of war requires. 
The numbers I had the honour to state to your excellency, 
in my letter of the 22d ult. As other objects will require 
the service of a great part of the regular troops, it will he- 
come my duty to order them from the sea-hoard, and, of 
course, I must leave some part of the coast icith less protection 
against those depredating parties of the enemy, that may 
attempt invasion for the ?nere purpose of plunder, than pru- 
dence would have justified, if a suitable number of the mili- 
tia should not be ordered out in conformity with the views 
and intentions of the President of the United States, as 
heretofore expressed. If your excellency shall consider it 
expedient to have the militia turned out for the proposed 
purposes, I will with pleasure affoi'd all the aid in my 
power, for effecting the intended objects, consistently with 
the orders I have received. As early an answer as your 
excellency can make convenient, will be desirable. 

" I have the honor to be, 

" Very respectfully, your Excellency's 
" Most obedient servant, 

•' H. Dearborn, Major General.^' 



-HARTFORD CONVENTION. 253 

It will be recollected, that when the war was declared, 
it was professedly for the purpose of forcing Great Britain 
to revoke her orders in council, and to abandon the prac- 
tice of impressment. In order to accomplish these objects, 
the nation at large was subjected to the various calamities 
which an offensive war necessarily brin'gs upon any coun- 
try. But the Atlantic coast was exposed to all the evils 
which a powerful maritime enemy, having the absolute 
command of the ocean, might be disposed to inflict upon 
a defenceless foe. It would have been natural, under such 
circumstances, to expect that the government which had 
declared the war, would at least have taken all possible 
care to guard against invasions and depredations along 
the sea-shore ; — especially as the large towns and cities, 
and the oldest and wealthiest settlements, lay very near to 
the ocean, and of course were peculiarly exposed to hostile 
attacks. Instead of which, within less than a month after 
the declaration of war, the letter above recited was for- 
warded by the commander in chief of the American army 
to the chief magistrates of two of the New-England states, 
informing them that he had received orders to leave the 
sea-coast, and to repair to Albany ; and adding, that as other 
objects besides the defence of the coast would require the 
service of a great part of the regular troops, it would be- 
come his duty to order those troops from the sea-board, 
and that this must leave some part of the coast with less 
protection against those depredating parties of the enemy, 
who might attempt invasion for the mere purpose of plun- 
der, than prudence ivould justify. Hence he urges the de- 
tachment of the militia, which had been previously called 
for. If any new or additional motive could have been neces- 
sary to induce those states to proceed with the strictest 
caution, and to guard against any unconstitutional demand 
for the militia, it might have been found in this letter. 
The coast of New-England, stretching from New-Bruns- 
wick to the border of the state of New- York, may be con- 



254 HISTORY OF THE 

sidered as between six and seven hundred miles in length; 
and the property upon it which would be exposed to the 
depredations of an enemy, was undoubtedly many times 
greater than lay in the same predicament upon the coast 
south of New- York, to the Gulf of Mexico. And yet, the 
small force which the national government had stationed 
upon that coast, was ordered away in pursuit of other ob- 
jects — that is the conquest of Canada — and the inhabitants 
left exposed to the miseries of invasion and depredation. 
And this measure of depriving the eastern coast of the 
United States troops, in a time of war, which had been 
stationed there for their protection and security in a time 
of peace, was adopted at the very moment when, if the 
assertion of the chief magistrate of the Union was to be 
credited, there was the greatest need of their exertions for 
the public safety ; for in a letter from the Secretary of 
War to Lieutenant Governor Smith of Connecticut, dated 
July 14th, 1812 — one day after the date of the foregoing 
letters to the governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut 
— that officer soys he was instructed by the President to 
state to Governor Smith, that there vas at that time, immi- 
nent danger of the invasion of the country; and this was 
advanced as a reason why the militia of those states should 
be ordered out agreeably to the call made by General 
Dearborn. 

Could any thing be more preposterous than such con- 
duct as this ? Had it been in the power of the government 
of the United States to conquer the Canadas, they would 
have been worthless compared with the value of the coun- 
try and the settlements upon the New-England coast. And 
events very speedily proved the weakness and absurdity of 
the attempts to invade and subdue the British provinces. 
Disaster and disgrace overtook our forces ; and the con- 
quest of the Canadas, weak and unprotected as they were, 
was soon fovmd to be altogether chimerical. Instead of 
victors, our forces were led from the field as prisoners of 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 255 

war ; and the people on the frontiers were placed in great 
hazard of invasion, from the very enemy against whom 
offensive war had been declared. 

Little as the New-England states had been satisfied with 
the origin of the war, they had still less reason to be pleased 
with the manner of carrying it on. In a very short time it 
became apparent that they must defend themselves, or be 
left at the mercy of the foreign enemy. It was equally 
apparent, that if the President of the United States had 
the constitutional right to call forth the hundred thousand 
militia, under the act of Congress of April lOth, 1812, put 
them under command of United States officers, and march 
them to any point or station which he might think proper, 
the states would have been entirely deprived of their natural 
and legitimate means of defence, and left exposed to the 
inroads of the enemy wherever they should think proper to 
visit their coasts, and invade their territory. It therefore 
became a matter of not only constitutional right, but of 
self-security in the New-England states, exposed as they 
were, to meet the evils with which they were threatened 
at the threshold. Accordingly, in Connecticut, the opinion 
and advice of the council of the state were taken ; and in 
Massachusetts, in pursuance of the practice of that state 
in times of emergency, the case was submitted to the su 
prcme court of the state, for their decision upon the fol- 
lowing questions — 

" 1. Whether the commanders in chief of the militia of 
the several states have a right to determine whether any 
of the exigencies contemplated by the constitution of the 
United States exist, so as to require them to place the mi- 
litia, or any part of it, in the service of the United States, 
at the request of the President, to be commanded by him, 
pursuant to acts of Congress ? 

"2. AVhether, when either of the exigencies exist au- 
thorizing the employing the militia in the service of the 
United States, the militia thus employed can be lawfully 



256 HISTORY OF THE 

commanded by any officers but of the militia, except by 
the President of the United States ?" 

The court, consisting of three very eminent judges, viz. 
Theophilus Parsons, Samuel Sewall, and Isaac Parker, 
gave it as their opinion, that the commanders in chief of 
the several states had the right to decide whether any of 
the constitutional exigencies existed, which authorized the 
calling forth of the militia. In our judgment, there were 
many strong reasons in favour of this opinion ; one of 
which may be found in the following letter from the 
Secretary of War to Lieutenant-Governor Smith, of Con- 
necticut — 

" War Department, July 14^A, 1812. 

Sir, — I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of 
the 2d inst. The absence of his excellency Governor 
Griswold, ' on account of ill health,' is seriously to be re- 
gretted, particularly at this important crisis, when his 
prompt assurances of obeying the requisition of the Presi- 
dent, to call into the service of the United States such de- 
tachments of militia as might be required, conformably to 
the act of April 10th, 1812, through General Dearborn, 
are interrupted and suspended by your honour. 

" The reason assigned for refusing to execute the en- 
gagements of his excellency Governor Griswold, appear 
not less extraordinary than the act itself. After a decla- 
ration of war against a nation possessed of powerful and 
numerous fleets, a part of which were actually on our 
coast, had been promulgated, and officially communicated 
to the executive of the state, the assertion made by your 
honour, ' that the governor is not informed that the United 
States are in imminent danger of invasion,^ was not to have 
been expected. To remove all doubt from your mind on 
this subject, / a?n instructed by the President, to state to you 
that such danger actually exists ; and to request that the re- 
quisition of General Dearborn, made by his special autho- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 257 

rity for calling into the service of the United States certain 
detachments of militia from the state of Connecticut, be 
forthwith carried into effect. 

" The right of the state to officer the militia, is clearly 
recognized in the requisition of General Dearborn. The 
detachments, when marched to the several posts assigned 
them, with their proper officers appointed conformably to 
the laws of the state, will command, or be commanded, 
according to the rules and articles of war, and the usages 
of service. 

" I have the honour to be, 

'' Respectfully, sir, your obedient servant, 

" W. EUSTIS. 
*' His Honor John Cotton Smith, 
Sharon, Connecticut." 

At the date of this letter, war had been declared but 
four weeks. The fact that such an event had occurred 
was not known to the government of Great Britain, and 
of course, no measures could have been adopted by that 
government for the invasion of our country, or even for the 
prosecution of hostile measures of any description towards 
the United States. With what propriety then could it be 
said, that this country was in iinminent danger of invasion 
on the 14th of July, 1812 ? It was not true. " Imminent 
danger" means danger near at hand, threatening, imme- 
diate. Under no circumstances could an order for the 
invasion of the territory of the United States be expected 
from Great Britain in less than five or six weeks after the 
14th of July. Whatever danger, therefore, there might 
have been of eventual invasion, it was then remote, and 
not imminent ; and therefore the declaration in the letter 
above alluded to was not warranted by facts. But it is to 
be presumed from the circumstances of the case, that if it 
had been considered necessary at the time, the same de- 
claration would have been made when General Dearborn 

33 



258 HISTORY OF THE 

wrote his letters to the governors of Massachusetts and 
Connecticut, calling for the respective quotas of militia 
from those states, viz. on the 22d of June, four days after 
the declaration of war. 

On the ITth of July General Dearborn addressed the 
following letter to Lieutenant Governor Smith — 

" Head Quarters, Boston, July 17, 1812. 

"HON. JOHN COTTON SMITH. 

" Sir, — Being disposed to obviate as far as my authority 
extends, the objection to turning out the companies, re- 
quired from the state of Connecticut, in my letter to Go- 
vernor Griswold of the 22d June ult. I renew my requisi- 
tion to your honor as acting governor in the absence of his 
excellency Governor Griswold, and request that you would 
turn out the number of companies proposed in my letter 
above alluded to; and that those companies destined for 
Fort Trumbull may be commanded by one of the majors 
that shall have been detached with your state's quota. 

" I have the honour. Sir, to be respectfully 
" Your most obedient servant, 

" H. Dearborn, Major General,'''' 

To this letter, the following answer was returned — 

''Lyme, 22d August, 1812. 

" Sir, — Your two letters of the 15th and 17th of July 
were put into my hands immediately after my return from 
the state of New York ; but accidentally were left at Hart- 
ford, without having been acknowledged. No inconve- 
nience however could have resulted, as the answer to the 
letter of the Secretary of War, of the 14th of July, ex- 
pressed the determination of the government of this state, 
on the points you had suggested. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 259 

** I have therefore only to express my satisfaction of the 
readiness with which you proposed to give the command 
of the companies required for New-London, to a major of 
our own ; together with your disposition to make every 
necessary provision for the defence of the sea-coast. And 
on all occasions, I shall be happy to co-operate with you in 
such measures as our defence may require. 

" I have the honour to be, with high respect, 
" Your obedient and humble servant, 

(Signed) " Roger Griswold." 

" General Dearborn." 

On the 4th of August, 1812, Governor Griswold again 
convened the council, and submitted to their consideration 
the letter of the Secretary of War of the 14th, and those 
of the 15th and 17th of July from General Dearborn, which 
have already been quoted, and received from them the fol- 
lowing report — 

"Jit a meeting of the Governor and Council of the state of Connec- 
ticut, held at Hartford on the fourth day of August, Jl. D. 1812. 

" A letter from the Secretary of War addressed to his 
honor the Lieutenant-Governor, dated July 14th, 1812, 
and two letters from Major-General Dearborn, one dated 
July 15th, addressed to his excellency the Governor, and 
one dated July 17th, addressed to his honor, the Lieuten- 
ant-Governor, have been submitted by his excellency the 
Governor to this board, for their consideration and advice. 
They all relate to the subject of ordering five companies 
of the militia of this state into the service of the United 
States. It is obvious that the claim for the services of the 
militia is made on the ground that war has been declared 
by the Congress of the United States against Great Bri- 
tain. No place in this state, or in the United States, has 
been particularly designated as in danger of being invaded. 
The dansrer which exists is that alone which arises from 
a state of war thus declared ; and exists throughout the 



260 HISTORY OF THE 

United States, and will continue, so long as the war shall 
last. To provide against this supposed danger of invasion 
five companies of militia are required. 

" They are required to do ordinary garrison duty at the 
forts at New-London and New-Haven. Upon the same 
principle, that the militia may be called for, to march to 
these places and do this duty, they may be called for, to 
march to any place within the United States, to perform 
the same duty, and this, from time to time, and at all times, 
during the continuance of the war. It will not escape 
attention that this requisition is not made for a portion of 
the militia, most convenient to thejylaceof danger or scene of 
action, pursuant to the act of Congress, approved February 
28th, 1795, but is made upon the Governor of this state, 
for a portion of the militia detached, pursuant to an act of 
Congress passed the 10th day of April, 1812, and liable 
by the terms of that act, to be called into the service of 
the United States, when, and only when one of the exigen- 
cies provided hy the Constitution shall occur. By the Con- 
stitution of the United States, those exigencies are, to exe- 
cute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel 
Invasions. It is believed that the militia of this state 
would be among the first to perform their constitutional 
duties, and not among the last to understand and justly 
appreciate their constitutional rights. Should any portion 
of this state be invaded or menaced with invasion by a 
foreign power, the militia would not wait for a requisition, 
but hasten with alacrity to the place invaded or threatened, 
to meet and repel it. Of this spirit his excellency the 
Governor would doubtless receive prompt evidence, in the 
execution of the laws of this state, should the necessity 
unhappily arise. But if the Congress of the United States 
have seen fit to exercise the power to declare war, before 
they have carried into execution another provision of the 
Constitution to raise and support armies, it does not follow 
that the militia are bound to enter their forts and garrisons 



I 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 261 

to perform ordinary garrison duty, and wait for an inva- 
sion, which may never happen. 

*' Whatever may be the disposition of this state, or the 
militia thereof, to render voluntary services under state 
authority to carry on the war in which this country is un- 
happily engaged, it is surely important that when demands 
are made by the administration of the government of the 
United States, they should be found to be strictly within 
the constitution of the United States, and while obedience 
shall be promptly yielded to all its requirements, that the 
constitution and sovereignty of this state should not be 
impaired or encroached upon — That the powers ^delega- 
ted to the United Slates^ m^y be exercised, and the pow- 
ers 'reserved to the states respectively^ may be retained. 
And as no information has been given, and none is in pos- 
session of this board, that any part of this state is invaded, 
or that any other danger exists than that which arises from 
a declaration of war made by the Congress of the United 
States against Great Britain, and the suggestion that a 
part of her fleet has been on the coast of the United States, 
and as the militia are called for, not to repel invasion, but 
to perform ordinary garrison duty, the Council are of 
opinion that it does not consist with 'the powers retained' 
by this state to order its militia into the service of the 
United States, on the requisition of any of the officers of 
the United States, in a case not demanded by the constitu- 
tion. And until such case occurs, the Council advise his 
excellency the Governor to retain the militia of this state 
under his own command, and decline a compliance with 
the requisition of the Secretary of War and Major-Gene- 
ral Dearborn. Passed in the Council. 

"Attest. Thomas Day, Secretary.'''' 

In this state of things, Governor Griswold called an 
extra session of the General Assembly of Connecticut, on 
the fourth Tuesday of August, 1812, on which occasion he 
transmitted to them the following message — 



262 HISTORY OF THE 

" Message of his Excellenctj Governor Griswold, to the General 
Assembly, with the Vocuments accompanying the same. 

** Gentlemen of the council, mr. speaker, and 
gentlemen of the house of representatives. 

" Several important matters, growing out of the war 
in which we are unhappily engaged, appear to demand the 
immediate attention of the legislature ; and although aware 
of the expense and inconvenience attending a meeting of 
the General Assembly at this season of the year, and at a 
time so near the fall session, yet, I trust, that on a full ex- 
amination of all the circumstahces, it will appear that the 
measure has become highly expedient. To render our 
public concerns, however, intelligible, it will be necessary 
to unfold the events which have attended us. 

" It is known to the Assembly, that on the 10th of April 
last, Congress passed an act to detach one hundred thou- 
sand militia for the service of the United States, and that 
three thousand men, the quota of this state, agreeably to 
the orders of the President, were promptly detached, and 
held in readiness, for the exigencies pointed out by the 
constitution and the law. 

" The act of Congress, and the measures regarding it, 
were communicated at the last session, and will be asain 
laid before you. After your adjournment, a letter was 
received from the War Department, dated June 12th, 
transferring the duty of calling for the men to General 
Dearborn, and requesting that his requisition might there- 
fore be complied with. 

*' As nothing appeared in this communication, but a 
wish of the President to confide this duty to an officer of 
rank, who it was understood, would be charged with the 
general command of the troops in the northern states, and 
as it could not be expected that the President would au- 
thorize an order which should be repugnant to the consti- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 263 

tution ; I did not hesitate to inform the Secretary of War, 
that any requisition which the President might make 
through General Dearborn should be complied with. 

" Soon after these transactions, at a time when I was 
pursuing a journey for my health, a letter was received 
from General Dearborn, requiring four companies of the 
drafted militia to march, and to be placed under the com- 
mand of the officer commanding at Fort Trumbull at New- 
London, and one company to march for the battery near 
New-Haven. An attention to the terms of General Dear- 
born's letter fully satisfied me, that the requisition was un- 
constitutional and could not be complied with. I had long 
noticed that important provision in the constitution of the 
United States, which authorizes the President to call into 
service the militia, ' to repel invasions, suppress insurrec- 
tions, and to aid in the execution of the laws ;' and it was 
with satisfaction I had noticed that the act of Congress 
had strictly followed the principle of the constitution. 

"But although I entertained no doubts regarding my 
duty, yet as I viewed the step which it became necessary 
to take, highly important, it became proper for me to ob- 
tain the reasonings and opinions of the Council on the 
occasion. 

"That body was accordingly convened at Hartford, and 
it gave me great satisfaction to find that their opinions 
concurred with my own. Thinking it necessary, however, 
to pursue my journey, his honor. Governor Smith, was so 
good as to take the charge of the correspondence which 
had become necessary on the occasion ; and by his letter 
to the Secretary of War of the 2d of July, communicated 
the opinion entertained in this state, and our determination 
respecting the requisition. 

" The Secretary in reply, dated July 14th, in language 
unusual, and altogether unexpected, appeared to claim a 
promise, contained in my letter of the 12th of June, to 
execute any requisition which should be made by General 



264 HISTORY OF THE 

Dearborn. This strange insinuation, which originated in 
expressions of civiHty to the President, and could not with 
decency have been omitted, was repelled. 

" In a letter from the War Department, the subject 
was also placed in a point of view which appeared to re- 
quire a new consideration; and a second meeting of the 
Council was accordingly deemed necessary. The gentle- 
men comprising that body were again fully consulted, and 
every view of the subject has been taken of which it ap- 
peared susceptible, and we have been confirmed in the 
opinion which we first formed, and the Council has again j|; 
advised that nothing has taken place to justify me in exe- I 
cuting the requisition of General Dearborn. " 

" All the papers, to which I have referred, together with 
a general proclamation, concisely explaining the facts 
which have taken place, and the views which have been 
entertained at this important period, will be now commu- 
nicated for your inspection. 

" The importance of this measure, both as it regards 
the security of the state, and as it may also form a prece- 
dent on future occasions, rendered it highly important to 
consult the General Assembly. 

"But the inconvenience of convening so large a body, 
and the early period of the fall session, induced me to sub- 
mit to the temporary disadvantage of a delay, rather than 
subject the immediate representatives of the people to so 
much inconvenience. Several new circumstances, how- 
ever, having arisen, which it appeared to me could not 
with propriety admit of delay; I have thought it my duty 
at this time to convene the legislative body, and I avail 
myself of the occasion to solicit your immediate attention 
to the proceedings of the council, and your deliberate opi- 
nion on the measure which has been taken. This becomes 
more immediately important, from the consideration, that 
if any errors have been committed, they may, at this time, 
be corrected without much inconvenience. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 2d5 

*'The necessity of obtaining supplies of military stores 
on this emergency, in addition to those already on hand, 
will be universally felt ; and finding the price and scarcity 
rapidly increasing, I thought no consideration could justify 
a delay in calHng the attention of the legislature imme- 
diately to that subject. It can scarcely be necessary to 
inform you that military stores are not to be expected 
from the general government ; and that we have reason 
to expect that the regular troops will be principally called 
from the sea-coast, and of course the state will be left to 
defend itself, if exposed to foreign invasion. 

" It may also be observed that it is unwise to depend 
altogether upon the general government for the defence 
of our sea-coast. 

" The extensive territory which it has been the national 
policy to grasp within our jurisdiction, and the great num- 
ber of points requiring defence, together with an unhappy 
disposition to enlarge our extended frontier by new con- 
quests, will probably demand all the military force in the 
power of government for similar objects. This appears 
to be the determination at this time, and the important 
business of garrisoning the coast must be left to the mili- 
tia, or neglected. 

" But if these essential interests are disregarded, we 
must not neglect ourselves ; and I trust that the present 
occasion will furnish the best reasons for improving the 
militia both in organization and discipline, and for obtain- 
ing ample supplies of arms and military stores, and placing 
ourselves on the best footing for defence. It is also proper 
to avail ourselves of every principle in the constitution for 
Tendering our means effectual and the least inconvenient. 

" Among other provisions in the constitution, it will be 
found, that in time of war the states may organize and 
support a military force of their own, and which cannot, 
under any circumstances, be controlled by the general 
government, and which may undoubtedly be applied in all 

34 



266 HISTORY OF THE 

cases to the defence of the State. Whether such a force 
will become immediately necessary, the general assembly 
will judge ; but as the subject can be examined and a plan 
partially digested without expense, and measures com- 
menced for the speedy execution of the principle at an 
early but future session, I feel it ray duty to recommend 
that subject to your consideration. 

"In recommending this measure, it is far from my in- 
tention to propose that the state troops should at any time 
during the war be withheld from aiding the national and 
neisrhbourins state forces in the common defence ; but to 
increase the strength of those corps, and particularly to 
ap])ly that body of men to our own defence, should our 
frontier at any future time be unhappily abandoned. 

"Nor will it be understood that whilst I feel it my duty 
to recommend the necess^ary preparation for arraying every 
description of constitutional and military force which may 
be proper for our defence, that [ wish to urge a step which 
may interfere with any liberal measure which the general 
government may take for the same object. 

" To the general government we must and ought to look 
for our security ; and I trust that the time will come when 
a full knowledge of our resources will place the safety of 
our sea-coast on that naval defence which alone is capable 
of giving it complete security. 

" Although it has been thought correct in this state, ore 
ordinary occasions, for the state government to leave the 
national councils to pursue their own measures without 
interference, yet I submit to your consideration whether 
this is not an occasion on which that principle should be 
dispensed with, and whether it is not proper that the gene- 
ral assembly should, by a plain and decisive address to the 
President, express their own opinion and that of their con- 
stituents on the important questions which have recently 
occurred. 

"It is certainly necessary that the public opinion should 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 267 

fae known by the President on the question of war ; and it 
is presumed, when expressed by the legislature of a state, 
it will be respected. 

" Whatever events, however, may take place, you may 
be satisfied that the faithful preservation of the public 
peace, a rigid and prompt execution of the laws under 
which we happily live, and which form our security, to- 
gether with a strict adherence to our form of government 
and of the constitution of the United States, will compose 
the basis of the administration of government in this state. 

" Trusting, gentlemen, that the God of our fathers will 
not desert us on this occasion, and that our safety is in 
Him, I have only to implore his guidance in all our pro- 
ceedings, and his smiles on all our deliberations. 

" Roger Griswold. 

" Extra Session, 4th Tuesday of August, 1812." 

This message was accompanied by the correspondence 
between the United States officers, civil and military, to 
which reference has been made, and extracts from which 
have been copied ; and thus the whole was placed before 
the legislature of that state for their consideration. These 
documents were referred to a joint committee of the two 
houses, who made a long and able report on the general 
subject, and concluded by recommending the following 
resolution — 

" Resolved, that the conduct of his excellency the go- 
vernor, in refusing to order the militia of this state into 
the service of the United States, on the requisition of the 
Secretary of War and Major-General Dearborn, meets 
with the entire approbation of this assembly." 

This resolution was adopted and passed by both houses. 
The general assembly also, in pursuance of the suggestion 
in the executive message, united at the same session in a 
declaration, in which they say, that "they believe it to be 
the delibexate and solemn sense of the people of the state 



7 



268 HISTORY OF THE 

that " the war was unnecessary." The following passage 
is extracted from the abovementioned document — 

"To the United States is delegated the power to call 
forth the militia to execute the laws, to suppress insurrec- 
tion, and repel invasion. To the states respectively is 
reserved the entire controul of the militia, except in the 
cases specified. In this view of that important provision 
of the constitution, the legislature fully accord with the de- 
cision of his excellency the governor in refusing to comply 
with the requisition of the general government for a por- 
tion of the mihtia. While it is to be regretted that any 
difference of opinion on that subject should have arisen, 
the conduct of the chief magistrate of this state, in main- 
taining its immunities and privileges, meets our cordial 
approbation. The legislature also entertain no doubt that 
the militia of the state will, imder the direction of the cap- 
tain-general, be ever ready to perform their duty to the 
state and nation in peace or war. They are aware that 
in a protracted war, the burden upon the militia may be- 
come almost insupportable, as a spirit of acquisition and 
extension of territory appears to influence the councils of 
the nation, which may require the employment of the 
whole regular forces of the United States in foreign con- j 
quest, and leave our maritime frontier defenceless, or to 
be protected solely by the militia of the states. 

" At this period of anxiety among all classes of citizens, 
we learn with pleasure that a prominent cause of the war 
is removed by a late measure of the British cabinet. The 
revocation of the orders in council, it is hoped, will be met 
by a sincere spirit of conciliation on the part of our admi- 
nistration, and speedily restore to our nation the blessings 
of a solid and. honourable peace." 

Almost immediately after the close of this session of 
the general assembly of Connecticut, an election of mem- 
bers of the house of representatives of that state occurred, 
when the returns showed, as far as evidence of public 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 269 

opinion can be derived from such a source, that the people 
of the state, by a very large majority, approved the course 
pursued by the governor and council with regard to the 
militia, and the measures adopted by the legislature at 
the extra session in the preceding month of August. The 
parties in the house stood — Federalists 163, Democrats 36 
— leaving a majority of Federalists of 127. 

At the regular session, which was held in October fol- 
lowing, an act was passed to establish a military corps for 
the defence of the state. By it, the commander in chief 
of the state was authorised to raise, by voluntary enlist- 
ments, a military corps for the defence and protection of 
the state, to suppress insurrections and repel invasion, and 
compel obedience to the laws of the state, and of the 
United States, to consist of two regiments of infantry, four 
companies of artillery, and four troops of horse, to serve 
during the war, unless sooner discharged by law. 

This act of the legislature was carried into effect, and 
a corps of about two thousand men was raised under it, 
who were completely officered and equipped, and in the 
course of the war performed very essential services to the 
United States, as well as to the state to which they be- 
longed. 

In July, 1812, the governor of Massachusetts issued a 
general order to the militia of that state, in which, after 
some preliminary remarks on the state of the country, and 
directing that the detachment often thousand men should 
be completed without delay — it is added, — that as that 
body of men, being to be raised throughout the state, could 
not be assembled to repel a sudden invasion, and it would 
be extremely burdensome to keep them constantly in ser- 
vice, and if they were assembled, they would not be ade- 
quate to the defence of the exposed points on a coast of 
several hundred miles in extent, — it was ordered that the 
officers of the whole militia of the state hold themselves, 
and the militia under their command, inconstant readiness 



270 HISTORY OF THE 

to assemble, and march to any part or parts of the state. 
Congress assembled at Washino^ton on the 4th of No- 
vember, 1812. In the message to the houses on that oc- 
casion, the disputes with the New-England states relative 
to the militia were referred to in the following manner : — 
" Among the incidents to the measures of the war, I am 
constrained to advert to the refusal of the governors of 
Massachusetts and Connecticut, to furnish the required 
detachments of militia towards the defence of the maritime 
frontier. The refusal was founded on a novel and unfortu- 
nate exposition of the provisions of the constitution relating 
to the militia. The correspondences which will be before 
you, contain the requisite information on the subject. It 
is obvious that if the authority of the United States to call 
into service and command the militia for the public defence, 
can be thus frustrated, even in a state of declared war, and 
of course under apprehensions of invasion preceding tear, 
they are not one nation for the purpose most of all requir- 
ing it ; and that the public safety may have no other re- 
source, than in those large and permanent military esta- 
blishments which are forbidden by the principles of our 
free government, and against the necessity of which the 
militia were meant to be a constitutional bulwark." 

This part of the message, which wears somewhat the 
appearance of a denunciation, was referred to a committee 
of the Senate, of which William B.Giles, of Virginia, was 
chairman, whose feelings were strongly in favour of the 
administration, and in support of their measures, and par- 
ticularly of the war. That this gentleman, from the pecu- 
liarity of his temper, as well as the feelings and sentiments 
entertained by him, would gladly have seized this opportu- 
nity to manifest his animosity against the New-England 
politicians, no one acquainted with him can doubt. But 
after keeping the subject before the committee during the 
whole session, it was suffered to pass away without any 
report, or even the recommendation of a resolution of cen- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 271 

sure upon the course pursued by the governments of the 
New-England states. 

And it is apparent, from the language of the message 
itself, that the President found some difficulty in placing 
the subject in a satisfactory manner before the national 
legislature. It says, " the refusal of the governors of Mas- 
sachusetts and Connecticut to furnish the required detach- 
ments of militia towards the defence of the maritime fron- 
tier, was founded on a novel and unfounded exposition of 
the provisions of the constitution relating to the militia^ If 
the exposition given by those governors was novel, it was 
probably owing to the fact, that no such call for the mili- 
tia had previously been made. Being made under such 
circumstances, it must necessarily have been novel. That 
it was unfortunate, depends upon the question whether it 
was sound, and conformable to the letter and spirit of the 
constitution ? If such was its character, however unfortu- 
nate it may have been for the policy of the administration, 
or the objects they liad in view, it must be considered as 
quite otherwise for the country, and emphatically so for 
the militia — which will be allowed to be objects of much 
higher moment than the views or the popularity of any 
individuals for the time entrusted with the administration 
of the government. 

The militia are composed of the whole male inhabitants 
of the states, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five — 
that is, of the active physical force of the union. They 
are the inhabitants of the states in which they reside, and 
they belong to the several states. By the second section 
of the second article of the constitution of the United States, 
it is provided that — '^^The President shall be commander 
in chief of the navy and army of the United States, and 
of the militia of the several states, when called into the 
actual service of the United States." Here the militia 
are described, in the constitution itself, as belonging to the 
several states, and the national government have no autho- 



272 HISTORY OF THE 

rity over them, beyond that which the several states have 
rehnquished to them in the constitution. Any attempt on 
the part of the national government, or of the President, 
to exercise such authority beyond that granted to them in 
the constitution, would be usurpation, and would render 
the individuals exercising it liable to the consequences of 
an usurpation of power. 

The only cases mentioned in the constitution, in which 
the congress have the power to call the militia of the states 
into their service, are " to execute the laws of the Union, 
suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." These are 
cases in which the existence of the government and the 
safety of the country are in danger, and to preserve them 
this extraordinary power was vested in the national go- 
vernment. But aware of the danger that might arise in 
placing the whole military force of the country under the 
command of the national executive, it was wisely and pru- 
dently, and it may be added, fortunately provided, that the 
appointment of the officers of the militia should be reserv- 
ed to the states respectively. By this reservation, the in- 
dividual states were secured against the danger of having 
their own military forces taken from-under their own im- 
mediate authority and controul, and placed under the com- 
mand of men who, if so disposed, might turn them against 
the governments to which they belonged, and the commu- 
nities of which they formed a part, and thus subvert and 
destroy their freedom and independence. It wa^manifest- 
ly the object of President Madison, when he called upon 
the governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut for their 
quotas of militia, under the act of Congress of April 10th, 
1812, to take them away from their own officers, appointed 
under state authority, and put them under the command 
of United States officers, because, as has been shown, he 
took care in the call upon the first of those magistrates, 
to designate no officer of the rank which the number of 
troops required ; and in the call upon the second of them, 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 273 

to designate no officer of any rank, but to order the men 
to be placed immediately under the command of the Uni- 
ted States officers in the garrisons at New-London and 
New-Haven. That such was his object appears to be 
clear and unquestionable, not only from the circumstances 
already alluded to, but from the language of the message 
above recited. It is there said — " It is obvious that if the 
authority of the United States to call into service and com- 
mand the militia for the public defence, can be thus frus- 
trated, even in a state of declared war, and of course under 
apprehensions of invasion preceding war, they are not one 
nation for the purpose most of all requiring it." The ob- 
ject was not only to call the militia into service, but into 
the command of the United States. A defeat in the at- 
tempt to accomplish these objects, President Madison says, 
would show that the United States were not one nation 
for the purpose most of all requiring it. " In such a state 
of things," he adds, "the public safety may Imve no other 
resource than in those large and permanent military esta- 
blishments which are forbidden by the principles of our 
free government, and against the necessity of which the 
militia were meant to be a constitutional bulwark." What 
is meant by the expression of " apprehensions of invasion 
preceding war" is not very apparent. The constitution 
contains no provision for calling forth the militia, in the 
case of " apprehension c^ invasion preceding war." The 
language of that instrument is "to repel invasion." It 
does not require a military force to repel an invasion 
which exists only in the fears or imagination of an indivi- 
dual, even if that individual should be placed at the head 
of the government ; and above all things, when such an 
invasion is apprehended before war takes place. 

As it regards the militia, no doubt can be entertained 
by those who are uninfluenced by party feelings or selfish 
interests, the conduct of the governors of Massachusetts 
and Connecticut will be considered as of the highest im- 

35 



274 HISTORY OF THE. 

portance. Tlie duties of the militia of the several states 
to the United States, are described in the clause of the 
constitution which has been quoted. They are few, and 
easily understood. When there occurs, in any portion of 
the Union, such a degree of resistance to the execution of 
the laws of the United States, as cannot be overcome by 
the ordinary means which the laws provide, it is the duty 
of the national government to call forth the militia to en- 
force that execution. In the event of a domestic insur- 
rection against the government, which is too formidable to 
be quelled in any other mode, resort must be had to the 
militia for the accomplishment of the object. And when 
the country is invaded by a foreign enemy, upon a con- 
stitutional call from the national government, it is the duty 
of the militia to repair to the place where the hostile in- 
road has occurred, and repel the invader. Beyond these 
specific services, the United States have not, and cannot 
have, any claim upon the militia for military services. 
But there is nothing in the constitution that implies a 
power in the President of the United States to call the 
militia into the field, when there are in his mind ai^prehen- 
sions of an invasion by a foreign nation, preceding war. 
Much less is there any authority in the constitution to take 
the militia from their homes, and away from their ofiicers, 
shut them up in garrisons, under the command of United 
States officers, subject to the services and the duties of a 
standing army, and liable to the provisions and penalties 
of the "Rules and Articles of War." If there is any 
thing valuable in being secured against any future attempt 
to exercise this unconstitutional power over the militia, if 
there is any gratification to the minds of free citizens of a 
free republic, in being exempt from all liability to the de 
gradation of being forced into a standing army, and held 
in bondage under tho despotic government which always 
controuls and regulates standing armies, they will be in- 
debted for these privileges and this security to the firm. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 275 

independent, dignified stand taken by those virtuous and 
upright New-England magistrates. 

On the 2d of August, 1812, the United States frigate 
Constitution, commanded by Captain Isaac Hull, sailed 
on a cruise from the harbour of Boston. On the 19th of 
that month he fell in \\\'.\i the British frigate Guerriere, 
Captain Dacres, and af r a short but severe engagement 
captured her. This brilliant achievement, as was perfectly 
natural, caused great exultation throughout the country, 
and particularly among the friends of the administration ; 
and much merit was claimed on their behalf for such a 
splendid victory over the "Empress of the ocean." No 
|)erson probably doubted that the Constitution, as well as 
others of our ships of war, had been ordered to cruise in 
quest of the enemy, in order to give them specimens of 
our skill and bravery upon their favourite element. As 
far as can be ascertained, no such orders were given, cer- 
tainly in the case of the abovementioned vessel. 

At the time when war was declared, the Constitution 
lay at Annapolis in Maryland. On that day, the following 
letter was addressed from the Navy Department to Captain 
Hull— 

*' NaiJy Department, 18th of June, 1812. 

" This day war has been declared between the United 
empire of Great Britain, Ireland, and their dependencies, 
and the United States of America, and their territories. 
And you are, with the force under your command, entitled 
to every belligerent right — to attack, and capture, and to 
defend. You will use the mo-st despatch to reach New- York, 
after you have made up your complement of men, <fec. at 
Annapolis. In your way from thence, you will not fail to 
notice the British flag, should it present itself. I am in- 
formed that the Belvidera is on our coast, but you are not 
to understand me as impelling you to battle, previously to 
your having confidence in your crew, unless attacked ; or 



276 HISTORY OF THE 

with a reasonable prospect of success, of which you are |! 
to be, at your discretion, the judge. 

*' You are to reply to this, and inform me of your 
progress. 

"P» Hamilton. 

"Captain Hull, of the United States Frigate Constitution." 

On the 3d of July, 1812, the following letter was written 
to Captain Hull — 

^^ Navy Department, 3d July, 1812. 

'* As soon as the Constitution is ready for sea, you will 
weigh anchor, and proceed to New- York. 

" If on your way thither, you should fall in with an 
enemy's vessel, you will be guided in your proceedings by 
your own judgment, bearing in mind however, that you 
are not voluntarily to encounter a force superior to your 
own. On your arrival at New- York, you will report your- 
self to Commodore Rodgers. If he should not be in that 
port, you will remain there till further orders. 

"P. Hamilton. 

"Captain Isaac Hull, Annapolis." 

These orders extended no further than to sailing the 
Constitution from Annapolis to New-York ; and great care 
is taken by the Secretary of the Navy to let Captain Hall 
understand, that upon the passage to the latter port, 
he must act upon his own discretion, if he should fall in 
with any British vessels — that he was not to be understood 
as impelling Captain Htdl to battle, previously to hainng 
confidence in his creiv, unless attacked; that he must act upon 
his own Judgment, at the same time not voluntarily to en- 
counter a force superior to his oim. Here is certainly a 
praise-worthy degree of precaution, manifested by the 
Secretary of the Navy, against risk and responsibility, 
but no encouragement to fighting. That any further or- 
ders were given to Captain Hull, between the 3d of July 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 277 

and the 2d of August, is hardly to be supposed. If there 
were such, they can be produced. If there were not, all 
the credit of this gallant exploit is due to Captain Hull, 
and not the slightest portion of it to the administration. 

No special credit, however, was ever given to that brave 
and meritorious officer, on the score of his having gone 
upon this enterprise upon his own responsibility, and with- 
out the orders of the government. A satisfactory reason 
may be given for this reserve on the part of the latter on 
this subject. The Constitution having sailed without or- 
ders, had she been unsuccessful, the misfortune would have 
been justly ascribed to the rashness of her commander; 
if successful, the country would of course suppose that she 
had been ordered by the government on the cruise, and the 
glory of the victory would redound to their credit, as well 
as to that of the officers and crew. 

This sketch of the manner in which the government of 
the United States commenced their warlike operations in 
the eastern states, will satisfy any person that it was not 
calculated to render the war, or the administration, popular 
in that portion of the Union. The plan of removing the 
United States troops from the Atlantic coast, in order to 
march them to the frontiers of Canada, and thus leave the 
inhabitants for several hundred miles upon the coast ex- 
posed to the horrors of invasion, could not, in the nature 
of things, reconcile them to a war which they originally 
considered unnecessary and extremely impolitic. The 
result of the choice of representatives for the state legisla- 
ture in Connecticut, in September, 1812, showed what was 
the tone of public feeling in that state. Governor Gris- 
wold died during the October session of the general assem- 
bly, and of course was placed beyond the reach of human 
applause or censure, for the share he had borne in the 
transactions which have been alluded to. But the votes 
of the freemen of that state, during the remainder of the 
war, showed, in the most conclusive manner, their decnded 



278 HISTORY OF THE 

approbation of the measures he had recommended, and 
the course he had pursued, for the security of the mihtia, 
and for the protection and preservation of the constitu- 
tional rights of the state. 

And such also was the state of things in Massachusetts. 
In 1812, at an election which was held more than two 
months before the declaration of war, Governor Strong 
was chosen by a majority of 1,370 votes only. In 1813, 
he received a majority of 13,974. In 1814, though op- 
posed by a federalist of distinguished talents and charac- 
ter, his majority was 10,421. In October, 1814, the 
house of representatives of the state legislature passed a 
resolution approving of Governor Strong's conduct, in re- 
lation to the defence of the state, by a vote of 222 to 59. 
At the same session, a resolution authorising the governor 
to raise ten thousand men for the defence of the state, 
passed the same body by a vote of 252 to 71. 

In the month of June, 1813, a detachment of ships from 
the United States navy, consisting of the frigates United 
States and Macedonian, and the sloop of war Hornet, 
under the command of Commodore Decatur, in attempt- 
ing to pass through Long Island Sound to the ocean, 
found a British squadron at the entrance into the Sound, 
of such force that it became necessary for the former to 
take refuge in New-London harbour. As the garrisons in 
and near that port were not sufficient to resist the British 
squadron on that station, strong apprehensions were en- 
tertained that the latter would force their way into the 
harbour, for the purpose of destroying the United States 
ships. Those ships, by way of precaution, were moved up 
the river Thames, several miles above New-London ; and 
application was immediately made to Governor Smith, the 
successor to Governor Griswold, for a military force to 
defend the city of New-London, and to protect the United 
States squadron. Orders were issued without delay for 
the detachment of a large body of militia, to be stationed 



HARTFORD COIN VENTION. 279 

at and near New-London. This detaclunent, drawn partly 
from the troops raised for the defence of the state, and 
the residue from the mihtia, were speedily in the field, and 
were placed under the command of Major-General Wil- 
liams of the militia ; and from that time until the depar- 
ture of the squadron from the harbour of New-London, 
which was not until after the peace, a large military force 
was kept in service by the state, for the security of the 
United States ships of war blockaded at New-London. 

During the year 1813, Brigadier General Burbeck, of 
the United States army, commanded in the "military dis- 
trict," in which Connecticut was included. This means 
that he resided as titular commander of a certain portion 
of country which for the occasion was called a " military 
district," but in which the United States had very few 
troops, — the appointment having been, beyond a doubt, for 
the purpose of having a United States officer on the spot, 
to take the command of the militia whenever they might 
be ordered into the service of the nation. No difficulty, 
however, occurred during that year, between General 
Williams and General Burbeck on the score of precedence ; 
and at the close of the year, the expenses of the campaign 
were allowed and paid by the United States. 

In 1814, General Burbeck having been removed to ano- 
ther station, the command at New-London was placed in 
the hands of Brigadier-General Gushing. The harbour of 
New-London was still blockaded, and the United States' 
squadron still required protection. In the month of April, 
a body of sailors and marines from the British fleet in the 
Sound, entered Connecticut river, and landed at a village 
in the town of Saybrook, a few miles above the mouth of 
the river, where they destroyed a considerable number of 
merchant vessels, which were there laid up, and retreated 
before any force was brought to attack or resist them. At 
this time Long-Island Sound was under the absolute con- 
troul of the British cruizers. In August following, an at- 



280 HISTORY OF THE 

tack was made upon Stonin|^ton, the easternmost town m 
Connecticut, bordering on the sea-shore, by a number of 
British armed ships under the command of Commodore 
Hardy, which was repulsed with great gallantry by a small 
body of militia, hastily assembled there for the purpose. 
This movement of the enemy excited strong apprehen- 
sions for the safety of the squadron in the Thames ; and a 
call was forthwith made by General Cushing upon Gover- 
nor Smith for a detachment of militia for its security. 

On the 4th of July, 1814, the following circular was 
addressed to the governors of several of the states — 

" War Department, July 14th, 1814. 

" Sir, — The late pacification in Europe, offers to the 
enemy a large disposable force, both naval and military, 
and with it the means of giving to the war here, a charac- 
ter of new and increased activity and extent. 

" Without knowing with certainty that such will be its 
application, and still less that any particular points will 
become the objects of attack, the President has deemed it 
advisable, as a measure of precaution, to strengthen our- 
selves on the line of the Atlantic, and (as the principal 
means of doing this will be found in the militia) to invite 
the executive of certain states to organize and hold in rea- 
diness, for immediate service, a corps of 93,500 men, 
under the laws of February, 1795, and the ISth of April, 
1814. 

" The enclosed detail will show your excellency what, 
under this requisition, will be the quota of 

" As far as uniform volunteer companies can be found, 
they will be preferred. 

" The expediency of regarding (as well as in the desig- 
nations of the militia as of their places of rendezvous) the 
points, the importance or the exposure of which will be 
most likely to attract the views of the enemy, need but be 
suggested. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 281 

^* A report of the organization of your quota, when com- 
pleted, and of its place or places of rendezvous, will be 
acceptable. 

" I have the honour to be, &lc. 

" John Armstrong." 

** His Excellency the Governor of ." 

'* Detail of militia service, under the requisition of July 
4th, 1814. Connecticut, 3 regiments, viz. 300 artillery, 
2,700 infantry, total 3,000. General staff, 1 Major Gene- 
ral, 1 Brigadier General, 1 Deputy Quartermaster Gene- 
ral, 1 Assistant Adjutant General." 

By this order from the War Department, it appears that 
3,000 men were considered as forming a division, or in 
other words, a Major General's command. This would 
of course make 1,500 a brigade, or Brigadier General's 
command. The requisition from General Gushing, upon 
Governor Smith, was for seventeen hundred of the three 
thousand men specified in the official call from the Secre- 
tary of War — outnumbering a brigade, and therefore 
having a legal claim to be commanded by a Major Gene- 
ral ] — and this more especially as there was but one Bri- 
gadier General detailed in that order. Doubtless Brigadier 
General Gushing believed that no officer of higher rank 
than himself was necessary, and therefore took care in his 
requisition, not to call for any officer who should take rank 
above himself. In the course of the summer, in conse- 
quence of the alarm produced by the hostile operations of 
the British, other detachments of the militia were ordered 
to various other points, until the whole number in the ser- 
vice amounted to twenty-three or twenty-four hundred 
men. This was considerably larger than that of the pre- 
cedino- year. Being therefore warranted in the measure 
by the example of 1813, when the whole number of men 
was smaller, and by the conduct of the national govern^ 

36 



282 HISTORY OF THE 

ment in paying the troops of that year, as well as by the 
large body of men in the field, a Major General was ordered 
to take the command. And when, in addition to these consi- 
derations, it is recollected that all, or nearly all the ex- 
pense of both years was incurred in defence of the national 
property vested in Decatur's squadron, no person could 
have suspected that so material a distinction colild have 
been drawn between the cases, as that the expenses of 
one year would have been paid without hesitation, and 
those of the other peremptorily refused. Such, however, 
was the fact ; and the state was left, after all the burdens 
which had been thrown upon ihem by a war, the justice of 
which tiiey questioned, and the policy of which they en- 
tirely condemned, to provide for the support of the whole 
body of militia ordered into the service of the United 
States, and essentially for the security of their ships of 
war, during the year 1814. The change of conduct in the 
government of the United States on the foregoing subject, 
may perhaps be accounted for, at least in part, by the oc- 
currence of peace just after the close of the year 1814. 
The intelligence that peace had been concluded, relieved 
them from all apprehensions of further embairassments 
from the continuance of hostilities ; and this afforded an 
opportunity for the administration to manifest their re- 
sentment for the measures pursued in the JXew-England 
states, on the subject of the war, and particularly in re- 
gard to the militia. 

In the year 1817 agents were appointed by the state of 
Massachusetts, to present the claim of that state for a re- 
muneration for the expenditure which had been incurred 
for the various detachments of militia for the defence of 
the state, during the war. After alluding to the call by 
General Dearborn, in 1812, which has already been ad- 
verted to, those agents, in the representation accompany- 
ing their claim, remark — 

" The next request received by the governor, was in 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 283 

July, 1814, when the probability of attack having increas- 
ed, the general requested eleven hundred men might be 
ordered out for the defence of the more exposed parts of 
the sea-coa?t — this order was complied with, the troops 
placed under the authority of the United States, and the 
service performed ; part of the said troops, to the number 
requested by General Dearborn, having been stationed at 
Castine and Machias, prior to the capture of those places 
by the enemy. 

"On the 5th of September, 1814, General Dearborn 
again made a requisition on the governor of 3Iassachusetto*, 
for a body of militia, when the general order No. 2, here- 
with presented, was issued on the 6th of the same month, 
and every measure taken to guard against the attacks of 
the enemy, — a considerable body of the elite of the mili- 
tia from the interior, was ordered into immediate service, 
and marched and encamped on the sea-board, and the 
whole of the militia were enjoined to hold themselves in 
constant readiness, and were called upon 'by every motive 
of the love of country, of honour, and sympathy for their 
fellow-citizens, who might be suffering the perils of war, 
to maintain the most perfect state of preparation, and to 
move when called to the scene of action with the utmost 
celerity ;' but the difficulties which had arisen, and the 
complaints that had been made, from placing the militia 
in the immediate service of the United States, under Uni- 
ted States officers, on former occasions, had been such as 
to induce the belief, it would be inexpedient, if not ha- 
zardous, to repeat the order, without having the power to 
enforce it ; an arrangement was, however, subsequently 
made with General Dearborn, to place part of the militia 
in the forts of the United States in the harbour of Boston, 
under the direction of his son. General H. A. S. Dearborn, 
and the very efficient body of troops beforementioned, were 
stationed in the vicinity of the forts. 

" A fourth requisition was made by General Dearborn 



284 HISTORY OF THE 

to guard the prisoners at Pittsfield, but the same causes 
as in the other case, in addition to the belief, that in the 
midst of a thickly settled population, the danger of escape 
from the existing guard, or of insurrection, did not require 
a compliance with the call — the event verified the sound- 
ness of the opinion. 

" These are all the calls for the militia which are known 
to have been made, and it is believed it can be shown, that 
the omission to place the militia in the service of the Uni- 
ted States was a matter of form rather than of fact — that 
the protection of the country was never for a moment 
abandoned, and that the militia were assembled and in 
readiness to act, whenever emergencies appeared to re- 
quire them, that the arrangements adopted were judicious, 
and in several instances predicated upon the wishes of the 
officers of the United States, or of those who had the con- 
fidence of the general government." — 

The authorities of Massachusetts and Connecticut have 
been so often charged with having refused to order out 
the militia of those states, upon the call of the President 
of the United States, and they have been go frequently and 
so loudly reproached for this conduct, that there are good 
reasons for believing that a great proportion of the inhabi- 
tants of the United States, and especially that large num- 
ber of them who have come upon the stage of active life 
since the close of the war of 1812, have been fully im- 
pressed with the idea that the militia of those states were 
never in the field during the war, but were entirely w ith- 
held from the i)ublic service. The facts which have been 
stated will serve to remove such an impression, wherever 
it may exist. The militia were never withheld from the 
public service, but in both states, when the exigencies of 
the times required, were in large numbers in the field. 
And in Connecticut, they were not merely encamped for 
the purpose of preventing or repelling invasion, but they 
were out in large numbers, for two successive seasons, for 



•4J 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 285 

the purpose of defending the property of the United States, 
and preventing the destruction of the squadron of armed 
ships in the harbour of New-London. The refusal of the 
governors of those states to order out the niihtia, at the 
requisition of General Dearborn, in 1812, was on widely 
different ground. That ground has been already alluded 
to. It was solely because an attempt was made to take 
the militia away from their own officers, and to place them 
under the command of officers of the United States, thus 
depriving the states of their natural defenders, and the 
militia of their constitutional right, and in fact incorpora- 
ting them into the standing army. Probably they were 
induced to take this course, by a wish to change the char- 
acter of the war from defensive to offensive ; and to ac- 
complish this object, the absurd and ridiculous project of 
attempting to conquer the Canadas was devised. The 
result proved, that the character of the war was not easily 
altered. The first campaigns on that frontier, showed it 
to be as truly defensive on the inland frontier, as it was 
upon the Atlantic coast. 

There was nothing in the mode of conducting the war 
that was in the slightest degree calculated to secure the 
confidence of the country, and especially of that part of 
it where it was the most unpopular. Neither the plan of 
general operations, nor the character of the men appointed 
to carry them into effect, had any tendency to convince the 
opponents of the war, that it would prove to be either ho- 
nourable or advantageous to the United States. The mili- 
tary operations against Upper Canada, which was the first 
object of hostile movements, were not only disastrous, but 
in the highest degree disgraceful. One army, with its 
commander-in-chief, was captured almost without firing a 
shot ; and very little reputation was gained the first season 
along the whole line of the inland frontier. 

Instances of great bravery and good conduct occasion- 
ally occurred; but nothing appeared which manifested dis- 



28G HISTORY OF THE 

tinguished military talents, skill, or experience. In the 
President's message at the opening of Congress in Novem- 
ber, ]812, it is said — 

"With these blessings [that is health, plenty, &c.] are 
mingled the pressures and vicissitudes incident to the state 
of war into which the United States have been forced, by 
the perseverance of a foreign power in its system of injus- 
tice and aggression. 

"Previous to its declaration it was deemed proper, as a 
measure of precaution and forecast, that a considerable 
force should be placed in the Michigan territory, with a 
general view to its security, and, in the event of war, such 
operations in the uppermost Canada as would intercept 
the hostile influence of Great Britain over the savages, 
obtain the command of the lake on which that part of 
Canada borders, and maintain co-operating relations with 
such forces as might be most conveniently employed against 
other parts. Brigadier General Hull was charged with 
this provisional service; having under his command a body 
of troops, composed of regulars, and of volunteers from 
the state of Ohio. Having reached his destination after 
his knowledge of the war, and possessing discretionary 
authority to act offensively, he passed into the neighbouring 
territory of the enemy, with a prospect of easy and victo- 
rious progress. 'Vhe expedition nevertheless terminated 
unfortunately, not only in a retreat to the town and fort of 
Detroit, but in the surrender of both, and of the gallant 
corps commanded by that officer. The causes of this pain- 
ful reverse will be investigated by a military tribunal. 

" Our expectation of gaining the command of the lakes, 
by the invasion of Canada from Detroit, having been dis- 
appointed, measures were instantly taken to provide on 
them a naval force su])erior to that of the enemy. From 
the talents and activity of the officer charged with this 
object, every thing that can be done may be expected. 
Should the present season not admit of complete success. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 287 

the progress made will ensure for the next a naval ascen- 
dancy, uhere it is essential to our permanent peace with, 
and control over the savages." 

The mortification arising from the disasters on the 
Canada frontier, were in some measure alleviated by the 
success of some of our armed ships upon the ocean. The 
victory obtained by the frigate Constitution, under the 
command of Captain Hull, over the British frigate Guer- 
riere, in the month of August, had a tendency to soothe 
the irritable feelings of the administration, as well as those 
of their friends who were ardently devoted to the prose- 
cution of the war. Other brilliant achievements at sea 
occurred, in a high degree honourable to our naval cha- 
racter ; but the capture of a few armed ships was calcu- 
lated rather to prolong, than to shorten the contest ; and 
to heighten, rather than allay the fears of the states upon 
the sea-coast, of hostile visits and depredations from the 
enemy. 

No doubt can rest on any mind, that the government of 
the United States expected to make a serious impression 
on Great Britain, by carrying the war into the British 
provinces. It appears by the above quotation from the 
President's message, that General Hull was entrusted 
" with discretionary pov.'ers to act offensively," and that 
the object was to get " the command of the lakes by the 
invasion of Canada from Detroit." And this may serve 
to explain the reasons why orders were given to General 
Dearborn, at so early a stage of the war, to march the 
regular troops away from the Atlantic coast to the Canada 
frontier, leaving the former entirely exposed to the inva- 
sions of the enemy, unless repelled by the forces of the 
individual states adjoining that coast. Eventually those 
invasions were made. It has been seen that Savbrook 
and Stonington in Connecticut were the subjects of them, 
and attempts were made to effect landings at other places 
bordering upon Long Island Sound. In Massachusetts, 



288 HISTORY OF THE 

Casline, Machias, and Eastport, in the District of Maine, 
were all taken possession oi' by British forces, and the 
adjoining- country, to a considerable extent, was threat- 
ened with subjugation, and of course was kept in a state 
of great alarm and apprehension. 

In 1814, when invasions had actually occurred, and de- 
predations were threatened along the New-England coast, 
an 1 those states were left to depend exclusively upon their 
own means of defence, while the burdens arising from the 
military arrangements for their own security were becom- 
ing more and more severe, at such a moment, when the 
legal pecuniary demands of the government were fully 
exacted, the supplies and pay of the militia were with- 
drawn by the orders of the national government, and the 
whole weight of supporting them was, in a petulant fit of 
resentment, thrown upon the states. By this time defen- 
sive measures had become absolutely necessary, not only 
to secure the property, but the persons of the inhabitants 
along the coast. The character of the war, whether that 
war was originally necessary or unnecessary, just or un- 
just, had ceased to be an object of discussion or considera- 
tion. The inhabitants of the states where the declaration 
of war had been most pointedly condemned, were now 
placed in situations where considerations of a different 
nature came home with full force to their circumstances 
and feelings. Self-defence, the protection of their families 
and fire-sides, became objects of immediate and pressing 
necessity to the people near the Atlantic shore; and no 
sacrifices of a pecuniary nature, or of personal feeling, 
could stand in the way of individual or domestic security. 
It would not be practicable, without far transcending 
the limits of this work, to give a minute and circumstan- 
tial history of the manner in which the military operations 
in the New-England states were conducted. In July, 
1813, the British squadron ofl' New-London was rein- 
forced by the addition of several armed vessels, and con- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. -289 

sisted of two ships of the line, two frigates, a. brig, and a 
number of transports. This, of course, excited great 
alarm among the inhabitants, as that city was far more 
exposed to an attack from the water, than the ships be- 
longing to Decatur's squadron. On the first week in July 
Governor Smith had been employed in detaching a body 
of militia to New-London, and had left Hartford, the seat 
of government, for his residence in the western part of the 
state, when he received information from General Bur- 
beck, the United States officer commanding at New-Lon- 
don, informing him that orders had been received from the 
Secretary of War for the discharge of the militia at that 
place. In less than a week after the receipt of the order, 
and the consequent dismission of the troops, the additional 
force which has been mentioned, arrived, and joined the 
British squadron. The alarm produced by this event, and 
the exposure of the city of New-London to an attack, in- 
duced General Burbeckto dispatch an express to Governor 
Smith, and request a detachment of militia for the protec- 
tion of that city. A similar application was made on be- 
half of the inhabitants of New-London; and orders were 
immediately issued for a strong body of the militia to re- 
pair to that station. On the 20th of the same month 
Governor Smith convened the council, to confer with them 
on the state of affairs, and to submit to them the measures 
he had adopted in the emergency which had so recently 
occurred. They unanimously approved of his conduct^; 
and advised him to detach an additional body of mf?n for 
the defence of New-London. 

How this dismission of the militia, and the subsequent 
sudden call for a new detachment, all occurring within the 
compass of a single week, is to be accounted for, has not 
been explained. Whether it was owing to a fit of caprice, 
or to some other cause which it was thought on the score 
of prudence required concealment, remains among the 
mysteries of the period. Until an explanation is made, 

37 



290 HISTORY OF THE 

the public must be left to form their own conclusions. To 
whatever other cause it may be ascribed, no person will 
charge it to the account of an eager solicitude, on the part 
of the national government, to protect the inhabitants on 
the sea-coast of the state, against the inroads of the 
enemy. 

In his speech at the opening of the session of the gene- 
ral assembly of that state in October, 1813, Governor 
Smith alluded to the occurrences which have been men- 
tioned, in the following manner — 

" The cause which first occasioned the array of a mi- 
litary force at New-London has not ceased to operate. 
Accordingly, at the request of the general government, a 
considerable body of fcroops has been kept at that station, 
I have endeavoured, conformably to the advice of the 
council, to divide the duty between the militia and the 
military corps, and to spread detachments of the former 
over the several brigades. To men, however, who are 
accustomed to different pursuits, the service could not be 
otherwise than burdensome. The remark is particularly 
applicable to the regiments in the neighbourhood of New- 
London. From their proximity to the scene of action, they 
were of course first brought into the field, and although 
they were dismissed as speedily as circumstances would 
permit, yet the frequent alarms, produced by sudden aug- 
mentation of the enemy's force, as frequently compelled 
them to return. They have therefore suffered losses and 
privations which could be equalled only by the patience 
and magnanimity with which they were endured. Their 
hardships were unhappily increased by an occurrence, 
which, as it is intimately connected with these events, ought 
not to pass unnoticed. An order from the war depart- 
ment for the dismission of all the militia then on duty, 
arrived at the moment a detachment from the distant bri- 
gades was on the march to relieve those who had been so 
repeatedly called into service. Believing the general go- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 2dl 

vernment had the right of determining what degree of 
force would suffice to protect the national property, and 
unwilling to obtrude the services of our citizens upon the 
public when they were not desired, especially in a season 
so very important to our husbandmen, I issued instruc- 
tions giving full effect to the order. Scarcely however 
had the disbanded troops reached their several homes, be- 
fore a request for the militia was renewed, enforced by an 
urgent petition from the principal inhabitants of New- 
London and Groton. This combined application I felt no 
disposition to refuse. The requisite aid was immediately 
ordered : but from the necessity of the case, men who had 
been just discharged, were obliged to repair again to the 
post of danger, and to remain until a new detachment 
could be levied and brought to their relief. The ground 
of this procedure is hitherto unexplained." 

In the course of the session, a joint committee of the 
two houses was appointed to take into consideration the 
subject of the war, who made a report, from which the 
following passage is copied — 

" The committee cannot forbear to express their opinion 
on a subject intimately connected with the object of their 
appointment. They consider the general plan of warfare 
adopted by the Administration of the National Govern- 
ment, as not conformable to the spirit of the constitution 
of the United States. That instrument was formed, and 
adopted, among other things, for the express purpose 

OF PROVIDING FOR THE COMMON DEFENCE OF THE NA- 
TION. The war in which we are now engaged, was de- 
clared hy the government of the United States. The con- 
test is with a nation possessed of an immense naval force, 
and capable of annoying us in no other manner than by 
means of that force. To its attacks a long extent of sea- 
coast, stretching from one extremity of the nation to the 
other, and containing a vast proportion of its population 
and wealth, was peculiarly exposed. Against the dangers 



292 HISTORY OF THE 

and calamities of a war thus declared, and with such an 
enemy, the inhabitants of the cities, towns, villages, and 
plantations along that coast, had an undoubted and impe- 
rative right to such protection as the nation could provide 
Instead of which, the regular forces have been, almost 
without exception, ordered away from the Atlantic fron- 
tier, to the interior of the country, for the purpose of car- 
rying hostilities into the territory of unoffending provinces, 
and in pursuit of conquests, which, if achieved, would pro- 
bably produce no solid benefit to the nation ; while the sea- 
coast is left exposed to the multiplied horrors usually pro- 
duced by an invading and exasperated enemy." 

The events and transactions of 1814, immediately con- 
nected with the military operations in Connecticut, have 
been already adverted to. The burthens thrown upon the 
New-England states at the commencement of the war in 
1812, had been increasing in weight and severity through 
the two following years, until, by the refusal of the na- 
tional government to fin-nish supplies and pay for the 
troops employed in the defence of the coast, and particu- 
larly in Connecticut to protect the naval squadron near 
New-London, had become nearly intolerable. In the 
meantime the national government, embarrassed by the 
fruits of their own rashness, in declaring war when they 
were totally unprepared with the means of carrying it on 
with the least prospect of success, were driven to the ne- 
cessity of raising money by loans, and this at an extrava- 
gant rate of premiums to the lenders. As a large portion 
of the wealth of the country was in the hands of men who 
considered the war not only unnecessary but unjust, appli- 
cation was of course made to this description of persons to 
advance the means of defraying the expenses to which it 
necessarily subjected the government. Voluntary loans by 
individuals who viewed the controversy in the light which 
has been alluded to, were to a gif!^t extent declined, and 
much clamour was raised, throughout a large part of the 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 293 

country, against them, for their want of patriotism in this 
course of conduct. It is a little remarkable that a charge 
of this description should be preferred, under the circum- 
stances of the case, against individuals who were situated 
as the capitalists in the New-England states were. The 
government had, in their opinion, plunged the nation into 
a war unnecessarily, and without having previously made 
the requisite preparations for carrying it on with any rea- 
sonable hope of success. The war had exposed them to 
the most serious calamities from a naval enemy ; and to 
increase the evils under which they laboured, the govern- 
ment had withdrawn their troops from the sea-coast, 
more immediately liable to hostile visitation, and left them 
to defend themselves, or to suffer all the horrors of inva- 
sion, while the national forces which ought to have defend- 
ed and protected them, were despatched to a distant re- 
gion, on a quixotic expedition, after adventures in no way 
likely to raise the reputation of the government, or to pro- 
mote the substantial interests of the country. And to add 
to all these, during the year 1814, when the dangers were 
the most threatening, and the fears of the inhabitants on 
the coast were excited to the highest pitch, the govern- 
ment, in a fit of splenetic resentment, withheld all supplies 
of provisions and pay from the large bodies of militia thus 
forced into the field in .self-defence. It certainly was 
presuming much when that government called upon the 
wealthy men of the eastern states to lend them money to 
expend in attempts to subdue the British provinces, at 
the same moment that the families and firesides of the 
latter were exposed to the inroads and devastations of an 
exasperated foe. Nor would an appeal to the feelings of 
patriotism be likely to add much force to a call of this de- 
scription. 

But on what ground is it, that men are bound by feel- 
ings of patriotism, to lend their money to the government 
to carry on a war, the effects of which are in the most ex- 



294 HISTORY OF THE 

treme degree disastrous to them, and the principle of which 
they conscientiously an-d utterly condemn ? As good citi 
zens, they will of course yield obedience to the laws; and 
if the laws exact money from them to support the war, 
they will pay it. But voluntary loans stand upon a very 
different basis. As honest men, they cannot, consistently 
with their integrity, voluntarily contribute their aid in pro- 
secuting an unjust and unnecessary war, because such a 
course of conduct would involve them in the guilt, as well 
as the calamities of the controversy. Besides, is a man 
to be forced, under any circumstances, to lend money to 
his government ? The idea is incompatible with the plain- 
est principles of freedom. In the dark ages, the despotic 
sovereigns of Europe did not hesitate, by the most cruel 
tortures, to force one class of their subjects to advance 
them money, whenever they thought proper to make such 
a requisition. But in modern times, the practice of forc- 
ing contributions, from members of civilized communi- 
ties, is left exclusively to highway robbers and associa- 
tions of banditti. Civilized governments dare not raise 
money in this mode. On the broad principle of freedom, 
freemen have a perfect and unquestionable right to with- 
hold their contributions of money from any object, let the 
requisition proceed from what source it may. It has been 
urged in reference to this subject, that the character of the 
country was at stake, and every man was bound, let his 
political principles or feelings have been what they might, 
to bury those principles and feelings, and support the war, 
and save the reputation of the country. The opposers of 
the war viewed the matter in a somewhat different light. 
The administration of the national government, and their 
immediate partizans and supporters, made the war. It 
was their war, and not that of the country. A large por- 
tion of the country was opposed to it, and used every effort 
to prevent its occurrence. Their remonstrances were not 
listened to, and the war was declared. The responsibility 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 295 

of it, therefore, rested upon those who brought it upon the 
nation. It was not, then, the character of the country 
that was at stake, except so far as the country was respon- 
sible for the acts of its government — but it was the cha- 
racter of the administration. It is probable that the oppo- 
sers of the war did not, under the pecuhar circumstances 
of the case, consider themselves bound to make any extra- 
ordinary efforts or sacrifices to save the reputation of an 
administration in whom they never placed confidence, and 
whose misuse of the powers with which they had been en- 
trusted, had reduced them to a state of great peril, and 
subjected them to the most lively apj)rehensions. The 
principle contended for by those who claimed it to be the 
duty of capitalists, whether they approved or disapproved 
of the war, upon the broad ground of public spirit and pa- 
triotism to advance their money to carry on the war, may 
be brought to a test respecting which there is very little 
room for mistake. Laws were passed early in the contro- 
versy, authorising the government to accept the services 
of volunteer troops. Probably such services were offered 
in a variety of instances ; but did any man ever pretend 
that the great body of the militia throughout the Union, 
were bound, by a regard to the character of the country, 
voluntarily to shoulder their muskets and march into the 
field .'' It is certain that men are of more importance in a 
war than even money, because the latter is wanted almost 
exclusively for the purpose of obtaining the former. But 
what proportion even of the able-bodied tnen of the United 
States, who were the supporters of the administration, and 
of course of the war, ever tendered their personal services 
in the field to the government ? And who ever thouo^ht of 
reproaching and reviling them, because they preferred 
staying at home, to risking their lives in the camp, as ene- 
mies to their country, or even as wanting in the proper 
feelings of patriotism ? When the war in Europe was 
brought to a close by the downfall of Bonaparte, and the 



296 HISTORY OF THE 

overthrow of his imperial power and tyranny, then the au- 
thors of the war hetween the United States and Great 
Britain became seriously alarmed for their popularity, as 
well as for the safety of the country. Under the excite- 
ment which their well grounded fears for their own safe- 
ty produced, they made every exertion in their power to 
enlist the nation at large in the contest. The means 
adopted for this purpose, were not of the most rej)utable 
kind. Instances of gross imposition upon the people at 
large are exhibited in the course of this work, which will 
justify this assertion ; while the original policy which led to 
the war, and the objects for which it was professedly de- 
clared, must satisfy every reasonable and dispassionate 
mind, that its character was not national. In addition to 
this, the fact that it was political, and intended to answer 
the purposes of politicians of a daring and ambitious cha- 
racter, was well known at the time to those most inti- 
mately acquainted with the public affairs of the nation. 

In the course of the year 1814, the progress of the war 
upon the sea-coast became in the highest degree alarming 
and destructive. It appeared to be the object of the Bri- 
tish to render hostilities as distressing to the inhabitants, 
especially upon the southern division of the Union, as the 
ravages of invading armies could make them. It is not 
the object of this work to give a history of the war. The 
subject is alluded to for the purpose of showing how mise- 
rably it was conducted on the part of the United States, 
and how the inhabitants along the Atlantic shore were left 
exposed to its depredations and miseries, while the na- 
tional government were either totally unable, or not dis- 
posed to yield them any protection. In the month of 
August, having entire command of the Chesapeake Bay, 
the British landed a force in the state of Maryland, and 
moved forward towards the city of Washington, the seat 
of the United States government. An attempt was made 
by the militia of that state to resist them, particularly at 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 297 

Bladensburgh, but without success ; and their progress 
towards the capital was so rapid, that the President, and 
other high officers of the government, were under the ne- 
cessity of fleeing into the country with great precipitation, 
to avoid falHng into the hands of the enemy. During the 
time in which they held possession of the city of Washing- 
ton, they destroyed the public buildings, and committed 
other depredations, in a manner and to an extent, that 
would have better characterized an armed body of Van- 
dals, than the well disciplined forces of a modern civilized 
government. At the same time, a squadron of armed 
ships sailed up the Potomac, and took possession of the 
city of Alexandria, where they contented themselves with 
carrying away all public and private naval stores, the 
shipping then in port, and merchandise of every descrip- 
tion. These enterprises were followed by an attack upon 
the city of Baltimore, where the British were repulsed 
with considerable loss ; and among the officers who were 
killed on that occasion, was General Ross, the command- 
ing officer of the expedition. It was also well understood, 
that the plan of their operations included attacks upon the 
other principal cities and towns upon the sea-coast, such 
as Charleston, Savannah, &.c. and the character of the 
war was rapidly degenerating into a system of barbarous 
invasion of towns and villages, the plundering of private 
inhabitants, and the burning of vessels, stores, «fcc. and 
spreading ruin and desolation along the sea-shore. 

The disasters of 1814 showed, in the most conclusive 
manner, the incapacity, or indisposition of the national 
government to protect the country against the calamities 
brought upon it by the war into which they had plunged it ; 
and the uncivilized manner in which it was carried on dur- 
ing that year, greatly alarmed the fears of the people, who 
could not but see that the inhabitants more immediately 
exposed to the inroads of naval squadrons, were in danger 
of experiencing the most severe misfortunes and sufferings 

38 



298 HISTORY OF THE 

And what added much to the general anxiety, was the 
publication of a message from the President to congress, 
in the month of October of that year, containing an ac- 
count from the American commissioners for negotiating 
peace at Ghent, of the extravagant demands of tlie British 
commissioners, of certain principles as the basis of nego- 
tiation. By a despatch from the former, dated August 
19th, 1814, it was stated, that it was demanded as a sine 
qua non on the part of Great Biitam, that the Indians who 
had been engaged in hostilities on the side of that nation, 
and against the United States, " should be included in the 
pacification ; and as incident thereto, the boundaries of 
their territories should be permanently established." The 
object of this requisition was stated to be, "that the 
Indians should remain as a permanent barrier between 
our western settlements and the adjacent British pro- 
vinces, to prevent them from being conterminous to each 
other : and that neither the United States nor Great Bri- 
tain should ever thereafter have the right to purchase or 
acquire any part of the territory, thus recognized as be- 
longing to the Indians." 

It was stated further, that there should be a revision of 
the boundary line between the dominions of Great Britain 
and the United States ; and in explanation of this requisi- 
tion, it was said that — " Experience had proved that the 
joint possession of the lakes, and a right, common to both na- 
tions, to keep tip a naval force on them, necessarily produced 
collisions, and rendered peace insecure. As Great Britain 
could not be supposed to expect to make conquests in that 
quarter, and as that province was essentially weaker than 
the United States, and exposed to invasion, it was neces- 
sary for its security that Great Britain should require that 
the United States shoidd hereafter keep no armed naval force 
on the tvestern lakes, from Lake Ontario to Lake Superior y 
both inclusive ; that they should not erect any fortified or mi- 
litary post or establishment on the shores of those lakes ; and 



:&i 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 299 

that they should not maintain those u-hich are already exist- 
ing. This must be considered, they said, as a moderate 
demand, since Great Britain, if she had not disclaimed 
the intention of any increase of territory, might, with pro- 
priety, have asked a cession of the adjacent American 
shores. The commercial navigation and intercourse would 
be left on the same footing as heretofore. It was ex- 
pressly stated, in answer to a question (by the American 
commissioners) that Great Britain was to retain the right 
of having an armed naval force on those lakes, and of 
holding military posts and establishments on their shores." 

This last demand, respecting the exclusive occupation 
of the lakes, was not stated as a sine qua non; the British 
commissioners, when inquired of respecting that point, 
declined giving a positive answer. 

The message and documents relating to this subject, so 
far as the executive thought proper to make them public, 
were published without delay ; and as was doubtless ex- 
pected and intended, they excited much feeling through- 
out the Union. Not an individual in the United States, 
however decidedly he might originally have been opposed 
to the declaration of war, and however strongly he might 
have disapproved the general policy and measures of the 
administration, could fail of rejecting such extravagant 
demands as the basis of a treaty of peace. Overlooking 
what had passed, there was a general determination to 
resist such a requisition at every hazard. Some other 
facts relating to this subject, of which the community at 
large have, even to this day, been kept in ignorance, may 
now with much propriety be adverted to. A letter from 
Washington, dated October 15th, 1814, from a gentleman 
of the highest respectability, and directed to his friend, 
contains the following passage — 

" The instructions to our commissioners were communi- 
cated and read on the 14th. They are voluminous, and 
contain a great deal of reasoning. The greatest part are 



300 HISTORY OF THE 

ordered to he printed. The subjects of blockade and impress- 
ment, after the fall of Bonaparte, were entirely abandoned. 
With respect to security on the lakes, our commissioners were 
instructed to make the same demands of the British, as they 
have made on us — that is, that the British shall keep no force 
there, iDhile ine might keep as large a force as ice thought 
proper. Some of the party say, that the British must have 

had a knowledge of these instructions, and that , 

instead of finding out other people's secrets at London, 
has probably lost his own." 

It is doubted whether a more singular occurrence than 
this ever took place in the history of any government. The 
war was declared against Great Britain, at a time, and 
under circumstances as irritating to that government, as 
can well be imagined. It was also against the decided 
opinions and feelings of a large portion of our own coun- 
trymen. But events had occurred which had changed the 
face of things, and gave that nation the vantage ground 
against us ; and it therefore became necessary to excite 
the resentment of the people of the United States, and 
unite them in opposition to the extravagant demands of 
the enemy as the price of peace. For those purposes the 
instructions containing these demands, were communicat- 
ed to Congress, and the country, as the sine qua non, the 
only basis on which Great Britain would consent to nego- 
tiate for a treaty of peace ; and as has been remarked, it 
produced the intended effect — the country was greatly ex- 
cited, and manifested a determination, under no circum- 
stances, to yield to such requisitions. Now it seems that 
though \xe declared the war, and were in a state of alarm 
for the result, yet onr commissioners were instructed to make 
the same extravagant demands of the British, that they 
made of us ; but the instructions to our commissioners 
were never presented to the British negotiators, and were 
kept back from the public, while those of the British were 
distributed through the country, to rouse the public indig- 



^'J 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 301 

nation. Nor have the instructions relating to this particu- 
lar subject ever been published to this time. 

The facts now disclosed warrant the belief, that the 
British government had, by some means or other, become 
acquainted with the nature of the instructions to our com- 
missioners, and therefore shaped theirs to meet them. 
But the British commissioners having disclosed their in- 
structions, ours had address enough to keep their own out 
of sight, doubtless for the purpose of enabling the Presi- 
dent to produce a strong effect upon the public mind, and 
to induce all descriptions of people to unite in opposition 
to such extravagant demands. The effect was produced; 
but it was the result of a gross imposition, not to say 
fraud, upon the people of the United States. 

The situation in which the state of Connecticut was 
placed early in the year 1814, may be in some measure 
ascertained from the following extract from the speech 
delivered by Governor Smith to the legislature of that 
state, at the opening of their session in the month of May. 

" I am not informed that any effectual arrangements 
are made by the national government to put our sea-coast 
into a more respectable state of defence. Should the plan 
of the last campaign be revived, and especially should the 
war retain the desolating character it has been made to 
assume, the states on the Atlantic border cannot be insen- 
sible to the dangers which await them. ' To provide for 
the common defence' was an avowed, and it may with 
truth be said the chief purpose for which the present con- 
stitution was formed. How far this object is promoted by 
aiming at foreign conquest, and resigning our most wealthy 
and populous frontier to pillage and devastation, becomes 
a momentous inquiry. Whatever measures, gentlemen, 
you may think proper to adopt on the occasion, I feel as- 
sured they will flow from an equal regard to your own 
rights and to the interests of the Union. In any event, I 
am persuaded that we shall place no reliance on the for- 



302 HISTORY OF THE 

bearance of a declared enemy, and that if the aid to which 
we are entitled is withheld, the means which God has 
given us will be faithfully employed for our safety. 

"It is with concern I lay before you an official account 
of the destruction of a very considerable number of pri- 
vate vessels at Saybrook, by a detachment from the British 
squadron. The misfortune is embittered by the reflection 
that it would probably have been prevented by a small 
force stationed at Fort Fenwick, at the entrance of Con- 
necticut river. It will be recollected that a guard, autho- 
rised by the United States, was kept at that post nearly the 
whole of the last season. It was dismissed early in De- 
cember. Information of the exposed condition of these 
vessels, and of the consequent apprehensions of the town 
for its own safety, was duly transmitted to the war depart- 
ment, and the attention of the government to the impor- 
tant objects was earnestly solicited. It was presumed, as 
there were regular troops in the vicinity, either that the 
request would be promptly complied with, or if such an 
arrangement was inconvenient, that this government would 
be frankly and seasonably apprized of it. In the latter 
event the force of the state would have been applied not 
less readily to the protection of the persons and property 
of our citizens, than it had been to the defence of the na- 
tional squadron. Under these circumstances then existing, 
the Council, whom I particularly consulted, could not think 
it adviseable for the state government to interfere." 

The war having been declared for the reasons assisfned, 
and hostilities having commenced, and prosecuted, it has 
not been an object of importance to trace the course of 
the administration with regard to the mode of conducting 
it, but to ascertain the principles on fVhich they would be 
willing to bring it to a close. It will be borne in mind, 
that immediately after the declaration of war was pub- 
lished, and long before the news of that event could have 
reached England, the orders in council were repealed by 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 303 

the British government, leaving no other acknowledo-ed 
cause of war except the subject of impressment. The 
strong language used by the President, and the Secretary 
of State, on various occasions, has been noticed. After 
the offer of mediation by the emperor of Russia, the Pre- 
sident, professing to entertain no doubts that Great Britain 
would accede to the proposition, nominated commissioners 
to negotiate under that mediation, and furnished them with 
a long set of instructions, relative to the formation of a 
treaty of peace. Those instructions related principally to 
the subject of impressment. In the course of them it is 
said — "I have to repeat, that the great object which you 
have to secure, in regard to impressment, is, that our fla^' 
shall protect the crew:' — Again — "Upon the whole subject 
I have to observe, that your first duty will be to conclude 
a peace with Great Britain, and that you are authorized to 
do it, in case yon obtain a satisfactory stipulation against iin- 
prcssment, one which shall secure, under our flag, protection to 
the crew. The manner in which it may be done has been 
already stated, with the reciprocal stipulations which you 
may enter into, to secure Great Britain against the injury 
of which she complains. If this encroachment of Great 
Britain is not provided against, the United States have ap- 
pealed to arms in vain. If your efforts to accomplish it 
should fail, all further negotiations will cease, and you will 
return home without delay.'' 

These instructions bear date April 15th, 1813. 

The British government having declined the offer of 
Russian mediation, a proposition was made to open a ne- 
gotiation at Gottenburg. This having been agreed to, in- 
structions were made out to the United States commission- 
ers accordingly. In those instructions, after a reference 
to those previously given, when it was supposed the nego- 
tiations would have been held at St. Petersburgh, and a 
declaration that they were to be considered as applicable, 
except where modified by the present, to the negotiations 



304 HISTORY OF THE 

about to take place; the following passage occurs — "On 
impressment, as to the right of the United States to be 
exempted from it, I have nothing new to add. The senti- 
ments of the President have undergone no change on that im- 
portant subject. This degrading practice must cease; our 
jlag must protect the crew, or the United States cannot con- 
sider themselves an independent nation.'''' 

On the I4th of February, 1814, additional instructions 
were forwarded to the commissioners, in which the follow- 
ing passage appears — " By an article in the former in- 
structions, you were authorised in making a treaty to pre- 
vent impressment from our vessels, to stipulate, provided 
a certain specified term could not be agreed on, that it 
might continue in force for the present war in Europe 
only. At that time it seemed probable that the war might 
last many years. Recent appearances, however, indicate 
the contrary. Should peace be made in Europe, as the 
practical evil of which we complain in regard to impress- 
ment would cease, it is presumed the British government 
would have less objection to a stipulation to forbear that 
practice for a specified term, than it would have, should 
the war continue. In concluding a peace with Great Bri- 
tain, even in case of a previous general peace in Europe, 
it is important to the United States to obtain such a stipu- 
lation." 

It will be recollected, that the letter from which the pre 
ceding passage is copied, was written after the failure of 
Bonaparte's Russian expedition, and the disastrous retreat 
of his forces from Moscow. On the 24th of March, 1814, 
the Secretary of State wrote a short letter to the commis- 
sioners, in which he says — " If a satisfactory arrangement 
can be concluded with Great Britain, the sooner it can be 
accomplished the happier for both countries. If such an 
arrangement cannot be obtained, it is important for the 
United States to be acquainted with it without delay." 

When the war was declared by the United States, in 



HARTFORD COiWENTION- 305 

1812, Bonaparte was just preparing to invade Russia with 
an immense army, and with every expectation of hum- 
bUng, at least, if not of dethroning the sovereign of that 
vast and powerful empire. It requires the exercise of 
much charity towards this government to believe that they 
did not seize that opportunity to throw their weight into 
the scale against Great Britain, who was supporting Rus- 
sia against France, and whose influence and power had up 
to that time prevented the absolute subjugation of the 
whole continent of Europe by the French. Hence it may 
be accounted for, that after the defeat which the ambi- 
. tious emperor of that nation experienced in Russia, the 
tone of the United States government so suddenly changed 
on the subject of the negotiations for peace, and the still 
greater change after he was dethroned in 1814. This 
will be manifest from the style of the letter just quoted, 
and still more so from one from the Secretary of State to 
the commissioners, dated June 25th, 1814 — 

"It is impossible, with the lights which have reached 
us, to ascertain the present disposition of the British go- 
vernment towards an accommodation with the United 
States. We think it probable that the late events in 
France may have had a tendency to increase its preten- 
sions. 

"At war with Great Britain, and injured by France, 
the United States have sustained the attitude founded on 
those relations. No reliance was placed on the good 
offices of France, in bringing the war with Great Britain 
to a satisfactory conclusion. Looking steadily to an ho- 
nourable peace, and the ultimate attainment of justice 
from both powers, the President has endeavoured, by a 
consistent and honourable policy, to take advantage of every 
circumstame that might projiwtc that result. He, neverthe- 
less, knew that France held a place in the political system of 
Europe and of the world, which, as a check on England, 
could not fail to he useful to us. What eftect the late events 

39 



306 HISTORY OF THE 

may have had, in these respects, is the important circum*- 
stance of which you are doubtless better informed than we 
can be. 

" It was inferred from the general policy of Russia, and 
the friendly sentiments and interposition of the emperor, 
that a respect for both would have much influence, with 
the British cabinet, in promoting a pacific policy towards 
us. The manner, however, in which it is understood that 
a general pacification is taking place ; the influence Great 
Britain may have in modifying the arrangements involved 
in it ; the resources she may be able to employ exclusively 
against the United States ; and the uncertainty of the 
precise course which Russia may pursue in relation to the 
war between the United States and Great Britain, natu- 
rally claim attention, and raise the important question, in 
reference to the subject of impressment, on which it is pre- 
sumed your negotiations will essentially turn, whether 
your powers ought not to be enlarged, so as to enable you 
to give to those circumstances all the weight to which they 
rnay be entitled. On full consideration, it has been de- 
cided, that in case no stipulation can be obtained from the 
British government at this moment, when its pretensions 
may have been mucli heightened by recent events, and 
the state of Europe be most favourable to them, either 
relinquishing the claim to impress from American vessels, 
or discontinuing the practice, even in consideration of the 
proposed exclusion from them of British seixmen, you may 
concur in an article, stipulating, that the subject of impress- 
ment, together with that of commerce between the two 
countries, be referred to separate negotiation, to be un- 
dertaken without delay, at such place as you may be able 
to agree on, preferring this city, if to be obtained." 

Two days after the date of the i)receding letter, viz. 
June 27th, 1814, the Secretary of State addressed a letter 
to the American commissioners, in which is the folIowing^ 
passage — 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 307 

" On mature consideration it has been decided, that 
under all the circumstances above aUuded to, incident tea 
prosecution of the war, you may omil any stipulation on the 
subject of impressment, if found indispensably necessary to 
terminate it. You will, of course, not recur to this expe- 
dient until all your eflbrts to adjust the controversy in a 
more satisfactory manner have failed. As it is not the 
intention of the United States, in suffering' the treaty to be 
silent on the subject of impressment, to admit the British 
claim thereon, or to relinquish that of the United Slates, 
it is highly important that any such inference be entirely 
precluded, by a declaration or protest in some form or 
other, that the omission is not to have any such effect or 
tendency. Any modification of the practice to prevent 
abuses, being an acknowledgment of the right in Great 
Britain, is utterly inadmissible." 

On the 11th of August, 1814, the Secretary of State, 
in a letter to the commissioners, says — "By my letters of 
the 25th and 27th of June, of which another copy is now 
forwarded, the sentiments of the President, as to the con- 
ditions on which it will be proper for you to conclude a 
treaty of peace^ are made known to you. It is presumed 
that either in the mode suggested in my letter of the 25th 
of June, which is much preferred, or by permitting the 
treaty to be silent on the subject, as is authorized in the 
letter of the 27th of June, the question of impressment 
may be so disposed of, as to form no obstacle to a pacifi- 
cation. This government can go no further, because it will 
make no sacrifice of the rights or honour of the nation." 

It is worthy of notice, that the negotiations between the 
British and American commissioners, related almost exclu- 
sively to subjects which had no connection with the causes 
of the war. The declaration of war was founded on the 
orders in council, and impressment. The first were re- 
pealed within a week from the date of the declaration of 
war, leaving nothing to contend about but impressment. 



308 HISTORY OF THE 

In one of the earliest communications from the commis- 
sioners of the United States to those of Great Britain, 
when the negotiations opened at Ghent, and which was 
dated the 24th of August, 1814, is contained the following 
passage — " The causes of the war between the United States 
and Great Britain having disappeared hy the maritime paci- 
fication of Europe, the government of the United States does 
not desire to continue it in defence of abstract principles, 
which have, for the present, ceased to have any practical effect. 
The undersigned have been accordingly instructed to agree 
to its termination, both parties restoring whatever they 
may have taken, and both reserving all their rights, in 
relation to their respective seamen." 

It is to be presumed that the commissioners made use 
of this language, in pursuance of the, powers contained in 
their instructions. But who will undertake to reconcile it 
with that adopted by the committee of foreign relations in 
January, 1813? Referring to the repeal of the orders of 
council in June, 1812, as having removed one of the causes 
of the war, leaving only that of impressment, the commit- 
tee say — "Had tlie executive consented to an armistice on 
the repeal of the orders in council, without a satisfactory 
provision against impressment, or a clear and distinct un- 
derstanding with the British government to that effect, 
your committee would not have hesitated to disapprove it. 
The impressment of our seamen being deservedly consid- 
ered a principal cause of the war, the war ought to be pro- 
secuted until that cause was removed." — " War having 
been declared, and the case of impressment being neces- 
sarily included as one of the most important causes, it is 
evident that it must be provided for in the pacification : 
the omission of it in a treaty of peace would not leave it 
on its former ground: it would in effect be an absolute 
relinquishment." — "It is an evil which ought not, which 
cannot be longer tolerated." — "It is incompatible with 
their (the United States) sovereignty. It is subversive of 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 309 

the main pillars of their independence. The forbearance 
of the United States under it has been mistaken for pusil- 
lanimity." 

Notwithstanding these, and many other specimens of 
strong language, and a professed predetermination, on the 
part of our government, to prosecute the war until a spe- 
cific agreement, in a formal treaty, should be obtained 
from Great Britain, renouncing both the right and the 
practice of impressment, the moment Bonaparte was over- 
thrown, and his power subverted, the subject dwindled into 
an abstract principle, not worth the trouble of further con- 
troversy. 

In September, 1814, Congress were convened by the 
executive at an earlier day than had been fixed at the pre- 
vious adjournment ; and on the 20th of that month the 
President's message was received by the houses. After 
alluding to the reasons for the early meeting, one of which 
was the manner in which the war was carried on, mani- 
festing a spirit of hostility more violent than ever, the Pre- 
sident remarks — 

" This increased violence is best explained by the two 
important circumstances, that the great contest in Europe, 
for an equilibrium guarantying all its states against the 
ambition of any, has been closed without any check on 
the overbearing power of Great Britain on the ocean ; and 
that it has left in her hands disposable armaments, with 
which, forgetting the difficulties of a remote war against 
a free people, and yielding to the intoxication of success, 
with the example of a great victim to it before her eyes, 
she cherishes hopes of still further aggrandizing a power 
already formidable in its abuses to the tranquillity of the 
civilized and commercial world. 

" But, whatever may have inspired the enemy with 
these more violent purposes, the public councils of a na- 
tion, more able to maintain than it was to acquire its in- 
dependence, and with a devotion to it, rendered more 



310 HISTORY OF THE 

ardent by the experience of its blessings, can never deli- 
berate but on the means most effectual for defeatini^ the 
extravagant views or unwarrantable passions with which 
alone the war can now be pursued against us." 

It is very apparent from the language above cited, that 
President Madison had become seriously alarmed by the 
course of events in Europe, the downfall of Bonaparte, 
and the destruction of his imperial despotism, and that he 
therefore considered it necessary to excite the country to 
make more vigorous exertions in carrying on the war, the 
folly and fruitlessness of which now stared him full in the 
face. That he expected the war would render powerful 
assistance in the accomplishment of the great object which 
the French emperor had in view — viz. the humiliation, if 
not the absolute subjugation of Great Britain, cannot be 
doubted. And that the disappointment in liis expecta- 
tions from this quarter not only mortified, but alarmed 
him, is very apparent. " The closing of the great contest 
in Europe," he says, " without producing any check on 
the overbearing power of Great Britain on the ocean, has 
left in her hands disposable armaments, with which, for- 
getting the difficulties of a remote war against a free peo- 
ple, she cherishes hopes of still further aggrandizing a 
power already formidable to the tranquillity of the civilized 
and commercial world." That our government expected 
to have an important agency in producing that check to 
the power of Great Britain, when they undertook the war, 
nobody who is acquainted with the history and circum- 
stances of the case can doubt. But it is a little extraordi- 
nary that the President should allude to the war as if it 
were one for which they were responsible, apparently de- 
sirous of keeping out of sight the fact, that it was forced 
upon them by us, and that under circumstances calculated 
greatly to excite their feelings, and enkindle their resent- 
ment against this country. 

But the language of the next paragraph is still more 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 311 

extraordinary. The message, with apparent gratification, 
states, that as a nation, we were, in 1814, more able to 
maintain our itulcpendence than ice were originally to ac- 
quire it ; and that having experienced the blessings of in- 
dependence, we could deliberate on nothing " but the most 
effectual means of defeating the extravagant views and 
unwarrantable passions with which alone the war could 
be pursued against us." It was understood that the war, 
when declared, was to vindicate our rights, not to defend 
our independence. Whatever encroachments might have 
been committed against our neutral character, and those 
were the injuries complained of, there was no attempt 
on the part of Great Britain to destroy our national inde- 
pendence, and reduce us to the condition of colonies. If 
our political character as a foreign independent people was 
in danger, it was the effect of the indiscreet declaration of 
a war by our government, at a time when they were en- 
entirely unprepared to prosecute it with vigour, or with 
any reasonable prospect of success. And if at the end of 
the second year after the commencement of hostilities, in- 
stead of an oftensive, it had become a defensive war, it 
was in the most emphatical manner disgraceful to those 
by whom it was forced upon the country. 

After reviewing the events of the war, the message, in 
terms not the most explicit, but sufficiently clear, when 
taken in connection with other circumstances, to be un- 
derstood, speaks in the following language : — 

"To meet the extended and diversified warfare adopted 
by the enemy, great bodies of militia have been taken into 
service, for the public defence, and great expenses incur- 
red. That the defence every where may be; both more con- 
venient and more economical. Congress will see the ne- 
cessity of immediate measures for filling the ranks of the 
regular army^ and of enlarging the provision for special 
corps, mounted and unmounted, to be engaged for longer 
periods of service than are due from the militia. I ear- 



S12 HISTORY OF THE 

nestly renew, at the same time, a recommendation o^ such 
changes in the system of the militia, as by classing and dis- 
ciplining for the most prompt and active service the portions 
the most capahle of it, will give to that great resource for 
the pubhc safety, all the requisite energy and efficiency." 

This subject was referred by the house of representa- 
tives to the military committee, who of course applied to 
the Secretary of War for the purpose of ascertaining the 
views and wishes of the administration with regard to 
these suggestions. That office was then filled by James 
Monroe, afterwards President of the United States. Hav- 
ing but recently entered upon the duties of his office, he 
was not able to reply to the committee until the ITth of 
October, at which time he submitted his report, of which 
the following is an extract : — 

" 1. That the present military establishment, amounting 
to 62,448 men, be preserved and made complete, and that 
the most efficient means authorised by the constitution and 
consistent with the general rights of our fellow citizens be 
adopted, to fill the ranks, with the least pgssible delay. 

" 2. That a permanent force, consisting of at least 40,000 
men, in addition to the present military establishment, be 
raised for the defence of our cities and frontiers, under an 
engagement by the executive with such corps that it shall 
be employed in that service within certain specified limits, 
and that a proportional augmentation of general officers 
of each grade, and other staff, be provided for." 

This report was accompanied by a long letter from the 
Secretary, addressed to the chairman of the military com- 
mittee, explaining the views and sentiments of the execu- 
tive department on the subject at large, under the general 
head of "Explanatory Observations." 

"In providing a force necessary to bring this war to a 
happy termination, the nature of the crisis in which we 
are involved, and the extent of its dangers, claim particu- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 313 

lar attention. If the means are not fully adequate to the 
end, discomfiture must inevitably ensue. 

"It may be fairly presumed, that it is the object of the 
British government, by striking- at the principal sources of 
our prosperity, to diminish the importance, if not to de- 
stroy the political existence of the United States. If any 
doubt remained on this subject, it has been completely re- 
moved by the despatches from our ministers at Ghent, 
which were lately laid before Congress. 

"A nation contending for its existence against an ene- 
my powerful by land and sea, favoured in a peculiar man- 
ner by extraordinary events, must make great sacrifices. 
Forced to contend again for our liberties andindependence, 
we are called on for a display of all the patriotism which 
distinguished our fellow citizens in the first great struggle. 
It may be fairly concluded, that if the United States sam- 
Jice any right, or make any dishonourable concession to the 
demands of the British government, the spirit of the nation 
will be broken, and the foundations of their union an I inde- 
pendence shaken. The United States must relinquish no right, 
or perish in the struggle. There is no intermediate ground 
to rest on. A concess'on on one point, leads directly to the 
surrender of every other. The result of the contest cannot 
be doubtful. The highest confidence is entertained that 
the stronger the pressure, and the greater the danger, the 
more firm and vigorous will be the resistance, and the 
more successful and glorious the result. 

"It is the avowed purpose of the enemy to lay waste 
and destroy our cities and villages, and to desolate our 
coast, of which examples have already been afforded. It 
is evidently his intention to press the tear along the ichole 
extent of our sea-board, in the hope of exJiausting equally the 
spirit of the people and the national resources. There is 
also reason to presume, that it is the intention to press the 
war from Canada on the adjoining states, while attempts 
are made on the city of New- York, and other important 

40 



314 HISTORY OF THE 

points, with a view to the main project of dismemberment 
or subjugation. It may be inferred likewise to be a part 
of the scheme, to continue to invade this part of the Union, 
while a separate force attacks the state of Louisiana, in 
the hope of taking- possession of the city of New-Orleans, 
and of the mouth of the Mississippi, that great inlet and 
key to all that portion of the United States lying westward 
of the Alleghany mountains. The peace in Europe having 
given to the enemy a large disposable force, has essentially 
favoured these objects. 

"The advantage which a great naval superiority gives 
to the enemy, by enabling him to move troops from one 
quarter to another, from Maine to Mississippi, a coast of 
two thousand miles extent, is very considerable. Even a 
small force moved in this manner for the purposes avowed 
by the British commanders, cannot fail to be sensibly felt^ 
more especially by those who are most exposed to it. It 
is obvious, if the militia are to be relied on principally for 
the defence of our cities and coasts against their predatory 
and desolating incursions, wherever they may be made, 
that by interfering with their ordinary pursuits of industry, 
it must be attended with serious interruption and loss to- 
them, and injury to the public, while it greatly increases 
the expense. It is an object, therefore, of the highest im- 
portance, to j)rovide a regular force, with the means of 
transporting it from one quarter to another along our coast, 
thereby following the movements of the enemy with the 
greatest possible rapidity, and repelling the attack wher- 
ever it may be made. These remarks are equally true a» 
to the militia service generally under the present organi- 
zation of the militia, and the short terms of service pre- 
scribed by law. It may be stated with confidence, that at 
least three times the force in the militia has been employed 
at our principal cities along the coast, and on the frontier, 
in marching to and returning thence, that would have been 
necessary in regular troops; and that the expense attend- 



i 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 315 

ing it has been more than proportionably augmented, from 
the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of preserving the 
same degree of system in the militia, as in the regular 
service. 

"But it will not be sufficient to repel these predatory 
and desolating incursions. To bring the war to an honour- 
able termination, we must not be contented with defending 
ourselves. Different feelings must be touched, and appre- 
hensions excited in the British government. By pushing 
the war into Canada, we secure the friendship of the In- 
dian tribes, and command their services, otherwise to be 
turned by the enemy against us; we relieve the coast from 
the desolation which is intended for it, and we keep in our 
hands a safe pledge for an honourable peace. 

"It follows from this view of the subject, that it will be 
necessary to bring into the field the next campaign, not 
less than 100,000 regular troops. Such a force, aided, in 
extraordinary emergencies, by volunteers and militia, will 
place us above all inquietude as to the final result of this 
contest. It will fix on a solid and imperishable founda- 
tion our union and independence, on which the liberties 
and happiness of our fellow citizens so essentially depend. 
It will secure to the United States an early and advanta- 
geous peace. 

" The return of the regular force now in service, laid 
before you, will show how many men will be necessary to 
fill the present corps ; and the return of the numerical 
force of the present military establishment, will show how 
many are required to complete it to the number proposed. 
The next and most important inquiry is, how shall these 
men be raised ? Under existing circumstances, it is evi- 
dent that the most prompt and efficient mode that can be 
devised, consistent with iheequal rights of every citizen, 
ought to be adopted. The following plans are respectfully 
submitted to the consideration of the committee. Being 



316 HISTORY OF THE 

distinct in their nature, I will present each separately, with 
the considerations applicable to it." 

By the extreme consternation which it is manifest from 
the lanffuage of this document the administration felt, at 
facing the dangers and calamities they had brought upon 
the country, it would seem that they must have engaged 
in the war without the remotest idea that they could fail 
of success in its progress and termination. This confi- 
dence of theirs undoubtedly rested upon the full assurance 
they entertained, that Bonaparte would succeed in his ex- 
pedition against Russia, and after having subdued his great 
northern foe, that he would have nothing to do but to turn 
his whole force against Great Britain, in which event, the 
downfall of the latter might be considered as absolutely 
certain. The circumstances of the case were, by an un- 
toward series of occurrences, reversed, and instead of the 
emperor of Russia having been humbled and subdued, that 
calamity fell upon the emperor of France ; and thus Great 
Britain became extricated from the European controversy^ 
and was at liberty to bring all her force to bear upon the 
United States. It was not unnatural that men, whose 
views were at the outset so shortsighted, and who took so 
much for granted, should, at such a material change of 
circumstances, when their eyes were opened upon the dan- 
gers and difficulties with which they were surrounded, be- 
come seriously alarmed and perplexed with such unex- 
pected embarrassments. From the lofty ground of a na- 
tion which had declared an offensive war, at the end of a 
little more than two years, we were reduced to one " con- 
tending for existence, against an enemy powerful by land 
and sea," and " favoured in a peculiar manner by extraor- 
dinary events." Let it be remembered, that the British na- 
tion were, in October, 1814, no more powerful by land or sea, 
than they were in June, 1812.' And if those who precipitated 
the United Slates into the war, had possessed a little more 
moderation of feeling, had entertained a smaller degree 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 317 

of devotion to France, and not quite so much animosity 
ao-uinst Great Britain, they would not have rushed head- 
Ion", influenced by a mad calculation of future events, into 
a contest whic'.i might so easily and so speedily bring them 
to the extreme of danger, and this when so absolutely un- 
provided with the means of carrying on the war, and 
bringing themselves honourably out of the conflict. 

But a most extraordinary sentiment is contamed in this 
document — extraordinary, when the facts connected with 
it are taken, into consideration. The President of the 
United States, speaking through the medium of the Secre- 
tary of War, says in this letter — " It may be fairly con- 
cluded, that if the United States sacrifice any rigid, or 
make any dishonourable concession to the demands of the 
British government, the spirit of the nation will be broken, 
and the foundation of their union and independence shaken. 
The United States must relinquish no right, or perish in the 
struggle. There is 7io intermediate ground to rest on. It 
will be borne in mind, that the war was declared in order 
to force the British government to revoke their orders of 
council, and to give up the practice of impressment. The 
orders of council were revoked within five days after the 
declaration of war, leaving no avowed subject of contro- 
versy but that of impressment. A determination not to 
submit to this any longer, was manifested throughout the 
conflict ; and our public agents of all descriptions, who 
had any thing to do with the subject of the controversy, 
were instructed never to agree to any treaty of peace 
which did not contain a specific provision, that the British 
government should relinquish that practice. And in a 
great number of instances, many of which have been 
quoted, instructions to this effect were given to their com- 
missioners, appointed to negotiate for peace, and language 
equally strong with that just cited from the letter of the 
Secretary of War, was used in their instructions on the 
subject. Now let it be remembered, that on the 27th of 



318 HISTORY OF THE 

June, 1814, nearly four months lefore the date of this report 
of the Secretary of War, instructions had been sent by the 
President of the United States, to the commissioners at Ghent, 
through the medium of James Monroe, then Secretary of 
State, and in October following Secretary of War, in which 
those commissioners are told that — " On mature conside-^ 
ration it has been decided, that wider all the circumstances 
above alluded to, incident to a prosecution of the war, you 
may omit any stipulation on the subject of impressment, ij 
found indispensably necessary to terminate it^ That is, the 
only subject of controversy, about which the country had 
been engaged in a war for nearly two years and a half, at 
an expense of more than a hundred millions of dollars, 
and from thirty to fifty thousand lives, was formally aban- 
doned in June ; — and in October following, it was declared 
that rather than relinquish any right, ive ought to make up 
our minds to perish in the struggle. This can be viewed in 
no other light than that of an attempt, on the part of the 
administration, to impose upon Congress the belief, that 
we were fighting for existence, and that we ought to perish 
rather than surrender a single right, when at the same 
msment, the only ground of controversy had been long pre- 
viously abandoned by that same administration, for the sole 
purpose of extricating themselves from the war. 

The following is Mr. Secretary Monro's " First Plan." 

*' Let the free male population of the United States, 
between eighteen and forty-five years, be formed into 
classes of one hundred men each, and let each class fur- 
nish men for the war, within thirty days after the 
classification, and replace them in the event of casualty. 

" The classification to be formed with a view to the 
equal distribution of property among the several classes. 

" If any class fails to provide the men required of it, 
within the time specified, they shall be raised by draft on 
the whole class ; any person being thus drafted being al- 
lowed to furnish a substitute. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 319 

*' The present bounty in land being allowed to each re- 
cruit, and the present bounty in money, which is paid to 
each recruit by the United States, to be paid to each draft 
by all the inhabitants within the precinct of the class 
within which the draft may be made, equally according to 
the value of the property which they may respectively 
possess ; and if such bounty be not paid within days, 
the same to be levied on all the taxable property of the 
whole precinct. 

" The recruits to be delivered over to the recruiting 
officer in each district, to be marched to such places of 
general rendezvous as may be designated by the depart- 
ment of war. 

" Thai this plan will he efficient cannot he doiihted. It is 
evident, that the men contemplated may soon be raised by 
it. Three modes occur, by which it may be carried into 
effect. 1st. By placing the execution of it in the hands 
of the county courts throughout the United States. 2d. 
By relying on the militia officers in each county. 3d. By 
appointing particular persons in each county for that pur- 
pose. It is believed that either of these modes would be 
found adequate. 

" Nor does there appear to be any well-founded objec- 
tion to the right in Congress to adopt this i)lan, or to its 
equality in its application to our fellow-citizens individu- 
ally. Congress have a right, by the constitution, to raise 
regular armies, and no restraint is imposed in the exercise 
of it, except in the provisions which are intended to guard 
generally against the abuse of power, with none of which 
does this plan interfere. It is proposed, that it shall 
operate on all alike, that none shall be exempt from it ex- 
cept the chief magistrate of the United States, and the 
governors of the several states. 

" It would be absurd to suppose that Congress could not 
carry this power into effect, otherwise than by accepting 
the voluntary service of individuals. It might happen that 



320 " HISTORY OF THE 

an army could not be raised in that mode, whence the 
power would have been granted in vain, 'i'he safety of 
the state might depend an such an army. Long continued 
invasions conducted by regular well disciplined troops, can 
best be repelled by troops kept constantly in the field, and 
equally well disciplined. Courage in an army is in a great 
measure mechanical. A small body well trained, accus- 
tomed to action, gallantly led on, often breaks three or 
four times the number of more respectable and more 
brave, but raw and undisciplined troops. The sense of 
danger is diminished by frequent exposure to it without 
harm, and confidence, even in the timid, is inspired by a 
knowledge that reliance may be placed on others, which 
can grow up only by service together. The grant to 
Congress to raise armies was made with a knowledge of 
all these circumstances, and with the intention that it 
should take effect. The framers of the constitution, and 
the states who ratified it, knew the advantage which an 
enemy might have over us, by regular forces, and intended 
to place their country on an equal footing. 

" The idea that the United States cannot raise a regu- 
lar army in any other mode than by accepting the volun- 
tary service of individuals, is believed to be repugnant to 
the uniform construction of all grants of power, and equal- 
ly so to the first principles and leading objects of the fede- 
ral compact. An unqualified grant of power gives the 
means necessary to carry it into effect. This is an uni- 
versal maxim which admits of no exception. Equally 
true is it that the conservation of the state is a duty para- 
mount to all others. The commonwealth has a right to 
the service of all its citizens, or rather, the citizens com- 
posing the commonwealth have a right collectively and in- 
dividually to the service .of each other, to repel any danger 
which may be menaced. The manner in which the ser- 
vice is to be apportioned among the citizens, and render- 
ed by them, are objects of legislation. All that is to be 



HAKTFORD COiWENTION. 321 

dreaded in such case, is the abuse of power, and happily 
our constitution has provided ample security against that 
evil. 

" In support of this right in Congress, the militia ser- 
vice affords a conclusive proof and striking example. The 
organization of the militia is an act of public authority, not 
a voluntary association. The service required must be 
performed by all, under penalties which delinquents pay. 
The generous and patriotic perform them cheerfully. In 
the alacrity with which the call of the government has 
been obeyed, and the cheerfulness with which the ser- 
vice has been performed throughout the United States by 
the great body of the militia, there is abundant cause to 
rejoice in the strength of our republican institutions, and 
in the virtue of the people. 

"The plan proposed is not more compulsive than the 
militia service, while it is free from most of the objections 
to it. The militia service calls from home, for long terms, 
whole districts of country. None can elude the call. Few 
can avoid the service, and those who do are compelled to 
pay great sums for substitutes. This plan fixes on no one 
personally, and opens to all who choose it a chance of de- 
clining the service. It is a principal object of this plan to 
engage in the defence of the state the unmarried and 
youthful, who can best defend it, and best be spared, and 
to secure to those who render this important service, an 
adequate compensation from the voluntary contribution of 
the more wealthy in every class. Great confidence is en- 
tertained that such contribution will be nmde in time to 
avoid a draft. Indeed it is believed to be the necessary 
and inevitable tendency of this plan to produce that effect. 

" The limited power which the United States have in 
organizing the militia may be urged as an argument against 
their right to raise regular troops in the mode proposed. 
If any argument could be drawn from that circumstance, 
I should suppose that it would be in favour of an opposite 

41 



322 HISTORY OF THE 

conclusion. The power of the United States over the 
mihtia has been limited, and that for raising regular ar- 
mies granted without limitation. There was doubtless 
some object in this arrangement. The fair inference seems 
to be, that it was made on great consideration; that the 
limitation in the first instance was intentional, the conse- 
quence of the unqualified grant of the second. 

"But it is said that by drawing the men from the militia 
service into the regular army, and putting them under re- 
gular officers, you violate a principle of the constitution,, 
which provides that the militia shall be commanded by 
their own officers. If this was the fact, the conclusion 
would follow. But it is not the fact. The men are not 
drawn from the militia, but from the population of the 
country : when they enlist voluntarily, it is not as militia 
men that they act, but as citizens. If they arc drafted, it 
must be in the same sense. In both instances they are 
enrolled in the militia corps, but that, as is presumed, can- 
not prevent the voluntary act in one instance, or the com- 
pulsive in the other. The whole population of the United 
States within certain ages belong to these corps. If the 
United States could not form regular armies from them, 
they could raise none. 

" In proposing a draft as one of the modes of raising 
men in case of actual necessity, in the present great emer- 
gency of the country, I have thought it my duty to exam- 
ine such objections to it as occurred, particularly those of 
a constitutional nature. It is from my sacred regard for 
the principles of our conssiitution that I have ventured to 
trouble the committee with any remarks on this part of 
the subject. 

"Should it appear that this mode of raising recruits 
was justly objectionable on account of the tax on property, 
from difficulties which may be apprehended in the execu- 
tion, or from other causes, it may be advisable to decline 
the tax, and for the government to pay the whole bounty.'" 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 323 

Large extracts have been made from this extraordinary- 
document, for the purpose of placing before the commu- 
nity a state paper, which is probably but little known, and 
which contains sentiments and doctrines of the most ex- 
travagant and dangerous description. 

The proposition here made is, to divide the free male 
population of the United States into classes of 100 men 
each, each class to furnish men. This classifica- 

tion to be made with a view to an equal distribution of 
property among the classes. If any class should fail to 
provide the men within 30 days after the classification, 
they were to be raised by draft on the class. The bounty- 
given to recruits by the United States in money, was to be 
paid by the inhabitants belonging to the class within which 
the draft was made, according to the value of the property 
they might possess ; and if not paid within the time spe- 
cified by law, it was to be levied on all the taxable pro- 
perty of the said inhabitants. The recruits thus obtained, 
were to be delivered over to the recruiting officer in each 
district, and marched to such places of general rendezvous 
as the Secretary of War might direct. 

This whole system is founded upon the simple basis of 
arbitrary power in the national government over the mili- 
tia of the states. Voluntary enlistments are entirely dis- 
carded, and a hundred men, arbitrarily classed together, 
and their property as arbitrarily assessed, are to be forced 
to raise a specified number of soldiers from the list of 
names in their class, and pay them their bounty-money, 
and, in case of failure, to pay a round sum of money, in fact 
as a penalty, to be levied and collected from their property, 
an 1 applied, of course, to the use and benefit of the Uni- 
ted States. This was a conscription of the most detesta- 
ble kind, intended to be introduced into a nation living un- 
der a written constitution of government, and nominally 
enjoying the benefit of laws to protect their persons and 
property against the arbitrary exactions of despotic power. 



324 HISTORY OF THE 

Although rather more insidious in the manner, it was in- 
tended to be equally efficacious in its effects with the con- 
scription established in France by Bonaparte, — the object 
of it being two-fold — first, to recruit the regular army by 
force from the militia, and secondly, to replenish the trea- 
•sury of the United States, not by a forced loan, but by an 
exaction from a certain portion of the community, equally 
unwarranted by the constitution of the country as is the 
demand of a man's purse upon the highway by a footpad. 
In the first place, the attempt to force the militia into 
the regular service of the United States, to perform duty 
as soldiers of the standing army, was in direct violation 
of the national constitution. It has already been contend- 
ed, and it is believed has been shown in this work, that the 
militia belong to the several states, and not to the United 
States — that the latter have only a limited power over the 
militia, in certain cases specified in the constitution, and 
that beyond those cases, the United States have no authori- 
ty whatever over them. A statesman of distinguished 
talents, a few weeks after the date of this letter of the 
Secretary of War, made the following remarks in the 
House of Representatives of the United States — " One 
general principle is, that the militia of the several states 
belong to the people and government of the states — and 
not to the government of the United States. I consider 
this as a jn-oposition too clear to require illustration, or to 
admit of doubt. The militia consist of the whole people 
of a state, or rather of the whole male population capable 
of bearing arms; including all of every description, avo- 
cation, or age. Exemption from militia duty is a mere 
matter of grace. This militia, being the very people, 
belong to the people or to the state governments, for their 
use and protection. They were theirs at the time of the 
revolution, under the old confederation — and when the 
present form of government was adopted. Neither the 
people nor their state governments have ever surrendered 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 325 

this their property in the militia to the general government, 
but have carefully kept and preserved their general do- 
minion or control, for their own use, protection, and de- 
fence. They have, i^; is true, granted or lent (if I may use 
such an expression) to Congress a special concurrent au- 
thority or power over the militia in certain cases; which 
cases are particularly set down — guarded — limited and 
restricted, as fully as the most scrupulous caution, and the 
use of the most apt and significant words our language 
affords could limit and restrict them. The people have 
granted to Congress a right to call forth the militia in cer- 
tain cases of necessity and emergency — a right to arm and 
organize them — and to prescribe a plan, upon which they 
shall be disciplined and trained. When they are called 
into the service of the United States (and they cannot be 
called unless upon the happening of one of the contingen- 
cies enumerated) they are to be under the command of 
the President. Hence it follows, that the general power, 
authority, or jurisdiction, remains i^j the state govern- 
ments. A special, qualified, limited, and concurrent power 
is vested in Congress, to be exercised when the event hap- 
pens, and in the manner pointed out, prescribed, and lim- 
ited in the constitution. And hence it also follows, that 
this delegated power cannot be executed upon any other 
occasions, nor in any other ways, than those prescribed by 
the constitution."* 

This reasoning may challenge refutation. If its force is 
admitted, or if it cannot be overthrown, it must necessarily 
follow that there is no authority in the constitution, under 
this orany other mask, to draft the militia away from the 
states, and force them into the standing army of the 
United States, to do duty as re^^ular soldiers of that army. 

But, says the Secretary of War — " Congress have a 
right, by the constitution, to raise regular armies, and no 

* Speech of the Hon. Richard Stockton, in the House of Represen- 
tatives, United States, December 10, 1814. 



326 HISTORY OF THE 

restraint is imposed in the exercise of it, except in the pro- 
visions which are intended generally to guard against the 
abuse of power, with none of which does this plan inter- 
fere." This is a broad and sweeping declaration. What 
is the usual mode of raising or recruiting armies ? By 
voluntary enlistments ; and there can be no other mode 
adopted in this free country, compatible with the rights 
and liberties of the citizens. Would the Secretary of War 
have contended for the authority in the general govern- 
ment, under the power to raise armies, to issue an order 
to the several states to send into the service of the United 
States four able-bodied soldiers from every hundred men 
between the ages of 18 and 45, to be placed in the ranks 
of the standing army, and under the command of the offi- 
cers of that army, to pay each man a hundred dollars 
bounty, or in failure to do so, to pay to the national go- 
vernment a hundred dollars for each man ? But both are 
equally constitutional ; and if the power for which he con- 
tends is warrantee^ by the constitution, the case above 
stated is warranted also. 

Another constitutional difficulty lay in the way of the 
Secretary of AVar, and it was so important, as well as so 
obvious, that he could not avoid bestowing a moment's 
attention to it. " But it is said, that by drawing the men 
from the militia service into the regular army, and putting 
them under regular officers, you violate a principle of the 
constitution, which provides that the militia shall be com- 
manded by their own officers. If litis ivas the fact, the 
conclusion would follow. But it is not the fact. The men 
are not drawn from the militia, but from the popidation of 
the country: when they enlist voluntarily, it is not as mili- 
tiamen that they act, but as citizens. If they are drafted, 
it must be in the same sense. In both instances they are 
enrolled in the militia corps, but that, as is presumed, can- 
not prevent the voluntary act in one instance, or the com- 
pulsive in the other. The whole population of the United 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 327 



' States, within certain ages, belong to these corps. If the 
United States could not form regular armies from them, 
they could raise none." 

To establish the constitutionality of his plan, then, it 
was incumbent on the Secretary of War to establish the 
position, that there is a real and substantial difference be- 
tween the citizens as a body, and the militia. He says the 
men who by his plan were to be drafted for the regular 
armv, " were not to be drawn from the militia, but from 
the population of the coimtry.'" And his argument rests 
entirely upon the soundness of this proposition. Who 
then are the militia ? The militia, in the most extensive 
! sense of the word, consist of the whole male population of 
a state capable of bearing arms. According to the laws 
of congress, they are made up of all the able-bodied men 
of the country, between the ages of 18 and 45. This re- 
striction of the meaning of the term is founded upon the 
idea that those who are under the age of 18 are too young 
to endure the fatigues and perform the services of a mi- 
litary life, and those above 45 are too old. If the first are 
too young, and the last are too old, as militiamen, cer- 
tainly they are equally so as citizens. And the Secretary 
of War adopts the same language with that of the law, in 
describing that part of the population from which his con- 
scripts, or drafts, are to be taken. He says, let the free 
male population of the United States, between 18 and 45 
years, he formed into classes. Now, when the whole male 
population between those ages are formed into classes as 
citizens, for the purpose of making the drafts, it may be 
asked where are the militia ? Suppose the plan had pro- 
vided, that instead of four or six recruits from each class, 
the whole number of the class had been included. Where 
would the militia of the states have been in that case ? But 
if the constitution gave authority to congress to draft four 
from every hundred of the citizens, in a greater enier- 



328 HISTORY OF THE 

gency, bj the same mode of reasoning, it could have 
authorised a draft of fifty, or even the whole hundred. 

The most abstruse logic, the nicest metaphysical rea- 
soning that the human mind is capable of devising, can 
never raise this argument above the level of gross and ob- 
vious absurdity. It therefore, as a necessary consequence, 
leaves the administration liable to the charge of a second 
attempt to force the militia into the service of the United 
States, in violation of the constitution, by taking them 
away from the states to which they belong, depriving them 
of their constitutional right to be commanded by their own 
officers, ordering them to be marched where the Secretary 
of War might direct, and reducing them to the degraded 
condition of regular soldiers in a standing army. The 
Secretary of War acknowledges that such will be the con- 
clusion, if the men thus drafted are taken from the mili- 
tia. That they must he taken from the militia, if taken 
at all, has, it is believed, been demonstrated. It then must 
follow that the plan violated the constitution. 

" But," says the Secretary of War, " it would be ab- 
surd to suppose that Congress could not carry this power 
into effect, otherwise than by accepting the voluntary ser- 
vice of individuals. It might happen that an army could 
not be raised in that mode, whence the power would have 
been granted in vain. The safety of the state might de- 
pend on such an army." The language of the constitution 
is — " Congress have power to raise and support armies." 
The argument of the Secretary is, that having the power 
to raise armies, if it cannot be done by voluntary enlist- 
ment, it may, as a matter of necessity, be done by force ; 
and hence the attempt to establish this system. There is 
no allegation in this letter, that the militia had refused to 
enlist. Indeed, such an allegation could not have been 
truly made on the occasion, for this was a mere project 
before a committee, ndt having been reported, and of 
course no call could have been made under it upon the 



HARTFORD CONVENTIOiV. 329 

militia to enlist. As far, therefore, as the soundness of 
the argument depends on necessity, it must fail, because 
no experiment to obtain voluntary enlistments had been 
made. It is, however, perfectly obvious, that there was a 
further object in view, in driving this measure with so 
much force. Money was wanted as well as men ; and in 
one mode or the other the government intended to obtain 
it. They meant to force the inhabitants to advance them 
money in the shape of a bounty to the conscripts, or in the 
character of a penalty if they failed in procuring the men. 
If the bill for raising the eighty thousand men, which was 
brougiit before the Senate by Mr. Giles, had in the first 
place provided for opening recruiting quarters, the men 
might have voluntarily enlisted, and then there would 
have been no opportunity to extort the money from the 
inhabitants. 

The very next clause of the constitution after that for 
raising and supporting armies, is in the following words — 
" Congress shall have power to provide and maintain a 
navy." Providing a navy, is exactly equivalent to raising 
an army; and maintaining a navy to supjmrting an army. 
" Congress have a right," says the Secretary of War, " by 
the constitution, to raise regular armies, and no restraint 
is imposed by the exercise of it." Hence he infers the 
right, if men do not voluntarily enlist, to force them by a 
draft, in other words, by a conscription, into the ranks of 
the regular army. Congress have the power also to pro- 
vide a navy, and there is no restraint imposed upon its ex- 
ercise. By the same course of reasoning, they might 
order each state to provide, that is to build and equip, a 
seventy-four gun ship, and hand it over to the United 
States, as a constituent part of their naval force. And as 
in the case of the conscript, tl>e bounty was to be paid by 
the classes, so in the case of the ships, it might be ordered 
that the states sShould lay in the stores, or furnish the 
means to pay the men. This would fall distinctly within 

43 



330 HISTORY OF THE 

the idea of maintaining a navy ; and therefore, agreeably 
to the mode of reasoning adopted by the Secretary of 
War, would be constitutional. 

The Secretary of War carries his doctrine to a still 
greater length. He says — " An unqualified grant of 
power gives the means necessary to carry it into effect. 
This is an universal maxim which admits of no exception. 
Equally true is it that the conservation of the state is a 
duty paramount to all others." These are latitudinarian 
sentiments, especially when it is considered that they come 
from a source which has always contended obstinately for 
the doctrine of " strict construction," and for the principle 
that all power not expressly granted to the United States, 
is reserved to the several states. However, they serve 
to show, that men who in some situations are the most 
pertinacious in their adherence to certain general princi- 
ples, will, when placed in different situations, bend easily 
to circumstances, and adopt those of a more liberal de- 
scription. In this case, however, the construction is very 
liberal, under the maxim that " the conservation of the 
state is a duty paramount to all others;" and, therefore, 
men may be forced not only without constitutional autho- 
rity, but in the very face of it, from the militia of the 
states, into the regular army, under the pretence that the 
commonwealth is in danger. An inquiry naturally arises 
here, what composes the state ? The answer of course is^ 
the people of the state. The state is made up of the peo- 
ple; and the government belongs to the people. This is 
so universally acknowledged, that it has become a mere 
truism. And it is founded upon the fundamental princi- 
ple of our system, that the people are the source of power. 
No man dare dispute the soundness of this maxim. On 
the contrary, the very rulers of our country, those in whose 
hands the powers of government, from time to time are 
placed, call themselves the servants of the people. How- 
ever solemn or momentous, then, the duty of conserving 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 331 

the State may be, it is very questionable whether the ser- 
vants of the people have the right to insist upon it that 
their masters shall, under all circumstances, be forced to 
perform the duty of conserving themselves and their govern- 
ment — that the question whether they will or will not, 
should not even be put to them, but they are ordered by 
the power of conscription to march to the field, for the 
purpose of taking care of their own interests, at the com- 
mand of their servants. 

The mode proposed by the Secretary of War, for car- 
rying this project into effect, is indicative not only of a 
great want of judgment and discretion in its abettors, but 
of a total disregard of the constitutional rights of the citi- 
zens. " Three modes occur," says that officer, " by which 
it may be carried into effect. 1. By placing the execu- 
tion of it in the hands of the county courts throughout the 
United States. 2. By relying on the militia officers in 
each county. 3. By appointing particular persons in 
each county for that purpose." Suppose each of these 
bodies should decline to execute their commission, what 
would in that case become of the conscription? If the 
county courts, or the militia officers, had undertaken the 
task in some states, or at least in one, viz. in Connecticut, 
the legislature of the state would, without ceremony, have 
revoked their commissions, and thus deprived them of all 
authority. 

But suppose either conscript body had accepted the 
commission, and had gone on to class the militia, and 
niade the drafts, in what mode would they have levied 
and collected the bounty in the one case, or the penalty in 
the other ? The plan says, the bounty shall be " paid to 
each draft by all the inhabitants within the precinct of the 
class, equally, according to the value of the property they 
may respectively possess ;" and if" not paid within 
days, the same to be levied on all the taxable property of 
the said inhabitants." The property of one hundred men 



332 iirsTORY OF the 

is to be assessed. Oi>e niiffht be worth half a million of 
dollars, and one not more than ten dollars, and the other 
ninety-eight would be set at various sums between the two 
extremes. In what manner is this to be levied and col- 
lected ? Who is to decide the legal questions that may 
arise, render the judgment, and issue the execution? Is 
the property to be taken according to the different de- 
grees of indebtedness in the class, and sold at auction, or 
by private sale ? The constitution says — " In suits at 
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre- 
served." This, however, may not be considered as a 
civil claim, but as partaking more of a criminal nature. 
The right of trial by jury is also secured to all persons in 
criminal cases. 

The truth is, the whole scheme was not only unconsti- 
tutional, and oppressive in the most extravagant degree, 
and totally at variance with the rights and liberties of the 
citizens, but it was in an equal degree preposterous and 
absurd. And when it was modified, and reduced some- 
what to form, in a bill introduced by Mr. Giles into the 
senate, for the purpose of raising eighty thousand men for 
the army, after long debate, and great efforts by the friends 
of the administration, and the zealous supporters of the 
war, the measure could not be carried through the houses, 
and of course failed. 

But it served to show to the nation at large, that those 
who plunged the country into the war, when they found 
their popularity in danger, were prepared to adopt the 
boldest and the most unconstitutional measures to save 
their own reputations, and to preserve their power. And 
it was equally well calculated to excite the greatest alarm 
in the citizens at large, not merely for the preservation of 
the constitutional authority of the government, but for 
their own personal security, rights, and liberties ; and to 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 333 

teach them the absolute necessity of watching over their 
own freedom and safety. 

In pursuance of what appears to have been the general 
plan of operations, viz. forcing men into the service, the 
Secretary of the Navy also made a report, in answer to a 
resolution of the senate, " for the better organization of 
the navy of the United States." Among many other things 
contained in that document, is the following passage — 

" There is another branch of the service which appears 
to me to merit the serious deliberation of the legislature, 
with regard to the establishment of some regular system, 
by which the voluntary enlistments for the navy may de- 
rive occasional enforcement from the services of those 
seamen who, pursuing their own private occupations, are 
exempt, by their itinerant habits, from public service of 
any kind. In my view, there would be nothing incompa- 
tible with the free spirit of our free institutions, or the 
rights of individuals, if registers, with a particular descrip- 
tive record, were kept in the several districts, of all the 
seamen belonging to the United States, and provision 
made by law for classing and calling into the public ser- 
vice, in succession, for reasonable stated periods, such 
portions or classes as the public service might require ; 
and if any individual so called should be absent at the 
time, the next in succession should perform the tour of 
duty of the absentee, who should, on his return, be liable 
to serve his original tour, and his substitute be exempt 
from his succeeding regular tour of duty. 

" In the military service, should the ranks not be filled by 
recruits, the deficiency of regular force may be filled up 
by drafts of militia to assemble at a given tin)e and place ; 
not so in the naval service, it depends exclusively upon 
voluntary enlistments, upon which there is no reliance for 
any given object, at any time or place. Hence the most 
important expeditions may utterly fail, though every pos- 



334 HISTORY OF THE 

sible exertion shall have been made to carry them into 
effect." 

This was advancing another step in the policy of con- 
scription. Having, as was probably supposed, devised a 
plan for forcibly turning the militia into regular soldiers, 
and recruiting the standing army by a large body of con- 
scripts, the next attempt was to supply the deficiencies of 
the navy by a similar process. That was, in effect, to 
establish by law, what even in Great Britain has never 
had any higher sanction than that of practice, viz. — a sys- 
tem of impressment — that very abuse, for which, when pro- 
ceeding from another nation towards us, we had carried 
on a most expensive and disastrous war of nearly two 
years and a half continuance. And it is worthy of notice, 
that the Secretary of the Navy speaks of the right of 
drafting the militia, proposed by the Secretary of War, 
as an established legal right, and makes use of it as an 
argument to justify his plan of impressment. 

At the same time that these attempts were making by 
the administration to establish conscription and impress- 
ment by law, a measure was brought before the Senate of 
a kindred character, and of a common origin. It was 
called a bill, " making further provision for filling the 
ranks of the army of the United States." The first sec- 
tion of the bill provided, that recruiting officers should be 
authorised to enlist into the army of the United States 
any free, effective, able-bodied men, between the age of 
eighteen and fifty years. 

The second section repealed so much of former acts, as 
required the consent in writing of the parent, master, or 
guardian, to authorise the enlistment of persons under 
twenty-one years of age, provided masters of apprentices 
who enlist should receive a certain portion of the bounty- 
money. 

This measure excited great alarm in many parts of the 
country. It was considered as aiming a direct blow at the 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 335 

legislative prerogatives of the several states, by the as- 
sumption of a power never granted to the United States, 
but most clearly belonging to the several states. By the 
laws of the individual states, parents have an absolute 
right to the services of their children, until they arrive at 
the age of twenty-one years. This right is founded on 
the duty of protection and support on the one side, and of 
obedience and service on the other. In the case of ap- 
prentices, the relationship is formed by positive contract 
between the parties; and the constitution contains no au- 
thority for Congress to interfere in the private concerns of 
individuals under the jurisdiction of the several states, to 
destroy the nearest and most interesting and important 
relationships of domestic life, or to vacate contracts entered 
into between individuals, concerning the ordinary business 
of life. But the fears of parents were excited to the high- 
est degree, by this bold and arbitrary attempt to destroy 
the moral character and welfare of their children — to take 
them from under parental care and controul, and place 
them in the purlieus of a camp, and in the midst of the 
contaminating atmosphere of a regular army. 

It was clearly perceived, that if Congress could thus 
interfere with the internal affairs of the states, annul the 
authority of their laws in cases of such importance as the 
domestic relations of the inhabitants, and set aside obliga- 
tions, legal, moral, and social, of the most interesting and 
momentous character, there could be no further question 
about the nature of the government. It must be considered 
as a fearful and unrelenting despotism, restrained by no 
constitutional authority, and regulated and controuled sole- 
ly by its absolute and sovereign will and pleasure. 

The legislature of Connecticut were in session when in- 
formation was received of the propositions before Congress 
for establishing a conscription and for enlisting minors. 
That information produced a great degree of excitement, 
and the constitutional means of guarding the rights of the 



336 HISTORY OF THE 

• 

militia, and of parents, guardians, and masters, became 
an object of serious consideration and examination. In 
the course of the session the following measure was adopt- 
ed unanimously in the council, and in the House of Re- 
presentatives by a vote nearly unanimous, there being but 
six in the minority. 

"Resolution. 

'* Whereas a plan of the Secretary of the Department 
of War, for filling up the regular army of the United 
States, has been submitted to the Congress of the United 
States, now in session, and a bill for an act to carry a part 
of the same into execution is pending before the House of 
Representatives of the United States, the principles of 
which plan and bill, if adopted, will place at the disposal 
of the administration of the United States government, 
not only all the militia of this state, but the troops raised 
for the defence of this state at a period when the state 
was left unprotected — and by the principles of Avhich our 
sons, brothers, and friends, are made liable to be delivered 
against their will, and hy force, to the marshals and re- 
cruiting officers of the United States, to be employed, not 
for our own defence, but for the conquest of Canada, or 
upon any foreign service upon which the administration 
may choose to send them; or impose upon the people of 
this state 'a capitation or other direct fax,'' limited by no 
rules but the will of officers appointed by the President of 
the United States. 

^^ A?id whereas the principles of the plan and bill afore- 
said, are, in the opinion of this assembly, not only intole- 
rably burdensome and oppressive, but utterly subversive 
of the rights and liberties of the people of this state, and 
the freedom, sovereignty, and independence of the same, 
and inconsistent with the principles of the constitution of 
the United States. 

^' Andivhereas it will become the imperious duty of the 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 337 

legislature of this state to exert themselves to ward off a 
blow so fatal to the liberties of a free people — 

"■Resolved by this Assembly — that in case the plan and 
bill aforesaid, or any other bill on that subject, containing 
the principles aforesaid, shall be adopted, and assume the 
form of an act of Congress, the Governor of this state is 
hereby requested forthwith to convoke the General Assem- 
bly ; and to avoid delay, he is hereby authorised to issue 
his proclamation, requiring the attendance of the members 
thereof, at such time and place as he may appoint, to the 
end that opportunity may be given to consider what mea- 
sures may be adopted to secure and preserve the rights 
and liberties of the people of this state, and the freedom, 
sovereignty and independence of the same." 

The events of 1814 have been already referred to. 
They had excited strong consternation throughout a large 
portion of the country, and particularly in the New-Eng- 
land states, where the exposure to invasion was pre-emi- 
nently great, and where the consequences which must 
ensue such a hostile visitation, must necessarily prove in 
the highest degree disastrous. The national government 
had withdrawn almost all their troops from the Atlantic 
frontier, and had provided nothing for the safety of the 
inhabitants beyond a single military officer of some rank, 
(and perhaps a small number of soldiers,) to take the 
oversight of a certain specified portion of territory which 
was called a "military district." In a pamphlet published 
in Boston in 1823, it is said — " In the summer of 1814, 
the war, which before had not approached nearer than the 
great northern lakes, at length fell unexpectedly and in 
an alarming manner upon the borders of Massachusetts. 
The English, in considerable force, captured Castine, a 
small town at the mouth of the Penobscot, and in a short 
time had the absolute control of all that part of Maine 
which lies to the eastward of that great river. Intelli- 
gence was shortly received by express at head quarters in 

43 



338 HISTORY OF THE 

Boston, that the enemy was preparing to execute without 
delay a more extensive invasion, and it therefore became 
necessary to take measures of immediate and vigorous 
defence. Under these distressing and disastrous circum- 
stances, Governor Strong resolved to assemble the mem- 
bers of the legislature. The general court accordingly 
met on the 5th day of October of the same year ; and his 
excellency commenced his message in the following 
words :^— " Since your last adjournment such important 
changes have taken place in the state of our public affairs, 
and the war in which we have been unhappily involved 
has assumed an aspect so threatening and destructive, that 
the council unanimously concurred with me in opinion that 
an extraordinary meeting of the legislature was indispen- 
sable." " Two days after the session began, viz. on 

the 7th of October, a resolution approving the governor's 
conduct as it related to the defence of the state, passed 
the house by a vote of 222 to 59. On the i3th of October 
another resolution, authorising the governor to raise ten 
thousand men for the defence of the state, passed the 
house by a vote of 252 to 71." 

In addition to all the other calamities with which the 
country was visited, in the year 1814, a large proportion of 
the banks in the states south of New-England had refused 
to pay their notes in specie, in consequence of which the 
paper currency issued by such banks greatly deprecia- 
ted, strong fears prevailed that they were insolvent, and 
the alarm became almost universal. As a natural result 
of the excitement which was caused by this state of 
things, business of all kinds was greatly impeded and 
embarrassed, if not entirely suspended ; to such a degree 
had the fears of the community been raised, that the in- 
dividual who was under the necessity of travelling from 
New- York to Boston, found himself subjected to serious 
loss, as well as great inconvenience, in consequence of the 
doubts entertained of the security of the notes circulated 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 339 

by the banks of the former city. The state of Connecticut, 
bordering upon the state of New- York, and having a con- 
stant intercourse with its inhabitants, and especially rely- 
ing upon the city of New- York as the great market for 
their marketable commodities, received New-York bank 
paper almost exclusively in payment for those commodi- 
ties ; and it soon became a question of much importance, 
whether it was safe for the state of Connecticut to receive 
a depreciated and depreciating currency of another state, 
in payment of taxes, which, by the extraordinary expen- 
ditures in support of the war, and especially in paying the 
militia, had become extremely burthensome. From the 
high tone which, in their public communications, the 
American government had assumed, when treating of the 
subject of peace, it was impossible to foresee, or even to 
calcidate the probable duration of the war. If they ad- 
hered to their demands, it appeared likely to be intermi- 
nable, for the Britisli, having been extricated from the 
war with France, were left at full liberty to devote their 
undivided attention to that with the United States. And 
had our government held out — had they not in their in- 
structions to their agents, who were employed in nego- 
tiating for peace, empowered them to abandon every 
ground and principle for which the war was professedly 
undertaken, there is no room to doubt that the year 1815 
would have been the most fearful period that had ever 
marked our national history. The events of 1814 mani- 
fested a spirit of resentment on the part of the British, 
from which it was easy to perceive that the worst passions 
would attend, and the most vindictive spirit be exhibited, 
in the further prosecution of the war. There was nothing, 
therefore, in the prospect, that was calculated to afford the 
slightest relief to the apprehensions of the country, re- 
specting the hostile movements of the enemy, during the 
approaching season. On the contrary, as the means for 
carrying on the war were in a great measu' ^ exhausted, 



340 HISTORY OF THE 

the government had become alarmed for their own po^ 
pularity, and were obviously preparing to resort to the 
most desperate, as well as the most unconstitutional mea- 
sures, to save themselves from the odium which they 
could scarcely hope to avoid, if hostilities should continue 
through another year, and the utmost alarm prevailed con- 
cerning the result. The situation of the New-England 
states was in the highest degree critical and dangerous. 
The services of the militia, for two years, had been ex- 
tremely severe, they were constantly taken from their 
farms and their ordinary occupations, and in addition to 
all the losses which such a state of things must necessa- 
rily produce, they were subjected to the hardships and 
hazards of a camp, and the life of a soldier. In the mean 
time, the United States had withheld all supplies for the 
maintenance of the militia for the year 1814, both in Mas- 
sachusetts and Connecticut, and thus forced upon the 
states the burden of supporting the troops employed in 
defending their coasts from invasion, and their towns from 
being sacked and pillaged. And all this time, the taxes 
laid to carry on the war were exacted from those states 
with the most rigorous strictness ; and when, under all 
these circumstances, the monied institutions in a large part 
of the country were stopping payment, when their credit 
was shaken, their notes depreciated, and their solvency 
doubted, the capitalists of the New-England states, be- 
cause they did not deem it expedient to risk their private 
fortunes by loaning money to the government, which had 
wilfully and against all remonstrances, brought these 
multiplied calamities upon themselves, as well as upon 
the nation, were reviled as enemies to their country and 
as traitors to its government. It had become perfectly 
apparent, that if the New-England states were rescued 
from the effects of these calamities at all, it must depend, 
as far as human means were concerned, upon their own 
exertions, and that they could not place the least depend- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 341 

ance on the national government. Indeed, they had been 
repeatedly told that such was the state of things by the 
national government. 

In Massachusetts, the danger to which the inhabitants 
near the sea-coast were exposed, had spread an alarm 
throughout the commonwealth. Early in the ye-ar 1814, 
memorials from a great number of towns, from the inte- 
rior as well as near the coast, were forwarded to the legis- 
lature, praying that body to exert their authority to pro- 
tect the citizens in their constitutional rights and privi- 
leges, and suggesting the expediency of appointing dele- 
gates, " to meet delegates from such other states as might 
think proper to appoint them, for the purpose of devising 
proper measures to procure the united efforts of the com- 
mercial states, to obtain such amendments and explana- 
tions of the constitution as will secure them from further 
evils." 

These memorials were referred to a joint committee of 
the Senate and House of Representatives, who made a 
report, of which the following, in relation to the proposed 
convention, is an extract — " The committee are convinced 
of the right, and think the legislature ought to vindicate it, 
of acting in concert with other states, in order to produce 
a powerful, and, if possible, an irresistible claim for such 
alterations as will tend to preserve the Union, and restore 
violated privileges, yet they have considered that there are 
reasons which render it inexpedient at the present mo- 
ment to exercise this power. 

" The committee entertain no doubt, that the sentiments 
and feelings expressed in the numerous memorials and 
remonstrances which have been committed to them, are 
the genuine voice of a vast majority of the citizens of this 
commonwealth." 

This report bears date February 4th, 1814, and was 
adopted in the Senate by a vote of 23 to 8, and in the 
House of Representatives, of 178 to 43. 



342 HISTORY OF THE 

On the 16th of October the House of Representatives 
passed the following resolution, by a vote of 2G0 to 90 — 

" Resolved, That twelve persons be appointed as dele- 
gates from this Commonwealth, to meet and confer with 
delegates from the other New-England states, or any 
other, upon the subject of their public grievances and 
concerns ; and upon the best means of preserving our re- 
sources ; and of defence against the enemy ; and to devise 
and suggest for adoption by those respective states such mea- 
sures as they may deem expedient ; and also to take mea- 
sures, if they shall think it proper, for procuring a conven- 
tion of delegates from all the United States, in order to 
revise the Constitution thereof, and more effectually to 
secure the support and attachment of all the people, by 
placing all upon the basis of fair representation." 

The Senate having concurred in passing this resolution, 
on the 18th of October the Houses in convention elected 
the delegates by a vote of 226 to 67. The legislature 
directed the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives, to make known as speedily 
as possible, to the different governments of the Union the 
proceedings of the government of that state. Accordingly 
the following letter was written by those two officers of the 
government to the executive magistrates of the other 
states. — 

" Boston, October 17th, 1814. 

" Sir, — Your Excellency will herewith receive certain 
resolutions of the legislature of Massachusetts, which you 
are respectfully requested to take the earliest occasion to 
lay before the legislature of your state, together with this 
letter, which is intended as an invitation to them, to ap- 
point delegates, if they shall deem it expedient, to meet 
such others as may be appointed by this and other states, 
at the time and j)lacc expressed in these resolutions. 

" The sjeneral objects of the proposed conference are, 



HARTFORD CO.\VEL\TION. 343 

first, to deliberate upon the dangers to which the eastern 
section of the Union is exposed by the course of the war, 
and which there is too much reason to believe will thicken 
round them in its progress, and to devise, if practicable, 
means of security and defence which may be consistent 
with the })reservation of their resources from total ruin, 
and adapted to their local situation, mutual relations and 
habits, and not repugnant to their obligations as 
MEMBERS OF THE Union. When Convened for this object, 
which admits not of delay, it seems also expedient to sub- 
mit to their consideration, the inquiry, whether the inte- 
rests of these states demand that persevering endeavours 
be used by each of them to procure such amendments, to be 
effected in the national constitution, as may secure to them 
equal advantage, and whether, if in their judgment this 
should be deemed impracticable, under the existing pro- 
visions for amending that instrument, an experiment may 
be made without disadvantage to the nation, for obtaining 
a convention from all the states in the Union, or such of 
them as approve of the measure, with a view to obtain such 
amendment. 

" It cannot be necessary to anticipate objections to the 
measure which may arise from jealousy or fear. This le- 
gislature is content, for its justification, to repose on the 
purity of its own motives, and upon the known attachment 
of its constituents to the national union, and to the rights and 
independence of their country. 

'* We have the honor to be, &lc. 
"John I^hillips, 

" President of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 

" Ti.mothy Bigelow, 

" Speaker of the House of Representatives of said Commonwealth." 

The documents from the legislature of Massachusetts, 
which have just been quoted, were transmitted to the legis- 
latures of Connecticat and Rhode Island. The General 



344 HISTORY OF THE 

Assembly of Connecticut were then in session, and the 
documents were communicated to the two houses, and by 
them were referred to a joint coinntittee, who thereupon 
made the following report — 

" At a General Assembly of the State of Connecticut, 
holden at New-Haven, in said state, on the second Thurs- 
day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight 
hundred and fourteen. 

" To the Honourable the General Assembly now in ses- 
sion. The committee to whom was referred the speech 
of his excellency the governor, with the documents accom- 
panying the same, and also his excellency's message, pre- 
senting a communication from the governour of Massa- 
chusetts ; further report, — 

'* That the condition of this state demands the most se- 
rious attention of the Legislature. We lately enjoyed, in 
common with the other members of the national confede- 
racy, the blessings of peace. The industry of our citizens, 
in every department of active life, was abundantly re- 
warded ; our cities and villages exhibited indications of 
increasing wealth ; and the foreign lelations of the Union 
secured our safety and nourished our prosperity. 

" The scene is now reversed. We are summoned to 
the field of war, and to surrender our treasures for our de- 
fence. The fleets of a powerful enemy hover on our 
coasts ; blockade our harbours ; and threaten our towns 
and cities with fire and desolation. 

" When a commonwealth suddenly falls from a state of 
high prosj)erity, it behoves the guardians of its interests to 
inquire into the cause of its decline, and, with deep solici- 
tude, to seek a remedy. 

" In the latter part of the last century, a spirit of daring 
enterprise — impatient of restraint — regardless of the sanc- 
tions of religion — hostile to human happiness, and aspiring 
to supreme power — overturned many ancient govern- 
ments ; made Europe a scene of carnage, and threatened 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 345 

With ruin all which was valuable in the civilized world. 
The history of its progress and decline is familiar to every 
mind. Nations without the reach of the immense physi- 
cal power which it embodied, were tainted by its corrup- 
tions ; and every state and province in Christendom has felt 
its baneful influences. By the pure principles inherited 
from our fathers, conducive, at once, to the preservation of 
liberty and order, this state has been eminently exempt, in 
its interior policy, from this modern scourge of nations. 
In thus withstanding this potent adversary of all ancient 
establishments, while many monarchies have been sub- 
verted, we have exhibited to the world the highest evi- 
dence that a free constitution is not inconsistent with the 
strength of civil government, and that the virtue of a peo- 
ple is the best preservation of both. 

" Occupying a comparatively small territory, and natu- 
rally associating, during the revolutionary war, with states 
whose views were identified with ours, our interests and 
inclinations led us to unite in the great national compact, 
since defined and consolidated by the constitution of the 
United States. We had justly anticipated, from that 
union, the preservation and advancement of our dearest 
rights and interests ; and while the father of his country, 
and those other great and wise men, — who, mindful of their 
high duties, and regardless of local and party conside- 
rations, consulted the happiness of the commonwealth, 
guided our councils, we were not disappointed in our ex- 
pectations. The federal government, in which our own 
venerable statesmen were conspicuous, was revered in 
every nation. An American in foreign lands, was ho- 
noured for his country's sake : a rich and virtuous popula- 
tion was rapidly reducing the limits of our extensive wil- 
derness ; and the commerce of America was in every sea. 

"But a coalition, not less evident than if defined by the 
articles of a formal treaty, arose between the national ad- 
ministration and that fearful tyrant in Europe, who was 

44 



346 HISTORY OF THE 

aspiring to the dominion of the world. No means, how- 
' ever destructive to the commerce and hazardous to the 
peace of this coiintr}^ were left unattempted, to aid his 
efforts and unite our interests and destinies with his. 
From this fatal cause, we are bereft of the respectable 
standing we once held in the councils of the nation ; im- 
poverished by a long course of commercial restrictions; 
involved in an odious and disastrous war ; and subjected 
to all the complicated calamities which we now deplore. 
" Thus driven from every object of our best hopes, and 
bound to an inglorious struggle in defence of our dwellings 
from a public enemy; we had no apprehension, much as 
we had suffered from the national government, that it 
would refuse to yield us sucii protection as its treasures 
might afford. Much less could we doubt, that those dis- 
bursements, which might be demanded of this state, would 
be passed to our credit on the books of the treasury. Such 
however has not been the course adopted by the national 
agents. All supplies have been withdrawn from the mili- 
tia of this state, in the service of the United States. The 
groundless pretext for this unwarrantable measure, was, 
their submission to an officer assigned them by the com- 
mander in chief, in perfect conformity with miiiiary usage, 
and the principles of a request from the President himself, 
under whicii a party of them were detached. The injus- 
tice of that measure, by which we were compelled to sus- 
tain alone the burden of supplying and paying our own 
forces, in the service of the United States — a service ren- 
dered necessary to defend our territory from invasion — is 
highly aggravated by the consideration, that the dangers 
which called them to the field, and the concentration of 
the enemy's forces on our coasts, have resulted from the 
ships of the United States having taken refuge in our wa- 
ters. Were this the only instance evincive of the disre- 
gard of the administration to the just claims and best in- 
terests of this state, — the only ground to fear that we are 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 347 

forgotten in their councils, except as subjects of taxation 
and oppression, — we should choose to consider it an in- 
stance anomalous and solitary — still yield lliem our confi- 
dence, and hope for protection to the extent of their power, 
in this season of unusual calamity. 

"Protection is the first, and most important claim of these 
states on the government of the nation. It is a primary 
condition, essential to the very obligation of every compact 
between rulers and their subjects. To obtain that, as a 
principal object, Connecticut became a member of the na- 
tional confederacy. In a defensive war, a government 
would stand justified, after making a fair application of its 
powers to that important end ; — for it could do no more. 
But when a government hastily declares war, without pro- 
viding the indispensable means of conducting it — want of 
means is no apology for refusing protection. In such a 
case, the very declaration of war, is, of itself, a breach of 
the sacred obligation; inasmuch as the loss of protection 
by the subject, is the natural and inevitable consequence 
of the measine. When that war annihilates the only re- 
venues of the nation, the violation of the original contract 
is still more palpable. If waged for foreign conquest, and 
the wreck of the national treasures devoted to a fruitless 
invasion of the enemy's territory, the character of the act 
is more criminal, but not more clear. 

" Whatever may be the disposition of the national Exe- 
cutive towards this state, during the sequel of the war, such 
is the condition of the public finances, that constant and 
very great advances must be made from our state treasury, 
to meet the expenditures necessary for our own defence. 

"But the utmost eflTorts of this state, under the most fa- 
vourable circumstances for raising revenue, would be hardly 
adequate to the costly operations of defending, against a 
great naval power, a sea-coast of more than one hundred 
and twenty miles in length ; much less, at this inauspicious 
period, when the distresses of the people are enhanced by 



348 HISTORY OF the 

the embarrassments of our monied institutions, and the 
circulating medium constantly diminishing, can any thing 
be spared consistently with our safety. Yet the national 
government are dooming us to enormous taxation, without 
affording any just confidence that we shall share in the 
expenditures of the public revenue. The invasion of Ca- 
nada is perseveringly pursued, our coasts left defenceless, 
and the treasures of the country exhausted on more fa- 
voured points of the national frontier. To meet those de- 
mands, and, at the same time, to defend ourselves, is im- 
possible. Whatever we may contribute, we have no rea- 
sonable ground to expect protection in return. 

*'The people of this state have no disloyalty to the inte- 
rests of the Union. For their fidelity and patriotism, they 
fliay appeal, with confidence, to the national archives from 
the commencement of the revolutionary war. 

"In achieving the independence of the nation, they bore 
an honourable part. Their contingent in men and money 
has ever been promptly furnished, when constitutionally 
required. Much as they lament the present unnatural 
hostilities with Great Britain, they have, with characteris- 
tic obedience to lawful authority, punctually paid the late 
taxes imposed by the general government. On every law- 
ful demand of the national Executive, their well-disciplined 
militia have resorted to the field. The public enemy, when 
invading their shores, has been met at the water's edge, 
and valiantly repulsed. They duly appreciate the great 
advantages which would result from the federal compact, 
were the government administered according to the sacred 
principles of the constitution. They have not forgotten the 
ties of confidence and affection, which bound these states 
to each other during their toils for independence ; — nor 
the national honour and commercial prosperity, which they 
mutually shared, during the happy years of a good admi- 
nistration. They are, at the same time, conscious of their 
rights and determined to defend them. Those sacred li- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 349 

bertics — those inestimable institutions, civil and religions, 
which their venerable fathers have bequeathed them, are, 
with the blessing of Heaven, to be maintained at every 
hazard, and never to be surrendered by tenants of the soil 
which the ashes of their ancestors have consecrated. 

"In what manner the multiplied evils, which we feel 
and fear, are to be remedied, is a question of the highest 
moment, and deserves the greatest consideration. The 
documents transmitted by his excellency the Governor of 
Massachusetts, present, in the opinion of the committee, 
an eligible method of combining the wisdom of New- 
England, in devising, on full consultation, a proper course 
to be adopted, consistent with our obligations to the United 
States. The following resohitions are, therefore, respect- 
fully submitted. 

"Signed by order, 

"Henry Champion, Chairman:' 

" General AssenMy, October Session, 1814. 

"In the House of Representatives, the foregoing report 
is accepted and approved. 

"Attest. Charles Denison, Cleric" 
" Concurred in by the Upper House. 

" Attest. Thomas Day, Secretary:' 

" Resolved, That seven persons be appointed Delegates 
from this state, to meet the delegates of the Common- 
wealth of Massachusetts, and of any other of the New- 
England states, at Hartford, on the 15th day of Decem- 
ber next, and confer v.'ith them on the subjects proposed 
by a resolution of said Commonwealth, communicated to 
this legislature, and upon any other subjects which may 
come before them, for the purpose of devising and recom- 
mending such measures for the safety and welfare of these 
states, AS MAY consist with our obligations as mem^ 

BERS OF THE NATIONAL UnION. 



350 HISTORY OF TTIE 

" Resolved, That his excellency the Governor be re- 
quested to transmit the foregoing report and resolutions 
to the Executives of the New-England states. 

" This Assembly do appoint his honour Chauncey Good- 
rich, the honourable James Hillhouse, the honourable 
John Treadwell, the honourable Zcplianiah Swift, the ho- 
nourable Nathaniel Smith, the honourable Calvin Goddard 
and the honourable Koger M. Sherman, Delegates from 
this state, to meet the Delegates of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts a. id of any other of the New-England states, 
at Hartford, on the fifteenth day of December next, and 
confer with them on the subjects proposed by a resolution 
of said Commonwealth, communicated to this Leirislaturc, 
and upon any other subjects which may come before them, 
for the jjurpose of devising and recommending such mea- 
sures for the safety and welfare of these states as may con- 
sist with our obligations as members of the national Union. 

"The above and foregoing are true copies of record, 
esarained and certified under the seal of the state, by 

" Thomas Day, Secretary:' 

The following is an account of the proceedings of the 
legislature of Rhode-Island on this subject — 

'* State of Rhode-f stand and 

Providence Plantations. 

•' In General Assembly, October Session, A. D. 1814. 

•* Whereas this General Assembly, having long witness- 
ed with regret and anxiety, the defenceless situation of 
this state, did, at their last session, request his excellency 
the governor to communicate with the executives of our 
neighbouring sister states upon the subject of our common 
defence by our mutual co-operation : and whereas those 
states feeling equally with us the common misfortunes, 
and the necessity of united exertions, have appointed and 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 351 

invited us to appoint delegates to meet and confer upon 
our calamitous situation, and to devise and recommend 
wise and prudent measures for our common relief. 

" Resolved, That this General Assembly will appoint four 
delegates from this state, to meet at Hartford in the state 
of Connecticut, on the fifteenth day of December next, and 
confer with such delegates as are or shall he appointed by 
other states, upon the common dangers to which these 
states are exposed, upon the best means of co-operating 
for our mutual defence against the enemy, and upon the 
measures which it may be in the power of said states, con- 
sistently with their obligations to adopt, to restore and se- 
cure to the people thereof, their rights and privileges under 
the constitution of the United States. 

" True copy — witness, 

" Henry Bowen, .SfcV^." 

"Both houses having joined in grand committee, chose 
Daniel Lyman, Samuel Ward, Benjamin Hazard, and 
Edward Mantou, Ksquires, delegates from this state, to 
meet at Hartfonl in the state of Connecticut, on the fif- 
teenth day of December next, and confer with delegates 
from other states, pursuant to a resolution for this purpose 
passed at the present session. 

" True copy — witness 

" Henry Bowen, Sec'rj/." 

On the 15th of December, 1814, the Convention met at 
Hartford, in the state of Connecticut. There were twelve 
members from Massachusetts, viz. George Cabot, Nathan 
Dane, William Prescott, Harrison Gray Otis, Timothy 
Bigeljw, Joshua Thomas, Samuel Sumner Wilde, Joseph 
Lyman, George Bliss, Stephen Longfellow, Jun. Daniel 
Waldo, and Hodijah Baylies. From Connecticut there 
were seven members, viz. Chauncey Goodrich, John 
Treadwell, James Hillhouse, Zephaniah Swift, Nathaniel 



352 HISTORY OF THE 

Smith, Calvin Goddard, and Roger Blinot Sherman. From 
Rhode Island there were four, viz. Daniel Lyman, Samu- 
el Ward, Edward Manton, and Benjamin Hazard. Three 
persons, viz. Benjamin West and Mills Olcott, from New- 
Hampshire, and William Hall, Jun. of Vermont, who ap- 
peared as delegates chosen by local conventions in those 
states, were also admitted as members. Immediately upon 
being assembled, they proceeded to the choice of officers. 
George CaLot, a member from Massachusetts, was chosen 
president, and the author of this work secretary. Having 
thus become organized, they proceeded in the performance 
of the business for which they had been delegated ; and 
after a session of three weeks, embodied the result of their 
labours in the following report — 

" The delegates from the legislatures of the states of ^Massachusetts, 
Connecticut^ and Rhode-Island, and from the counties of Grafton 
and Cheshire in the state of JVeic-Hampshire and the county of 
Windham in the state of Vermont, assembled in convention, beg 
leave to report the following resxdt of their conference. 

" The convention is deeply impressed with a sense of the 
arduous nature of the commission which they were ap- 
pointed to execute, of devising the means of defence against 
dangers, and of relief from oppressions proceeding from 
the acts of their own government, without violating con- 
stitutional principles, or disappointing the hopes of a suf- 
fering and injured people. To prescribe patience and 
firmness to those who are already exhausted by distress, 
is sometimes to drive them to despair, and the progress 
towards reform by the regular road, is irksome to those 
whose imaginations discern, and whose feelings prompt, 
to a shorter course. But when abuses, reduced to a sys- 
tem, and accumulated through a course of years, have per- 
vaded every department of government, and spread cor- 
ruption through every region of the state ; when these are 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 353 

clothed with the forms of law, and enfoiced by an execu- 
tive whose will is their source, no summary means of re- 
lief can be applied without recourse to direct and open 
resistance. This experiment, even when justifiable, can- 
not fail to be painful to the good citizen ; and the success 
of the effort will be no security against the danger of the 
example. Precedents of resistance to the worst adminis- 
tration, are eagerly seized by those who are naturally 
hostile to the best. Necessity alone can sanction a resort 
to this measure ; and it should never be extended in dura- 
tion or degree beyond the exigency, until the people, not 
merely in the fervour of sudden excitement, but after full 
deliberation, are determined to change the constitution. 

" It is a truth, not to be concealed, that a sentiment pre- 
vails to no inconsiderable extent, that administration- have 
given such constructions to that instrument, and practised 
so many abuses under colour of its authority, that the 
time for a change is at hand. Those who so believe, re- 
gard the evils which surround them as intrinsic and incu- 
rable defects in the constitution. They yield to a persua- 
sion, that no change, at any time, or on any occasion, can 
aggravate the misery of their country. This opinion may 
ultimately prove to be correct. But as the evidence on 
which it rests is not yet conclusive, and as measures 
adopted upon the assumption of its certainty might be irre- 
vocable, some general considerations are submitted, in the 
hope of reconciling all to a course of moderation and firm- 
ness, which may save them from the regret incident to 
sudden decisions, probably avert the evil, or at least insure 
consolation and success in the last resort. 

" The constitution of the United States, under the auspi- 
ces of a wise and virtuous administration, proved itself 
competent to all the objects of national prosperity com- 
prehended in the views of its framers. No parallel can 
be found in history, of a transition so rapid as that of the 
United States from the lowest depression to the highest 

45 



354 HISTORY OF THE 

felicit) — from the condition of weak and disjointed repub- 
lics, to that of u great, united, and prosperous nation. 

" Although this high state of public happiness has under- 
gone a miserable and afHicting reverse, through the pre- 
valence of a weak and profligate policy, yet the evils and 
afHictJons which have thus been induced upon the country, 
are not peculiar to any form of government. The lust 
and caprice of power, the corruption of patronage, the 
oppression of the weaker interests of the community by 
the stronger, heavy taxes, wasteful expenditures, and un- 
just and ruinous wars, are the natural offspring of bad 
administrations, in all ages and countries. It was indeed 
to be hoped, that the rulers of these states would not 
make such disastrous haste to involve their infancy in the 
embarrassments of old and rotten institutions. Yet all 
this have they done ; and their conduct calls loudly for 
their dismission and disgrace. But to attempt upon every 
abuse of power to change the constitution, would be to 
perpetuate the evils of revolution. 

"Again, the experiment of the powers of the constitu- 
tion to regain its vigour, and of the people to recover from 
their delusions, has been hitherto made under the greatest 
possible disadvantages arising from the state of the world. 
The fierce passions which have convulsed the nations of 
Europe, have passed the ocean, and fjuding their way to 
the bosoms of our citizens, have afforded to administra- 
tion the means of perverting public opinion, in respect to 
our foreign relations, so as to acquire its aid in the indul- 
gence of their animosities, and the increase of their adhe- 
rents. Further, a reformation of public opinion, resulting 
from dear-bought experience, in the southern Atlantic 
states, at least, is not to be despaired of. They will have 
felt, that the eastern states cannot be made exclusively 
the victims of a capricious and impassioned policy. They 
will have seen that the great and essential interests of the 
people are common to the south and to the east. They 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 355 

will realize the fatal errors of a system which seeks re- 
venge for commercial injuries in the sacrifice ot com- 
merce, and aggravates by needless wars, to an immeasu- 
rahle extent, the injuries it professes to redress. They 
may discard the influence of visionary theorists, and re- 
cognize the benefits ©fa practical policy. Indications of 
this desirable revolution of opinion, among our brethren 
in those states, are already manifested. While a hope 
remains of its ultimate completion, its progress should not 
be retarded or stopped, by exciting fears which must 
check these favourable tendencies, and frustrate the efibrts 
of the wisest and best men in those states, to accelerate 
this propitious change. 

" Finally, if the Union be destined to dissolution, by rea- 
son of the multiplied abuses of bad administrations, it should, 
if possible, be the \ ork of j)eaceab!e times, and deliberate 
consent. Some new form of confederacy should be sub- 
stituted among those states which shall intend to maintain 
a federal relation to each other. Events may prove that 
the causes of our calamities are dee]} and permanent. 
They may be found to proceed, not merely from the blind- 
ness of prejudice, pride of opinion, violence of party spirit, 
or the confusion of the times ; but they may be traced to 
implacable combinations of individuals, or of states, to 
monopolize power and office, and to trample without re- 
morse u|ionthe rights and interests of commercial sections 
of the Union. Whenever it shall appear that these causes 
are radical and permanent, a separation, by equitable ar- 
rangement, will be [)referable to an alliance by constraint, 
among nominal friends, but real enemies, inflamed by 
mutual hatred and jealousy, and inviting, by intestine divi- 
sions, contempt and aggression from abroad. But a seve- 
rance of the Union by one or more states, against the will 
of the rest, and especially in a time of war, can be justified 
only by absolute necessity. These are among the princi- 
pal objections against precipitate measures tending to dis- 



I 



356 HISTORY OF THE 



unite the states, and when examined in connection with 
the farewell address of the Father of his country, they 
must, it is believed, be deemed conclusive. 

" Under these impressions, the convention have proceed- 
ed to confer and deliberate upon the alarming state of pub- 
lic affairs, especially as affecting- the interests of the peo- 
ple who have appointed them for this purpose, and they are 
naturally led to a consideration, in the first place, of the 
dangers and grievances which menace an immediate or 
speedy pressure, with a view of suggesting means of pre- 
sent relief; in the next place, of such as are of a more re- 
mote and general description, in the hope of attaining fu- 
ture security. 

" Among the subjects of complaint and apprehension, 
which might be comprised under the former of these pro- 
positions, the attention of the convention has been occupi- 
ed with the claims and pretensions advanced, and the au- 
thority exercised over the militia, by the executive and 
legislative departments of the national government. Also, 
upon the destitution of the means of defence in which the 
eastern states are left ; while at the same time they are 
doomed to heavy requisitions of men and money for na- 
tional objects. 

" The authority of the national government over the mih- 
tia is derived from those clauses in the constitution which 
give power to Congress ' to provide for calling forth the 
militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrec- 
tions and repel invasions ;' — Also ' to i)rovide for organiz- 
ing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for govern- 
ing such parts of them as may be employed in the service 
of the UnTted States, reserving to the states respectively 
the appointment of the ofKcers, and the authority of train- 
ing the militia according to the discipline prescribed by 
Congress.' Again, ' the President shall be commander 
in chief of the army and navy of the United States, 
and of the militia of the several states, when called into 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 357 

the actual service of the United States.'' In these specified 
cases only, has the national government any power over 
the militia ; and it follows conclusively, that for all general 
and ordinary purposes, this power belongs to the states 
respectively, and to them alone. It is not only with regret, 
but with astonishment, the convention perceive that under 
colour of an authority conferred with such plain and pre- 
cise limitations, a power is arrogated by the executive 
government, and in some instances sanctioned by the two 
houses of congress, of control over the militia, which if 
conceded will render nugatory the rightful authority of the 
individual states over that class of men, and by placing at 
the disposal of the national government the lives and ser- 
vices of the great body of the people, enable it at plea- 
sure to destroy their liberties, and erect a military despo- 
tism on the ruins. 

*' An elaborate examination of the principles assumed for 
the basis of these extravagant pretensions, of the conse- 
quences to which they lead, and of the insui'mountable 
objections to their admission, would transcend the limits 
of this report. A few general observations, with an exhi- 
bition of the character of these pretensions, and a recom- 
mendation of a strenuous opposition to them, must not, 
however, be omitted. 

" It will not be contended that by tlie terms used in the 
constitutional compact, the power of the national govern- 
ment to call out the militia is other than a power express- 
ly limited to three cases. One of these must exist, as a 
condition precedent to the exercise of that power — Unless 
the laws shall be opposed, or an insurrection shall exist, 
or an invasion shall be made, congress, and of consequence 
the President as their organ, has no more power over the 
militia than over the armies of a foreign nation. 

" But if the declaration of the President should be admit- 
ted to be an unerring test of the existence of these cases, 
this important power would depend, not upon the truth of 



358 HISTORY OF THE 

the fact, but upon executive infallibility. And the limita- 
tion of the power would consequently be nothing more 
than merely nominal, as it might always be eluded. It 
follows therefore that the decision of tiie President in this 
particular cannot be conclusive. It is as much the duty 
of the state authorities to watch over the rights reserved, 
as of the United States to exercise the powers which are 
delegated. 

" The arrangement of the United States into military 
districts, with a small portion of the regular force, under 
an officer of high rank of the standing army, with power to 
call for the militia, as circumstances in his judgment may 
require ; and to assume the command of them, is not war- 
ranted by the constitution or any law of the United States. 
It is not denied that Congress may delegate to the Presi- 
dent of the United States the power to call forth the militia 
in the cases which are within their jurisdiction — But he 
has no authority to substitute military prefects throughout 
the Union, to use their own discretion in such instances. 
To station an officer of the army in a military district with- 
out troops corresponding to his rank, for the purpose of 
taking command of the militia that may be called into ser- 
vice, is a manifest evasion of that provision of the consti- 
tution which expressly reserves to the states the appoint- 
ment of the officers of the militia ; and the object of de- 
taching such officer cannot be well concluded to be any 
other than that of superseding the governor or other offi- 
cers of the militia in their right to command. 

" Tiie power of dividing the militia of the states into 
classes, and obliging such classes to furnish by contract or 
draft, able-bodied men, to serve for one or more years 
for the defence of the frontier, is not delegated to Con- 
gress. If a claim to draft the militia for one year for 
such general object be admissible, no limitation can be 
assigned to it, but the discretion of those who make the 
law. Thus, with a power in Congress to authorize such 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 339 

a draft or conscription, and in the Executive to decide 
conclusively upon the existence and continuance of the 
emergency, the whole militia may be converted into a 
standing- army disposable at the will of the President of 
the United States. 

" The power of compelling the militia, and other citi- 
zens of the United States, by a forcible draft or conscrip- 
tion, to serve in the regular armies as proposed in a late 
official letter of the Secretary of War, is not delegated 
to Congress by the constitution, and the exercise of it 
would be not less dangerous to their liberties, than hostile 
to the sovereignty of the states. The efibrt to deduce 
this power from the right of raising armies, is a flagrant 
attempt to pervert the sense of the clause in the constitu- 
tion which confers that right, and is incompatible with 
other provisions in that instrument. The armies of the 
United States have always been raised by contract, never 
by conscription, and nothing more can be wanting to a 
government possessing the povt'er thus claimed to enable 
it to usurp the entire control of the militia, in deroo-ation 
of the authority of the state, and to convert it by impress- 
ment into a standing army. 

" It may be here remarked, as a circumstance illustrative 
of the determination of the Executive to establish an ab- 
solute control over all descriptions of citizens, that the 
right of impressing seamen into the navat service is ex- 
pressly asserted by the Secretary of the Navy in a late 
report. Thus a practice, which in a foreign government 
has been regarded with great abhorrence by the people, 
finds advocates among those who have been the loudest to 
condemn it. 

" The law authorising the enlistment of minors and ap- 
prentices into the armies of the United States, without the 
consent of parents and guardians, is also repugnant to the 
spirit of the constitution. By a construction of the power 
to raise armies, as applied by our present rulers, not only 



3G0 HISTORY OF THE 

persons capable of contracting are liable to be impressed 
into the army, but those who are under legal disabilities 
to make contracts, are to be invested with the capacity, in 
order to enable them to annul at pleasure contracts made 
in their behalf by legal guardians. Such an interference 
with the municipal laws and rights of the several states, 
could never have been contemplated by the framers of the 
constitution. It impairs the salutary control and influence 
of the parent over his child — the master over his servant 
— the guardian over his ward — and thus destroys the most 
important relations in society, so that by the conscription 
of the father, and the seduction of the son, the power of 
the Executive over all the effective male population of the 
United States is made complete. 

" Such are some of the odious features of the novel sys- 
tem proposed by the rulers of a free country, under the 
limited powers derived from the constitution. What por- 
tion of them will be embraced in acts finally to be passed, 
it is yet impossible to determine. It is, however, suffi- 
ciently alarming to perceive, that these projects emanate 
from the highest authority, nor should it be forgotten, that 
by the plan of the Secretary of War, the classification of 
the militia embraced the principle of direct taxation upon 
the white population only ; and that, in the house of re- 
presentatives, a motion to apportion the militia among the 
white population exclusively, which would have been in its 
operation a direct tax, was strenuously urged and sup- 
ported. 

" In this whole series of devices and measures for rais- 
ing men, this convention discern a total disregard for the 
constitution, and a disposition to violate its provisions, de- 
manding from the individual states a firm and decided 
opposition. An iron despotism can impose no harder ser- 
vitude upon the citizen, than to force him from his home 
and his occupation, to wage offensive wars, undertaken to 
gratify the pride or passions of his master. The example 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 361 

of France has recently shown that a cabal of individuals 
assuming to act in the name of the people, may transform 
the great body of citizens intb soldiers, and deliver them 
over into the hands of a single tyrant. No war, not held 
in just abhorrence by the people, can require the aid of 
such stratagems to reciuit an army. Had the troops 
already raised, and in great numbers sacrificed upon the 
frontier of Canada, been employed for the defence of the 
country, and had the millions which have been squandered 
with shameless profusion, been appropriated to their pay- 
ment, to the protection of the coast, and to the naval ser- 
vice, there would have been no occasion for unconstitu- 
tional expedients. Even at this late hour, let government 
leave to New-England the remnant of her resources, and 
she is ready and able to defend her territory, and to resign 

- the glories and advantages of the border war to those 
who are determined to persist in its prosecution. 

" That acts of Congress in violation of the constitution 
are absolutely void, is an undeniable position. It does 
not, however, consist with respect and forbearance due 
from a confederate state towards the general government, 
to fly to open resistance upon every infraction of the con- 
stitution. The mode and the energy of the opposition, 
should always conform to the nature of the violation, the 
intention of its authors, the extent of the injury inflicted, 
the determination manifested to persist in it, and the dan- 
ger of delay. But in cases of deliberate, dangerous, and 

! palpable infractions of the constitution, aifecting the sove- 

I. reignty of a state, and liberties of the people ; it is not 
■only the right but the duty of such a state to interpose its 
authority for their protection, in the manner best calcu- 
lated to secure that end. When emergencies occur which 
are either beyond the reach of the judicial tribunals, or 

1 too pressing to admit of the delay incident to their forms, 
states which have no common umpire, must be their own 

^judges, and execute their own decisions, It will thus be 

46 



362 HISTORY OF THE 

proper for the several states to await the ultimate disposal 
of the obnoxious measures recoimnended by the Secreta- 
ry of War, or pending before Congress, and so to use their 
power according to the character these measures shall 
finally assume, as effectually to protect their own sove- 
reignty, and the rights and liberties of their citizens. 

" The next subject which has occupied the attention of 
the convention, is the means of defence against the com- 
mon enemy. This naturally leads to the inquiries, whe- 
ther any expectation can be reasonably entertained, that 
adequate provision for the defence of the eastern states 
will be made by the national government.^ Whether the 
several states can, from their own resources, provide for 
self-defence and fulfil the requisitions which are to be ex- 
pected for the national treasury ? and, generally, what 
course of conduct ought to be adopted by those states, in 
relation to the great object of defence. 

" Without pausing at present to comment upon the 
causes of the war, it may be assumed as a truth, oflicially 
announced, that to achieve the conquest of Canadian tei'- 
ritory, and to hold it as a pledge for peace, is the delibe- 
rate purpose of administration. This enterprize, com- 
menced at a period when government possessed the ad- 
vantage of selecting the time and occasion for making a 
sudden descent upon an unprepared enemy, now languishes 
in the third year of the war. It has been prosecuted with 
various fortune, and occasional brilliancy of exploit, but 
without any solid acquisition. The British armies have 
been recruited by veteran regiments. Their navy com- 
mands Ontario. The American ranks are thinned by the 
casualties of war. Recruits are discouraged by the unpo- 
pular character of the contest, and by the uncertainty of 
receiving their pay. 

" In the prosecution of this favourite warfare, admi- 
nistration have left the exposed and vulnerable parts of 
the country destitute of all the efficient means of defence.. 



p 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 363 

The main body of the regular army has been marched to 
the frontier. The navy has been stripped of a great part 
of its sailors for the service of the lakes. Meanwhile the 
enemy scours the sea-coast, blockades our ports, ascends 
our bays and rivers, makes actual descents in various and 
distant places, liolds some by force, and threatens all that 
are assailable with fire and sword. The sea-board of 
four of the New-England states, following its curvatures, 
presents an extent of more than seven hundred miles, 
generally occupied by a compact population, and accessi- 
ble by a naval force, exposing a mass of people and pro- 
perty to the devastation of the enemy, which bears a great 
proportion to the residue of the maritime frontier of the 
United States. This extensive shore has been exposed 
to frequent attacks, repeated contributions, and constant 
alarms. The regular forces detached by the national 
government for its defence are mere pretexts for placing 
officers of high rank in command. They arc besides con- 
fined to a few places, and are too insignificant in number 
to be included in any computation. 

*' These states have thus been left to adopt measures for 
their own defence. The militia have been constantly kept 
on the alert, and harassed by garrison duties, and other 
hardships, while the expenses, of which the national go- 
vernment decline the reimbursement, threaten to absorb 
all the resources of the states. The President of the Uni- 
ted States has refused to consider the expense of the mili- 
tia detached by state authority, for the indispensable de- 
fence of the state, as chargeable to the Union, on the 
ground of a refusal by the Executive of the state to place 
them under the command of officers of the regular army. 
Detachments of militia placed at the disposal of the gene- 
ral government, have been dismissed either without pay, 
or with depreciated paper. The prospect of the ensuin*' 
campaign is not enlivened by the promise of any allevia- 
tion of these grievances. From authentic documents, 



364 HISTORY OF the 

cxtortefl by necessity from those whose inclination might 
lead them to conceal the embarrassments of the govern- 
ment, it is apparent that the treasury is bankrupt, and its 
credit prostrate. So deplorable is the state of the finan- 
ces, that those who feel for the honour and safety of the 
country, would be willing to conceal the nielancholy spec- 
tacle, if those whose infatuation has produced this state 
of fiscal concerns had not found themselves compelled to 
unveil it to public view. 

"If the war be continued, there appears no room for 
reliance upon the national government for the supply of 
those means of defence which must become indispensable 
to secure these states from desolation and ruin. Nor is it 
possible that the states can discharge this sacred duty from 
their own resources, and continue to sustain the burden 
of the national taxes. The administration, after a long 
perseverance in plans to bafl^e every effort of commercial 
enterprize, had fatally succeeded in their attempts at the 
epoch of the war. Commerce, the vital spring of New- 
England's prosperity, was annihilated. Embargoes, re- 
strictions, and the rapacity of revenue officers, had com- 
pleted its destruction. The various objects for the employ- 
ment of productive labour, in the branches of business 
dependent on commerce, have disappeared. The fisheries 
have shared its fate. Manufactures, which government 
has professed an intention to favour and to cherish, as an 
indemnity for the failure of these branches of business, 
are doomed to struggle in their infancy with taxes and ob- 
structions, which cannot fail most seriously to affect their 
growth. The specie is withdrawn from circulation. The 
landed interest, the last to feel these burdens, must pre- 
pare to become their principal support, as all other sources 
of revenue must be exhausted. Under these circumstan- 
ces, taxes, of a dcscrij>tion and amount unprecedented in 
this country, are in a train of imposition, the burden of 
which must fall with the heaviest pressure upon the states 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 365 

east of the Potomac. The amount of these taxes for the 
ensuing year cannot he estimated at less than five millions of 
dollars upon the New-England states, and the expenses of the 
last year for defence^ in Massachusetts alone, approaches to 
one million of dollars. 

" From these facts, it is almost superfluous to state the 
irresistible inference that these states have no capacity of 
defraying the expense requisite for their own protection, 
and, at the same time, of discharging the demands of the 
national treasury. 

" The last inquiry, what course of conduct ought to be 
adopted by the aggrieved states, is in a high degree mo- 
mentous. When a great and brave people shall feel them- 
selves deserted by their government, and reduced to the 
necessity either of submission to a foreign enemy, or of 
appropriating to their own use those means of defence 
which are indispensable to self-preservation, they cannot 
consent to wait passive spectators of approaching ruin, 
which it is in their power to avert, and to resign the last 
remnant of their industrious earnings to be dissipated in 
support of measures destructive of the best interests of 
the nation. 

"'This convention will not trust themselves to express 
their conviction of the catastrophe to which such a state 
of things inevitably tends. Conscious of their high respon- 
sibility to God and their country, solicitous for the continu- 
ance of the Union, as well as the sovereignty of the states, 
unwilling to furnish obstacles to peace — resolute never to 
submit to a foreign enemy, and confiding in the Divine 
care and protection, they will, until the last hope shall be 
extinguished, endeavor to avert such consequences. 

" With this view they suggest an arrangement, which 
may at once be consistent with the honour and interest of 
the national government, and the security of these states. 
This it will not be difficult to conclude, if that government 
shpuld be so disposed. By the terms of it these states 



366 HISTORY OF THE 

might be allowed to assume their own defence, by the mi- 
litia or other troops. A reasonable portion, also, of the 
taxes raised in each state might be paid into its treasury, 
and credited to the United States, but to be appropriated 
to the defence of such state, to be accounted for with the 
United States. No doubt is entertained that by such an 
arrangement, this portion of the country could be defend- 
ed with greater effect, and in a mode more consistent with 
economy, and the public convenience, than any which has 
been practised. 

*' Should an application for these purposes, made to Con- 
gress by the state legislatures, be attended with success, ' 
and should peace upon just terms appear to be unattaina- 
ble, the people would stand together for the common de- 
fence, until a change of administration, or of disposition in 
the enemy, should facilitate the occurrence of that auspi- 
cious event. It wouM be inexpedient for this Convention 
to diminish the hoj)e of a successful issue to such an appli- 
cation, by recommending, upon supposition of a contrary 
event, ulterior proceedings. Nor is it indeed within their 
province. In a state of things so solemn and trying as 
may then arise, the legislatures of the states, or conven- 
tions of the whole people, or delegates appointed by them 
for the express purpose in another Convention, must act 
as such urgent circumstances may then require. 

'* But the duty incumbent on this Convention will not 
have been performed, without exhibiting some general 
view of such measures as they deem essential to secure 
the nation against a relapse into difficulties and dangers, 
should they, by the blessing of Providence, escape from " 
their present condition, without absolute ruin. To this 
end a concise retrospect of the state of this nation under 
the advantages of a wise administration, contrasted with 
the miserable abyss into which it is plunged by the profli- 
gacy and folly of political theorists, will lead to some prac- 
tical conclusions. On this subject, it will be recollected* 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 867 

that the immediate influence of the Federal Constitution 
upon its first adoption, and for twelve succeeding years, 
upon the pros|)erity and happiness of the nation, seemed 
to countenance a belief in the transcendency of its })erfec- 
tion over all other human institutions. In the cataloo-ue 
of blessings which have fallen to the lot of the most favour- 
ed nations, none could be enumerated from which our 
country was excluded — a free Constitution, administered 
by great and incorruptible statesmen, realized the fondest 
hopes of liberty and independence — The progress of agri- 
culture was stimulated by the certainty of value in the 
harvest — and commerce, after traversing every sea, re- 
turned with the riches of every clime. A revenue, secur- 
ed by a sense of honour, collected without oppression, and 
paid without murmurs, melted away the national debt; 
and the chief concern of the public creditor arose from its 
too rapid diminution. The wars and commotions of the 
European nations, and their interruptions of the commer- 
cial intercourse afforded to those who had not promoted, 
but who would have rejoiced to alleviate their calamities, 
a fair and golden opportunity, by combining themselves to 
lay a broad foundation for national wealth. Although oc- 
casional vexations to commerce arose from the furious col- 
lisions of the powers at war, yet the great and good men 
of that time conformed to the force of circumstances which 
they could not control, and preserved their country in se- 
curity from the tempests which overwhelmed the old 
world, and threw the wreck of their fortunes on these 
shores. Respect abroad, prosperity at home, wise laws 
made by honoured legislators, and prompt obedience yield- 
ed by a contented people, had silenced the enemies of re- 
publican institutions. The arts flourished — the sciences 
were cultivated — the comforts and conveniences of life 
were universally diff'used — and nothing remained for suc- 
ceeding administrations but to reap the advantages and 



368 HISTORY OF THE 

cherish the resources flowing from the policy of their 
predecessors. 

" But no sooner was a new administration established 
in the hands of the [)arty opposed to the Washington po- 
licy, than a fixed determination was perceived and avowed 
of changing a system which had already produced these 
substantial fruits. The consequences of this change, for 
a few years after its commencement, were not sufficient to 
counteract the prodigious impulse towards prosperity, 
which had been given to the nation. But a steady perse- 
verance in the new plans of administration, at length de- 
veloped their weakness and deformity, but not until a ma- 
jority of the people had been deceived by flattery, and in- 
flamed by passion, into blindness to their defects. Under 
the withering influence of this new system, the declension 
of the nation has been imiform and rapid. The richest 
advantages for securing the great objects of the constitu- 
tion have been wantonly rejected. While Europe reposes 
from the convulsions that had shaken down her ancient 
institutions, she beholds with amazement this remote 
country, once so happy and so envied, involved in a ruin- 
ous war, and excluded from intercourse with the rest of 
the world. 

*' To investigate and explain the means whereby this 
fatal reverse has been eff(Bcted, would require a voluminous 
discussion. Nothing more can be attempted in this report 
than a general allusion to the principal outlines of the 
policy which has produced this vicissitudel Among these 
may be enumerated — 

" First. — A deliberate and extensive system for eflTect- 
ing a combination among certain states, by exciting local 
jealousies and ambition, so as to secure to popidar leaders 
in one section of the Union, the controul of public affairs 
in perpetual succession. To which primary object most 
other characteristics of the system may be reconciled. 

" Secondly. — The political intolerance displayed and 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 369 

avowed in excluding from office men of unexceptionable 
merit, for want of adherence to the executive creed. 

*' Tliirdly. — The infraction of the judiciary authority 
and rights, by depriving judges of their offices in violation 
of the constitution. 

" Fourthly. — The abolition of existing taxes, requisite 
to prepare the country for those changes to which nations 
are always exposed, with a view to the acquisition of po- 
pular favour. 

" Fifthly. — The influence of patronage in the distribu- 
tion of offices, which in these states has been almost inva- 
riably made among men the least entitled to such distinc- 
tion, and who have sold themselves as ready instruments 
for distracting public opinion, and encouraging adminis- 
tration to hold in contempt the wishes and remonstrances 
of a people thus apparently divided. 

" Sixthly. — The admission of new states into the Union 
formed at pleasure in the western region, has destroyed 
the balance of power which existed among the original 
States, and deeply affected their interest. 

" Seventhly. — The easy admission of naturalized fo- 
reigners, to places of trust, honour or profit, operating as 
an inducement to the malcontent subjects of the old world 
to come to these States, in quest of executive patronage, 
and to repay it by an abject devotion to executive mea- 
sures. 

" Eighthly. — Hostility to Great Britain, and partiality 
to the late government of France, adopted as coincident 
with popular prejudice, and subservient to the main ob- 
ject, party power- Connected with these must be ranked 
erroneous and distorted estimates of the power and resour- 
ces of those nations, of the probable results of their contro- 
versies, and of our political relations to them respectively. 
" Lastly and principally. — A visionary and superficial 
theory in regard to commerce, accompanied by a real 
hatred but a feigned regard to its interests, and a ruinous 

47 



370 HISTORY OF THE 

perseverance in efforts to render it an instrument of coer- 
cion and war. 

" But it is not conceivable that the obliquity of any ad- 
ministration could, in so short a period, have so nearly 
consummated the work of national ruin, unless favoured 
by defects in the constitution. 

"To enumerate all the improvements of which that in- 
strument is susceptible, and to propose such amendments 
as might render it in all respects perfect, would be a task 
which this convention has not thought proper to assume. 
They have confined their attention to such as experience 
has demonstrated to be essential, and even among these, 
some are considered entitled to a more serious attention 
than others. They are suggested without any intentional 
disrespect to other states, and are meant to be such as all 
shall find an interest in promoting. Their object is to 
strengthen, and if possible to perpetuate, the union of the 
states, by removing the grounds of existing jealousies, and 
providing for a fair and equal representation, and a limita- 
tion of powers, which have been misused. 

" The first amendment proposed, relates to the appor- 
tionment of representatives among the slave holding 
states. This cannot be claimed as a right. Those states 
are entitled to the slave representation, by a constitu- 
tional compact. It is therefore merely a subject of agree- 
ment, which should be conducted upon principles of mu- 
tual interest and accommodation, and upon which no sen- 
sibility on either side should be permitted to exist. It has 
proved unjust and unequal in its operation. Had this 
efl'ect been foreseen, the privilege would probably not have 
been demanded ; certainly not conceded. Its tendency in 
future will be adverse to that harmony and mutual confi- 
dence which are more conducive to the happiness and 
prosperity of every confederated state, than a mere pre- 
ponderance of power, the prolific source of jealousies and 
controversy, can be to any one of them. The time may 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 371 

therefore arrive, when a sense of magnanimity and justice 
will reconcile those states to acquiesce in a revision of this 
article, especially as a fair equivalent would result to them 
in the apportionment of taxes. 

"The next amendment relates to the admission of new 
states into the Union. 

" This amendment is deemed to be highly important, 
and in fact indispensable. In proposing it, it is not intend- 
ed to recognize the ri^ht of Congress to admit new states 
without the original limits of the United States, nor is any 
idea entertained of disturbing the tranquillity of any state 
already admitted into the Union. The object is merely to \ 
restrain the constitutional power of Congress in admitting \ 
new states. At the adoption of the constitution, a certain { 
balance of power among the original parties was consid- / 
ered to exist, and there was at that time, and yet is among ; 
those parties, a strong affinity between their great and 
general interests. — By the admission of these states that 
balance has been materially affected, and unless the prac- 
tice be modified, must ultimately be destroyed. The 
southern states will first avail themselves of their new 
confederates to govern the east, and finally the western 
states, multiplied in number, and augmented in population, 
will control the interests of the whole. Thus for the sake 
of present power, the southern states will be common suf- 
ferers with the east, in the loss of permanent advantages. 
None of the old states can find an interest in creating pre- 
maturely an overwhelming western influence, which may , 
hereafter discern (as it has heretofore) benefits to be de- 
rived to them by wars and commercial restrictions. 

"The next amendments proposed by the convention, 
relate to the powers of Congress, in relation to embargo 
and the interdiction of commerce. 

" Whatever theories upon the subject of commerce 
have hitherto divided the opinions of statesmen, experience 
has at last shown that it is a vital interest in the United 



372 HISTORY OF THE 

States, and that its success is essential to the encourage- 
ment of agriculture and manufactures, and to the wealth, 
finances, defence, and liberty of the nation. Its welfare 
can never interfere with the other great interests of the 
state, but must promote and uphold them. Still those 
who are immediately concerned in the prosecution of com- 
merce, will of necessity be always a minority of the na- 
tion. They are, however, best qualified to manage and 
direct its course by the advantages of experience, and the 
sense of interest. But they are entirely unable to protect 
themselves against the sudden and injudicious decisions of 
bare majorities, and the mistaken or oppressive projects of 
those who are not actively concerned in its pursuits. Of 
consequence, this interest is always exposed to be harassed, 
interrupted, and entirely destroyed, upon pretence of se- 
curing other interests. Had the merchants of this nation 
been permitted by their own government to pursue an in- 
nocent and lawful commerce, how different would have 
been the state of the treasury and of public credit! How 
short-sighted and miserable is the policy which has anni- 
hilated this order of men, and doomed their ships to rot 
in the docks, their capital to waste unemployed, and their 
affections to be alienated from the government which was 
formed to protect them ! What security for an ample and 
unfailing revenue can ever be had, comparable to that 
which once was realized in the good faith, punctuality, 
and sense of honour, which attached the mercantile class 
to the interests of the government ! Without commerce, 
where can be found the aliment for a navy ; and without 
a navy, what is to constitute the defence, and ornament, 
and glory of this nation ! No union can be durably ce- 
mented, in which every great interest does not find itself 
reasonably secured against the encroachment and combi- 
nations of other interests. When, therefore, the past sys- 
tem of embargoes and commercial restrictions shall have 
been reviewed — when the fluctuation and inconsistency of 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 373 

public measures, betraying a want of information as well 
as feeling in the majority, shall have been considered, the 
reasonableness of some restrictions upon the power of a 
bare majority to repeat these oppressions, will appear to be 
obvious. 

"The next amendment proposes to restrict the power 
of making offensive war. In the consideration of this 
amendment, it is not necessary to inquire into the justice 
of the present war. But one sentiment now exists in re- 
lation to its expediency, and regret for its declaration is 
nearly universal. No indemnity can ever be attained for 
this terrible calamity, and its only palliation must be found 
in obstacles to its future recurrence. Rarely can the state 
of this country call for or justify offensive war. The ge- 
nius of our institutions is unfavourable to its successful 
prosecution ; the felicity of our situation exempts us from 
its necessity. In this case, as in the former, those more 
immediately exposed to its fatal effects are a minority of 
the nation. The commercial towns, the shores of our 
seas and rivers, contain the population whose vital inte- 
rests are most vulnerable by a foreign enemy. Agriculture, 
indeed, must feel at last, but this appeal to its sensibility 
comes too late. Again, the immense population which 
has swarmed into the west, remote from immediate dan- 
ger, and which is constantly augmenting, will not be averse 
from the occasional disturbances of the Atlantic states. 
Thus interest may not unfrequently combine with passion 
and intrigue, to plunge the nation into needless wars, and 
compel it to become a military, rather than a happy and 
flourishing people. These considerations, which it would 
be easy to augment, call loudly for the limitation proposed 
in the amendment. 

" Another amendment, subordinate in importance, but 
still in a high degree expedient, relates to the exclusion 
of foreigners hereafter arriving in the United States from 
the capacity of holding offices of trust, honour, or profit. 



374 HISTORY OF THE 

"That the stock of population already in these states 
18 amply sufficient to render this nation in due time suffi- 
ciently great and powerful, is not a controvertible question. 
Nor will it be seriously pretended, that the national defi- 
ciency in wisdom, arts, science, arms, or virtue, needs to 
be replenished from foreign countries. Still, it is agreed, 
that a liberal policy should offer the rights of hospitality, 
and the choice of settlement, to those who are disposed to 
visit the country. But why admit to a participation in the 
government aliens who were no parties to the compact — 
who are ignorant of the nature of our institutions, and 
have no stake in the welfare of the country but what is 
recent and transitory ? It is surely a privilege sufficient, 
to admit them after due probation to become citizens, for 
all but political purposes. To extend it beyond these limits, 
is to encourage foreigners to come to these states as candi- 
dates for preferment. The Convention forbear to express 
their opinion upon the inauspicious effects which have al- 
ready resulted to the honour and peace of this nation, 
from this misplaced and indiscriminate liberality. 

"The last amendment respects the limitation of the of- 
fice of President to a single constitutional term, and his 
eligibility from the same state two terms in succession. 

" Upon this topic it is superfluous to dilate. The love of 
power is a principle in the human heart which too often 
impels to the use of all practicable means to prolong its 
duration. The office of President has charms and attrac- 
tions which operate as powerful incentives to this passion. 
The first and most natural exertion of a vast patronage is 
directed towards the security of a new election. The in- 
terest of the country, the welfare of the people, even ho- 
nest fame and respect for the opinion of posterity, are 
secondary considerations. All the engines of intrigue, all 
the means of corruption are likely to be employed for this 
object. A President whose political career is limited to a 
single election, may find no other interest than will be pro- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 375 

moted by making it glorious to himself, and beneficial to 
his country. But the hope of re-election is prolific of 
temptations, under which these magnanimous motives are 
deprived of their principal force. The repeated election 
of the President of the United States from any one state, 
affords inducements and means for intrigues, which tend 
to create an undue local influence, and to establish the 
domination of particular states. The justice, therefore, of 
securing to every state a fair and equal chance for the 
election of this officer from its own citizens is apparent, 
and this object will be essentially promoted by preventing 
an election from the same state twice in succession. 

"Such is the general view which this Convention has 
thought proper to submit, of the situation of these states, 
of their dangers and their duties. Most of the subjects 
which it embraces have separately received an ample and 
luminous investigation, by the great and able assertors of 
the rights of their country, in the national legislature*, and 
nothing more could be attempted on this occasion than a 
digest of general principles, and of recommendations suit- 
ed to the present state of public affairs. The peculiar dif- 
ficulty and delicacy of performing even this undertaking, 
will be appreciated by all "who think seriously upon the 
crisis. Negotiations for peace are at this hour supposed 
to be pending, the issue of which must be deeply interest- 
ing to all. No measures should be adopted which might 
unfavourably affect that issue ; none which should embar- 
rass the administration, if their professed desire for peace 
is sincere ; and none which on supposition of their insince- 
rity, should afford them pretexts for prolonging the war, 
or relieving themselves from the responsibility of a disho- 
nourable peace. It is also devoutly to be wished, that an 
occasion may be afforded to all friends of the country, of 
all parties, and in all places, to pause and consider the 
awful state to which pernicious counsels and blind passions 
have brought this people. The number of those who per- 



376 nisToiiY OF the 

ceive, and who are ready to retrace errors, must, it is be- 
lieved, be yet suflicient to redeem the nation. It is neces- 
sary to rally and unite them by the assurance that no hos- 
tility to the constitution is meditated, and to obtain their 
aid in placing it under guardians who alone can save it 
from destruction. Should this fortunate change be effect- 
ed, the hope of happiness and honour may once more dis- 
pel the surrounding gloom. Our nation may yet be great, 
our union durable. But should this prospect be utterly 
hopeless, the time will not have been lost which shall have 
ripened a general sentiment of the necessity of more 
mighty efforts to rescue from ruin, at least some portion 
of our beloved country. 

" Therefore resolved, 

" That it be and hereby is recommended to the legis- 
latures of the several states represented in this Conven- 
tion, to adopt all such measures as may be necessary ef- 
fectually to protect the citizens of said states from the 
operation and effects of all acts which have been or may 
be passed by the Congress of the United States, which 
shall contain provisions, subjecting the militia or other 
citizens to forcible drafts, conscriptions, or impressments, 
not authorised by the constitution of the United States. 

'■'■Resolved, That it be and hereby is recommended to 
the said Legislatures, to authorize an immediate and 
earnest application to be made to the government of the 
United States, requesting their consent to some arrange- 
ment, whereby the said states may, separately or in con- 
cert, be empowered to assume upon themselves the de- 
fence of their territory against the enemy ; and a reason- 
able portion of the taxes, collected within said States, may 
be paid into the respective treasuries thereof, and appro- 
priated to the payment of the balance due said states, and 
to the future defence of the same. The amount so paid 
into the said treasuries to be credited, and the disburse- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 377 

ments made as aforesaid to be charged to the United 
States. 

'^^ Resolved, That it be, and hereby is, recouiniended to 
the legislatures of the aforesaid states, to pass laws (where 
it has not already been done) authorizing the governors or 
commanders-in-chief of their militia to make detachments 
from the same, or to form voluntary corps, as shall be most 
convenient and conformable to their constitutions, and to 
cause the same to bo well armed, equipped, and disciplined, 
and held in readiness for service : and upon the request of 
the governor of either of the other states to employ the 
whole of such detachment or corps, as well as the regular 
forces of the state, or such part thereof as may be required 
and can be spared consistently with the safety of the state, 
in assisting the state, making such request to repel any in- 
vasion thereof which shall be made or attempted by the 
public enemy. 

^^ Resolved, That the following amendments of the con- 
stitution of the United States be recommended to the 
states represented as aforesaid, to be proposed by them 
for adoption by the state legislatures, and in such cases as 
may be deemed expedient by a convention chosen by the 
people of each state. 

" And it is further recommended, that the said states 
shall persevere in their efforts to obtain such amendments, 
until the same shall be effected. > 

" First. Representatives and direct taxes shall be ap- 
portioned among the several states which may be included 
within this Union, according to their respective numbers 
of free persons, including those bound to serve for a term 
of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, and all other 
persons. 

" Second. No new state shall be admitted into the 
Union by Congress, in virtue of the power granted by the 
constitution, without the concurrence of two thirds of both 
houses. 

48 



378 HISTORY OF THE 

*' Third. Congress shall not have power to Jay anj 
embargo on the ships or vessels of the citizens of the 
United States, in the ports or harbours thereof, for more 
than sixty days. 

" Fourth. Congress shall not have power, without the 
concurrence of two thirds of both houses, to interdict the 
commercial intercourse between the United States and 
any foreign nation, or the dependencies thereof. 

" Fifth. Congress shall not make or declare war, or 
authorize acts of hostility against any foreign nation, with- 
out the concurrence of two thirds of both houses, except 
such acts of hostility be in defence of the territories of the 
United States when actually invaded. 

" Sixth. No person who shall hereafter be naturalized, 
shall be eligible as a member of the senate or house of 
representatives of the United States, nor capable of hold- 
ing any civil office under the authority of the United 
States. 

" Seventh. The same person shall not be elected pre- 
sident of the United States a second time ; nor shall the 
president be elected from the same state two terms in suc- 
cession. 

" Resolved, That if the application of these states to the 
government of the United States, recommended in afore- 
going resolution, should be unsuccessful, and peace should 
not be concluded, and the defence of these states should 
be neglected, as it has been since the commencement of 
the war, it will, in the opinion of this convention, be expe- 
dient for the legislatures of the several states to appoint 
delegates to another convention, to meet at Boston in the 
state of Massachusetts, on the third Thursday of June 
next, with such powers and instructions as the exigency of 
a crisis so momentous may require. 

*' Resolved, That the Hon. George Cabot, the Hon. 
Chauncey Goodrich, and the Hon. Daniel Lyman, or any 
two of them, be authorized to call another meeting of this 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 



379 



convention, to be holden in Boston, at any time before 
new delegates shall be chosen, as recommended in the 
above resolution, if in their judgment the situation of the 
country shall urgently require it. 



George Cabot, 
Nathan Dane, 
William Prescott, 
Harrison Gray Otis, 
Timothy Bigelow, 
Joshua Thomas, 
Samuel Sujiner Wilde, 
Joseph Lyman, 
Stephen Longfellow, Jun. 
Daniel Waldo, 
Hodijah Baylies, 
George Bliss. 



^ 



Massachusetts. 



Chauncey Goodrich, 
John Treadwell, 
James Hillhouse, 
Zephaniah Swift, 
Nathaniel Smith, 
Calvin Goddard, 
Roger Minot Sherman. 



> Connecticut. 



Daniel Lyman, 
Samuel Ward, 
Edward Manton, 
Benjamin Hazard, 



>• Rhode-Island, 



Benjamin West, 
Mills Olcott. 

William Hall, Jun. 



> N. Hampshire. 
Vermont." 



This document was immediately published, and exten- 
sively circulated through the country. It was looked for 
with much anxiety, and of course was read with great avidi- 



380 HISTORY OF THE 

ty. The expectations of those who apprehended it would 
contain sentiments of a seditious, if not of a treasonable 
character, were entirely disappointed. They looked in 
vain for either the one or the other, and were obliged to 
acknowledge that no such sentiments were to be found in 
it. Equally free was it from advancing doctrines which 
had a tendency to destroy the union of the states. On 
the contrary, it breathed an ardent attachment to the in- 
tegrity of the republic. Its temper was mild, its tone 
moderate, and its sentiments were liberal and patriotic. 
Many leading members of the party who had always ad- 
hered to the administration and supported the war, did 
not hesitate to declare that it was an able and unexception- 
able document ; and politicians of every party, and of all 
descriptions, agreed that it displayed great ability, and con- 
tained, principles and sentiments of much importance to 
the welfare of the nation. 

In a very short time after the publication of the report, 
the country was surprised with the news of peace. The 
manner in which the intelligence of this event was re- 
ceived throughout the country, afforded a striking com- 
mentary upon the character of the war, and the light in 
which it was viewed by the nation at large. Without wait- 
ing to learn what were the provisions of the treaty, or to 
ascertain whether the objects for which the war was pro- 
fessedly declared had been accomplished, a general spirit, 
not merely of rejoicing, but of exultation, broke out in 
every part of the coinitry. Mutual congratulations at the 
restoration of peace were exchanged by all descriptions of 
politicians, bonfires were kindled, and illuminations were 
exhibited over a large portion of the Union. Nobody 
seemed to manifest any anxiety about the provisions of the 
treaty — the war was at an end, and peace was established ; 
and beyond those main points, scarcely any individual ap- 
peared to be disposed to inquire or examine- 
Almost at the same moment of time when the news of 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 381 

peace reached the seat of government^ intelligence was 
received of the repulse of the British forces at New-Or- 
leans. Although this event occurred some time after the 
treaty of peace was signed, and the war was ended, yet 
its brilliancy wa'S considered as a proof of merit in the 
administration in the manner of conducting the war. The 
flush of feeling which this victory occasioned, drew the 
public attention away from the treaty of peace, and the 
vast expense of treasure and blood which the war had 
given rise to ; and the administration and their devoted 
friends, with their usual skill, turned it to their own ac- 
count. As a never-failing source of profit to the leaders 
of the party in power, the public resentment was excited 
against the opposers of the war, and particularly against the 
New-England states, and the Hartford Convention became 
the theme of universal calumny and reproach. The report, 
dignified, able, and unobjectionable as it was so generally 
acknowledged to be, had no efficacy in shielding the states 
from the most opprobrious charges, and the Convention 
from the foulest reproaches. Not being able to find any 
thing to justify this virulence in the report, it was alleged 
with as much apparent confidence as if it had been known 
to be a matter of fact, that although the report itself con- 
tained no evidence of treason, or even of sedition, yet the 
history of their secret proceedings, whenever they should 
be made public, would disclose an abundance of proof of 
the existence of both. When the Convention adjourned 
on the 5th of January, 1815, it was supposed that it might 
be necessary for them to hold a second meeting. With 
that expectation, when they adjourned, they did not think 
it expedient to remove the injunction of secrecy under 
which the members had been laid at the commencement 
of the session ; and the journal was sealed, and placed for 
safe keeping in the hands of the President. When it was 
found that it was not likely to be published, the charge of 
meditated sedition and treason was repeated in every quar- 



382 HISTORY OP THE 

ter, certain specific measures partaking of such a charac- 
ter were boldly asserted to have been brought before the 
Convention, and urged upon the members for their adop- 
tion. And to give plausibility to their declarations, some 
of the stories went so far as to statd the manner in 
which the mischievous propositions were rejected, and to 
name the individual member or members by whose exer- 
tions and influence the intended object was defeated. 
Notwithstanding the impossibility that facts of this kind 
could be disclosed, except by some of the members, or by 
the secretary, as no others were ever present at any of the 
proceedings, the tale, in spite of its absurdity, appeared to 
gain credit abroad in the community, and added one more 
item to the long catalogue of falsehoods and slanders that 
were circulated about the proceedings and character of the 
Convention. At length it was thought expedient to place 
the journal in the office of the Secretary of State of Massa- 
chusetts, for the inspection of ail persons who might feel 
curiosity enough to examine it. It was afterwards pub- 
lished in pamphlets, and in newspapers ; but it did not 
stop the clamours of those who were unwilling to lose so 
powerful an engine of partizan warfare as this had long 
been. Like the name of " Federalist," it answered the 
most valuable purpose among demagogues, and unprinci- 
.pled politicians ; it was used with great efll'ect ; the weak, 
the designing, and the wicked, still made use of the Hart- 
ford Convention as a countersign of party, and as a watch- 
Avord to rally the ignorant and the vicious around the 
standard of the ambitious ; and even now, there is an ap- 
parent uneasiness among that description of people, at the 
• idea that they may be obliged to give up this their favourite 
topic of reproach upon their political opponents. 
The following is a copy of that document. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 383 

Secret Journal of the Hartford Convention. 

" Hartford, Thursday, Dec. 15, 1814. 

" This being the day appointed for the meeting of the 
Convention of Delegates from the New-England states, 
assembled for the purpose of conferring on such subjects 
as may come before them, the following persons, from 
those states, met in the council chamber of the state house, 
in Hartford, in the state of Connecticut, viz. — 

" From the state of Massachusetts, Messrs. George Cabot, 
William Prescott, Harrison Gray Otis, Timothy Bigelow, 
Nathan Dane, George Bliss, Joshua Thomas, Hodijah 
Baylies, Daniel Waldo, Joseph Lyman, Samuel S. Wilde, 
and Stephen Longfellow, Jun. 

" From the state of Rhode-Island, Messrs. Daniel Lyman, 
Benjamin Hazard, and Edward Manton. 

" From the state of Connecticut, Messrs. Chauncey Good- 
rich, James Hillhouse, John Treadwell, Zephaniah Swift, 
Nathaniel Smith, Calvin Goddard, and Roger M. Sher- 
man. 

" From the state of New-Hampshire, Messrs. Benjamin 
West, and Mills Olcott. 

"Upon being called to order by Mr. Cabot, the persons 

present proceeded to choose, by ballot, a President 

Messrs. Bigelow and Goodrich were appointed to receive 
and count the votes given in for that purpose, who report- 
ed that Mr. George Cabot, a member from Massachusetts, 
was unanimously chosen. 

" On motion, voted, that the Convention proceed to the 
choice of a person to be their Secretary, who is not a mem- 
ber of the Convention ; and the votes having been received 
and counted, Theodore Dwight, of Hartford, was declared 
to be chosen unanimously. 

" Messrs. Otis, Hillhouse, and Lyman, were appointed 
a committee to examine the credentials of the membera 



384 HISTORY OF THE 

returned to serve in the convention, and report the names 
of such as they should find duly qualified ; who, having 
attended to the subject of their said appointment, made 
the following report : — 

" The committee appointed to examine the credentials 
of the members returned to serve in the convention now 
assembled at Hartford, have attended to that service, and 
find the following persons to have been elected members 
thereof by the respective legislatures of the following 
states ; — From Massachusetts, George Cabot, William 
Prescott, Harrison Gray Otis, Timothy Bigelow, Stephen 
Longfellow, Jun. Daniel Waldo, George Bliss, Nathan 
Dane, Hodijah Baylies, JoshuaThomas, Joseph Lyman, and 
Samuel S. Wilde. From Rhode-Island, Daniel Lyman, 
Samuel Ward, Benjamin Hazard, and Edward Manton. 
From Connecticut, Chauncey Goodrich, James Hillhouse, 
John Treadwell, Zephaniah Swift, Calvin Goddard, Na- 
thaniel Smith, and Roger Minot Sherman. 

" The committee also report, that at a conventional 
meeting of twenty towns in the county of Cheshire, in the 
state of New-Hampshire, Hon. Benjamin West was elect- 
ed to meet in this convention ; and at a conventional meet- 
ing of delegates from most of the towns in the county of 
Grafton, and from the town of Lancaster, in the county of 
Coos, Mills Olcott, Esq. was elected to meet in this con- 
vention ; and the committee are of opinion, that the above 
named persons are entitled to take their seats as members 
of this convention. 

" On motion, voted, that said report be accepted and 
approved. 

" On motion of Mr. Otis, voted, that the convention be 
opened with prayer, and that the delegates from the state 
of Connecticut be requested to invite a clergyman belong 
ing to the town of Hartford to perform that service. 

*' On motion, voted, that Messrs. Goddard, Bigelow, and 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 385 

Lyman, be a committee to prepare rules of proceeding for 
ihis Convention. 

" The Convention was opened with prayer by the Rev. 
Dr. Strong, of Hartford. 

*' On motion, voted, that this Convention be adjourned 
to 3 o'clock, P. M. of this day, then to meet at this place. 

" Tliursday, Dec. 15, 3 o'clock, P. M. 

" The Convention met agreeably to adjournment. 

" The committee appointed to prepare rules of proceed- 
ing, proper to be observed by this Convention, &.c. made the 
following report. 

" The committee appointed to prepare rules and orders, 
proper to be observed by this Convention, during its con- 
tinuance, ask leave to report the following; which are 
respectively submitted. 

" Calvin Goddard, per Order. 

" 1. The meetings of this Convention shall be opened 
«ach morning, by prayer, which it is requested may bo 
performed, alternately, by the chaplains of the legislature 
of Connecticut, residing in the city of Hartford. 

" 2. The most inviolable secrecy shall be observed by 
each member of this Convention, including the Secretary, 
as to all propositions, debates, and proceedings thereof, 
until this injunction shall be suspended or altered. 

*' 3. The secretary of this Convention is authorized to 
employ some suitable person to serve as a door-keeper 
and messenger, together with a suitable assistant, if ne- 
cessary, neither of whom are, at any time, to be made 
acquainted with any of the debates or proceedings of the 
board. 

'• 4. That the president of this Convention be authorized 
to regulate and direct the debates and proceedings thereof, 
in such manner as may seem to him discreet and proper, 
and to name all their committees. 

49 



386 HISTORY OF THE 

*' On motion, voted, that said report be accepted and 
approved. 

"On motion, voted, that a committee of five be ap- 
pointed to inquire what subjects will be proper to be con- 
sidered by this Convention, and report such propositions 
for that purpose, as they may think expedient, to the Con- 
vention, to-morrow morning. 

" The following persons were appointed on that com- 
mittee: Messrs. Goodrich, Otis, Lyman, of Rhode Island, 
Swift, and Dane. 

" On motion, voted, that this Convention be adjourned to 
10 o'clock to-morrow morning; then to meet at this place. 

" Friday, December 16, 1814. 

" The Convention met, agreeably to adjournment. 

" The Convention was opened with prayer by the Rev. 
Dr. Strong. 

" Mr. Ward, a member from the State of Rhode Island, 
attended, and took his seat in the Convention. 

" The committee appointed to inquire what subjects 
will be proper to be considered by the convention, and to 
report such propositions for that purpose, as they may 
think expedient, respectfully report : 

'*' That your committee deem the following to be pro- 
per subjects for the consideration of the Convention : — 
The powers claimed by the executive of the United States, 
to determine, conclusively, in respect to calling out the 
militia of tlie states into the service of the United States ; 
and the dividing the United States into military districts, 
with an officer of the army in each thereof, with discre- 
tionary authority from the executive of the United States, 
to call for the militia to be under the command of such 
officer. The refusal of the executive of the United States 
to supply, or pay the militia of certain states, called out 
for their defence, on the grounds of their not having been 
called out under the authority of the United States, or not 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 387 

having been, by the executive of the state, put under the 
command of the commander over the mihtary district. The 
failure of the government of the United States to supply 
and pay the militia of the states, by them admitted to have 
been in the United States' service. The report of the 
Secretary of War to Congress, on filling the ranks of the 
army, together with a bill, or act, on that subject. A bill 
before Congress, providing for classing and drafting the 
militia. The expenditure of the revenue of the nation in 
offensive operations on the neighbouring provinces of the 
enemy. The failure of the government of the United 
States to provide for the common defence ; and the con- 
sequent obligations, necessity and burdens, devolved on 
the separate states, to defend themselves; together with 
the mode, and the ways and means, in their power for 
accomplishing the object.' 

*' On motion, voted, that said report be accepted and 
approved. On motion, voted, that a committee of three 
be appointed to obtain such documents and information 
as may be necessary for the use and consideration of the 
Convention, and may be connected with their proceedings. 
Mr. Hillhouse, Mr. Bliss, and Mr. Hazard, were appoint- 
ed on that committee. On motion, voted, that the Rev. 
Dr. Perkins be invited to attend in turn with the other 
gentlemen already invited, as chaplains. On motion, 
voted, that the injunction of secrecy, as to the proceedings 
of yesterday, be removed. On motion, voted, that the 
convention be adjourned to 3 o'clock, P. M. of this day, 
then to meet in this j)lace. 

" Three dclock, P. M. — The Convention met agreeably 
to adjournment. After spending the afternoon in various 
discussions of important subjects, on motion, voted, that 
this Convention be adjourned till to-morrow, 10 o'clock, 
A. M. then to meet at this place. 



888 HISTORY OF THE 

" Saturday, December 17, 1814, 
** The Convention met, agreeably to adjournment. 
'• Tiie Convention was opened with prayer, by the Rev. 
Dr. Strong. After spending the forenoon in discussing 
the first section of the report of the committee made on 
Friday, on motion, voted, that when this Convention ad- 
journ, it be adjourned till Monday next. On motion, 
voted, that this Convention be adjourned till Monday next, 
at 10 o'clock, A. M. then to meet at this place. 

'^^ Monday, Deceinher 19, 1814. 

'* The Convention met, agreeably to adjournment. The 
Convention was opened with prayer, by the Rev. Mr. 
Chase. 

" On motion, voted, that a committee of five be appoint- 
ed to prepare and report a general project of such mea- 
sures as it may be proper for this Convention to adopt. 

" Messrs. Smith, Otis, Goddard, West, and Hazard, 
were appointed to be of that committee. 

** On motion, voted, that this Convention be adjourned 
till 3 o'clock this afternoon, then to meet at this place. 

•' Three (/cloc'c, P. M. — The Convention met agreeably 
to adjournment. On motion, voted, that the Rev. Mr. 
Cushman be invited to attend in turn with the other gen- 
tlemen already invited, as chai)lains. 

" After spending the afternoon in discussing the report, 
the committee, on motion, voted, that this Convention be 
adjourned till to-morrow morning, 10 o'clock, then to be 
held at this place. 

" Tuesday, December 20, 1814. 

*' The Convention met, agreeably to adjournment. The 
Convention was opened with prayer, by the Rev. Dr. 
Strong. The committee appointed to prepare and report 
a general project of such measures as it may be proper 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 389 

for this Convention to adopt, made a report, which was 
laid in and read. After discussing several articles of the 
said report, the further consideration of it was postponed 
until the afternoon. On motion, voted, that this Conven- 
tion be adjourned till 3 o'clock this afternoon, then to 
meet at this place. 

" Three o^ clock, P. M. — The Convention met, pursuant 
to adjournment. The Convention resumed the considera- 
tion of the report of the committee, which was postponed 
in the forenoon ; and after discussion through the after- 
noon, the same was postponed until the morning. On 
motion, voted, that this Convention be adjourned until to- 
morrow morning, 10 o'clock, A. M. then to meet at this 
place. 

" Wednesday, December 21, 1814. 
" The Convention met, pursuant to adjournment. The 
Convention was opened with prayer, by the Rev. Mr. 
Chase. The Convention resumed the consideration of the 
report postponed yesterday. After spending the time of the 
forenoon in the discussion of the report of the committee, 
the further consideration was postponed to the afternoon. 
On motion, voted, that this Convention be adjourned to 3 
o'clock this afternoon, then to meet at this place. 

" Three o'clock, P. M. — The Convention met, pursuant 
to adjournment. The Convention resumed the considera- 
tion of the report of the committee, which was postponed 
in the forenoon. On motion, voted that a committee of 
seven be raised to pre{>are a report illustrative of the f)rin- 
ciples and reasons which have induced the Convention to 
adopt the results to which they have agreed. Mr. Otis, 
Mr. Smith, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Dane, Mr. Prescott, Mr. 
West, and Mr. Hazard, were appointed on that committee. 
On motion, voted, that this Convention be adjourned til 
to-morrow morning, 10 o'clock. 



390 HISTORY OF THE 

" Thursday, December 22, 1814. 

•* The Convention met, pursuant to adjournment. The 
Convention was opened with prayer, by the Rev. Dr. Per- 
kins. The Convention resumed the consideration of the 
report of the committee, postponed last evening. After 
spending the forenoon in discussing said report, the fur- 
ther consideration was postponed till this afternoon. On 
motion, voted, that this Convention be adjourned till 3 
o'clock, then to meet at this place. 

" Three o'clock, P. M. — The Convention met agreeably 
to adjournment. The Convention resumed the considera- 
tion of the report of the committee, which was postponed 
in the forenoon. After spending the afternoon in discuss- 
ing said report, the further consideration thereof was post- 
poned. On motion, voted, that this Convention be ad- 
journed till to-morrow morning, 10 o'clock, then to meet 
at this place. 

" Friday, December 23, 1814. 

«' The Convention met pursuant to adjournment. The 
Convention was opened with prayer by the Kev. Mr. 
Chase. The Convention resumed the consideration of the 
report of the committee, which was postponed yesterday. 
After spending the forenoon in discussing the report of the 
committee, the further consideration thereof was postponed 
until to-morrow. On motion, voted, that this Convention 
be adjourned until to-morrow morning, 10 o'clock, then to 
meet at this place. 

" Saturday, December 24, 1814. 
»' The Convention met, pursuant to adjournment. The 
Convention was opened with prayer, by the Rev. Dr. Per- 
kins. The president communicated an address from a 
number of citizens belonging to the county of Washing- 
ton, in the state of New- York, which was read. On mo- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 391 

tion, voted, that the said address be referred to the com- 
mittee appointed on the 21st inst. 

" The Convention resumed the consideration of the re- 
port of the committee, which was postponed yesterday. 
On motion, voted, that another member be added to the 
committee appointed on the 21st inst. Mr. Sherman be- 
ing necessarily absent. Mr. Swift was appointed on said 
committee. 

" The report of the committGe which was laid in on the 
20th instant, having been under discussion at the several 
meetings of the Convention, and having been amended, 
was adopted, and referred to the committee appointed on 
the 21st to report ; which report is as follows, viz. 

" The committee appointed to prepare and report a ge- 
neral project of such measures as it may be proper for this 
Convention to adopt, respectfully report : 

" 1. That it will be expedient for this convention to 
prepare a general statement of the unconstitutional at- 
tempts of the executive government of the United States 
to infringe ujjpn the rights of the individual states, in re- 
gard to the militia, and of the still more alarming claims 
to infringe the rights of the states, manifested in the letter 
of the Secretary of War, and in the bills pending before 
Congress, or acts passed by them, and also to recommend 
to the legislatures of the states, the adoption of the most 
effectual and decisive measures, to protect the militia and 
the states from the usurpations contained in these pro- 
ceedings. 

" 2. That it will be expedient, also, to prepare a state- 
ment, exhibiting the necessity which the improvidence and 
inability of the general government have imposed upon 
the several states, of providing for their own defence, and 
the impossibility of their discharging this duty, and at the 
same time fulfilling the requisitions of the general govern- 
ment; and also, to recommend to the legislatures of the 
several states, to make provision for mutual defence, and 



892 HISTORY OF THE 

to make an earnest application to the government of the 
United States, with a view to some arrangement, whereby 
the states may be enabled to retain a portion of the taxes 
levied by Congress, for the purposes of self-defence, and 
for the reimbursement of expenses already incurred, on 
account of the United States. 

" 3. That it is expedient to recommend to the several 
state lesfislatures, certain amendments to the constitution 
of the United States, hereafter enumerated, to be by them 
adopted and proposed. (The remainder of this article in 
the report was postponed.) 

"1. That the power to declare or make war, by the 
Congress of the United States, be restricted. 

" 2. That it is expedient to attempt to make provision 
for restraining Congress in the exercise of an unlimited 
power, to make new states, and admit them into this 
Union. 

" 3. That the powers of Congress be restrained in lay- 
ing embargoes, and restrictions on commerce. 

" 4. That a president shall not be elected from the same 
state two terms successively. 

*' 5. That the same person shall not be elected president 
a second time. 

"G. That an amendment be proposed, respecting slave 
representation, and slave taxation. 

" On motion, voted, that this Convention be adjourned 
to Monday afternoon, three o'clock, then to meet at this 
place. 

" Monday^ December 26, 1814. 

** The Convention met, pursuant to adjournment. The 
Convention was opened with prayer, by the Rev. Mr. 
Woodbridge, of Hadley, Massachusetts. The committee 
not being prepared to lay in their report, on motion, voted, 
that this Convention be adjourned till to-morrow morning, 
ten o'clock, then to meet at this place. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 393 



*' Tuesday, December 27, 1814. 

"The Convention met, pursuant to adjournment. The 
Convention was opened with prayer, by the Rev. Dr. Per- 
kins. The committee not being prepared to lay in their 
report, on motion, voted, that this Convention be adjourned 
till this afternoon, three o'clock, then to meet at this place. 

" Three o'clock, P. M. — The Convention met pursuant 
to adjournment. The committee not being prepared to 
lay in their report, on motion, voted, that this Convention 
be adjourned till to-morrow morning, ten o'clock, then to 
meet at this place. 

" Wednesday, December 28, 1814. 

" The Convention met, pursuant to adjournment. The 
Convention was opened with prayer, by the Rev. Mr. 
Chase. A certificate of the proceedings of a Convention 
in the county of Windham, in the state of Vermont, ap- 
pointing the Hon. William Hall, Jun. to represent the people 
of that county in this Convention, was read. On motion, 
voted, that the Hon. William Hall, Jun. is entitled to a seat 
in this Convention; and that the Hon. Mr. Olcott, of New- 
Hampshire, be requested to introduce Mr. Hall, for the 
purpose of taking his seat. 

" Mr. Hall, a member from the county of Windham, 
in the state of Vermont, attended, and took his seat in 
the Convention. The report of the committee not being 
prepared, on motion, voted, that this Convention be ad- 
journed to three o'clock, this afternoon ; then to meet at 
this place. 

" Three o^clock, P. M. — The Convention met pursuant 
to adjournment. The report of the committee not being- 
prepared, upon motion, voted, that this Convention be ad- 
journed till to-morrow morning, ten o'clock. 

50 



394 HISTORY OF THE 

" Thursday, December 29, 1814. 

" The Convention met, pursiiaiit to adjournment. The 
Convention was opened with prayer, by the Rev. Dr.. 
Strong. On motion, voted, that the following proposition 
be referred to the committee appointed on the 21st instant. 

'"That the capacity of naturalized citizens to hold offi- 
ces of trust, honour, or profit, ought to be restrained; and 
that it is expedient to propose an ampndment to the Con- 
stitution of the United Stages, in relation to that subject.' 

" The report of the committee not being prepared, on 
motion, voted, that this Convention be adjourned till three 
o'clock this afternoon, then to meet at this place. 

" Tkrce o'clock, P. M. — The Convention met, pursuant 
to adjournment. The report of the committee not being 
prepared, on motion, voted, that this Convention be ad- 
journe 1 till to-morrow morning, ten o'clock, then to meet 
at this place. 

''Friday, December SO, 1814. 

"The Convention met, pursuant to adjournment. Ths 
Convention was opened with prayer, by the Ilcv. Dr. Per- 
kins. The committee appointed on the 21st instant pre 
sented their report, which was read twice. The forenoon 
bavin"- been spent in reading the report, on motion, voted, 
that this Convention be adjourned till three o'clock this 
afternoon, then to meet at this place. 

'^ Three o'clock, P. M. — The Convention met, pursuant 
to adjournment. After spending the afternoon in discuss- 
in"- the report, the subject was postponed. On motion, 
voted, that this Convention be adjourned till to-morrow^ 
morning, ten o'clock, then to meet at this place. 

''Saturday, December 31, 1814. 

" The Convention met, pursuant to adjournment. The 
Convention was opened with prayer, by the Kev. Mr. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 395 

Chase. The Cnnvpiitioii resinned the consideration of 
the rej5ort, postponed yesterday. On motion, voted, that 
a committee, to consist of tliiee, be appointed to procure 
that part of the report which relates to the militia, printed 
confidentially. Messrs. Goodrich, Lyman, of Massachu- 
setts, and Goddard, were appointed on that committee. 
After havin<j spent the forenoon in considering the report, 
the further consideration thereof was postponed. On mo- 
tion, voted, that this Convention be adjourned till half past 
two o'clock this afternoon, then to tneet at this place. 

" Three u'clock, P. M. — The Convention met, pursuant 
to adjournment. The Convention resumed the considera- 
tion of the report of the Committee, which was postponed 
in the forenoon. After having- spent the afternoon in dis- 
cussing the report of the committee, the further conside- 
ration thereof was postponed. On motion, voted, that a 
committee of three persons be appointed to ascertain what 
expenses have been incurred in this Convention, which it 
is necessary for them to defray, and to report the mode of 
discharging them. Mr. Goddard, 3Ir. Prescott, and Mr. 
Ward, were appointed on that committee. On motion, 
voted, that the first eight pages of the report be recom- 
mitted to the committee which reported it, to reconsider 
the same. On motion, voted, that the same committee re- 
port such documents and articles as they may think proper, 
to compose an appendix to the report. 

" On motion, voted, that this Convention be adjourned 
till Monday morning, ten o'clock, then to meet at this place. 

*' Monday, January 2, 1815. 

** The Convention met, pursuant to adjournment. The 
Convention was opened with prayer, by the Kev. Mr. 
Chase. The Convention resumed the consideration of the 
report of the committee which was postponed from Satur- 
day. After spending the forenoon in discussing the report, 
the further consideration thereof was postponed, Oq 



396 HISTORY OF THE 

motion, voted, that this Conventlnn bp, adjourned till hal 
past two o'clock this afternoon, then to meet at this place* 
*' Half past two o'clock, P. M. — The Convention met, pur- 
suant to adjournment. The Convention resumed the con- 
sideration of the report of the committee which was post- 
poned in the forenoon. After spending the afternoon in 
discussing the report of the committee, the further con- 
sideration thereof was postponed. On motion, voted, that 
this Convention be adjourned till to-morrow morning, nine 
o'clock, then to meet at this place. 

" Tuesday, January 3, 1815. 

" The Convention met, pursuant to adjournment. The 
Convention was opened with prayer, by the Rev. Dr. Per- 
kins. The Convention resumed the consideration of the 
report of the committee which was postponed yesterday. 
After spending the forenoon in discussing the report of the 
committee, the same was postponed till the afternoon. On 
motion, voted, that this Convention be adjourned till three 
o'clock this afternoon, then to meet at this place. 

" Three o'' clock, P. M. — The Convention met, pursuant 
to adjournment. The Convention resumed the considera- 
tion of the report of the committee, which was postponed 
in the forenoon. After discussing and amending the report 
of the committee, voted, that the same be accepted and 
approved. On motion, resolved, that the injunction of 
secrecy, in regard to all the debates and proceedings of 
this Convention, except in so far as relates to the report 
finally adopted, be, and hereby is, continued. On motion, 
voted, that a committee of three persons be appointed to 
consider and report what measures it will be expedient to 
recommend to the states, for their mutual defence. Mr. 
Prescott, Mr. Wilde, and Mr. Manton, were appointed on 
the committee. 

"On motion, voted, that Mr. Sherman be added to the 
committee for superintending the printing of the report. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 397 

On motion, voted, that this Convention be adjourned till 
to-morrow morning, ten o'clock, then to meet at this place. 

'• Wednesday, January 4, 1815. 
" The Convention met, pursuant to adjournment. The 
Convention was opened with prayer, by the Rev. Mr. 
Chase. On motion, voted, that certain documents before 
the Convention, be published, with the following title, 
' Statements prepared and jmhlished, hy order of the Conven- 
tion of delegates, held at Hartford, Dec. 15, 1814, and 
printed hy their order.'' 

" On motion, voted, that Mr. Goodrich be discharged 
from any further services on the committee to superintend 
the printing of the report, (fcc. On motion, voted, that 
another member be added to that committee. Mr. Otis 
was appointed to that place. The committee appointed 
to report what measures it will be expedient to recommend 
to the states, for their mutual defence, presented a report, 
which was read. On motion, voted, that the said report 
be accepted and approved. On motion, voted, that this 
Convention be adjourned till three o'clock this afternoon, 
then to meet at this place. 

" Three o'clock, P. M. — The Convention met, pursuant 
to adjournment On motion, voted, that two copies of the 
report of the Convention, subscribed by all the members 
who shall be disposed to sign the same, be forwarded to 
each of the governors of the states of Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, New-Hampshire, and Ver- 
mont ; one of which to be for the private use of the said 
governors, and with a request that the other, at some pro- 
per time, may be laid before the legislatures of the states 
aforesaid. 

" Mr. Goodrich submitted the following resolution to the 
Convention. Resolved, That the thanks of the Conven- 
tion be presented to the Hon. George Cabot, in testimony 
of the respectful sense they entertain of his conduct whilst 
presiding over their deliberations. 



398 HISTORY OF THE 

*' On the question being put by the secretary, it passed 
in the affirmative, inmnmously. On motion, voted, that 
the Conversion be arljourned till 7 o'clock, this evening, 
then to meet at this place. 

" Seven (/dock, P. M. — The committee met, pursuant 
O adjournment. On motion, voted, that the report, as 
amended, and the resolves accompanying the same, be 
accepted and approved. On motion, voted, that the dele- 
gates from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, 
take two copies of the report of the Convention, and deli- 
ver the same to the governors of those states, agrecab'y 
to the vote of the Convention passed this day, and that the 
president be requested to transmit two copies of the re- 
port to the governors of the states of New-Hampshire and 
Vermont, together with a copy of the vote of the Conven- 
tion aforesaid. 

" On motion, voted, that at the close of the Conven- 
tion, the journal be committed to the care of the president. 
On motion, voted, that the Convention be adjourned till 
to-morrow^ morning, 9 o'clock, then to meet at this place. 

•' Thursday, January 5, 1815 — d o'clock, A. M. 
" The Convention met, pursuant to adjournment — after 
solemn prayer, by the Rev. Dr. Strong, on motion, voted, 
that this Convention be adjourned without day. 

•' Attest, Theodore Dwight, Secretary.^' 

This document, when placed in the secretary's office at 
Boston, was accompanied by a certificate of the followin<'' 
tenor, viz. 

" I George Cabot, late president of the Convention, as- 
sembled at Hartford, on the fifteenth day of December, 
3814, do hereby certify, that the foregoing is the original 
and only journal of the proceedings of that Convention ; 
and that the twenty-seven written pages, which compose 
it, and the printed report, comprise a faithful and conjplete 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 399 

record of all the motions, resolutions, votes, and proceed- 
ings, of that Convention. And I do further certify, that 
this journal has been constantly in my exclusive custody, 
from the time of the adjournment of the Convention, to tho 
delivery of it into the office of the Secretary of this Com- 
monwealth. 

" George Cabot. 

''Boston, Nov. l^th, 1S19." 

By adverting to the Report, it will be seen that the 
Convention, in their proceedings, and in the result, kept 
strictly within the limits of their commissions. They con- 
feri'ed upon the general subjects referred to them for con- 
sideration ; and after mature deliberation, and the exercise 
of the utmost caution, discretion, and sound judgment, 
they embodied their views, their sentiments, and their con- 
clusions, in a document which has been admired, and which 
will be admired, even by future generations, as one of the 
ablest for wisdom and talent that our country has ever 
produced. 

After a concise, but forcible review of the policy of the 
government previo\isly to the declaration of war, the Con- 
vention take a survey of the state of things after that event, 
and of the calamities which it had brought upon the na- 
tion ; and close with recommending to the legislatures by 
whom they were appointed, the following resolutions : 

'■^Resolved, That it be and is hereby recommended to 
the legislatures of the several states represented in this 
Convention, to adopt all such measures as may be neces- 
sary efiectually to protect the citizens of said states from 
the operation and effects of all acts which have been or may 
be passed by the Congress of the United States, which shall 
contain provisions subjecting the militia or other citizens 
to forcible drafts, conscriptions, or impressments, not au- 
thorised by the Constitution of the United States. 



^v 



400 HISTORY OF THE 

*' Resolved, That it be and hereby is recommended to 
the said legislatures to authorise an immediate and earnest 
application to be made to the Government of the United 
States, requesting their consent to some arrangement, 
whereby the said states may separately or in concert, be 
empowered to assume upon themselves the defence of their 
territory against the enemy ; and a reasonable portion of 
the taxes collected within said states, may be paid into the 
respective treasuries thereof, and appropriated to the pay- 
ment of the balance due said states, and to the future de- 
fence of the same. The amount so paid into the said trea- 
suries to be credited, and the disbursements made as 
aforesaid, to be charged to the United States. 

" Resolved, That it be, and it hereby is recommended 
to the legislatures of the aforesaid states, to pass laws 
(where it has not already been done) authorising the Go- 
vernors or Commanders in chief of their militia, to make 
detachments from the same, or to form voluntary corps, as 
shall be most convenient and conformable to their consti- 
tutions, and to cause the same to be well armed, equipped, 
and disciplined, and held in readiness for service; and upon 
the request of the Governor of either of the other states, 
to employ the whole of such detachment or corps, as well 
as the regular forces of the state, or such part thereof 
as may be required, and can be spared consistently with 
the safety of the state, in assisting the state making such 
request, to repel any invasion thereof which shall be made 
or attempted by the public enemy." 

The other resolutions recommended by the Convention 
to their several legislatures, consisted of various proposi- 
tions for amending the Constitution of the United States, 
a practice which has been extensively engaged in by diffe- 
rent states, almost throughout the Union, and which is 
harmless in itself; and as the mode of amending that in- 
strument is pointed out by itself, it is not necessary to 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 401 

allude to them in the present work. Nor have the others 
which we have copied been considered as reprehensible 
in themselves. To recommend to the legislatures of the 
states to adopt such measures as might be necessary to 
protect their citizens from forcible drafts, conscriptions, 
and impressment, cannot fail to meet with the approba- 
tion not only of that great body of citizens who are imme- 
diately exposed to the effects of such unconstitutional 
measures, but of all upright, just, and virtuous people, of 
every age, and in whatever circumstances of life. 

The next re'solution falling directly within the provision 
which has been quoted, will be as little likely to meet with 
objections from any quarter. It recommends an applica- 
tion to Congress, for permission to assume upon themselves 
the defence of their own territory, and to appropriate a 
portion of the taxes collected within those states, to pay 
the balance due the states for money already advanced in 
defending their coasts, and to defray any further expenses 
attending their future efforts for the same object. 

The third resolution recommends to the legislatures of 
the several states which they represented, to pass laws for 
forming volunteer corps, and to cause them to be armed 
and equipped, and held in readiness for service, and if ne- 
cessity required, to assist each other in defending them- 
selves against the inroads of the enemy. 

This recommendation pursues the course pointed out by 
the administration, soon after the commencement of the 
war, when they called upon Massachusetts to send a body 
of militia to Rhode Island, to defend the town and port of 
Newport in the latter state. 

The case of the Hartford Convention appears, then, to 
be summarily as follows: — It was legitimate in its origin, 
in no respect violating any provisions of the constitution 
of the United States, either in its letter or its spirit. The 
commissions given to the members were scrupulously- 
guarded against any unconstitutional conduct on the part 

51 



402 HISTORY OF THE 

of the Convention, giving them authority only to confer 
together, and recommend such measures to their principals 
as they might deem expedient, taking care to govern them- 
selves by a regard to the duties and obligations which the 
states owed to the United States. The account of their 
proceedings shows that they punctiliously observed the in- 
junctions contained in their instructions ; and the result of 
their deliberations proves their conduct to have been, io 
every respect, strictly constitutional. 

Notwithstanding the vast amount of calumny and re- 
proach that has been bestowed upon the Hartford Conven- 
tion by the ignorant and the worthless, it will not be a 
hazardous assumption to say, that henceforward no man 
who justly estimates the value of his character for truth 
and honesty, and who, of course, means to sustain such a 
character, will risk his reputation by the repetition of such 
falsehoods respecting that body, as have heretofore been 
uttered with impunity. No man, with the facts before him, 
can do this, without sacrificing all claim to veracity, and> 
of course, to integrity and honour. Nor will the subter- 
fuge that the journal and report of the Convention do not 
contain the whole of their proceedings, save him from the 
disgrace of wilfully disregarding the truth. Nearly nine- 
teen years have elapsed since the Convention adjourned, 
and no proof has been adduced, and nothing nearer proofs 
than the unsupported assertions of the corrupt journals of 
political partizans, of any measure having been adopted 
or recommended by the Convention, besides those con= 
tained in the journal and the report. If there was any 
treason, proposed or meditated, against the United States, 
at the Convention, it must have been hidden in as deep 
and impenetrable obscurity, as the fabulous secrets of free 
masonry are said to be buried, otherwise some traces of 
it would have been discovered and disclosed to the public 
before this late period. No such discovery having beeis 



■ HARTFORD CONVENTION. 403 

made, the inference must necessarily be, that no such 
treasonable practice or intention existed. 

But, in the nature of things, nothing could have been 
transacted by the Convention, beyond what appears in 
their journal and report. They were a public body— a 
grand committee appointed by the legislatures of three 
distinct states, to confer, and report. The subjects of 
their conference must appear in their journal, otherwise 
they could never obtain a legitimate existence. And the 
report must, in like manner, contain the entire result of 
their deliberations, because nothing that did not appear 
embodied in that document, could, in the nature of things, 
form a part of their proceedings, and be laid before their 
principals. It is then absurd to pretend that there were 
other proceedings, which have been kept out of sight, or 
suppressed, and never revealed, because nothing that was 
thus kept back could have formed any part of their pro- 
ceedings. 

The internal evidence of the case is therefore sufficient 
to show the groundlessness of the charge that a part of 
the proceedings of the Convention were suppressed. But 
the certificate of Mr. Cabot has been quoted, which asserts 
in direct and positive terms, that the journal contains "a 
faithful and complete record of all the motions, resolutions, 
votes, and proceedings of that Convention.''' If this certifi- 
cate is false, there were, at the time it was made, at least 
twenty individuals of the highest respectability in exist- 
ence, who would have been able to prove its falsity. There 
are no less than twelve such individuals now living, who 
are able to impeach its correctness, if it asserts that which 
is not true. Mr. Cabot was a man of the highest respec- 
tability for understanding, integrity, and talents. He had 
more reputation to lose than scores together of those who 
would impeach his veracity can lay claim to or boast of. 
His declaration on any subject would have been taken for 
truth, wherever he was well known, with as much confi- 



404 HISTORY OF THE 

dence as if it had been sanctioned by the most solemn 
oath. Here it is impeached by nothing but the unsupport- 
ed assertions or suggestions of political partizans — men 
without manners, without principles, and of course without 
reputation. 

In January, 1831, the publishei of a newspaper in the 
State of Connecticut, was prosecuted before the Superior 
Court of that State for a libel. The article which was 
the foundation of the prosecution, contained an allusion to 
the Hartford Convention. Although that allusion was 
not the basis of the charge, yet the opportunity was im- 
proved to draw from one of the members of that body 
some facts respecting its character and conduct. The 
member referred to was Roger Minot Sherman, a lawyer 
of great eminence, and a gentleman of the highest respec- 
tability of character, both professional and personal. He 
was regularly summoned as a witnes-s, on a collateral 
point, and not material to the issue before the court, and 
was examined at length. There is very little doubt that 
the object was, to ascertain from this source, whether there 
was any thing treasonable, or seditious, in the proceedings 
of the Convention. In the course of his testimony he 
said — 

" There was not, to the best of my recollection, a sin- 
gle motion, resolution, or subject of debate, but what appears 
ill the Journal.^'' In answer to a question put to him, he 
replied — " I believe I know their proceedings perfectly, 
and that every measure, done or jjroposed, has been published 
to the world. ^^ 

But it may be said, that both Mr. Calot and 3Ir. Sher- 
man were members of the Convention, and however high 
their standing in the community, as men of the purest 
morals, and the most unsullied integrity, may have been, 
still they must be considered as involved in its guilt, if 
guilt actually existed, and therefore they are witnesses 
interested in the question, and not entitled to the 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 405 

full measure of credit which would otherwise be due 
to them. It then only remains for the only individual who 
was present at the Convention, and was not a member, 
and who alone had the opportunity to be fully acquaint- 
ed with all their proceedings, to give his testimony. This 
testimony is not offered because the exigencies of the case 
in any sense require it. If a hundred disinterested indi- 
viduals of the most unquestioned integrity could be found, 
who were as well acquainted with the facts as the two 
persons who have already been named, and who should 
concur in their declarations, their united testimony would 
not add a particle of strength to that of Messrs. Cabot 
and Sherman, where the characters of the latter were 
known. But if a disinterested witness should be kept 
back, who might be produced, an inference might be 
drawn by some caviller, from that circumstance, unfavour- 
able to the character and conduct of the Convention. 
Such a witness is the author of this work — the Secretary 
of the Convention ; and he feels it a duty which he owes 
to truth, and the characters of as respectable, patriotic, 
and virtuous a body of men, as ever were collected on any 
occasion, to say, in the most positive and unhesitating 
manner, and with all the solemnity which the nature of 
the case requires, that the Journal and the Report of 

THE Co.^ENTION, CONTAIN A FULL, C03IPLETE, AND .SPE- 
CIFIC ACCOUNT OF ALL THE MOTIONS, VOTES, AND PRO- 
CEEDINGS OF THE Convention. And he will add, that 
no proposition was made in the Convention to divide the 
Union, to organize the New England States into a sepa- 
rate government, or to form an alliance with Great Bri- 
tain, or any other foreign power ; on the contrary, every 
motion that was made, every resolution that was offered, 
and every measure that was adopted, was, in principle 
and in terms, strictly confined within the limits of the in- 
structions from the several legislatures by whom the dele- 
gates were appointed. And when the Report was adopted, 



406 HISTORY OF THE 

it was by an unanimous vote, sanctioned by the signature 
of every member. 

The effect of this declaration upon the public mind^ 
will of course be left to the decision of the public. 

The legislative acts of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and 
Khode Island, containing provisions for the appointment 
of Delegates to meet in Convention, and stating the gene- 
ral objects of the measure, specifying the powers and au- 
thorities by which their conduct should be regulated, and 
prescribing the limits within which they were to be con- 
fined, it will be recollected were passed in the month of 
October, 1814. The condition of the country at large, 
and particularly that of the New England States upon the 
Atlantic coast, has been alluded to and explained. At 
that time, the towns upon the sea-shore were exposed to 
hostile invasion by the enemy's naval forces — several of 
the towns had been captured, some places had been at- 
tacked by their ships, property to a great amount destroyed, 
the whole extent of the coast, from the border of ISew-York 
to Eastport, had been essentially abandoned by the United 
States troops, and the defence of it thrown upon the indi- 
vidual states — those states had large bodies of men in the 
field, guarding the towns, defending the forts, and protecting 
the inhabitants, at a most enormous sacrifice of time and 
money ; and in the darkest and most threatening period 
of the war, the United States government had withdrawn 
their supplies for the militia, and forced the states to sup- 
port their own men in the national service. At the same 
time, the taxes imposed and collected by thjp government 
of the United States, for the expenses of the war, were 
extremely burthensome ; and to add to the general mass 
of calamity, the currency of the country had become de- 
ranged, and depreciated to such a degree, that the most 
extensive distress was threatened from that fruitful source 
of evil. 

Just at this moment, the despatches from the Commis- 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 407 

sioners at Ghent were published, showing that such ex- 
travagant demands were made by the British, as the basis 
of negotiation, that there was scarcely a ray of hope that 
peace would be obtained. And such was the languao-e of the 
executive members of our government. The letter of the 
Secretary of War to the military Committee of the House 
of Representatives, from which extracts have been made, 
was dated October 17th, 1814. In that extraordinary 
document, every effort was made to alarm the country, 
not only with regard to the continuance of the war, and 
the hopelessness of peace, but to convey the idea that it 
would thenceforward be a war of the most violent, despe- 
rate, and dangerous description — that we were fightino-, 
not only for our liberty and independence, but for exist- 
ence- — and that if we made any dishonourable concession to 
Great Britain, the spirit of the nation would be broken, 
and the foundation of our liberty and independence shaken. 

In addition to all these considerations, the manner of 
conducting the war had been such from the beginning, as 
to manifest great inability in the administration and tiieir 
agents, and to destroy all confidence, not only in their prin- 
ciples, but in their capacity for conducting the affairs of 
the nation. 

Under such circumstances, and with such a prospect 
for the ensuing year, the New England States were under 
the necessity, for their self-preservation, to consult ton-ether, 
for the purpose, if practicable, of devising and adopting 
some system of operations which might conduce to their 
own safety. The situation of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
and Connecticut, rendered it indispensably necessary that 
they should take })reliminary measures of this description, 
previously to the opening of another campaign. The Pre- 
sident had directed a call to be made upon Massachusetts, 
at a very early stage of the war, to furnish men for the 
defence of Newport, in Rhode Island. At that time the 
danger of invasion was inconceivably less than it was in 



408 HISTORY OF THE 

October, 1814. What part of the New England coast 
would be the object of the next hostile visit, could not be 
known, or conjectured. But that there was at that time 
*' imminent danger of invasion," could not be denied, or 
doubted. And that the whole extent of the coast was left 
destitute of the means of defence, was a fact not to be 
questioned. 

Under circumstances like these, the general subject was 
presented to the consideration of those states. If defend- 
ed at all, they must defend themselves. This was the 
import of the correspondence which the national govern- 
ment had carried on with those states from the beginning. 
The danger was common to them, and it was therefore 
absolutely necessary, in the performance of the duty which 
the national government had forced upon them, that some 
general plan of operations sliould be devised, which would 
be the most likely to accomplish the object in view. The 
New England States, therefore, in adoptingthe course they 
were pursuing, were not volunteers. The national govern- 
ment had withdrawn from them all the means of defence 
which they possessed, and then informed them they must 
defend themselves. And having brought those states in- 
to this predicament, they did not even furnish them with 
their advice in regard to the manner in which their de- 
fence was to I)e conducted. They left it to themselves to 
supply the means, and to use them in the manner which 
they might suppose would best accomplish the object in 
view. They adopted the plan of holding a convention of 
delegates, who should meet and consult upon thp great 
subject of defending their coasts from invasion, their towns 
from being sacked and plundered, their property from be- 
ing wasted and destroyed, their houses and their homes 
from being pillaged and broken up, and their families 
from being scattered or massacred. To j^roceed with 
the utmost prudence and caution, they selected the wisest 
and most virtuous members of their several communities 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 409 

— men of great experience, sound principles, mature age, 
holding large stakes in the public welfare, and highly es- 
teemed for integrity, public services, and patriotism. And 
to render the matter perfectly secure, the legislatures by 
whom the delegates were appointed, took care to furnish 
them with commissions, specifically prescribing the duties 
which they were to perform, and the limits within which 
they were to operate. In Massachusetts, their delegates 
were instructed " to devise, if practicable, means of security 
and defence ichich may be consistent with the preservation of 
their resources from total ruin, and adapted to their local 
situation, mutual relations and habits, not repugnant to 

THEIR OBLIGATIONS AS BIEMBERS OF THE UnION." The 

resolution of the legislature of Connecticut was equally 
specific and guarded. Their delegates were instructed to 
meet those of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and 
of other states who should appoint, and " confer with them 
on the subjects proposed by a resolution of said Common- 
wealth, and upon any other subjects which may come be- 
fore them, for the purpose of devising and recommending 
such measures for the safety and welfare of these states 

AS MAY CONSIST WITH OUR OBLIGATIONS AS MEMBERS OF 

THE NATIONAL Union." The Rhode Island legislature 
instructed their delegates to confer with such delegates as 
are or shall be appointed by other states, upon the com- 
mon dangers to which these states are exposed, upon the 
best means of co-operating for our mutual defence against 
the enemy, and upon the measures which it may be in the 
power of said states, consistently with their obliga- 
tions, to adopt, to restore and secure to the people their 
rights and privileges under the Constitution of the United 
States:' 

The great object of the states, then, in calling a con- 
vention, was, to confer on the practicability of devising means 
of security and defence — that is, to perform the task which 

the national government had thrown upon them in I8I2, 

52 



410 HISTORY OF THE 

and which had been left upon them down to tbje time of 
appointing delegates to meet in convention, and which had 
now become so imperative that there was no room to 
avoid it. But, at the same time, in holding this confer- 
ence, nothing was to be done that was not compatible with 
the duties and obligations of the states as members of the 
Union. These commissions were precisely similar in 
their character to powers of attorney, in which the prin- 
cipals give the agents authority to perform certain acts 
specified in the instruments. To the extent of that au- 
thority the agents may act, and no further. If the agents 
transcend those limits, whatever they may attempt to per- 
form beyond the scope of their authority is not binding 
upon the principals, and of course is void. In these com- 
missions, however, the delegates were not clothed with 
power to do any thing except to confer with their associ- 
ates, for the purpose of devising means for the defence 
and security of the states which they represented. What- 
ever conclusions they might eventually come to, must of 
course be reported to the legislatures by whom they were 
appointed and commissioned, for them to adopt or reject, 
as they might think expedient. Here, it will be recollect- 
ed, were tlie representatives of three states. Upon re- 
ceiving their report, one state might adopt, another might 
reject, and a third might not do either, but adopt in part, 
and reject in part ; or the three might reject the whole 
report. 

But whatever was done, or recommended to be done, 
was to be governed by the principles of loyalty to the 
Uiiion and Government of the United States. This limi- 
tation of power confined the Convention strictly within 
constitutional limits. The constitution provides that " 'No 
state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty 
on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, 
enter into any agreement or compact with another state,, 
or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actual- 



I 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 411 

\y invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit 
of delay." Had the Convention disregarded their autho- 
rity so far as to recommend the adoption of either of these 
prohibited acts, without the previous consent of Congress, 
their recommendation would have been void, for the want 
of power in themselves even to advise such a course. In 
addition to which, their recommendation of any course 
would not have bound the legislatures. To give it any 
validity, the latter bodies must have adopted it, and made 
it their own. 

Having given a history of the war, and of the manner 
in which it was conducted on the part of the United States, 
with the view of placing before the public a correct ac- 
count of the events which led to the assemblinff of the 
Hartford Convention, it may be well to devote a few mo- 
ments to its termination by the treaty of peace. 

On the 18th of February, 1815, the President of the 
United States transmitted a message to both houses of 
Congress, of which the following is an extract — 

" 1 lay before Congress copies of the treaty of peace and 
amity between the United States and his Britannic majesty, 
which was signed by the commissioners of both parties at 
Ghent, on the 24th of December, 1814, and the ratifica- 
tions of which have been duly exchanged. 

" While performing this act, I congratulate you, and 
our constituents, upon an event ickich is highly honourable 
to the nation, and terminates uith peculiar felicity, a cam- 
paign signalized by the most brilliant successes. 

" The late war, although reluctantly declared by Con- 
gress, had become a necessary resort, to assert the rights 
and independence of the nation. It has been waged with 
a success which is the natural result of the wisdom of the le- 
gislative councils, of the patriotism of the people, of the 
public spirit of the militia, and of the valour of the mili- 
tary and naval forces of the country. Peace, at all times 
a blessing, is peculiarly welcome, therefore, at a period 



412 HISTORY OF THE 

when the causes for the war have ceased to operate, when 
the government has demonstrated the efficiency of its 
powers of defence, and when the nation can review its 
conduct without regret, and without reproach." 

The only cause of war, at the end of five days after its 
declaration, was that of the impressment of our seamen 
by British cruisers. The prevention of this evil was consi- 
dered by our government an object of sufficient importance 
to justify the expenditure of the treasure and blood which 
was caused by the war. Many declarations of the govern- 
ment have been quoted in this work, from both the execu- 
tive and legislative departments, intended to impress upon 
the minds of the public at large, as well as upon those of 
the commissioners for negotiating a peace, the indispensa- 
ble importance of obtaining security against the furtlier 
adoption of the practice. As late as January, 1814, the 
Secretary of State informed the plenipotentiaries at Got- 
tenbur«[ that " The sentiments of the President had un- 
dergone no change on that important subject. This de- 
grading practice must cease : our flag must protect the 
crew, or the United States cannot consider themselves an 
independent nation." In January, 1613, the committee 
of foreign relations of the House of Representatives say, 
"War having been declared, and the case of impressment 
being necessarily included as one of the most important 
causes, it is evident that?7 imtsl be provided for in the paci- 
fication: the omission of it in a treaty of peace would not 
leave it on its former ground: it would in effect he an abso- 
lute relinquisJimenV^ — " It is an evil ickich ought not, which 
cannot be longer tolerated^^ — " It is incoinpatible with their 
sovereignly. It is subversive of the main pillars of their in- 
dcp'Jndence.^^ But the case of impressment was not j)ro- 
vidcd for in the pacification. So far from it, the subject 
is not once mentioned, or even alluded to in the whole 
course of the treaty. So far, then, from gaining this, 
which was avowedly the sole object of the war when it 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 413 

was declared, as well as when these various declarations 
were made, and this strong language was used, it must, 
according to those declarations, be considered as having 
been left on worse ground than that on which it stood up- 
on before the war; — indeed, as having been absolutely re- 
linquished ; for no stiprdation was entered into, no agree- 
ment made, not even an informal understanding was had 
with regard to it, and the evil which could not be longer 
tolerated, which was incompatible v.'ith our sovereignty, 
and subversive of the main pillars of our independence, 
was entirely unnoticed at the conclusion of the war and 
the negotiations for peace. And this was, in fact, the ef- 
fect of an "absolute relinquishment" of the subject by 
the positive order of the President. It has been seen, 
that in a letter of instructions from the Secretary of State 
to the commissioners, dated June 27th, 1814, the latter 
were informed, that if they should find it indispensably 
necessary in order to terminate the war, they might omit 
any stipulation in the treaty on the subject of impressment. 
And yet notwithstanding all this — notwithstanding no sin- 
gle object for which the war was declared was accomplish- 
ed, and the treaty of peace has no reference to such object, 
the President, in a public message to Congress, declares, 
that the peace was an event "highly honourable to the 
nation," and that it terminated "with peculiar felicity a 
campaign signalized by the most hrilliant successes.''* 

Even the subject of impressment, for the purpose of 
getting rid of which it had been exclusively maintained, 
almost from the beginning, had been formally abandoned, 
and the controversy had in October, 1814, in fact, though 
secretly, assumed its true character, which was that of a 
war for the support of the personal popularity of the na- 
tional administration, and not for the protection of the 
riojhts and honour of the nation. Havinij in terms relin- 
quished the idea of obtaining security against impress- 
ment in the treaty of peace, the only object was to retire 



414 HISTORY OF THE 

from the contest with as little loss of reputation, to those 
who involved the country in it, as the nature of the case 
would admit. To accomplish this object, the attempt to 
force the militia into the regular army, in defiance of the 
express provisions and principles of the constitution, was 
made. It was defeated by the patriotic and independent 
stand taken at the outset by the New-England govern- 
ments ; and to those governments is it solely owing, that 
a precedent so dangerous to the liberties of the country 
was not established. 

It is not an easy matter to reconcile the foregoing de- 
clarations of the chief magistrate of the United States with 
the facts which have been alluded to. How is it possible 
that a peace could be " highly honourable to the nation," 
when the single object for which the war was carried on 
was not accomplished ? The fact that we gained splendid 
naval victories, and that the British were repulsed at New- 
Orleans, do not prove it. M'Donough's victory on Lake 
Champlain was a brilliant achievement, as well as the re- 
pulse of the British at New-Orleans. But the latter event 
occurred in January, 1815, two weeks after the treaty of 
peace was signed, and therefore could not with propriety 
be considered as having terminated the campaign. But 
against these signal victories the capture of the city of 
Washington, the destruction of the public buildings, and 
the flight of the officers of the government, must be placed 
as a set-off. Besides, it must be borne in mind, that the 
war was on our part an offensive war ; and was waged 
professedly for the vindication of national rights. The 
victory of New-Orleans, which has been considered as the 
most brilliant event achieved by our land forces during the 
war, was the fruit of a defensive battle merely, fought upon 
our own ground, and for the protection of one of our own 
cities. The event, therefore, however reputable to those 
by whom the battle was fought, reflects no credit on the 
administration and their friends, who declared the war. 



HARTFORD CONVENTION, 415 

To have gained honour to themselves, required something 
more than mere defensive operations. That we were able 
in that one instance to defend ourselves, furnishes very 
slight evidence of the wisdom of our legislative councils, 
by whom the war was declared. As far as it went, it 
proved the efficiency of the powers of the government in 
self-defence. But there were many events in the course 
of the war which demonstrated the opposite fact — which 
showed its inefficiency for defence. And this inefficiency 
was acknowledged in the calls made by the administra- 
tion for the militia, in which it was stated expressly, that 
the regular troops were ordered from the Atlantic coast, 
and of course, that the coast would be left without defence, 
unless the militia were detailed upon the service. 

The truth is, the peace, so far from being highly honour- 
able to the country, was in an equal degree disgraceful. 
The mere circumstance that "the causes for the war had 
ceased to operate," proves nothing. Those causes would 
have ceased to operate in the same manner, whenever a 
peace should take place in Europe, as certainly without a 
war on our part against Great Britain, as with it. Such a 
peace, it was well known, must first or last occur, because 
a perpetual war was not in the nature of things to be ex- 
pected. War between this country and Great Britain, at 
the time, was calculated to put off the peace in Europe, ra- 
ther than to accelerate it. Peace eventually occurred, by 
the final overthrow of the great Disturber of that quar- 
ter of the globe — the man in whose favour the war was 
intended to operate — a short time after the treaty of 
Ghent between the United States and Great Britain, and 
was brought to pass by the great and decisive battle of 
Waterloo, on the 18th day of June, 1815 — the anniversary 
of the Declaration of War hy /he United States against 
Great Britain. This country is in a worse condition as it 
regards security in any future war, against impressment 
by the British, than it would have been if the treaty nego- 



416 HISTORY OF THE ' 

tiated by Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney had been ratified; 
and much worse than it would have been if the war had 
not been declared. That treaty was accompanied by an 
informal understanding entered into by the commissioners, 
that at some future time impressment should become the 
subject of further negotiation. Now we have no security 
even for that privilege ; but if an occasion should ever 
hereafter occur, which should render it convenient for the 
British to engage anew in the practice, they couJd do it 
without infringing the stipulations of a treaty, or even vio- 
lating an informal understanding. The United States 
would then have as strong an inducement to engage in a 
second war, for the purpose of forcing Great Britain to 
give up the practice, as they had in that of ]812 — that is, 
if impressment was the real cause of the war. In that 
event, they may have another opportunity to go through 
a warfare of two years and a half more ; and then make 
a peace " highly honourable to the country," without gain- 
ing the object for which the war was made, and ascribe 
the result to "the wisdom of the legislature," and "the 
cessation of the causes of the war." 

But this result proves, in the most conclusive manner, 
the correctness of the views of those who were opposed to 
the war. They contended that the country was utterly 
unprepared for war, and therefore ought not to rush into 
it, foreseeing that its effects would be disastrous, and 
its termination disreputable to the government, and the 
country. They did not believe that the real causes of the 
war were alleged in the manifesto which preceded it ; and 
the event showed that their belief was well founded. In 
short, judging of the character of the war, the capacity of 
those who were the appointed agents to conduct it, and 
the fact of its being brought to a close without securing 
one of its avowed objects, and all intelligent and upright 
people must justify the opposers of the war in withhold- 
ing their sanction from its justice, and their approbation 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 417 

from the sentiment that peace was " highly honourable 

TO THE COUNTRY." 

The readers of this work have now had a full opportu- 
nity to become acquainted with the causes which gave rise 
to the Hartford Convention, the duties which that Conven- 
tion were called upon to perform, the principles by which 
they were governed in their proceedings, and the manner 
in which they performed those duties. It will also have 
been jipir.pivfid, that it has not been the object of the au- 
thor to frame an apology either for the Convention, or for 
the legislative authorities by whom the Convention was 
appointed. His object has been by the simple force of 
truth, to stop the mouth of calumny, to turn the current 
of falsehood back upon its authors, to free historical evi- 
dence from the mists in which it has for so many years 
been involved and obscured, and if possible, to kindle a 
blush of shame on the cheek of political fraud and profli-' 
gacy. Instead of apologizing for the New-England States 
for their conduct during the late unprincipled war, he en- 
tertains not a doubt that the example which was set by 
those states, when they were drawn into competition with 
the national government, the unshaken resolution which 
they manifested in support of their own rights, and par- 
ticularly in defence of the rights of the militia, will be the 
means of protecting that large and most important class 
of citizens from all future attempts to deprive them of 
their constitutional rights, and to force them, at the will 
of a despotic administration, into the ranks of a standing- 
army. Had not the New-England States made a firm stand 
in defence of their constitutional privileges and preroga- 
tives, the next war in which the nation shall be engaged, 
would have reduced the individual states under the power 
and placed them at the inercy of the national government. 
All that would have been necessary to the accomplishment 
of the object, would be a declaration, whether true or false, 
that the country was in danger of invasion, and a demand 

53 



418 . HISTORY OF THE 

for any number of the militia which the Executive might 
think proper to order, to be placed under the command of 
United States officers, and made liable to be marched to 
any rendezvous which the President, or any subordinate 
officer under him should direct. This would at a stroke 
deprive the states of their militia — their only safeguard 
against tyranny and oppression ; aud the national govern- 
ment would at once be in possession of a power sufficient 
to overthrow their liberties and independence. 

Mr. Giles's bill, introduced into the Senate, in October, 
1814, was founded upon Mr. Monroe's plan for a conscrip- 
tion. It provided for raising eighty thousand men for the 
United States service. The manner in which they were to 
be obtained has been stated. The object was to make 
them regular soldiers, to be placed under the command of 
United States officers, and of course to remove them be= 
yond the limits and controul of state authority, put them 
in garrisons, march them to the frontiers, or to any other 
point to which they might be ordered by the Secretary of 
War. This would of course subject them to the military 
despotism which is centered in, and exercised under the 
"Rules and Articles of War." This vast body of men, 
far more numerous than the United States ever had in the 
iield on any former occasion, either in the revolutionary 
war, or since, would have been under the absolute direc- 
tion and controul of the President of the United States, 
and liable to be employed in any service upon which he 
might think proper to detach them. What security would 
the country have had against such a formidable force, in 
the hands of a daring, ambitious, unprincipled warrior, 
who was disposed to plant the standard of his own autho- 
rity on the ruins of his country's freedom f The question 
need not be answered. The condition of the New-Eng- 
land states may be alluded to, in the room of a more spe- 
cific reply to this inquiry. Pressed along the whole length 
of the coast by the fleets and forces of a flushed and via- 



I 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 419 

dictive foe, robbed of their militia, and exhausted of their 
means for carrying on military operations against either 
a foreign* or domestic enemy, they would have been at the 
mercy of whatever " 31ilitary Chieftain " might have hap- 
pened to be commander-in-chief. What would, under 
such circumstances, have been their fate, might, under 
different circumstances, have been the fate of other states. 
Nor would it be a difficult task for an ambitious soldier, at 
the head of such a force, to subvert every vestige of re- 
publicanism in our national government, and place him- 
self at the head of a military despotism. 

Speculations of this kind, in a time of peace, and when 
neither war, nor even rumours of war, exist, may be con- 
sidered extravagant. But as the last war was undertaken 
for political and personal interests, another may be waged 
for reasons equally unwarrantable and reprehensible. The 
measures of the administration during the war of 1812, 
will justify the remarks that have been made, and the spe- 
culations that have been suggested. It is true that Mr. 
Madison was not much of a hero, and in all probability 
would have hesitated, even under the circumstances sup- 
posed, before he would have placed himself at the head of 
the army, the raising of which Mr. Giles's bill contempla- 
ted, and made a daring effort to conquer and enslave his 
country. But he had nerve enough to commence his mili- 
tary career, by a series of bold attempts to violate the con- 
stitution of his country. And as the war advanced, and 
difficulties and dangers multiplied around him, his courage 
rose to a higher pitch, until he was, in a desperate mo- 
ment, induced to aim a fatal blow at some of the most 
important provisions and principles of the great charter of 
its freedom. 

It is, however, believed, that it was not originally his 
wish to plunge the nation into a war. He received the 
government from the hands of his immediate prede- 
cessor, embarrassed with all the difficulties which the lat- 



420 HISTORY OF THE 

ter had planted around it ; and in conducting its foreign 
affairs, it was next to impossible for him to change its 
course, without sacrificing his popularity with the leaders 
of the party which had placed him at its head. The first 
four years of his presidential life would expire in 1813 ; 
and unfortunately some bold and ambitious politicians 
had set their minds on war — with what expectation of 
advantage it is difficult to imagine. Apprehensive that 
his nerves might shrink from such a fearful responsibility, 
it was asserted at the time, and is not known ever to 
have been contradicted, or questioned, that he was in- 
formed by the individuals alhided to, that unless he recom- 
mended a war with Great Britain, the Western States 
would not support his re-election. The declaration of 
war was accordingly recommended, and proclaimed. The 
consequence was, the whole Union was agitated and dis- 
tressed for two years and a half, by the calamities and the 
fears necessarily attendant on a state of war. The nation 
incurred a debt of more than a hundred millions of dol- 
lars, the payment of which, at the end of eighteen years, 
has scarcely been completed, and the country lost, accord- 
ing to the best estimate that could be made, more than 
thirty thousand lives. Considering the war, then, as in- 
tended to secure an election, and not to vindicate the 
rights, nor to promote the general welfare of the country, 
it would not be safe reasoning to conclude, that merely 
because Mr. Madison was not bred in a camp, and did 
not like to " look on scenes of blood and carnage," that 
he had not nerve enough to prostrate the constitution and 
liberties of his country. The facts which have been ad- 
duced in this history have shown, that when the aspect of 
things became darkened, and the war began to assume a 
more threatening and formidable appearance to the coun- 
try at large, and of course to his personal popularity, he 
did not hesitate to recommend a series of measures, which, 
had they been carried into effect, would have been as 



HARTFORD CONVENTION. 421 

complete and fatal a triumph over the constitution, as could 
have been effected by a dispersion, with force and arms, 
of the legislative houses, and shutting up the halls of Con- 
gress. Had Mr. Giles's bill passed into a law, the power 
of accomplishing these results would have been placed in 
the hands of the executive. It would be but a poor an- 
swer to say that he would not have abused the power. 
The argument will carry but little force, when it is recol- 
lected, that the power which was in his hands was abused ; 
and in one instance, the very existence of the constitution 
was placed in extreme jeopardy. But the precedent 
would have remained ; and the first "Military Chieftain" 
who had been bred in a camp, and was not afraid to 
" look on blood and carnage," and who had succeeded in 
taking the reins of government into his own hands, would 
have it in his power, under its sanction, after having 
plunged the nation into a war, to conquer and enslave his 
country. 

For the escape from these evils, the United States are 
indebted to the firm and patriotic stand taken by the New 
England States, in defence of their constitutional rights 
and privileges. There is very little probability, at least 
for half a century to come, that another such attempt will 
be made against their liberties and independence. That 
probability is much strengthened by the consideration, 
that the attempt which was made during the late war was 
so signally defeated. Deeply concerned as all the indivi- 
dual states in fact were in the result of the controversy 
between the New England States and the United States, 
in 1812, and during the war, no particular class of inhabi- 
tants were so directly and deeply interested, as the whole 
body of militia throughout the Union. Nothing saved 
them from being forced, during the late war, into the ranks 
of the regular army, but the independent conduct of the 
chief magistrates of the three New England States, viz. 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. The firm- 



422 HISTORY OF THE &c. 

ness of those public officers, approved and supported as 
they were by the legislatures of their several jurisdictions, 
checked the progress of the national government towards 
the establishment of Conscription and Impressment, by 
legislative acts wearing the forms of law. And it should 
be borne in mind, that when these efforts were made to 
violate tlie constitutional rights of the states, and of the 
militia, the war had ceased to be a contest for the vindi- 
cation of any national right whatever. 



APPENDIX 



It may not be uninteresting, to give the community at 
large some general information respecting the characters 
of the individuals who composed the Hartford Convention, 
For that purpose, the following very brief sketches have 
been prepared. 

George Cabot was a native of Massachusetts, and a 
descendant of one of the discoverers of a portion of this 
continent. He was a man of strong powers of mind, ex- 
tensive knowledge, dignified manners, the strictest inte- 
grity, and the purest morals. He was a warm friend to 
the independence of his country during the revolutionary 
contest ; and soon after the adoption of the constitution of 
the United States, he was appointed a senator in Con- 
gress from the state of Massachusetts. He was an able, 
upright, judicious, and disinterested statesman, and 
had a thorough knowledge of the principles of the go- 
vernment, and the great interests of the country. His 
mind was elevated far above the arts of intrigue ; he dis- 
dained political cunning and chicanery; his principles were 
sound and pure, and his conduct disinterested and inde- 
pendent. 

For many years previously to 1814, he had declined pub- 
lic office, and had taken no active part in politics, until the 



424 APPENDIX. 

dangers of the country, and particularly those by which 
New-Eno-land was surrounded, induced him to consent to 
attend the Convention at Hartford. He was unanimously 
chosen to preside in that assembly ; and throuii^hout its 
session, he performed the duties of his office in the most 
acceptable and dignified manner. His life was prolonged 
several years after the close of the war ; and he maintain- 
ed the same high reputation that he had previously acquir- 
ed to the end of his days, enjoying the universal esteem 
and respect of his friends, and of the community where 
he had passed a long and virtuous life. Few men under- 
stood more thoroughly the jjrinciples of the government, 
or the important interests of the country ; and no man was 
ever more divested of selfishness, in his exertions to 
promote its welfare. 

Nathan Dane was bred to the bar, and practised law 
for many years with a high reputation for learning, integ- 
rity, and talents. He was a firm friend to his country 
during the revolutionary war, and was a member of Con- 
gress from Massachusetts, under the confederation, where 
he performed eminent services, — particularly in procuring 
the insertion of a provision in the ordinance establishing 
territorial governments over the territories northwest of 
the Ohio river, which forever excluded slavery from those 
regions. He was also for many years a member of the 
state legislature; and at all times, through a long and use- 
ful life, enjoyed extensively the confidence of his fellow- 
citizens in the town, county, and state where he resides. 
He is still living ; and though at a very advanced age, is 
still engaged in rendering important services to the com- 
munity, by the publication of valuable works on subjects 
of an interesting nature, and by distributing with a liberal 
hand the fruits of his own industry and talents, in support 
of the public institutions of the state. 



APPENDIX. , 425 

William Prescott was a son of Colonel Prescott, so 
distinguished in the annals of his country for heroic bra- 
very and conduct, — especially at the battle of Bunker's 
Hill, on the 17th of June, 1775, — for devoted patriotism, 
and an ardent zeal for the independence of his native land. 
Mr. Prescott was educated for the bar, and settled early in 
life in the town of Salem, in the county of Essex. Here he 
rose to great distinction as a learned counsellor, and an 
able advocate. He then removed to Boston, where he 
attained to great eminence as one of the most distinguished 
members of the profession. He has been a member of 
the House of Representatives, and of the senate of the 
state legislature, and was sure of an election whenever 
he would consent to be a candidate. No man ever had a 
higher reputation for strict integrity, personal worth, or 
public virtue; and very few men of his elevated standing 
for talents, or moral worth, were more entirely free from 
every feeling of ambition, or the desire of official distinc- 
tion or influence. 

Harrison Gray Otis was born at Boston, and is a 
branch of the same family with James Otis, one of the 
most active and eloquent patriots of that city, at the 
beo-innino- of the revolution. He was bred to the bar, and 
was distinguished for his talents and eloquence in his pro- 
fession. He came young into public life ; has been a re- 
presentative to congress, often a member of the legislature 
of the state, a senator to congress, and finally mayor of 
the city. In all these stations, he wag highly respected and 
esteemed as an eloquent speaker, an able statesman, and 
an upright politician. 

Few individuals have been placed more frequently in 
conspicuous stations before the public than this gentleman. 
Possessed of fine talents, of captivating oratory, and persua- 
sive eloquence, he has always been able to command the re- 
spect, and to a great extent the esteem of his political op- 

54 



426 APPENDIX. 

ponents ; while he has possessed in an eminent degree 
the attachment and the confidence of his political friends 
and associates. 

Timothy Bigelovv was a highly respectable lawyer, 
esteemed for his integrity in his professional pursuits ; 
was for many years elected a member of the state legisla- 
ture, and for nearly an equal period was annually chosen 
speaker of the house of representatives ; and having de- 
clined a further election to that office, was appointed a 
member of the executive council of the state. Few men 
have more fully possessed the confidence of their constitu- 
ents than Mr. Bigelow. 

Joshua Thomas held the office of judge of probate in 
the county of Plymouth, in Massachusetts, the duties of 
which he executed for many years with much reputation, 
enjoying the confidence of the community in an uncom- 
mon degree. This office rendered him inelegible to the 
legislature, otherwise there is no doubt he would have been 
elected to a seat in one house or the other, as often as he 
would have consented to become a candidate for popular 
favour. 

Joseph Lyman was by profession a lawyer, and pur- 
sued the practice for many years with a respectable cha- 
racter for integrity and talents. For a very considerable 
period he has held the office of sheriflT of the county to 
which he belongs, which renders him ineligible to a seat 
in the legislature. He was elected a member of the con- 
vention, which was held a number of years since, for the 
purpose of suggesting amendments to the state constitu- 
tion. He has always enjoyed the respect and confidence 
of the community, particularly that part of it where he has 
always resided, and still is esteemed for his public and 
private virtues. * 



APPENDIX. 427 

George Bliss was an eminent lawyer, distinguished 
in the profession for extensive learning, unwearied indus- 
try, uncommon intelligence, the strictest integrity, and the 
most unshaken independence both of principle iHid of con- 
duct. In private life he possessed a most estimable and 
exemplary character. He was repeatedly elected to the 
state legislature, and was often a member of the execu- 
tive council of the state. No man ever passed through 
life with a fairer reputation for integrity, or in a more en- 
tire possession of the confidence of the community in which 
he resided. 

Daniel Waldo is an inhabitant of Worcester, in the 
state of Massachusetts, where he was early in life estab- 
lished as a merchant. In all the business and intercourse 
of life, he has maintained a most respectable and irre- 
jnoachable character. He has been a member of the state 
senate, and could always be elected when he would suffer 
himself to be named as a candidate for that office. Afflu- 
ent in his circumstances, he has usually found sufficient 
employment in superintending his private affairs. Being 
of an unambitious disposition, he has, to a great extent, 
left the political concerns of the country to others, con- 
tenting himself with the quiet pursuits and occupations of 
private life, and in doing good to his fellow men. 

Samuel Sumner Wilde was bred to the bar, where 
he maintained a highly respectable character for learning, 
talents, and integrity. No better evidence of his high 
standing in the profession could be given, than his appoint- 
ment to a seat on the bench of the supreme court of Mas- 
sachusetts — a court which has always ranked among the 
most distinguished in our country, and which within a few 
years previously had been ornamented by a Parsons, a 
Strong, a Sedgwick, a Sewall, and other jurists of an em- 
inent character. This place Mr. Wilde has filled for 



428 APPENDIX. 

many years, with reputation to himself, and with the full 
approI)ation of the community. 

HoDiJAH Baylies was an officer of much merit in the 
revohitionary army, and served with reputation until the 
establishment of his country's independence. For many 
years he has held the office of judge of probate, in the 
county in which he resided, which disqualified him for le- 
gislative employment, otherwise from his well established 
character for sound understanding, solid talents, and un- 
impeachable integrity, he would doubtless have been often 
selected by his fellow citizens for places of trust and im- 
portance. 

Stephen Longfellow, Jun. was bred to the bar, and 
resided in the city of Portland, now in the state of Maine. 
As a lawyer, he has been considered as at the head of his 
profession, for talents and integrity. He has also been 
elected to the house of representatives of the United 
States, where his talents were fully displayed, the respec- 
tability of his character acknowledged, and his disinterest- 
edness and integrity duly appreciated. 

Chauncey Goodrich was educated for the bar, and 
was for many years a practitioner of the highest respec- 
tability, for learning, talents, and integrity. He was re- 
peatedly a member of the legislature of Connecticut, and 
held successively a seat in both of its branches. Early in 
life he was several times elected a member of the house 
of representatives of the United States, and subsequently 
was appointed a senator in congress. From the latter 
station he was chosen Lieutenant-Governor of the state — 
an office which he held till his death. Karely has any 
individual passed through so many scenes in public life 
with a higher reputation, and a more unimpeachable cha- 
racter. Thoroughly acquainted with the public concerns, 



APPENDIX. 429 

both of the state to which he belonged, and of the United 
States, no statesman ever pursued with a more single 
eye the interests of his country. Unshaken in his princi- 
ples, cool and determined in his conduct, nothing could in- 
duce him to deviate a hair's-breadth from the path of rec- 
titude, or swerve in the slightest degree from the most 
strict integrity of purpose. On all occasions, even during 
the highest strife of party spirit, and in the most animat- 
ing and exciting moments of debate, he never lost sight 
of the most rigid decorum of manners ; and his political op 
ponents involuntarily yielded him their esteem and respect. 

John Treadwell, in private life, was a model of per- 
sonal worth, and in public, was universally esteemed for 
his sound understanding, unquestionable integrity, and 
sterling worth. He spent a great part of his life in the 
service of the public — having filled successively the places 
of representative and councillor in the state legislature, 
and the offices of lieutenant-governor and governor of 
the state. He was also for a long period a judge of the 
court of common pleas, in the county in which he resided, 
and for a good many years was the presiding judge of that 
tribunal. In all the offices which he filled, and in all the 
public services which he performed, his life passed with- 
out a stain. He was a whig in the revolution, a patriot 
of the Washington school in politics, a plain republican in 
his principles and manners, conscientiously upright in all 
his intercourse with his fellow men, and he possessed, in 
a very extensive degree, the respect and confidence of the 
great body of the community in whose service he spent 
his days. 

James Hillhouse. Very few men in the United 
States have been more extensively known in public life 
than this gentleman. He was for many years a practising 
lawyer of celebrity, a member of the state legislature, and 



430 APPENDIX. 

for nearly twenty years connected with the national go- 
vernment, either as a representative, or a senator in Con- 
gress. In both those stations his character stood high for 
integrity, firmness, and independence. During the revo- 
lutionary war he fought bravely for his country ; and in 
the pursuit of peace, he was distinguished for activity, in- 
telligence, and public spirit. Few men ever possessed 
greater energy of character — no man ever excelled him 
in industry and perseverance, in whatever pursuit and 
employment he might be engaged. 

Zephaniah Swift was a lawyer, distinguished for 
learning and talents. For many years he was actively 
and extensively engaged in the duties of his profession ; 
during which he was successively a member of the state le- 
gislature, speaker of the house of representatives, and a 
representative in congress. Subsequently he was a judge, 
and for a number of years chief judge of the supreme 
court of the state, where he acquired a high reputation 
for learning, talents, integrity, and independence. 

Nathaniel Smith was one of the most extraordinary 
men of his time. With few advantages of early educa- 
tion, he became a student of law ; and after a regular pe- 
riod of preparation was admitted to the bar. By the 
force of great native powers of mind, and a most com- 
manding forensic eloquence, he soon rose to the head of 
the profession, and was for a number of years considered 
as one of the most distinguished lawyers and advocates in 
the state. He was elected a member of the house of 
representatives of the United States ; and afterwards, 
for a number of years, was a judge of the supreme court of 
the state. In every situation in which he was called to 
act, the extraordinary talents with which he was endued 
were manifest ; whilst his whole life was marked for pu- 
rity of morals, strict integrity, and a devoted attachment 



APPENDIX. 431 

to the interests of the state to which he belonged, and to 
the welfare of the United States. 

Calvin Goddard was born in Massachusetts, but was 
educated for the bar in Connecticut, where he first settled 
in the practice of law, and almost immediately rose to 
eminence in the profession. Possessed of distinguished 
talents, his practice soon became extensive, when at an 
early period he was elected a member of the house of 
representatives of the United States, where he served 
with much reputation for four successive years. At the 
end of that time he declined a third election. Upon leaving 
Congress he resumed the practice of law, which he followed 
with great success for a number of years. He was repeat- 
edly elected to the state legislature, and for a number of 
years was an active and influential member of the coun- 
cil, the higher branch of that body. Whilst a member of 
that house, he was appointed a judge of the supreme 
court of the state, and continued on the bench until the 
formation of the new state constitution, when he returned 
to the bar, and has been engaged till the present time in 
the business of his original profession, with a high charac- 
ter for learning, talents, and integrity. 

Roger Minot Sherman was bred to the bar; and im- 
mediately upon his admission to practice became distin- 
guished for abilities of a superior order. He has been 
repeatedly elected to the state legislature, and for a num- 
ber of years was a member of the council. Few men in 
the profession in any part of the country have a higher 
reputation, or possess forensic talents of a more distin- 
guished description. Such has been his reputation for 
purity of morals, strict professional and personal integrity, 
and for the unimpeachableness of his character, that he 
has always possessed the confidence of the community, 



432 APPENDIX. 

all parties having paid him the tribute of their esteem and 
respect. 

Daniel Lyman was a native of Connecticut. Early in 
the revolutionary war he joined the army, and served till 
the establishment of independence by the peace of 1783. 
He rose to the rank of major, and sustained a high repu- 
tation for military talents and bravery. After the peace 
he settled in the practice of law in Rhode Island, where 
he became distinguished for integrity and talents in the 
profession, and was eventually appointed Chief-Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the state ; a place that he filled for 
a number of years with much reputation, and to the en- 
tire satisfaction of the community whose laws he was 
called to administer. 

Samuel Ward was the son of Governor Ward of Rhode 
Island. He received his education at the university of 
that state ; and in the year 1774 joined the army of the 
United States, having received the commission of captain 
at eio-hteen years. In 1775 he joined General Arnold on 
his expedition against Quebec, and went with him on that 
most severe and dangerous enterprize ; and after enduring 
hardships almost inconceivable, he arrived before Quebec 
in December of that year. In the subsequent attack up- 
on that city he was made a prisoner ; but afterwards was 
exchanged, and returned to his country, and served in the 
army, having been promoted to the rank of colonel, till 
peace was restored, and our independence was acknow- 
ledged. He afterwards became engaged in trade, and 
visited the East Indies and Europe. 

In the year 1786, Colonel Ward was elected, with Col- 
onel Bowen, a delegate to the convention, which met at 
Annapolis, in Maryland, in September of that year, for 
the purpose of taking into consideration the trade and com- 
merce of the United States, and to endeavour to agree on 



APPENDIX. 433 

some uniform system in their commercial intercourse. 
Colonel Ward proceeded as far as Philadelphia, where he 
ascertained that the convention had adjourned. 

In private life Colonel Ward sustained a most estimable 
character ; and as a soldier and patriot, his reputation was 
without a stain. 

Benjamin Hazard was a native of Rhode Island, and 
was educated to the bar. In the profession, he has long 
ranked among the most respectable practitioners in the 
state for integrity aud talents. He has for many years 
been elected by his fellow-citizens of Newport to a seat in 
the state legislature, and is justly considered as one of the 
most distinguished members of that body. His private worth 
is universally acknowledged, and he is justly considered 
as one of the most respectable citizens of his native state. 

Edward Manton was a native of Rhode Island. 
He was of an unambitious disposition, and rarely rninHed 
in the political discussions and agitations. His principles 
were sound, stable, and independent — such as were com- 
mon to the friends of the Union and Constitution of the 
United States. His character as a man and a patriot 
was marked by sterling integrity, strict probity, and great 
moral worth ; and he enjoyed the respect and confidence 
of the community in a degree proportioned to his modest 
and unobtrusive merit. 

Benjamin West was a native of New-Hampshire, and 
was bred to the bar. He practised for many years with 
distinguished reputation, and was considered as at the 
head of the profession in that state. His integrity was 
universally admitted, and his talents as generally acknow- 
ledged. In his intercourse with the community he was 
greatly esteemed; and in the private relations of life his 
character was in a high degree estimable and interesting. 

55 



434 



APPENDIX. 



Mills Olcott was a natjve of New-Hampshire, and 
a son of the Hon. Chief-Justice Olcott of that state. He 
is himself a lawyer of respectable talents and character, 
and much esteemed for his private worth, his unimpeach- 
able integrity, and estimable character. It is understood 
that he has for a good many years withdrawn from jioliti- 
cal life, enjoying in retirement the advantages of social 
intercourse, and the unobtrusive round of domestic tran- 
quility and happiness. 

William Hall, Jun. was an inhabitant of Vermont, 
and his business that of a merchant. In the midst of ex- 
tensive concerns he found leisure to devote his attention 
occasionally to public affairs. He was frequently a member 
of the state legislature ; and might have been much more 
extensively employed in the service of his fellow citizens, 
if he had been disposed to pursue the life of a politician. 
No man ever enjoyed a reputation more entirely free from 
all reproach than this gentleman. He was universally 
esteemed and respected by all good men, who had the op- 
portunity to become acquainted with his character, man- 
ners, and moral excellence. 



It may not be amiss to compare the conduct of the New- 
England States during the war of 1812, with that of ano- 
ther state, at a much later period. It is well known, that 
a portion of the inhabitants of South Carolina were, for a 
considerable time, greatly excited on the subject of what 
has been familiarly called the "tariff policy " of the national 
government. That policy had for its object the encourage- 
ment and protection of domestic manufactures. For this 1 
purpose laws were passed laying heavy duties upon cer- 
tain kinds of foreign manufactures, with the view of cna- 



APPENDIX. 435 

bling American citizens to foster and support their own in- 
dustry. For a number of years very little complaint of 
injustice, or even of hardship, in the operation of the sys- 
tem, was heard from any quarter. At length, however, it 
became the subject of clamour among politicians, who re- 
sided in those parts of the country where manufacturing 
is not pursued, and where, from the peculiar situation and 
circumstances of the community, there is very little rea- 
son to expect that the industry of the labouring class of 
the inhabitants will take that direction. By the unwearied 
efforts of some of their influential citizens, and particularly 
of those whose attention was devoted to their political con- 
cerns, a great degree of warmth was enkindled, loud and 
threatening complaints were uttered, the laws laying du- 
ties on merchandise for the encouragement of American 
industry were openly denounced as unconstitutional, and 
therefore not obligatory upon the people, and threats of 
open and direct opposition to the execution of the laws al- 
luded to were heard from every quarter. At the same 
time, the constitutional authority of the national judiciary 
to determine questions of this descri|)tion was denied, the 
power of the individual states to decide, each for itself, 
was avowed, and the right of seceding from the Union, as 
the necessary consequence of these doctrines, was claimed 
and vindicated. 

Among the distinguished leaders in this crusade against 
the Union and constitution of the United States, was Ro- 
bert Y. Hayne, then a senator from South Carolina in the 
coniiress of the United States, and now governor of that 
state. In the year 1830, and whilst he was a member of 
the senate, the celebrated debate on the nominal subject 
of the public lands occinred in that body. This gentle- 
man took an active and decided part in that debate ; and 
in two successive speeches, put forth the whole strength 
of his talents, and the full powers of his eloquence. In 
the course of one of those speeches he alluded, among a 



436 APPENDIX. 

multitude of other subjects, to that of the Hartford Con- 
vention ; and after depicting the calamities of the country, 
at the time the Convention assembled, in glowing colours, 
he represented the conduct of the eastern states, in rela- 
tion to the war, in as reprehensible a light as the force of 
language would enable him. For the facts to support liis 
statements, he relied principally upon a book entitled 
*' The Olive Branch" published at a time not far distant 
from the meeting of the Convention — a work of almost 
all others intended to subserve party purposes, the least 
entitled to credit. On such an authority, he proceeded in a 
strain of great vehemence to make the following remarks : 

" As soon as the public mind was sufficiently prepared 
for the measure, the celebrated Hartford Convention was 
got up ; not as the act of a few unauthorized individuals, 
but by authority of the legislature of Massachusetts; and 
as has been shown by the able historian of that Conven- 
tion, in accordance with the views and wishes of the party 
of which it w^as the organ. Now, sir, I do not desire to 
call in question the motives of the gentlemen who composed 
that assembly ; I knew many of them to be in private life 
accomplished and honourable men, and I doubt not there 
were some among them who did not perceive the dange- 
rous tendency of their proceedings. I will even go further, 
and say, that if the authors of the Hartford Convention 
believed, that ' gross, deliberate, and palpable violations 
of the constitution' had taken place, utterly destructive of 
their rights and interests, I should be the last man to deny 
their right to resort to any constitutional measures for re- 
dress. But, sir, in any view of the case, the time when, 
aad the circumstances under which that Convention as- 
sembled, as well as the measures recommended, render 
their conduct, in my opinion, wholly indefensible. 

" Let us contemplate, for a moment, the spectacle then 
exhibited to the view of the world. I will not go over the 
disasters of the war, nor describe the difficidties in which 



APPENDIX. 43? 

the government was involved. It will be recollected, that 
its credit was nearly gone, Washington had fallen, the 
whole coast was blockaded, and an immense force collect- 
ed in the West Indies, was about to make a descent, which 
it was supposed we had no means of resisting. In this 
awful state of our j)ublic affairs, v/hen the government 
seemed to be almost tottering on its base, when Great 
Britain, relieved from all her other enemies, had proclaim- 
ed her purpose of 'reducing us to unconditional submis- 
sion' — we beheld the peace party in New-England (in the 
language of the work [The Olive Branch] before us) 
pursuing a course calculated to do more injury to their 
country, and to render England more effective service 
than all her armies. Those who could not find it in their 
hearts to rejoice at our victories, sang ' Te Denm' at the 
King's chapel in Boston at the restoration of the Bour- 
bons. Those who would not consent to illuminate their 
dwellings for the capture of the Guerriere, could give visi- 
ble tokens of their joy at the fiill of Detroit. The ' bea- 
con fires' of their hills were lighted up, not for the encou- 
ragement of iheir friends, but as signals to the enemy; 
and in the gloomy hours of midnight the very lights burn- 
ed blue. Such were the dark and portentous signs of the 
times which ushered into being the renowned Hartford 
Convention. That Convention met, and from their pro- 
ceedings it appears that their chief object was to keep 
back the men and money of New-England from the ser- 
vice of the Union, and to effect radical changes in the ffo- 
vernment — changes that can never be effected without a 
dissolution of the Union." 

In adverting to Mr. ITayne's speech on this occasion, 
the object has not been to examine into the justice of his 
remarks, the correctness of his statements, or the sound- 
ness of his conclusions. The subject has been noticed for 
a very different purpose. It is to give that gentleman, and 
the state of South Carolina, an opportunity to view them- 



438 APPENDIX. 

selves in their own mirror. The ground on which the 
Hartford Convention stood, is to be foinid in the preceding 
pages of this work. If the facts and evidence which have 
been adduced do not justify the IVew-England States in 
convening that assembly, and in the fullest manner war- 
rant their proceedings, and the result of their deliberations 
and labours, they will doubtless be condemned. But if, 
in any of these particulars, they suffer in a comparison with 
the state of South Carolina, in the measures more recently 
adopted by the latter in opposition to the laws of the United 
States, it will certainly excite no small degree of surprise. 

In South Carolina, though for a few years past, there 
have been great complaints of oppression arising from the 
operation of the revenue laws of the United States, yet the 
actual degree of suffering could not be easily and precise- 
ly ascertained. The real ground of complaint appeared to 
be against the acts of Congress laying what are called pro- 
tective duties ujjon foreign merchandise, for the purpose 
of encouraging and protecting domestic manufactures. 
The constitutional authority to lay duties of this descrip- 
tion was denied by the politicians of that state; and ha- 
ving failed after various attempts in Congress to obtain 
a repeal of those acts, the state determined to take the 
matter into their own hands, and force the national go- 
vernment to yield to their demands, or to secede from the 
Union, and establish an independent government. Ac- 
cordingly tlie legislature of the state passed an act, calling 
upon the people to elect delegates to a Convention, to take 
the subject into consideration, and provide a remedy for 
the (jvils which they experienced. Under the authority 
of this act delegates were chosen, and the Convention 
assembled ; and after due deliberation, they adopted the 
following ordinance : — 

" An ordinance to nullify certain acts of the Congress 
of the United States, purporting to be the laws laying duties 
and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities. 



APPENDIX. ' 439 

" Whereas the Congress of the United States, by va- 
rious acts purporting to be acts laying duties and imposts 
on foreign imports, hut in reality intended for the protec- 
tion of domestic manufactures, and the giving of bounties 
to classes and individuals engaged in particular employ- 
ment, at the expense and to the injury and oppression of 
other classes and individuals, and by wholly exempting 
from taxation certain foreign commodities, such as are not 
produced or manufactured in the United States, to afford 
a pretext for imposing higher and excessive duties on ar- 
ticles similar to those intcMided to be protected, hath ex- 
ceeded its just powers under the constitution, which con- 
fers on it no authority to afford such protection, and hath 
violated the true meaning and intent of the constitution, 
which provides for equality in imposing the burdens of tax- 
ation upon the several states and portions of the confede- 
racy. And whereas the said Congress, exceeding its just 
power to impose taxes and collect revenue for the purpose 
of effecting and accomplishing, hath raised and collected 
unnecessary revenues, for objects unauthorised by the con- 
stitution. 

" We, therefore, the people of the State of South Caro- 
lina in convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it 
is hereby declared and ordained, that the several acts and 
parts ofactsofthe Congress of the United States, purporting 
to be laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the im- 
portations of the United States, and more especially an 
act entitled 'An act in alteration of the several acts im- 
posing duties on imports,' approved on the nineteenth day 
of May, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-eight, 
and also an act entitled 'an act to alter and amend the 
several acts imposing duties on imports,' approved on the 
fourteenth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and 
thirty-two, are unauthorised by the constitution of the 
United States, and violate the true meaning thereof, and 
are null and void, and no law, not binding upon this state, 



440 APPENDIX. 

its officers or citizens; and all promises, contracts, and 
obligations, made or entered into, with the purpose to se- 
cure the duties imposed by said acts, and all judicial pro- 
ceedings which shall be hereafter had in affirmance thereof, 
are, and shall be, held utterly null and void. 

"And it is further ordained, that it shall not be lawful 
for any of the constituted authorities, whether of this state 
or of the United States, to enforce the payment of duties 
imposed by the said acts within the limits of this state ; 
but that it shall be the duty of the legislature to adopt 
such acts as may be necessary to give full effect to this 
ordinance, and to prevent the enforcement and arrest the 
operation of the said acts and parts of acts of the Con- 
gress of the United States within the limits of this state, 
from and after the first day of February next, and the duty 
of all other constituted authorities, and of all persons re- 
siding or being within the limits of this state, and they are 
hereby required and enjoined to obey and give effect to this 
ordinance, and such acts and measures of the legislature 
as may be passed or adopted in obedience thereto. 

"And it is further ordained, that in no case of law or 
equity, decided in the courts of this state, wherein shall 
be drawn in question the authority of this ordinance, or 
the validity of such act or acts of the legislature as may be 
passed for the purpose of giving effect thereto, or the va- 
lidity of the aforesaid acts of Congress, imposing duties, 
shall any appeal be taken, or allowed, to the Supreme 
Court of the United States, nor shall any copy of the re- 
cord be permitted or allowed for that purpose; and if any 
such appeal shall be attempted to be taken, the courts of 
this state shall proceed to execute and enforce their judg- 
ments, according to the laws and usages of the state, 
without reference to such attempted appeal ; and the per- 
sons attempting to take such appeal may be dealt with for 
a contempt of the court. 

*' And be it further enacted, that all persons now hold- 



APPENDIX. 441 

ing any office of honor, profit, or trust, civil or military, 
under this state, shall within such time as the legislature 
may prescribe, take, in such manner as the legislature 
may direct, an oath well and truly to obey, execute, and 
enforce this ordinance, and such act or acts of the legisla- 
ture as may be passed in pursuance thereof, according to 
the true intent and meaning of the same; and on the ne- 
glect or omission of any such person or persons so to do, 
his or their office or offices shall be forthwith vacated, and 
shall be filled up, as if such person or persons were dead, 
or had resigned ; and no person hereafter elected to any 
office of honour, profit, or trust, civil or military, shall, un- 
til the legislature shall otherwise provide and direct, enter 
on the execution of his office, or be in any respect compe- 
tent to discharge the duties thereof, until he shall in like 
manner have taken a similar oath; and no juror shall be 
impannelled in any of the courts of this state, in any cause 
in which shall be in question this ordinance, or any act of 
the legislature passed in pursuance thereof, unless he shall 
first, in addition to the usual oath, have taken an oath 
that he will well and truly obey, execute, and enforce this 
ordinance, and such act or acts of the legislature as may 
be passed to carry the same into operation and effect, ac- 
cording to the true intent and meaning thereof. 

" And we, the people of South Carolina, to the end that 
it may be fully understood by the government of the Uni- 
ted States, and the people of the co-states, that we are 
determined to maintain this, our ordinance and declara- 
tion, at every hazard, do further declare that we will not 
submit to the application of force, on the part of the fede- 
ral government, to reduce this state to obedience; but that 
we will consider the passage by Congress of any act au- 
thorising the employment of any military or naval force 
against the state of South Carolina, her constituted au- 
thorities or citizens, or any act abolishing or closing the 
ports of this state, or any of them, or otherwise obstruct- 

56 



442 APPENDIX. 

ing the free ingress and egress of vessels to and from the 
said [)orts ; or any other act on the part of the federal 
government to coerce the state, shut up her ports, destroy 
her commerce, or to enforce the acts hereby declared to 
be null and void, otherwise than through the civil tribu- 
nals of the country, as inconsistent with the longer con- 
tinuance of South Carolina in the Union : and that the 
people of this state will thenceforth hold themselves ab- 
solved from all further obligation to maintain or preserve 
their political connection with the people of other states, 
and will forthwith proceed to organize a separate govern- 
ment, and do all other acts and things which sovereign 
and independent states may of right do." 

Mr. Hayne found himself under the necessity of mak- 
ing a concession in his speech, in favour of the New Eng- 
land States, in consequence of the general principles which 
he maintained, and the course that the state to which he 
belonged were about to pursue. " If," said he, " the au- 
thors of the Hartford Convention believed that 'gross, de- 
liberate, and palpable violations of the constitution' had 
taken place, utterly destructive of their rights and inte- 
rests, I should be the last man to deny their right to resort 
to any constitutional measures for redress." The authors 
of the Hartford Convention not only believed, but they 
had positive and undeniable proof, that such violations of 
the constitution had in fact taken place. The evidence 
of this is contained in the body of this work. The Presi- 
dent of the United States violated the constitutional rights 
and privileges of the New England States, in demanding 
detachments of their militia, to be placed under the com- 
mand of United States officers — in attempting to raise 
troops from the militia by a conscription, and seamen by 
impressment — and to enlist minors without the consent of 
their parents, guardians, and masters. These are plain, 
specific cases — they were "gross, deliberate, and palpa- 
ble" — and they were calculated utterly to destroy the 



APPENDIX. 443 

rights against which they were directed. The argument 
then is finished, as far as that statement is concerned. 

But this is not the principal object to be accomplished 
ill adverting to the case of South CaroHna. The design 
is to compare the conduct of that state, in the year 1832, 
with that of the New England States, in the year 1814. 

The New England States "believed" that the national 
government had not only violated the constitution, in the 
several particulars above-mentioned, but they had, by 
their mode of carrying on the war, thrown upon those 
states the necessity of defending their coast, their towns, 
and their families, against the hostile visits and invasions 
of the enemy, and at the same time refused to furnish 
them with either men or money for their own protection. 
From the commencement of hostilities, those states had 
been informed that they must defend themselves — and this 
had been rejjeated from time to time, until, in the language 
of Mr. Hayne, " the credit of the government was nearly 
gone, Washington had fallen, the whole coast was block- 
aded, and an immense force, collected in the West Indies, 
was about to make a descent, which it was supposed we 
had no means of resisting." This was a state of thin<;s as 
fully understood and realized in New England, in the au- 
tumn of 1814, as it was by Mr. Hayne when this sj)cech 
was delivered in the Senate, in 1830. They had seven 
hundred miles of sea-coast to defend, with no other means 
than those which they were able themselves to furnish; 
and even of those, the national government, by the most 
unconstitutional and despotic measures, were endeavour- 
ing to deprive them. Under sucji circumstances, the Hart- 
ford Convention was appointed, and instructed to devise 
and recommend the best means in their power of preserv- 
ing their resources, to enable the states to fulfil the task 
which the national government had imposed upon them, 
but, to let every thing be done in a manner consistent with 
their duties and obligations to the United States. And the 



444 APPENDIX. 

most important measure recommended by the Convention 
was, that the New England States, thus deserted and 
abandoned by the government of the United^ States, should 
make application to Congress, for permission to use their 
own men, and their own money, in defence of their own 
territory — their towns, their property, and their fire-sides, 
against the invasions of the enemy. " Their chief object," 
says Mr. Hayne, " was to keep back the men and the 
money of New England from the service of the Union. 
The history of the case proves incontestibly, that this was 
an unfounded assertion. " Their chief object was," to em- 
ploy their men and their money in the service of the Unit- 
ed States — for it was the duty of the United States to 
provide both men and money, for the defence of the states 
against the enemy which they had brought upon them. 

"But," says Mr. Hayne, " the tinije when, and the cir- 
cumstances under which, that Convention assembled, as 
well as the measures they recommended, render their con- 
duct wholly indefeasible." This is seriously narrowing the 
ground of complaint against the Convention, yielding the 
right, at least by necessary implication, and objecting on- 
ly to the expediency of the time when they were convened. 
But so far from this being a well founded objection against 
calling the Convention, it was the time, and the circum- 
stances, which not only justified the measure, but which 
rendered it indispensably necessary. The danger which 
hung over the states was immediate; and the circum- 
stances were of so threatening and alarming a character, 
that preparation to ward ofl' tliat danger could not safely 
be postponed for a single day. And such was the import 
of the language used by the administration, in all the calls 
they made upon the New England States, to provide the 
means for their own defence. 

But what says the " Ordinance" of the South Carolina 
Convention ? That document declares the laws of Con- 
gress therein referred to, and v/hich arc commonly called 



I 



APPENDIX. 445 

the tariff laws, null and vdid, and not binding upon the peo- 
ple of that state — it declares all promises, contracts, and 
obligations, for the securing of the duties imposed by those 
laws, and all judicial proceedings in affirmance of such 
promises, contracts, and obligations, also null and void — 
that it shall not be lawful for the constituted authorities of 
South Carolina, or of the United States, to enforce the 
payment of such duties within that state, but it shall be 
the duty of the legislature to adopt measures for prevent- 
ing the collection of the duties, and to arrest the operation 
of the acts of Congress within that state, and all the au- 
thorities and all the people are enjoined to obey and give 
effect to the Ordinance. It then proceeds to declare, that 
the validity of the Ordinance shall not be drawn in ques- 
tion in any court in the state, that no appeal shall be al- 
lowed from the stale court to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, that no copy of the record of the state 
court shall be allowed to be taken for the purposes of an 
appeal ; and if any attempt to appeal should be made, the 
state court should proceed to execute their own judgments 
without regard to such appeal, and the person attempting 
to take it should be punishable for a contempt of court. 
The Ordinance advances still further, and declares, that 
all officers, civil and military, shall take an oath to obey 
the Ordinance, and for omitting to do so, their offices shall 
be vacated, and filled anew, as in the case of death or re- 
signation ; and no juror shall be impannelled, in any cause 
in which the Ordinance shall be drawn into question, with- 
out having first taken an oath to obey and enforce the 
Ordinance. And, finally, it is declared, that the state will 
not submit to the application of force, on the part of the 
United States, to reduce them to obedience ; but if Con- 
gress should undertake to employ military or naval force 
against them, to shut up their ports, destroy their com- 
merce, or resort to any other means of enforcing the laws 
which the Ordinance orders to be null and void, other than 



446 APPENDIX. 

through the civil tribunals of the country, such a course 
will render the longer continuance of South Carolina in 
the Union inconsistent, and that they will thenceforth hold 
themselves absolved from all further connection with the 
other states, and will proceed to organize a separate inde- 
pendent government. 

This is the case of South Carolina, placed in contrast 
with that of the New England States. The document 
which contains these provisions, was prepared under the 
eye, if not by the hand of the same Mr. Hayne, who pro- 
nounced the conduct of the authors of the Hartford Con- 
vention " utterly indefensible." This declaration referred 
to the time when, and the circumstances under which, the 
Hartford Convention assembled. That time, and those 
circumstances, have been repeatedly alluded to and de- 
scribed in the course of this work. They were alarming 
and portentous, fraught with danger and distress to the 
country, and foreboding ruin to the Union and Constitution. 
Far different were the times and the circumstances when 
the South Carolina Convention passed their ordinance. 
Their time was a time of peace and prosperity. The coun- 
try was pressed by no enemy from without, and by no tu- 
mult or insurrection within. Agriculture, commerce, and 
manufactures, were flourishing beyond all former exam- 
ple, and the country was advancing in numbers, wealth, 
and power, in a degree surprising to ourselves, and asto- 
nishing to all other nations. If there is any peculiar merit 
on the part of South Carolina, in choosing this halcyon 
period, for making such arrogant claims, and for throwing 
the Union into a state of discord, fermentation, and ani- 
mosity, when all things else were at peace, it would not 
be anii^s if those grounds were more explicitly stated. At 
present, they will be disallowed by every virtuous, intelli- 
gent, and patriotic mind. The Hartford Convention re- 
commended no measure which had the slightest tendency 
to prostrate the national constitution, or to destroy the 

^ RD-94 



: 



APPENDIX. 447 

Union. Every sentiment expressed in the South Carolina 
ordinance was hostile to the constitution, and every mea- 
sure proposed or adopted, was calculated to dissolve the 
Union. The propositions of the Hartford Convention, 
were to obtain the consent and ai)probation of the gene- 
ral government to their principal measures; the South 
Carolina ordinance denied the authority of that govern- 
ment to controul them in the case about which they com- 
plained, and defied their power to execute their laws. 
The Hartford Convention recommended an application to 
Congress for permission to raise troops for the defence of 
their coasts ; the South Carolina ordinance provided for 
the raising of a body of men to oppose by force of arms the 
execution of the laws of Congress, and to raise the stan- 
dard of rebellion against the government of the nation. 

If Mr. Hayne thought the conduct of the authors of the 
Hartford Convention " utterly indefensible," what must 
he think of the authors of the South Carolina Ordinance? 
About the facts in the two cases there is no room for dis- 
pute. The conclusions which those facts will fairly war- 
rant, will be drawn by the community. 



ERRATA. 

The reader is requested to correct the following errors in the foregoing paget. 

Page 28, line 14 from the top, read king instead of kings. 

32, line 8 from the bottom, read strain instead of train. 

46, line 9 from the top, read 1804 instead of 1801. 

126, line 19 from the top, after the word France, the words teas conducted are omittad. 
166, line 7 from the top, instead of " is," after " underscored," read contain. 

218, line 4 from the top, omit the words " and," to the end of the line. 

219, line 14 from the top, insert at the beginning of the sentence, /t required »oimi 

assuance. 
221, line 4 from the top, read have been stated. 
! 225, line 2 from the top, read definitive instead of definite. 
302, line 8 from the bottom, read hostilities having been comraoDcedi. 
361, line 17 from the bottom, read with th* respect. 



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